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As long as communities of people have existed, there have been different ideas about 
how best to deal with their environment and their natural resources.  Just to take an 
example which is far removed from our society in both space and time, Tikopia is a 
small Pacic island the story of which has been made famous by the anthropologist 
Raymond Firth - author of We The Tikopia (Firth, 1936), one of the most inuential 
study on Oceanian societies  -  and,  lately,  by Jared Diamond.  In  his  book Collapse 
(Diamond,  2005),  about  past  and  present  societies’ struggles  with  their  social  and 
natural environments, Diamond decided to classify Tikopia as the success story of a 
little population which, through various ingenious and  - according to contemporary 
liberal  standards  -  not  always  humane  methods,  such  as  risky  sea  voyaging,  has 
managed to sustainably inhabit the island for millennia. Around 1600, the Tikopians 
decided to kill  all  the pigs on the island and rely instead on shes and other small 
animals for their protein consumption. Pigs were part and parcel of the Tikopian identity 
and were considered a luxury food introduced some 400 years earlier by Polynesian 
people  coming  from  Fiji,  Samoa,  and  Tonga.  However,  their  farming  and  unruly 
behavior were taking a heavy toll on the vegetable gardens of the Tikopians. It is easy to 
imagine that  the  decision to  kill  all  the  pigs  had been tough and that  the  Tikopian 
population,  one  of  the  most  democratic  among  the  Pacic  societies  according  to 
Diamond, discussed at length the merits and demerits of the controversial “policy.” I am 
obviously speculating, but we can imagine that some Tikopians must have argued that 
pig farming was too important for their society to altogether do away with, and was well 
worth some sacrices. Other must have argued that pigs seriously harm the resources 
upon which they and their children depended, implying that their survival as individuals 
was more important than identity. And, yet other Tikopians might have suggested that a 
limited number of pigs be collectively maintained and their consumption be awarded 
through a lottery system in a traditional yearly festival; in this way, their identity as a 
pig farming population could have been preserved but the damaging consequences for 
the environment would have been minimized as much as possible. Perhaps the concept 
of a lottery as a mechanism to distribute justice is as anachronistic as a wristwatch in 
period dramas, but the point is that such a momentous decision could not have possibly 
been taken lightheartedly and without there being multiple competing ideas on how to 
ensure the survival of the population in such a fragile environment.  
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Today societies face similar challenges, but the contexts in which difcult choices 
need  to  be  taken  are  far  more  complex.  Researchers  coming  from  disciplines  as 
disparate  as  economics,  philosophy,  political  science,  geography,  urban  planning, 
zoology, anthropology, and many others usually speak of coupled human and natural 
systems to refer to the degree of complexity human beings now face in their relationship 
with the environment (Liu et al., 2007). This means that environmental problems are 
usually found at the crossroads between the complexity of ecosystems, the components 
and workings of which have evolved into an integrated whole over millions of years and 
which researchers know only very imperfectly,  and the complexity of  human social 
systems. The latter sort of complexity is perhaps less arcane as, on a very small scale, is 
what everyone who has gone to at least one condominium meeting has experienced at 
rst hand: given a problem, there are often as many different ideas, different priorities, 
different  approaches,  different  institutional  avenues  to  try  to  solve  it  as  there  are 
participants. This double order of complexity makes environmental problems extremely 
difcult to solve, to the point that they often crystallize into so-called wicked problems 
(Rittel  and  Webber,  1973;  Campbell,  2003).  Global  climate  change  is  one  of  the 
preferred examples in the literature on wicked problems (Grundmann, 2016).  In the 
philosophical  literature,  scholars  sometimes  follow  Stephen  Gardiner  and  use  the 
expression “perfect  moral  storm” to refer  to  a  somewhat  similar  concept  (Gardiner, 
2006). 
Environmental  problems  of  this  magnitude  of  complexity  lend  themselves 
naturally (meaning that it is a default approach in the philosophical community, even 
though, strictly speaking, there is nothing natural about it) to be analyzed through the 
lens of global or international justice.  The environment does not stop at the border; 
hence almost every intervention upon it has cross-border consequences, and when it 
raises issues of justice, it ipso facto also raises issues of international or global justice. 
As a  matter  of  fact,  there  are  people  who proposed to  stop the environment  at  the 
borders  by  instituting  political  entities  called  bioregions  (Sale,  1985),  but  such 
proposals are clearly unattainable for reasons which need not be rehearsed here (I will 
say a bit about this in Chapter 5). Furthermore, there is also an implicit bias in how 
philosophy looks at environmental issues. Much of the early research in environmental 
ethics focused on the human place within the natural world (White Jr., 1967), on human 
impacts on the environment (Carson, 1962; Ehrlich 1968; Meadows et al., 1972), and 
on the unit of moral consideration - humans, entities capable of suffering, living things, 
ecosystems, or the whole planet - our ethical theories should be based upon (e.g. Naess, 
1973;  Rolston  III,  1988;  Singer,  1975).  Then,  in  the  1980s,  philosophers  started  to 
inquire into the distributive issues of managing the environment, but they approached 
the topic mainly by piggybacking on the international debates on how to operationalize 
the notion of sustainable development, which, in the formulation provided by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development, famously reads as follows:
2
THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL NARRATIVES
Today societies face similar challenges, but the contexts in which difcult choices 
need  to  be  taken  are  far  more  complex.  Researchers  coming  from  disciplines  as 
disparate  as  economics,  philosophy,  political  science,  geography,  urban  planning, 
zoology, anthropology, and many others usually speak of coupled human and natural 
systems to refer to the degree of complexity human beings now face in their relationship 
with the environment (Liu et al., 2007). This means that environmental problems are 
usually found at the crossroads between the complexity of ecosystems, the components 
and workings of which have evolved into an integrated whole over millions of years and 
which researchers know only very imperfectly,  and the complexity of  human social 
systems. The latter sort of complexity is perhaps less arcane as, on a very small scale, is 
what everyone who has gone to at least one condominium meeting has experienced at 
rst hand: given a problem, there are often as many different ideas, different priorities, 
different  approaches,  different  institutional  avenues  to  try  to  solve  it  as  there  are 
participants. This double order of complexity makes environmental problems extremely 
difcult to solve, to the point that they often crystallize into so-called wicked problems 
(Rittel  and  Webber,  1973;  Campbell,  2003).  Global  climate  change  is  one  of  the 
preferred examples in the literature on wicked problems (Grundmann, 2016).  In the 
philosophical  literature,  scholars  sometimes  follow  Stephen  Gardiner  and  use  the 
expression “perfect  moral  storm” to refer  to  a  somewhat  similar  concept  (Gardiner, 
2006). 
Environmental  problems  of  this  magnitude  of  complexity  lend  themselves 
naturally (meaning that it is a default approach in the philosophical community, even 
though, strictly speaking, there is nothing natural about it) to be analyzed through the 
lens of global or international justice.  The environment does not stop at the border; 
hence almost every intervention upon it has cross-border consequences, and when it 
raises issues of justice, it ipso facto also raises issues of international or global justice. 
As a  matter  of  fact,  there  are  people  who proposed to  stop the environment  at  the 
borders  by  instituting  political  entities  called  bioregions  (Sale,  1985),  but  such 
proposals are clearly unattainable for reasons which need not be rehearsed here (I will 
say a bit about this in Chapter 5). Furthermore, there is also an implicit bias in how 
philosophy looks at environmental issues. Much of the early research in environmental 
ethics focused on the human place within the natural world (White Jr., 1967), on human 
impacts on the environment (Carson, 1962; Ehrlich 1968; Meadows et al., 1972), and 
on the unit of moral consideration - humans, entities capable of suffering, living things, 
ecosystems, or the whole planet - our ethical theories should be based upon (e.g. Naess, 
1973;  Rolston  III,  1988;  Singer,  1975).  Then,  in  the  1980s,  philosophers  started  to 
inquire into the distributive issues of managing the environment, but they approached 
the topic mainly by piggybacking on the international debates on how to operationalize 
the notion of sustainable development, which, in the formulation provided by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development, famously reads as follows:
2
“Sustainable  development  is  development  that  meets  the  needs  of  the  present  without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on 
Environment and Development, 1987).
As a  consequence of  these two fundamental  assumptions -  the environment  crosses 
political  boundaries,  and  employing  a  global  distributive  focus  in  approaching 
environmental problems -, many environmental conicts  are often understood through 1
the prism of global or international justice. However, in a sense, many of them are not, 
or  not  primarily,  about  global  or  international  justice.  Just  to  be  clear,  some 
environmental  problems,  and  the  conict  they  raise,  are  truly  about  global  or 
international justice: global climate change is a case in point. The political conict owes 
its existence to a disagreement among the views of different international actors, and 
deals with rights and duties which distant people and states owe to each other. But other 
environmental  problems,  and  the  related  conicts,  are  not:  what  shall  a  specic 
community do with a bunch of natural resources? We can imagine that some might 
argue in favor of putting the resources to their most economically rational use, others 
might want to preserve them, others might want to exploit them for reasons which have 
nothing  to  do  with  economic  efciency.  This  conict  of  views  does  not  owe  its 
existence  to  diverging  opinions  concerning  what  states  or  human  beings  scattered 
around the globe owe to each other. We could adapt this debate to a more global frame 
by  noting  that  how  natural  resources  get  used  has  cross-border  repercussions,  and 
therefore certain proposals are more warranted than others from a global justice point of 
view. But this move would not be particularly helpful for understanding why there is a 
conict about the use of those natural resources in the rst place, what is at stake, and 
what should be done to try to solve it.
This  presumption  towards  utilizing  a  global  lens  to  look  at  environmental 
problems often carries another bias: that of adopting a macro approach to study and 
analyze environmental conicts. A macro approach prompts a researcher to provide a 
vertical solution to a given problem: either from principles to specic cases  or from 
intuitions about specic cases to principles.  From principles to specic cases  means 
choosing a normative model,  applying it  to  the particular  issue at  hand,  and seeing 
whether a particular policy or set of policies are justied or not, and if not, whether they 
can be made justiable by means of additional measures and, if so, what these measures 
are. The weight of this argumentative endeavor then falls back on the initial normative 
model employed and the reason for its choice. In this case the researcher has to either go 
back and justify the employment of that particular model and the model itself; if this has 
already been done she can simply refer back to that previous work; otherwise she will 
need to do so. Or, she could put between brackets the justication of the normative 
model and present her research as an outcome conditioned on the previous acceptance 
of that very - perhaps contested - model; e.g. within a welfarist normative model, policy 
 “Conict” is a loaded term which can mean different things to different people, but in this context I will 1
employ a rather uncontroversial denition of it: there is a conict when there are competing ideas of what 
is appropriate to do with a bunch of natural resources.
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x would be justied because it does y. In this latter case, the answer to the question 
whether certain policies are justied or not will likely resonate particularly among those 
who have already made a prior commitment to that specic normative model. From 
intuitions  about  specic  cases  to  principles  means  that  the  researcher  has  strong 
intuitions on what is right, then she goes on to nd and adapt a normative model which 
could explain her intuitions. The normative model could then be justied because it ts 
well with the researcher intuitions, and possibly ours - those of the readers - as well. 
Alternatively, it  can be justied independently of those intuitions, while at the same 
time  accommodating  them;  this  process  of  crafting  a  justication  by  balancing 
independently vindicated normative principles with moral intuitions goes by the name 
of  reective  equilibrium.  Both  these  strategies  are  legitimate  ways  to  advance  our 
knowledge and do research. However, given a certain problem, these macro approaches 
tell us why, after all, there should not be any conict at all, but not why there is one.
In  this  book,  I  try  to  understand  what  makes  certain  environmental  conicts 
complex and resistant to resolution. In order to do so, I leave behind both the global lens 
and the macro approach usually adopted in these cases in the environmental philosophy 
scholarship, adopting instead what I call a meso-level approach which departs from a 
selected set of common competing positions usually found in environmental politics - 
both at the global and the local level - and then proceed to reconstruct the normative 
theories  behind such positions.  In particular,  I  will  use three popular  environmental 
narratives  as  a  way  of  parsing  environmental  politics  -  they  are  ecological 
modernization,  civic  environmentalism,  and  radical  environmentalism  -  usually 
associated  respectively  with  a  pro-market  approach,  a  democratic  and  participatory 
approach,  and  an  anti-status  quo  approach  (i.e.  anti-economic  growth  and  anti-
commodication) to environmental problem-solving. Then I will employ two sets of 
categories, or matrices, to understand why these competing normative theories make 
environmental conicts complex and resistant to resolution.
The  rst  matrix  considers  the  normative  presuppositions  informing  the 
environmental narratives according to the coordinates of two basic normative concerns: 
efciency  and  justice.  In  particular,  in  each  chapter  dedicated  to  an  environmental 
narrative, I will analyze which elements of the normative presuppositions of the various 
narratives are associated with a concern for efciency and which other elements with a 
concern for justice, and I will try to understand what the balance between these two 
normative  concerns  tell  us  about  each  specic  approach to  environmental  problem-
solving.  The  second  matrix  considers  the  normative  presuppositions  informing  the 
environmental narratives according to three different categories: clashes, continuities, 
and  blind  spots.  This  second  set  of  categories  will  allow  me  to  give  a  sense  of 
perspective and depth to the debates by considering whether two or more environmental 
positions are truly incompatible, whether there is a common underlying thread which 
unites two or more of these positions, or whether there are similar concerns which are 
then interpreted through different normative theories. 
What makes this approach a meso-level one, as opposed to a macro approach? 
And what are its merits? First, the analysis carried out in the following chapters departs 
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from common and popular positions in environmental debates which are already out 
there  and  ubiquitous  in  the  trenches  of  environmental  politics.  I  do  not  seek  to 
superimpose  a  new  external  normative  perspective  upon  an  environmental  conict 
because it is allegedly better than the other ones on some specic - and often disputable 
- account; nor do I seek to defend an existing normative perspective. Second, each of 
the  normative  presuppositions  underlying  the  environmental  narratives  explored 
throughout this book would qualify, if taken in isolation, as a macro approach, in the 
sense explored above. The added value of the type of research developed here is that 
they  are  not  considered  in  isolation.  They  are,  instead,  analyzed,  critiqued,  and 
compared to each other by means of the classicatory work done by the two matrices. 
In  other  words,  instead  of  choosing  an  overarching  normative  stance  and  then 
illuminating  its  theoretical  and  practical  consequences,  the  approach  taken  here 
considers  a  multiplicity  of  popular  positions  in  environmental  politics  and  tries  to 
explore what the relationships among these positions mean for a certain environmental 
conict as a whole.
The rst thesis I defend in this book is that macro approaches to environmental 
politics are ultimately reductive and fail to make sense of what is at stake in specic 
environmental conicts; I will argue for this, in particular, by showing how each one of 
the  normative  presuppositions  underlying  the  environmental  narratives  has  “blind 
spots.”  As a  consequence,  holding on to  one comprehensive view in  environmental 
politics ipso facto is an obstacle to appreciating the internally coherent and, at times, 
sensible stances of other competing views. The second thesis I defend in this book is 
that a meso-level approach of the likes of the one explored here is much more useful 
than the macro one for understanding the complexity of specic environmental conicts 
and offers  us the opportunity to understand why certain environmental  conicts  are 
resistant to resolution. Lastly, the book is also an exercise in clarifying complexity in 
environmental politics: it does so by analyzing three popular environmental narratives 
which regularly surface during environmental debates and by confronting them with the 
analytical  categories  employed  by  the  meso-level  approach  adopted  here  (those 
included in the two matrices, but also others which will be introduced later in the book: 
e.g.  relevant  information,  individual  agency,  locus  of  decision  making,  governance 
model).
I  will  develop my argument by starting from a specic case of environmental 
conict: the Yasuní-ITT Initiative proposed by the government of Ecuador in 2007. This 
Initiative, as we will see in the following chapter, lends itself to be analyzed both from a 
global  and  macro-level  approach  and  from the  meso-level  approach  adopted  in  the 
book; by bringing up this specic conict I hope to show what are the merits of the road 
taken here compared to the more standard macro analyses found in literature.
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AN OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
In Chapter 1 I introduce the theoretical toolbox - case study, concepts, and methods - 
which will be employed throughout the rest of the book. First, I present the Yasuní-ITT 
Initiative of Ecuador as an example of a complex environmental  conict.  Second, I 
introduce  the  three  main  environmental  narratives  mentioned  above,  along  with  an 
explanation of why environmental narratives are useful in the context of the meso-level 
approach adopted here. Finally, I also introduce the two matrices, with an explanation of 
the  rationale  behind  their  employment,  and  the  contribution  they  are  supposed  to 
provide in the context of this research. Each of the three following chapters - Ch. 2, 3, 
and 4 - is dedicated to the analysis one of the environmental narratives mentioned above 
and properly introduced in Chapter 1.
In Chapter 2 I analyze the narrative of ecological modernization. Here, I take a 
close  look at  the  arguments  used to  establish a  link between economic growth and 
environmental protection. Then I turn to the analysis of the mechanisms upon which 
policy makers usually rely to enlarge the economic pie, and hence grow the economy: 
cost-benet analysis and the market. I analyze how they have been and still are used in 
the context of environmental policy and, while doing so, I also point to the contested 
presuppositions which undergird their widespread employment. A full treatment of the 
contested normative presuppositions will have to wait, however, until Chapter 5 where 
the main arguments behind the narrative of ecological modernization will  be further 
claried and compared to those of the other narratives. In the second part of the chapter 
dedicated  to  the  narrative  of  ecological  modernization  I  consider  the  arguments  on 
grounds  of  justice  which  justify  the  employment  of  market  mechanisms  in  the 
environmental  sector.  I  identify two of  such arguments:  one is  embedded in Robert 
Nozick’s  theory  of  justice  as  entitlements;  the  other,  in  David  Gauthier’s  theory  of 
justice as self-interested reciprocity. I also analyze the claim that the presuppositions 
behind these two theories inform some of the features of the environmental regimes in 
international law.
In Chapter 3 I analyze the narrative of civic environmentalism. I briey review, at 
the beginning of the chapter, the likely reasons which lead to the development of this 
narrative  within  environmental  governance.  I  identify  two  concerns  which  the 
supporters  of  civic  environmentalism  are  likely  to  voice  against  the  proponents  of 
ecological  modernization.  According  to  the  rst  of  these  concerns,  market-based 
instruments alone might well provide environmental protection but it is contested that 
they  can  provide  equitable  environmental  protection.  According  to  the  second  one, 
efciency  arguments  are  consistently  used  to  set  the  political  agenda  of  disparate 
disciplines  engaged  in  environmental  protection;  the  consequence  of  this  is  a  bias 
towards, and overrepresentation of, a particular set of normative ideas - those linked 
with welfare economics -, and, potentially, a problem of legitimacy. Then I show how 
these two concerns paved the way for a narrative which centers on the idea of public 
participation and redistributive justice.  I  identify two different  ideas of  participation 
within this  narrative:  participation in terms of “providing information to the policy-
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and properly introduced in Chapter 1.
In Chapter 2 I analyze the narrative of ecological modernization. Here, I take a 
close  look at  the  arguments  used to  establish a  link between economic growth and 
environmental protection. Then I turn to the analysis of the mechanisms upon which 
policy makers usually rely to enlarge the economic pie, and hence grow the economy: 
cost-benet analysis and the market. I analyze how they have been and still are used in 
the context of environmental policy and, while doing so, I also point to the contested 
presuppositions which undergird their widespread employment. A full treatment of the 
contested normative presuppositions will have to wait, however, until Chapter 5 where 
the main arguments behind the narrative of ecological modernization will  be further 
claried and compared to those of the other narratives. In the second part of the chapter 
dedicated  to  the  narrative  of  ecological  modernization  I  consider  the  arguments  on 
grounds  of  justice  which  justify  the  employment  of  market  mechanisms  in  the 
environmental  sector.  I  identify two of  such arguments:  one is  embedded in Robert 
Nozick’s  theory  of  justice  as  entitlements;  the  other,  in  David  Gauthier’s  theory  of 
justice as self-interested reciprocity. I also analyze the claim that the presuppositions 
behind these two theories inform some of the features of the environmental regimes in 
international law.
In Chapter 3 I analyze the narrative of civic environmentalism. I briey review, at 
the beginning of the chapter, the likely reasons which lead to the development of this 
narrative  within  environmental  governance.  I  identify  two  concerns  which  the 
supporters  of  civic  environmentalism  are  likely  to  voice  against  the  proponents  of 
ecological  modernization.  According  to  the  rst  of  these  concerns,  market-based 
instruments alone might well provide environmental protection but it is contested that 
they  can  provide  equitable  environmental  protection.  According  to  the  second  one, 
efciency  arguments  are  consistently  used  to  set  the  political  agenda  of  disparate 
disciplines  engaged  in  environmental  protection;  the  consequence  of  this  is  a  bias 
towards, and overrepresentation of, a particular set of normative ideas - those linked 
with welfare economics -, and, potentially, a problem of legitimacy. Then I show how 
these two concerns paved the way for a narrative which centers on the idea of public 
participation and redistributive justice.  I  identify two different  ideas of  participation 
within this  narrative:  participation in terms of “providing information to the policy-
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makers” and participation in terms of “being present at the decision-making table.” I 
contend that the rst is closely linked with an aggregative model of democracy and that 
it  encapsulates  an idea  of  democratic  efciency;  the  second idea  of  participation is 
instead linked with a different model of democracy, and its normative underpinnings 
have to be researched in the normative presuppositions of participatory democracy and 
political liberalism.
In Chapter 4 I analyze the narrative of radical environmentalism. First, I parse and 
systematize the burgeoning literature on radical ideas in environmental politics into two 
core issues which radical environmentalism scholars tend to care about and focus on: (i) 
the concern for the commodication of nature and its services; (ii) the conviction that 
economic growth is the true cause of environmental degradation. I then treat the two 
core issues - commodication and economic growth - in turn. Underpinning the concern 
for the commodication of nature, I nd both anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric 
arguments, as well as both consequentialist and deontological arguments. Concerning 
the issue of economic growth, I analyze in some detail, in the second part of Chapter 4, 
the radical  opposition to it  and,  given the sensible  criticism which can be mounted 
against  economic  growth  as  an  overarching  policy  objective,  I  proceed  to  inquire, 
specically,  what it  is,  both in our economic thinking and in our liberal  theories of 
distributive justice, that prevents policy makers to do away with economic growth. I 
analyze which aspects of welfare economics and which aspects of our liberal theories of 
distributive justice are more prone to be criticized from the point of view of radical 
environmentalism scholars who would like to do away with economic growth as an 
overarching policy objective. In light of these two polemic targets, the chapter can be 
read as a sustained criticism of the competing environmental narratives of ecological 
modernization and civic environmentalism.
If I were to narrate how the three chapters follow each other with respect to the 
issue of economic growth, I would say that the narrative of ecological modernization 
deems  economic  growth  benecial  for  the  environment;  the  narrative  of  civic 
environmentalism treats  economic  growth  with  suspicion:  while  it  can  be  good  for 
environmental protection, it also creates negative social consequences which need to be 
addressed  through  procedural  and  redistributive  measures;  the  narrative  of  radical 
environmentalism  takes  a  hard  negative  stance  toward  economic  growth  as  it  is 
excluded that it can do good for the environment.
In  Chapter  5  I  provide  a  bird’s  eye  view of  the  differences  among the  three 
environmental narratives and their relative presuppositions. I analyze these differences 
in terms of the three analytical categories introduced in Chapter 1: clashes, continuities, 
and  blind  spots.  Finally,  I  also  clarify  the  meaning  of  these  different  relationships 
among narratives for environmental  politics:  clashes among the narratives and blind 
spots in how each narrative represents its competitors are what makes the debates about 
the appropriate means to tackle environmental problems stubbornly enduring and what 
makes it so polarized.
A Conclusion follows in which I briey summarize the main steps made along the 
way. In particular, I resort, once again, to the two matrices introduced in Chapter 1 and 
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employed in Chapters 2 to 4 (efciency vs. justice matrix) and in Chapter 5 (clashes, 
continuities,  and blind spots  matrix)  to  paint  a  picture  of  the  inherent  tensions  and 
conicts which shape environmental politics and, in particular, conicts around market-
based policies. Then, I return to the case of Ecuador presented in Chapter 1, briey 
exploring how the meso-level approach can be useful for policy analysis.
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THREE NARRATIVES, AND TWO MATRICES
THE YASUNÍ-ITT INITIATIVE AND
THE ACCUSATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL BLACKMAIL
In June 2007, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa announced that he would forgo oil 
prots from one of the country’s largest oil reserves (20% of its proven reserves) in the 
Amazonian  Yasuní  National  Park  in  exchange  for  donations  from  the  international 
community to pay Ecuadorians to keep oil underground. Here are his actual words:
“Ecuador doesn’t ask for charity, but does ask that the international community share in the 
sacrice and compensates us with at least half of what our country would receive, in recognition 
of  the  environmental  benets  that  would  be  generated  by  keeping  this  oil 
underground” (President Correa, 2007).
The Yasuní-ITT Initiative, named after the reserve’s oil elds Ishpingo, Tambococha, 
and Tiputini, is a plan which, following the reconstruction of Carlos Larrea and Lavinia 
Warnars (Larrea and Warnars, 2009), could have fullled three main objectives. The 
rst  is  to  protect  biodiversity.  The  Yasuní  National  Park  is  a  UNESCO  Man  and 
Biosphere Reserve of 982,000 hectares, considered by many scientists to be the single 
most biodiverse spot on the planet (Fontaine and Navarrez, 2007; Finer et al., 2009). 
Such an incredible  biodiversity  could be highly jeopardized if  deforestation and oil 
drilling are allowed (Bass et al., 2010). This, however, is not the only risk: biodiversity 
is also endangered by the colonization of the area allowed by camps and roads. This 
could lead to secondary deforestation, fragmentation of habitats and intensied hunting 
and shing (Franzen, 2006). The second is the reduction of CO2 emissions. There are 
three ways in which the Yasuní initiative could have allegedly helped in reducing CO2 
emissions and thus helped in limiting global warming: rstly, the oil not drilled would 
not have been processed; secondly, the emissions coming from deforestation and forest 
degradation would have been reduced; thirdly, the Yasuní initiative sought to reinvest 
part of the found in renewable energy projects. The third objective would be to reduce 
poverty in Ecuador. The money coming from the fund could have been allocated to 
health, education, and social development in order to ease the condition of those - a 
third of the total population - who live below the poverty line. 
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Soon  after  it  was  rst  put  forward,  this  policy  attracted  both  praise  and 
considerable criticism. Praiseworthy remarks came from those who saw it as a market-
friendly solution to mitigate climate change: those who forego opportunity costs are 
compensated, those who pay might eventually end up paying less than what they would 
have paid for equally effective alternative mitigation instruments, such as costly end-of-
pipe technologies (Ripley, 2011). Critical remarks came from those who saw the risk of 
giving money for actions which might not eventually lead to a reduction in greenhouse 
gasses  (Bucaram et  al.,  2016)  -  an  issue  of  additionality,  in  the  technical  parlance 
sometimes used in the debates about climate mitigation. Another source of worry had 
been the potential for imitation which such policy could carry in the developing world. 
“Yasunization” even became a word among the activist circles committed to a post-oil 
society,  used  to  refer  to  policies  which  aim to  “keep  oil  in  the  soil”  while  asking 
compensation for it (Rosendal et al., 2008; Temper et al., 2013). Other critical remarks 
came from those who saw the risk of compensating someone else for refraining from 
doing  something  which  should  not,  allegedly,  be  done  in  the  rst  place.  Less 
diplomatically, some critical voices called the Yasuní-ITT Initiative a potential case of 
environmental  blackmail  which  could  spin  out  of  control  among  the  resource-rich 
countries still on the path of development. 
It is not unreasonable to imagine that the Guyanese attempt at pricing part of its 
forests had been inspired by the Yasuní-ITT Initiative (and the initial success it gathered 
when  it  was  launched).  In  December  2008,  Guyanese  President  Bharrat  Jagdeo 
suggested  that  something  similar  to  the  Yasuní-ITT Initiative  could  be  realized  in 
Guyana. According to the 8th biannual Report on the State of the World’s Forest (FAO, 
2009),  Guyana has  had minor  cases  of  deforestation  between 1990 and 2005.  Low 
deforestation  rates  could  be  an  asset  if  there  were  a  system  which  rewards  good 
environmental performances. Jagdeo thus commissioned the consulting rm McKinsey 
to produce a report exploring possible solutions (McKinsey & Company, 2008). In the 
foreword  of  the  published  report  titled  Creating  Incentives  to  Avoid  Deforestation 
Jagdeo writes:
“Much deforestation happens because individuals, communities, and countries pursue legitimate 
economic activities – such as selling timber or earning money and creating jobs in agriculture. 
The world economy values these activities. It does not value most of the services that forests 
provide  when  trees  are  kept  alive,  including  the  avoidance  of  greenhouse  gases  emission. 
Correcting this market failure is the only long-term solution to deforestation” (President Jagdeo, 
in McKinsey & Company, 2008).
Excusatio non petita... some may say, below in the foreword of the Report, Jagdeo adds 
that this is:
“Not in any way a threat, or a suggestion that we will deliberately destroy our forest if the world 
does not pay us” (President Jagdeo, in McKinsey & Company, 2008).
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The following are the gures employed in the report to sustain the claim that incentives 
not to destroy part of Guyana forests have to be provided: Guyana can earn between 
US$4.3  billion  and  US$23.4  billion  if  the  country  decides  to  aggressively  pursue 
economically rational land use opportunities. Guyana could increase its deforestation 
rate to 4.3 % per year,  destroying all  forest outside protected areas in 25 years.  By 
protecting  its  forest,  Guyana  forgoes  economically  rational  opportunities  that  could 
amount to between US$430 million and US$2.3 billion in additional value per year. As 
expected, according to President Jagdeo and the authors of the report, the reasons that 
justify the creation of further incentives to avoid deforestation are incredibly valuable 
(they  are  similar  to  those  put  forward  by  President  Correa).  Indeed,  Guyana  needs 
“better schools and hospitals, teachers and doctors, economic opportunities and jobs for 
the citizens” (McKinsey & Company, 2008: 1).
The  position  of  Ecuador  was  unique  because  of  the  presence  of  indigenous 
people, rich biodiversity, and oil. Guyana was instead trying to adopt a similar proposal 
to  a  more  common  situation:  a  fairly  homogenous  large  forested  area  with  a  low 
deforestation rate which could have been made more protable, were the right economic 
incentives to be introduced. The publication of the “Creating Incentives” Report can 
also be seen as an attempt to exploit the logic behind the Yasuní-ITT Initiative to push 
the debate on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) 
which at the time was still in its infancy.
REDD mechanisms are forestry climate mitigation instruments which reward the 
sustainable management of forests and forest resources. They have been proposed in the 
context of international negotiations on climate change and rst tabled in international 
negotiations  by  Papua  New  Guinea  and  Costa  Rica  on  behalf  of  the  Coalition  of 
Rainforest Nations (UNFCCC, 2005). That forests not only occupy a pivotal role in the 
sustainable development strategies of local forest-dependent communities but also as 
climate  mitigation  instruments  was  already  acknowledged  in  the  1992 treaty  which 
established the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
For this reason, the negotiators responsible for crafting the rst binding climate regime 
pondered over the possibility of carving out a role for forest instruments within the 
Kyoto Protocol. The scope of the Protocol did include afforestation and reforestation 
projects,  yet  it  failed  to  also  include  the  management  of  existing  forests,  due  to 
legitimate concerns over issues of additionality and leakage,  which could not have been 1
properly settled in the time available before the treaty entered into force. In 2005 the 
issue was again tabled by the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN), yet at the time 
the proposal only focused on deforestation. Due to pressure from countries within the 
CfRN which  were  experiencing  an  array  of  dynamics  which  were  harmful  to  their 
 A project or activity is additional if there is a net positive difference that is a direct consequence of this 1
project or activity. In other words, a forestry project is additional when certain emission reductions would 
not  have  occurred,  were  the  activity  or  project  not  be  implemented.  Leakage  refers  to  an  indirect 
consequence which could unfold as a consequence of a certain activity. In other words, a forestry project 




forests, yet could not strictly speaking be subsumed under the category of deforestation, 
such as those of the Congo Basin, RED acquired its second “D” - thus becoming REDD 
– and as such was ofcially adopted at 14th Conference of the Parties (COP) of the 
UNFCCC in 2008. Due to additional pressures from other countries whose forest cover 
was not in decline (e.g.  India and China),  but which nonetheless feared that,  in the 
absence of the right incentives to manage the forests sustainably, their forests were also 
bound to degrade, REDD acquired its “+,” which stands for the conservation of forests, 
their sustainable management, and for the enhancement of their carbon stocks. With the 
negotiations on REDD+ advancing, the focus progressively shifted from the “what” and 
“why” questions to “how” questions. The management of forests needs to be respectful 
of the local communities and their ways of life, thus COP 16 in 2010 introduced the so-
called  REDD+  Safeguards  to  account  for  the  social  impacts  of  these  mitigation 
instruments. Furthermore, once it became clear that the management of forests might 
have been included in the national mitigation targets of the post-Kyoto arrangements, 
additional  efforts  have been made to  clarify  the  procedures  to  measure,  report,  and 
verify the existing and projected amount of carbon stocks; precisely to avoid issues of 
additionality and leakage. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) – 
the scientic arm of the UNFCCC – had already been tasked to study the matter and 
provide guidelines on how to properly account for carbon stock exchanges (Penman et 
al., 2003).
Parallel  to  the  slow but  progressive  institutionalization  of  REDD+ within  the 
UNFCCC, some REDD and REDD+ projects have been proposed by private actors; 
these, however, do not count towards the meeting of national emission reduction targets 
but only towards meeting voluntary emission reduction pledges. The uptake of REDD+ 
from  the  private  sector  is  mainly  due  to  two  reasons.  First,  many  private  actors 
developed REDD+ projects with the hope of gaining a competitive advantage: had the 
independently certicated emission reductions produced by the projects been allowed to 
be traded in carbon markets around the world - i.e. used by companies in order to meet 
carbon regulations -, the value of the carbon credits would have increased and those 
companies which had already gained experience in managing these projects would have 
been in a better position to start new highly protable REDD+ projects (Laing et al., 
2015). Second, these early REDD+ projects - especially those nanced by public donors 
- contribute to the complex process of data and knowledge gathering which is useful to 
rene the methods of carbon measuring and reporting as well as safeguards reporting.2
The  Yasuní-ITT Initiative,  the  Guyana  proposal,  together  with  REDD(+),  the 
backing of which it  is not unreasonable to think was the real objective of Guyana’s 
“Creating Incentives” report, share some fundamental features. They all represent the 
practice of asking for money contributions in order not to capitalize on natural resources 
globally  beneted  yet  prima  facie  rightfully  locally  exploitable.  Or  -  using  the 
vocabulary of economics - they are cases in which one’s party relinquishment of the 
lawful possibility of exploiting a natural resource is accompanied by the demand for the 
 For a review on the development of REDD+ throughout its phases, see den Besten et al. (2013).2
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compensation  of  the  opportunity  costs  lost.  They  are  all  so-called  market-based 
instruments. And they have all been accused of being potential cases of environmental 
blackmail.
The expression “environmental blackmail” seems to occur for the rst time in a 
1992  article  titled  “Environmental  blackmail  in  minority  communities”  by  Robert 
Bullard;  the  expression,  back  then,  mainly  referred  to  a  different  practice,  i.e.  big 
companies forcing the local minorities to bear the burden of environmental reforms by 
leveraging on their stronger bargaining position since they are the only employers of 
those  minorities  -  often  lower-income  people  (Bullard,  1992).  More  recently,  the 
expression  has  been  used  in  order  to  refer  to  the  action  of  President  Obama 
Administration’s  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA)  of  issuing  an 
“endangerment” nding whose main aim was to force Congress’ hands to pass a cap-
and-trade legislation to preempt a much worse regulatory regime (Schulz, 2009).
In the aftermath of the cold war, the expression has been used to describe behavior 
which bears some resemblance with the attempted policies of Ecuador and Guyana. 
Russia “threatened” to resume the Soviet-era practice of dumping radioactive wastes 
into the Arctic and the Pacic Ocean unless afuent neighboring countries agreed to 
nance  alternative  solutions  to  its  waste  disposal  problem.  Newly  formed  Ukraine 
“threatened” to resuscitate the Chernobyl nuclear power plant unless paid not to do so 
(Darst, 2001).
The parallel between the Yasuní-ITT Initiative and “environmental blackmail” has 
been suggested by journalists and academics alike who covered the policies put forward 
by  Ecuador  and  Guyana.  TIME  Magazine  titled  a  long  report  “Rainforest  for 
Ransom” (Walsh,  2011);  the Chicago Tribune titled an article  about  the Yasuní-ITT 
Initiative  “Ransoming  Paradise”  (Chicago  Tribune,  February  5,  2012).  Behind  the 
ashy headlines, both articles suggest that the question is more complex than their titles 
made it be, but still clung to the idea that some form of threat is at play. Ecuadorean 
journalist  Lorena  Fernández  in  an  article  titled  “Get  real,  Ecuador”  claims  that  the 
Initiative resembles a form of extortion (Fernández, 2011); David Kestenbaum in the 
radio program “Planet Money” aired on NPR in February 2013 said that the sales pitch 
of  the  proponents  of  the  Initiative  “runs  the  risk  of  sounding  a  bit  like 
blackmail” (Kastenbaum, 2013).
Politicians  weighed  in  on  the  issue,  too.  According  to  Dirk  Niebel,  a  former 
German  economic  cooperation  and  development  Minister,  the  Yasuní-ITT Initiative 
could be a dangerous precedent that could trigger a slippery slope towards a situation in 
which other states could potentially bargain a compensation in exchange for leaving the 
natural resources untouched (Niebel, 2011; Trumpf, 2011). A criticism close to Niebel’s 
position  has  been put  forward  by the  authors  of  the  FNI  report  for  the  Norwegian 
Ministry of Environment (Rosandal et al., 2008: 23). Their concern focuses on the fact 
that other countries which have already foregone the extraction of oil reserves situated 
in protected areas might use a similar policy in order to leave the oil underground - 
something that they would have done anyway - and ask money for it (this would be the 
case of Brazil, for example). The same stance had been taken by Billy Pizer, a former 
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deputy assistant  secretary for  environment and energy under President  Obama (now 
Professor at Duke University); this contributed to the US eventually not contributing to 
the Ecuadorean Initiative (Luft, 2015).
Hans Gregersen et al., in an analysis of the use of opportunity costs to determine 
the value of ecosystem services, explicitly referred to Guyana's publication Creating 
Incentives to Avoid Deforestation as a case of environmental blackmail (Gregersen et 
al.,  2010:  4).  Chris  Lang,  from  his  inuential  blog  on  REDD  policies  (redd-
monitor.org), had been very critical of the McKinsey-inspired Guyana’s proposal and 
wrote that a more tting title for the Report could have been "Hand over the money or 
we'll destroy the forests" (Lang, 2009).
Many authors and activists - including Gregersen et al. (2010), Alain Karsenty et 
al.  (2014),  and  climate  justice  activist  Michael  Schmidlehner  (2016)  who  use  the 
expression “environmental blackmail”; Anthony Hall (2011) who uses “greenmail”; and 
Beth Evans (2015) who uses “ecological blackmail” - use “blackmail” or expressions 
which bear a family resemblance to it to speak more in general of the perils of market-
based mechanisms such as REDD which allegedly reward the good management of 
forests against a projected yet abstract baseline.
It is the debate about blackmail which resonated most forcefully internationally 
with reference to the cases of Guyana and, in particular, Ecuador and its Yasuní-ITT 
Initiative. However, whereas, on the one hand, through the lens of this accusation we 
can start to appreciate what is at stake in these cases of environmental conicts, on the 
other, this accusation masks some of the complexities which these cases raise.
The reference to blackmail plunges us into a moral dimension of politics in which 
politicians should refrain from doing what seems most immediately benecial to them 
personally or their country in order to supposedly do “the right thing.” In other words, 
these  accusations  add  a  quintessentially  normative  dimension  to  these  debates:  not 
whether the policies would effectively bring the promised improvement in sustainability 
or  environmental  quality,  neither  a  purely  “not  worth  the  candle”  problem,  i.e.  a 
question  of  economic  efciency.  The  category  of  blackmail  recalls  right  away  a 
dimension of fairness. This means that there is, apart from the scientic debates about 
the quantity of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere or the quality of the soil, also a 
debate  about  the  values  and  principles  which  should  inform  our  responses  to  the 
environmental  changes under way.  For those engaged,  day in and day out,  in these 
debates in academia, think-tanks, NGOs, this is not particularly novel or striking news; 
but, in the generalist press or television, this value-dimension of the debate is usually 
squeezed out between issues of legality - what we can do in terms of some pre-existing 
legal  document  or  legal  convention  -  and  economic  efciency  -  whether  it  is 
economically  rational  to  undertake  a  certain  course  of  action.  Value  debates 
occasionally resurface when some milestone international agreement is in the pipeline, 
such as COP 21 in December 2015. But even then, they are sometimes minimized under 
a simple Realpolitik reading of international relations: incomprehension between parties 
arise when there are two equally reasonable courses of actions; yet these are nonetheless 
incompatible given different circumstances and goals.
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The problem with this “more international” debate about blackmail, however, is 
that it misses the trees for the forest, which, I would argue, it can be equally as bad as its 
more popular antitheses: missing the forest for the trees. In other words, if forced to 
follow through, and inquire into, the accusation of blackmail, a researcher would soon 
nd herself engaged in grand global justice theorizing which seldom can be marshaled 
in the context of specic environmental conicts and which at most gets strategically 
invoked  for  advocacy  purposes  during  international  climate  conferences  or  similar 
occasions. According to a popular theory provided by James Lindgren - the so-called 
Chips theory -, blackmail is wrong because “the blackmailer is negotiating for his own 
gain with someone else’s leverage or bargaining chips” (Lindgren, 1984: 702).  This 3
denition would force the researcher to consider what is the nature of the bargaining 
chips the blackmailer - in this case, the State and its representatives - is negotiating 
away, and who owns those bargaining chips in the rst place. In the specic case of the 
Yasuní-ITT Initiative, what is allegedly being negotiated away is the health, integrity, 
biodiversity  of  a  pristine  environment.  But  who  “owns”  those  things?  This  would 
prompt the researcher to go back, rst, to the issue of ownership of natural resources 
and, second, in order to settle the issue of blackmail, to how they should be allocated, if 
at all. The rst of these issues plunges us into the literature on territorial rights over 
lands and resources and the various arguments in order to argue in favor of there being a 
connection between states and their resources (e.g. Miller, 2012; Nine, 2012) or against 
it (e.g. Armstrong, 2015), and would take us, ultimately, to the question whether it is 
right that states enjoy permanent sovereignty over natural resources, as international law 
puts it. The second issue concerns more squarely issues of global distributive justice.  4
These analyses tell us little in the way of how specic environmental conicts 
should be understood or solved here and now; on the other hand, they are powerful and 
worth exploring - not here, however - precisely because they transcend the conicts 
here and now. In other words, the problem of analyzing environmental policies such as 
the Yasuní-ITT Initiative through the lens of blackmail and, hence, ultimately through 
the lens of  global  justice,  is  that  they can take us only so far  in  understanding the 
complexities  behind  the  Yasuní-ITT  Initiative  and  similar  environmental  conicts 
because,  by  doing  so,  we  would  totally  bypass  the  problems  and  concerns  which 
inspired and made popular these policies and initiatives in the rst place.
 Lindgren’s popular theory is only one among many which try to properly dene which behaviors and 3
cases  fall  under  the  concept  of  blackmail.  This  is  a  particularly  lively  area  of  research  in  political 
philosophy and philosophy of law because of the so-called “paradox of blackmail,” i.e. making sense of 
the fact that blackmail - which is considered wrong - is made up of acts which, taken in isolation, are not 
considered per se wrong, such as (i) threatening to reveal embarrassing information about a person, and 
(ii) asking money. For a comprehensive review of the literature see (Berman, 2011).
 Lindgren’s chips theory is taken just as an example of how a research which departs from the accusation 4
of blackmail would develop. Other theories of blackmail would engender largely similar approaches. For 
example, Robert Nozick’s theory of blackmail as involuntary and unproductive exchange would force a 
researcher, again, to assess who or which entity has the right to exploit a natural resource in order to settle 
whether or not the exchange is unproductive (Nozick, 1974: 84).
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Why is it important to offer an image as faithful as possible of the problems and 
concerns which inspired the Initiative? It might not seem important: seen through the 
lens of blackmail, cases such as the Yasuní-ITT Initiative can be used as a pretext to tell 
a story about global justice and natural resources. Chris Armstrong, for example, did 
precisely that (Armstrong, 2016). He opens his article with the case of the Yasuní-ITT 
Initiative  and  then  proceeds  to  argue  that  compensation  for  forest-rich  countries  is 
justied in certain cases on the basis of a principle of global egalitarian justice. But if 
one wants to understand what makes these types of environmental conicts so complex 
and polarized and resistant to resolution - even after a well-worked out argument in 
favor of one of the positions such as Armstrong’s had been put forward -  then one 
cannot  avoid  getting  one’s  hands  dirty  with  the  specicity  of  the  policy  and  the 
competing and, at times, incommensurable demands of justice it raises. To do this, it is 
necessary to leave behind the international debate about blackmail and delve into the 
national debate, which had been much richer and much more grounded in the specic 
problems of Ecuador and South America.
THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND
Going back to the rst page of this introduction, President Correa launched the Yasuní-
ITT Initiative in 2007. The purpose of the Initiative was to leave the oil in the soil in 
exchange for compensation - half of the opportunity costs lost - which could have been 
used to cover the expenses necessary to enlarge the welfare system of the country and 
protect its environment and natural resources. What happened next? But more important 
- to understand the policy in its context -, what happened before?
In August 2013 President Correa went on national television and announced “with 
great  sadness”  -  his  own  words  -  that  he  would  cancel  the  plan  to  leave  the  oil 
underground in the Ishpingo, Tambococha, and Tiputini zones of the Yasuní National 
Park. Why? “The world has failed us” said President Correa (President Correa, 2013). 
To succeed, the Initiative would have needed a monetary contribution of 3.6 billion 
dollars. The estimate on the dimension of the oil elds upon which these gures are 
based was  also  controversial  and difcult  to  check,  but  it  is  not  the  point  here.  In 
August, only 336 million dollars have been pledged and 13,3 million reported in the 
actual fund set up by Ecuador and jointly administered with UNDP. The world failed 
Ecuador - according to President Correa - because the developed states are not willing 
to put the money where their mouths are, one might say. In other words, developed 
countries emit most of the global CO2 but they are not willing to support smaller nations 
which try to nd alternative ways of developing, while at the same time not exploiting 
the environment. President Correa called the richest countries hypocrite. This is how the 
story of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative was told the last time it grabbed the headlines of news 
outlets around the world (Associated Press, 2013).
In October 2016, Ecuador conrmed that drilling was taking place in the Yasuní 
National  Park.  A  government’s  spokesman  told  The  Guardian  that  all  the  latest 
16
THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL NARRATIVES
Why is it important to offer an image as faithful as possible of the problems and 
concerns which inspired the Initiative? It might not seem important: seen through the 
lens of blackmail, cases such as the Yasuní-ITT Initiative can be used as a pretext to tell 
a story about global justice and natural resources. Chris Armstrong, for example, did 
precisely that (Armstrong, 2016). He opens his article with the case of the Yasuní-ITT 
Initiative  and  then  proceeds  to  argue  that  compensation  for  forest-rich  countries  is 
justied in certain cases on the basis of a principle of global egalitarian justice. But if 
one wants to understand what makes these types of environmental conicts so complex 
and polarized and resistant to resolution - even after a well-worked out argument in 
favor of one of the positions such as Armstrong’s had been put forward -  then one 
cannot  avoid  getting  one’s  hands  dirty  with  the  specicity  of  the  policy  and  the 
competing and, at times, incommensurable demands of justice it raises. To do this, it is 
necessary to leave behind the international debate about blackmail and delve into the 
national debate, which had been much richer and much more grounded in the specic 
problems of Ecuador and South America.
THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND
Going back to the rst page of this introduction, President Correa launched the Yasuní-
ITT Initiative in 2007. The purpose of the Initiative was to leave the oil in the soil in 
exchange for compensation - half of the opportunity costs lost - which could have been 
used to cover the expenses necessary to enlarge the welfare system of the country and 
protect its environment and natural resources. What happened next? But more important 
- to understand the policy in its context -, what happened before?
In August 2013 President Correa went on national television and announced “with 
great  sadness”  -  his  own  words  -  that  he  would  cancel  the  plan  to  leave  the  oil 
underground in the Ishpingo, Tambococha, and Tiputini zones of the Yasuní National 
Park. Why? “The world has failed us” said President Correa (President Correa, 2013). 
To succeed, the Initiative would have needed a monetary contribution of 3.6 billion 
dollars. The estimate on the dimension of the oil elds upon which these gures are 
based was  also  controversial  and difcult  to  check,  but  it  is  not  the  point  here.  In 
August, only 336 million dollars have been pledged and 13,3 million reported in the 
actual fund set up by Ecuador and jointly administered with UNDP. The world failed 
Ecuador - according to President Correa - because the developed states are not willing 
to put the money where their mouths are, one might say. In other words, developed 
countries emit most of the global CO2 but they are not willing to support smaller nations 
which try to nd alternative ways of developing, while at the same time not exploiting 
the environment. President Correa called the richest countries hypocrite. This is how the 
story of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative was told the last time it grabbed the headlines of news 
outlets around the world (Associated Press, 2013).
In October 2016, Ecuador conrmed that drilling was taking place in the Yasuní 
National  Park.  A  government’s  spokesman  told  The  Guardian  that  all  the  latest 
16
technologies in drilling had been employed, the pipelines buried deep underneath the 
soil,  and the  areas  above quickly  re-vegetated (Vidal,  2016);  these  measures  would 
allegedly minimize the environmental impact of oil exploitation. Critics have lamented 
the absence of transparency: the site was militarized and independent monitoring from 
civil society and scientists was prohibited. They also lamented that, in any case, it was 
too early to tell whether following these “best practices” would sufce to exploit the oil 
in a way that does not negatively impact the environment (Koenig, program director of 
Amazon Watch; quoted in Hance, 2016). 
The few lines  above are  just  a  snapshot  of  what  happened to  the  Yasuní-ITT 
Initiative throughout the last decade and how this story has been told in the media in the 
Western world. However, to fully appreciate the complexities which such policy raised, 
it is necessary to go back to the moments when the Yasuní-ITT Initiative was rst put 
forward and retell  its story through the lenses of the different political actors in the 
Ecuadorean society.  When it  was rst  put  forward in 2006,  i.e.  even before Correa 
publicly supported it in front of the international community in 2007 (Correa, 2007), 
and then again in 2009 (at Chatham House in London; Correa, 2009), the Yasuní-ITT 
Initiative  had  been  hailed  as  a  remarkable  success  of  Ecuadorean  environmental 
activism.  It  was  Acción  Ecológica  (AE)  -  an  Ecuadorean  environmental  non-
governmental organization (ENGO) with a long history of environmental activism in 
support  of  ending  new  concessions  of  oil  blocks  in  the  Amazon  Forest  -  which 
capitalized on the new momentum in Ecuadorean politics to push the Initiative into the 
front lines of national and international environmental politics. 
The ideas which inform the work of Acción Ecológica are those one would readily 
associate with erce on-the-ground environmental activism which, moreover, is also a 
serious presence on the Ecuadorean political scene. AE had been at the forefront of the 
battle to see the “rights of nature” been explicitly recognized in Ecuador’s new 2008 
Constitution, it kept criticizing the extractivist policies of the government, and, through 
the years, AE positioned itself as a scientically rigorous political presence by availing 
itself of the consulting work of famous ecological economists such as Joan Martínez-
Alier to support its various battles.
All these diverse ideas and positions coalesced, in the early 2000s, around the 
notion of ecological debt. In other words, given the consequences of the extractivist 
industries in Latin America - in terms of displacement and aggression of indigenous 
population  which  opposed  oil  concessions,  in  terms  of  environmental  damages  to 
pristine areas,  and in terms of the historical interference of foreign governments in the 5
national politics -, organizations such as Acción Ecológica managed to add a further 
dimension to the internal debates about debt which partially reversed the creditor-debtor 
relation: “the North owes the South historical, social and ecological debt” (Martínez-
Alier et al., 2011: 24, see also Figure 2 in the article).
 The most famous and most dramatic of such damages is the environmental catastrophe allegedly caused 5
by Chevron/Texaco. “Allegedly”, because the lawsuit which pits Ecuador against Chevron/Texaco for 
compensations of the environmental  and social  harms left  by the multinational  oil  company after  its 
operation in Ecuador is still underway.
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The story-line around ecological debt forcefully resounded with the Ecuadorean 
population. Similarly to what happened throughout Latin America in the 70s and 80s, 
Ecuador had received the IMF and World Bank cure of loans and structural adjustments 
programs attached to those loans. When the oil price fell and interest rates rose, Ecuador 
could no longer use the bulk of oil revenues to nance national development programs, 
and  over  50% of  oil  revenues  had  to  go  to  servicing  the  debt  contracted  with  the 
nancial institutions. Leon Zamosc (2004) reckons that from 1974 to 1984, Ecuador’s 
debt had increased from 324 million dollars to 8.4 billion. This led to a vicious circle in 
which  more  oil  concessions  had  to  be  given  away  to  service  the  enormous  debt. 
Meanwhile, Veronica Davidov (2012) notes, large-scale geological surveys were being 
sponsored by the World Bank to encourage Ecuador to accurately map the location of 
Ecuador’s natural resources in order to spur investments in the extractive industries. The 
issue  of  debt  swept  Latin  America,  and  not  just  Ecuador:  incomes  dropped, 
unemployment rose, growth stagnated, and ination reduced the buying power of the 
middle classes. It would be appropriate, at this point, to cite President Correa’s own 
Ph.D. dissertation in economics - awarded by the University of Illinois at Urbana in 
2001 - on the effects of the Washington Consensus policies in Latin America and the 
downsides of policies of economic liberalization (Hedgecoe, 2009).
Among the Ecuadorean population - since the late 1990s - a narrative emerged 
which  questioned  the  economic,  social,  and  environmental  merits  of  the  top-down 
policies of economic liberalization so far proposed. Ecuadoreans demanded a turnabout 
on these policies. The story-line around an ecological debt, of which Ecuadoreans are 
creditors, not debtors, is what allowed the environmental issues put forward by Acción 
Ecológica to enter into the wider policy arena. Oil concessions were, and still are, one 
of those issues. The Yasuní-ITT Initiative, which proposed to place a moratorium on the 
oil concessions of the ITT oil blocks of the Yasuní National Park, had been built around 
the concept of ecological debt. The idea behind the policy was to re-problematize the 
“Who owes to whom?” relation.  Payments into the Yasuní-ITT fund would halt  the 
degradation of the environment while, at the same time, contribute to servicing the huge 
ecological debt contracted by Northern countries. As Esperanza Martínez wrote, at the 
national level the Initiative sought to question the extractivist model of development to 
which, in the past, too many negative experiences have been linked. At the international 
level,  the  Initiative  sought  to  question  the  inherent  injustices  of  carbon  markets 
(Martínez, 2013). In other words, the Yasuní Initiative - in the mind of the of Martínez, 
the President of AE - should not have been an instance of a exibility mechanism in 
which business-as-usual somewhere is counterbalanced by a green project somewhere 
else: according to the proponents of the Initiative, leaving the oil in the ground would 
have collided head-on with this development model (Martínez, 2013). From the fringes 
of  environmental  activism,  through  the  re-problematization  of  the  debtor-creditor 
relation, the Yasuní-ITT Initiative had then been quickly taken up by a larger segment of 
the population and reconceptualized as an instrument of social justice.
Then came Correa.  His agenda partly overlapped with the motives behind the 
Yasuní-ITT Initiative: he had been ushered into power by the demands for social justice 
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which also made the Yasuní-ITT Initiative popular among the Ecuadorean population. 
He  ran  on  a  platform  which  condemned  economic  inequality,  both  at  home  and 
internationally. This was consistent with his personal history: he was born into a poor 
family, when he was young his father turned to small-time drug trafcking due to a 
period of unemployment, and he had been able to study in some of the best schools of 
Ecuador and of the world (Louvain in Belgium, and University of Illinois) only thanks 
to scholarships and donations. It was also consistent with a larger movement for social 
reforms and debt contestation which swept the whole of Latin America: the Kirchners in 
Argentina,  Evo Morales  in  Bolivia,  Luiz  Inácio  Lula  da  Silva  in  Brazil,  and Hugo 
Chávez in Venezuela - Correa kept a picture of the latter two on his desk (Hedgecoe, 
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advice  of  the  Commission,  which  recommended  non-payment  of  part  of  the  debt, 
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not pay 3.2 billion dollars. He gave orders to go into “selective default” and called “real 
monsters” the people - previous Ecuadorean politicians and the staff of the international 
nancial institutions  - who allegedly colluded to plunge Ecuador into debt.6
As  Davidov  points  out,  Correa  rose  to  power  by  directly  clashing  with  this 
“monster  economy”  and,  at  the  same  time,  proposing  his  vision  of  a  new  moral 
economy  (Davidov,  2012).  In  his  2009  speech  at  Chatham  House,  in  London,  he 




juxtaposed the two economic models and fully articulated the differences between the 
two. The “monster economy” is the “selsh logic of the market,” whereas his moral 
economy is “the logic of collective action and intergenerational cooperation.” He then 
went on and argued that nature “has a high value but no price” because the current 
“monster economy” knows how to price goods but not how to price the value created by 
nature.
Correa believes that the neoclassic economy model has dramatic consequences, 
both socially and environmentally, and that a moral economy should internalize these 
moral concerns. Correa’s equation of the “monster economy” with the economy tout 
court  is  partly  correct  and  partly  a  strawman  argument.  There  is  no  doubt  that, 
historically, much economic development has, in some locations, caused social pain and 
environmental destruction. Ecuador, as a matter of fact, offers good examples of both. 
On the other hand, it is not true that economics as a discipline and economists as experts 
are  not  aware  of  the  fact  that,  for  certain  goods  and  services,  there  is  a  mismatch 
between  value  and  price  and  of  the  fact  that  this  has  particularly  damaging 
consequences for the environment.
Correa, however, by linking the Initiative to a bigger concern for the development 
of  its  country  -  whether  through a  monster  economy or  a  moral  one -  had already 
alienated the section of the population which supported the Initiative for reasons which 
had nothing to do with the economy. Martínez and the staff of Acción Ecológica devised 
the initiative as a response to the “neoliberal scheme” of extracting oil while offsetting 
carbon. Yet Correa, through the Yasuní-ITT Initiative, ended up selling that same vision 
of environmental protection. In particular, Martínez lamented that, once the Initiative 
became institutionalized, i.e. part of Ecuador’s development program, the “discussions 
around Yasuní have consistently privileged the business section and neoliberal stream of 
environmentalism” (Martínez, 2013, 29).  In the hands of Ecuador’s government, the 
money raised by the Initiatives were no longer donations or contributions to a good 
cause which tries to keep the oil underground but a direct compensation for doing so. 
Ecuador’s government had even tried to link the Initiative to the carbon market: the 
ofcial document which sponsored the Yasuní-ITT Initiative at the climate negotiations 
in June 2008 in Bonn clearly stated that “buying a certied Yasuní credit gives a right to 
continue  emitting  carbon  into  the  atmosphere”  (Martínez,  2013,  29).  When  this 
approach failed, because of issues of additionality and leakage, Correa adopted a much 
more confrontational approach which asked for the compensation of the opportunity 
costs lost, to be calculated in terms of tons of CO2 emissions avoided.
Ever since the policy had been ofcially axed,  a  part  of  the Ecuadorean civil 
society took it upon herself to ensure that the oil of the Yasuní remains in the soil. To a 
certain extent, the rhetoric about the “monster economy” of Correa, which still enjoys 
considerable popularity among Ecuadoreans, has been so successful, and Ecuadoreans 
so mindful of the environmental disasters brought by previous oil exploitation, that the 
environmental organizations of Ecuador managed to collect 850,000 signatures, more 
than the 600,000 required (5% of the population), to call for a referendum on the matter. 
Given the popularity of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative, had the referendum been carried out, 
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the environmental organizations would have probably won. We will never know. More 
than half a million signatures were discarded by the National Electoral Council, on the 
basis that many were repeats and others fake. Oil drilling is now underway in Yasuní 
National Park. Vice President of Ecuador Jorge Glas cannot, of course, afford to project 
the image of the “tough on oil” government of the early Correa presidency, and has 
more clearly subscribed to the idea of moral economic development, which underpinned 
Correa’s rhetoric throughout the story of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative. As reported by The 
Guardian, on a visit to the drilling site in October 2016, Vice President Jorge Glas said 
that “This is the start of a new era for Ecuadorean oil. In this new era, rst comes care 
for the environment and second responsibility for the communities and the economy, for 
the Ecuadorean people” (Vidal, 2016).
Through the prism of Ecuadorean politics, the Yasuní-ITT Initiative is not only - 
and more importantly,  not primarily -  a controversial  proposal for an internationally 
sponsored development program. It is a contested political terrain in which different 
demands  clash.  There  is,  for  example,  from  the  perspective  of  certain  Ecuadorean 
political  actors,  the  request  for  a  model  of  economic  development  which  tries  to 
encompass elements of non-anthropocentric justice into politics. There is a criticism of 
business-as-usual models of economic development and a willingness to move away 
from  them  as  forcefully  as  possible.  There  is,  no  doubt,  the  expectation  from  the 
Ecuadorean  population  that  their  natural  resources  should,  in  one  way  or  another, 
improve their  wellbeing.  But  there  is  also a  certain ambivalence in  the Ecuadorean 
population towards the ideal use of natural resources: in the past, Ecuadorean natural 
resources had been exploited, but this had beneted Ecuadoreans only marginally, if at 
all.  They now wanted to be involved in the decisions concerning the use of natural 
resources and they were aware, on the one hand, that the exploitation of resources often 
results in unforeseeable natural disasters and, on the other, they also feel that it was now 
their  turn to  fully benet  from the resources located on their  territory.  There is  the 
government  led  by  Correa  which,  for  all  its  hard  posturing  with  the  international 
community, had to balance the demands of the Ecuadoreans for environmental quality 
and economic wellbeing with those of the foreign investors who might bring to the 
country the nancial and technological resources and the necessary expertise to make 
those demands possible.
All  of  these  positions  seem  sensible,  but  some  of  them  also  seem  to  be 
incompatible.  For  a  moment,  before  it  was  ofcially  taken  up  by  the  Ecuadorean 
government, the Yasuní-ITT Initiative seemed like a “silver bullet” policy option for 
Ecuador’s development, capable of unifying the interests of the environmentalists, the 
government,  and the citizens.  Yet,  once the Initiative had been institutionalized,  the 
different  interests  in  Ecuadorean  society  collided  head-on  against  one  another.  The 
posture  of  Correa  and his  government  against  the  international  nancial  institutions 
contributed to ushering him into power, but the international distrust he generated by 
expelling the World Bank representatives and by taking the step to go into “selective 
default” also prevented that the Initiative be backed by the sufcient degree of trust 
required  in  these  situations.  For  example,  the  German  politician  Niebel,  mentioned 
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above, had been so suspicious of Correa’s posture against the international institutions 
that he went as far as equating paying Ecuador not to drill for oil with paying Somalia 
not to let pirates attack shipping and pleasure vessels in the high waters in front of 
Somali coasts (Trumpf, 2011). Faced with this kind of pushback internationally, support 
from the government for a non-extractivist path to development dwindled - as predicted 
by Martínez-Alier -, whereas environmental activists remained rm on their positions.  
Whereas the question about blackmail might be interesting per se or as a pretext 
to argue in favor of a specic position in the debate on global justice, it nonetheless 
hides this contested political terrain and it ultimately returns to us a reductive image of 
the  real  debate  around the complex policy internationally  known as  the Yasuní-ITT 
Initiative in  which no “silver  bullet”  position can hope,  through reasoned argument 
alone, to gain the upper hand.
To do justice to the practical and theoretical difculties these types of policy raise, 
and the enduring conicts they create, a 'macro' account of environmental policies must 
give way to a 'meso-level' analysis  which is responsive to contextual considerations. 
These  contextual  considerations  are  often  hidden  behind  a  layer  of  complexity, 
disguised  as  semi-descriptive  statements,  dispersed  in  various  political  spaces: 
international regime negotiations, protest marches, local meetings, expert panels in the 
media. In this case, instead of asking what justies a certain policy - which commands a 
macro approach -, a better question for the researcher would be, “how are certain types 
of policies already being implicitly justied and contested?” This question goes to the 
heart  of  the  complexity  raised  by  the  debates  around  market-based  environmental 
policies because it requires the researcher, rst, to map the multiple answers already out 
there and, second, try to understand what makes those answers incompatible with each 
other.  This research question has,  therefore,  the potential  to explain the debates and 
conicts around market-based policies.
In the study of environmental politics, the use of narratives as a research focus has 
been particularly useful to understand how certain policies come to be adopted while 
others  are  discarded without  there  sometimes being even a  reasoned and principled 
political debate. For example, it  matters a lot for policy-making whether indigenous 
populations living in forested areas are portrayed as backward populations employing 
traditional and outdated farming methods, or rather as living in a naturally sustainable 
manner like uncorrupted bons sauvages. The rst narrative suggests paternalizing “we-
know-better” attitudes which would partially justify the taking over of some forested 
areas in the name of their scientic sustainable management; the second, admiration 
towards their lifestyle and a less intervening attitude. As politics, and environmental 
politics  is  no  different  in  this  respect,  always  deals  with  decisions  to  be  made, 
alternative scenarios, and possible outcomes, it follows that, even when a certain course 
of action is presented as inevitable through the clever deployment of a narrative, there 
are  always  normative  presuppositions  lurking  behind.  In  the  example  above,  those 
narratives do not by themselves clearly display normative elements, yet they are there: 
the  normativity  becomes  visible  through  the  interplay  of  the  narrative  with  beliefs 
which we might already have. “Backward,” “traditional,” and “outdated” come together 
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with our default preference towards “progress,” “scientic,” and “modern” to make the 
“should,” “ought to,” and “it would be better if” of politics. In other words, narratives, 
even when they do seem to simply describe states of affairs, are also vehicles of implicit 
normative presuppositions.
To reply to the above question - “how are certain types of policies already being 
implicitly justied or contested?” -, it is of paramount importance that the debate be 
appropriately mapped. This requires the researcher to, rst, unveil the normative stances 
that are already - so to speak - “out there.” To do this, I decided to look at various 
environmental narratives, discourses, and ideologies, but most of all, at their “normative 
baggage.” In other words, I will use environmental narratives to uncover the normative 
presuppositions behind the environmental debates on market-based mitigation policies, 
such as the Yasuní-ITT Initiative. This is a heuristic strategy which provides me with an 
entry point into environmental politics and it enables me to encounter and analyze the 
normative  arguments  as  they  are  already  employed  in  the  day-to-day  trenches  of 
environmental politics. I will then analyze these normative presuppositions through the 
interpretative grids of two matrices: the rst distinguishes the normative presuppositions 
underpinning the narratives in arguments on grounds of efciency and arguments on 
grounds of justice; the second matrix explores the differences among the narratives and 
their normative presuppositions through three categories: clashes, continuities, and blind 
spots. I will return later on, in this introduction, on the role and purpose, within this 
research, of these two matrices. It is now time to introduce the environmental narratives 
which will guide us throughout the following three chapters.
ENVIRONMENTAL NARRATIVES
AND THEIR NORMATIVE PRESUPPOSITIONS
Throughout the book, I have made use of the three environmental narratives to unveil 
the normative theories usually used in environmental politics to justify or reject market-
based policies. These three narratives are partly borrowed from the analysis of Karin 
Bäckstrand and Eva Lövbrand (2006, 2007, 2016) of afforestation projects under the 
Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand divide 
environmental  politics  into  three  narratives:  green  governmentality,  ecological 
modernization, and civic environmentalism.
According  to  Bäckstrand  and  Lövbrand,  green  governmentality  is  a  discourse 
which  depicts  the  environment  as  a  bounded  entity  which  can  be  scientically 
controlled. It is the discourse that - at least in industrialized societies - shapes the very 
understanding of nature and denes how human beings should relate to it: in terms of 
CO2 emitted or saved, the amount of atmospheric particulate matter in cities, and square 
meters of degraded forests. Environmental problems consequently require solutions to 
be administered through the target-setting and monitoring of the substances or other 
elements which cause the climate to change and the environment to degrade. Ecological 
modernization  is  a  discourse  which  promotes  market  solutions  to  environmental 
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problems  on  the  ground  that  there  are  still  many  unexploited  synergies  between 
economic growth and environmental protection. Civic environmentalism is a discourse 
which  sees  the  role  of  the  public  and  the  stakeholders  in  general  as  important  for 
environmental  protection on the ground that those who are personally affected by a 
problem should have a say in devising solutions which relate to them. Bäckstrand and 
Lövbrand distinguish between two different souls of civic environmentalism. A reform-
oriented  soul  of  civic  environmentalism  accepts  that  stakeholder  governance  could 
deliver on the promise of producing policies which solve environmental problems and, 
at the same time, keep in check the tendency of market mechanisms to produce wealth 
inequality. A radical soul of civic environmentalism remains skeptical both about the 
promise  that  market  mechanisms  could  provide  viable  solutions  to  environmental 
degradation  and  about  the  promise  that  institutions  through  which  stakeholder 
governance is channeled could redress the inequalities produced by the employment of 
market mechanism.
Given  that  my  focus  is  on  the  normative  debates  around  market-based 
environmental policies, I decided to adapt Bäckstrand and Lövbrand’s analysis to my 
needs. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand’s rst discourse - green governmentality - does not 
display  polarizing  elements.  In  other  words,  nowadays,  across  the  debate  spectrum 
around  market-based  policies,  the  dening  elements  which  characterize  the  green 
governmentality  discourse  are  mostly  accepted.  More  than  that,  these  elements  are 
instrumental to the other narratives. Both market-enthusiasts and eco-socialists accept 
that the environment is in a poor state and ground their analysis on the same literature: 
the report, and its periodical updates, about the limits to economic growth (Meadows et 
al.,  1972) and the research on the carrying capacity of the Earth (Rockstrom et al., 
2009). Green governmentality is thus a shared understanding of nature which crosses 
discursive boundaries. It is thus unlikely that an analysis of green governmentality will 
give  us  a  glimpse  into  contested  normative  presuppositions  which  could  tell  us 
something  about  market-based  instruments  and  the  heated  debate  which  they  have 
originated. On the other hand, the distinction between the reformed and the radical souls 
of civic environmentalism is more than a little difference in sensitivity. It is a deep rift - 
as we will see in the following chapters - in which competing normative presuppositions 
cannot  live  side-by-side  in  a  coherent  narrative.  This  stark  separation  seems  to  be 
implicitly accepted by Bäckstrand and Lövbrand themselves, who, in one of their latest 
joint contributions (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2016), seem to shift the boundaries of 
their  discursive  system.  They  narrow  the  differences  between  reformed  civic 
environmentalism and ecological modernization on the ground that both seem to accept 
that  environmental  degradation is  a  “problem nexus” to  be tackled through market-
based  mechanisms  in  a  dispersed  manner:  states,  stakeholders,  businesses,  NGOs 
contribute to climate mitigation by looking at viable opportunities when and where they 
arise.  Next  to  this  shift,  which  sees  reformed  civic  environmentalism  conceptually 
closer to ecological modernization, they also talk about a “resurgence of radical civic 
environmentalism” which is unlikely to go away, and instead nds expression outside 
the usual venues in which environmental politics is made.
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cannot  live  side-by-side  in  a  coherent  narrative.  This  stark  separation  seems  to  be 
implicitly accepted by Bäckstrand and Lövbrand themselves, who, in one of their latest 
joint contributions (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2016), seem to shift the boundaries of 
their  discursive  system.  They  narrow  the  differences  between  reformed  civic 
environmentalism and ecological modernization on the ground that both seem to accept 
that  environmental  degradation is  a  “problem nexus” to  be tackled through market-
based  mechanisms  in  a  dispersed  manner:  states,  stakeholders,  businesses,  NGOs 
contribute to climate mitigation by looking at viable opportunities when and where they 
arise.  Next  to  this  shift,  which  sees  reformed  civic  environmentalism  conceptually 
closer to ecological modernization, they also talk about a “resurgence of radical civic 
environmentalism” which is unlikely to go away, and instead nds expression outside 
the usual venues in which environmental politics is made.
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It needs to be mentioned, at this point, that the most comprehensive analysis of 
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Politics  of  the  Earth  (2013).  Dryzek’s  book  slices  environmental  politics  into  nine 
different discourses; however, his conceptual rigor does not always follow how policies 
are actually designed and implemented. More often than not, by following Dryzek, one 
has to analyze environmental policies by combining the discursive elements of different 
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modernization, on the basis that they both represent a response to the discourse on limits 
initiated  by  the  Club  of  Rome,  Dryzek  splits  them up  by  arguing  that  sustainable 
development simply asserts that economic growth and environmental conservation can 
be reconciled; while ecological modernization goes further, conservation can not only 
be reconciled with growth but it is actually good for businesses. In a sense, Bäckstrand 
and Lövbrand already put together the discursive elements that are likely to go hand-in-
hand, thus simplifying the task of situating environmental  policies in a spectrum of 
fewer and more general discourses. For example, Bäckstrand and Lövbrand analyze the 
discourse  of  ecological  modernization  in  terms  of  a  market-driven  and  expert-led 
approach to  ecological  problem-solving.  In  Dryzek’s  book,  each of  these  discursive 
elements -  market-drivenness,  being expert-led -  are parceled out to account for the 
relatively fewer cases in which an environmental policy is, for example, market-driven 
but not expert-led. The simpler discursive apparatus put in place by Bäckstrand and 
Lövbrand  seems,  therefore,  to  provide  a  better  entry  point  into  my analysis  of  the 
normative theories in the public space which already justify or condemn market-based 
mitigation instruments.
The previous point brings me to make a much-needed clarication. The narratives 
introduced  above,  and  which  I  will  use  throughout  this  research,  are  analytical 
constructs which abstract from reality certain key features of social types. They are so-
called ideal types. Whereas, on the one hand, it is not possible to justify the employment 
of these ideal types on the basis that they precisely replicate the social reality - they do 
it, but with some approximation -, on the other, their employment is nonetheless useful 
to the extent that they enable a researcher to study and explain social phenomena from a 
distinctively qualitative point of view. Furthermore, the employment of ideal types is 
also justied in the context of the epistemological  status of environmental  research. 
Ideal types - at least in the present research as well as in Weber’s original construct 
(Hekman, 1983) - are one-sided: the points of view and perspectives which they reect 
are  partial.  This  point  will  be better  developed in  Chapter  5  by showing how each 
narrative has “blind spots.”
In the following paragraphs, I will present in some more detail the three narratives 
I have decided to analyze. The choice has been made on the basis that their normative 
presuppositions  seem  to  be  sufciently  different  to  tell  us  something  about  the 
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complexity  of  the  debate  around  market-based  mechanisms  for  environmental 
protection.
The discourse on ecological modernization is conventionally made to start in 1987 
with the publication of the Report “Our Common Future” of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (1987) - chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland -, which 
made the  concept  of  “sustainable  development”  part  and parcel  of  the  international 
agenda on environmental issues. It is fair to say that still into the ‘70s, the dominant 
understanding of the relationship between the human beings and their activities, on the 
one hand, and the environment, on the other, was in terms of conict, as reected in the 
report Limits to Growth published in 1972 by the Club of Rome (Meadows et al., 1972). 
With  the  ecological  modernization  discourse,  a  new  rhetoric  gains  ground  and 
eventually subverts the old discourse according to which there are environmental limits 
to the resources needed to sustain a growing and aging population. The new rhetoric 
recognizes the multifaceted nature of environmental problems but nonetheless assumes 
that  existing  political,  economic,  and  social  institutions  can  internalize  care  for  the 
environment.  In  order  to  do  this,  however,  environmental  problems  had  to  become 
manageable with the instruments known to economists and political scientists: problems 
such as environmental degradation, biodiversity loss and emission of CO2 are therefore 
made measurable and calculable through analysis of costs and benets. A second and 
related characteristic of the ecological modernization discourse is that, by internalizing 
environmental  costs  into  the  systems  of  production,  as  opposed  to  environmental 
taxation or end-of-pipe technologies to contain pollution, environmental protection is 
portrayed  as  a  “positive-sum  game”  and  obstacles  are  portrayed  as  game-theoretic 
problems of  collective  action,  such as  the  tragedy of  the  commons (Hardin,  1968). 
Using  the  forests  as  an  example,  they  are  considered  as  an  instrument  of  low-cost 
climate mitigation because they have the capacity to store large quantities of CO2, more 
than the quantity presently stored in the atmosphere (FAO, 2006: xvii). Moreover, as 
forests provide multiple services ranging from biological ones - watershed protection - 
to cultural ones - tourism -, focusing on forests preservation and afforestation projects 
also allows for synergies maximization. According to the Technical Support Team of the 
UN in charge of providing background papers for the State representatives participating 
in the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development (in charge,  in the months 
leading to September 2015, of crafting a list of Sustainable Development Goals), forests 
are vital to achieve sustainable development.
“They  provide  solutions  for  addressing  many  development  challenges  including  poverty 
eradication, environmental sustainability, food security and agriculture, energy, clean water, and 
watershed protection, biodiversity conservation, mitigation of and adaptation to climate change, 
combating desertication and forest degradation, and disaster risk reduction” (UN TST, 2014).
The maximization of  synergies  also lead to  win-win solutions that  can be achieved 
when forest projects bring benets to more than one party; usually both the foreign 
investor  and  the  local  population.  This  ideally  happens  when  the  investor  funds  a 
project for some particular reasons - increasing the carbon storage and obtaining carbon 
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credits for example - while the local population benets from the project because of, for 
example,  increased  watershed  protection.  Low-cost  carbon  storage,  synergies 
maximization, and win-win solutions are the catchphrases or story-lines around which 
the ecological modernization discourse is built.  From within the discourse, however, 
they are achievable aims which provide the justication to further align the management 
of the forests with economics and politics.
The discourse on civic environmentalism is conventionally made to start with the 
Rio Conference of 1992. There, the language of participation of the civil society, of all 
the relevant stakeholders and marginalized groups - women, youth, indigenous people, 
etc.  -,  entered the global environmental agenda. The main justication for increased 
participation is that the groups who are directly affected by environmental problems 
should, rstly, be informed, and secondly, have a say in how these problems are tackled. 
Stakeholders’ engagement is seen as complementary to the state-centric practices and 
principally  aimed  at  increasing  the  legitimacy  and  the  public  accountability  of  the 
environmental institutions which are already in place. Although civic environmentalism 
generally  distrusts  that  the  market  alone  can  provide  equitable  solutions  to 
environmental problems, the proponents of this discourse also believe that by directly 
contributing to policy in institutional settings, they can somehow counterbalance the 
neoliberal tendencies of more mainstream policies. The inclusion of the so-called Major 
Groups in UN activities, since the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, accommodates the logic 
put forward by the civic environmentalism discourse. Again, using the case of forests as 
an example, it can be said that the increased focus on indigenous and local populations 
participation in the management of forest resources is in line with this environmental 
narrative, as well as the focus on transparency and access to information which is part 
and parcel of, for example, the REDD system based on pledges and review.
The  radical  environmentalism discourse  has  a  longer  history  compared  to  the 
other two discourses. Its beginning in Western politics can be traced back to the wave of 
environmental protests which characterized the period of intense economic development 
following  WWII  (e.g.  Carson,  1962).  This  discourse  is  critical  of  market-based 
mechanisms as they are not only seen as ineffective mitigation instruments but as the 
veritable culprits of environmental degradation, as they bring the allegedly destructive 
capitalist logic to bear on environmental matters. The discourse is also utterly critical of 
the promise of stakeholder governance. In particular, its proponents highlight the fact 
that certain power relations are at the very core of the institutions in charge of protecting 
the  environment  and  of  their  negotiation  processes  -  like  for  example  the  voting 
mechanism of the international nancial institutions and the composition of the UN’s 
Security Council.  These enduring power relations cannot  be broken from within by 
continuing to  employ the  same institutions.  Compensation schemes for  investing in 
forest projects in the Global South are not seen as mutually beneting deals in which 
one state invests in another state’s forests in exchange for the possibility of earning 
emission reduction credits; rather, they are perceived as a loophole that, by putting a 
price on forests and creating a market for them, permits the rich countries to evade their 
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historical  responsibility  for  the  high  concentrations  of  greenhouse  gases  in  the 
atmosphere.
Each  one  of  the  narratives  introduced  in  the  previous  paragraph  has  a  core 
storyline  which  revolves  around  a  broad  subject  –  markets,  participation,  or  de-
commodication and degrowth – and each storyline is in turn legitimized by a handful 
of  normative presuppositions – i.e.  a  theory of  why markets  or  participation or  de-
growth  is  good  and  should  be  promoted.  By  unveiling  these  presuppositions,  this 
research  aims  to  uncover  some  of  the  underlying  normative  forces  shaping 
environmental politics and aims to explain the polarization of the debate around market-
based  policies,  and  why  the  environmental  conicts  which  arise  from them are  so 
complex and difcult to solve. 
NARRATIVES AND FRAMES
I have been using the terms “narrative,” “discourse,” “frame,” and “story-lines” rather 
freely. As a partial excuse to this carelessness, this seems to be a common problem also 
affecting many towering academic gures in environmental sociology. For example, in 
an article reecting on a decade of usage of discourse analysis in environmental politics, 
Hajer  -  a  veritable  pioneer  in  this  academic eld  (see  Hajer,  1995)  -  together  with 
Wytske Versteeg refer to discourses as “ensembles of ideas, concepts, and categories 
through  which  meaning  is  given  to  social  and  physical  phenomena”  (Hajer  and 
Versteeg, 2006: 175). Later in the same article, the authors quite explicitly use “frame” 
as a synonym to “discourse” (177); furthermore, they also use the verb “to frame” to 
hint  at  what  discourses  do  (180).  While  they  do  not  make  any  reference  to  the 
“narrative” term, they use “story” and “storylines” to refer to subsets of discourses, yet 
this is not very well explained. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006) use “narrative” and 
“discourse” almost interchangeably,  they use “story” and “storyline” as the building 
blocks - or smaller entities - of which narratives are made, and seem to suggest that 
adopting a storyline is equivalent to framing. Similarly, George Lakoff (2010) makes 
use of “frame,” “discourse,” and “narrative,” yet he properly denes only one of them - 
“frame” -  whereas the other two are left  to the reader to gure out.  Dryzek (2013) 
species that a discourse is a “shared way of apprehending the world” (Dryzek, 2013: 9) 
and then he goes on to explain that its objective is that of putting information together 
into  coherent  stories.  For  Dryzek,  then,  “story-lines”  are  a  sort  of  output  of  the 
organizing work of discourses, not building blocks which construct discourses. All of 
these denitions bear a family resemblance as they dene discourses, narratives, frames, 
story, and story-lines as shared understandings of the world, which are always partial 
and situated. But now that a better understanding of how narratives embed normative 
presuppositions and what this means for environmental politics is sought, it is better to 
tidy up the vocabulary.
A narrative  always involves  some temporal  structure.  According to  a  minimal 
denition of narrative given by Gerald Prince, a “narrative is the representation of at 
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least  two  real  of  ctive  events  or  situations  in  time  sequence,  neither  of  which 
presupposes or entails the other” (Prince, 1982: 4, emphasis in the original). Every time 
there is a timeline, something that has happened before, something that has happened 
after or is happening now, and a “because” clause connecting the two, it is possible to 
refer to this construction as a narrative. Here is an example: population growth (before); 
deforestation, land degradation, and the advancement of the agricultural frontier (now); 
an increased demand for agricultural and wood products (because). This is the narrative: 
population  growth  is  pushing  the  agricultural  frontier  forward  because  there  is  an 
increasing demand for wood products and products such as soy, timber, and palm oil. In 
the environmental politics literature, there is also a second sense in which one could talk 
about narratives: when the temporal structure is implied by if-then clauses in future 
scenarios. If we employ a market-based forestry mechanism such as REDD to provide 
funding  to  counter  the  drivers  of  deforestation,  environmental  degradation  and  the 
agricultural  frontier  can be pushed back.  This,  too,  is  a  narrative,  albeit  in a  looser 
sense.
The denition of “discourse” provided by Hajer and Versteeg is a good starting 
point to reason about the differences between discourses and narratives. A discourse is 
“an ensemble of ideas,  concepts,  and categories through which meaning is  given to 
social and physical phenomena” (Hajer and Versteeg, 2006: 175). Discourses need not 
have a temporal  structure,  and although it  is  likely that  some of their  concepts and 
categories will display such a causal and temporal structure, this is not their most salient 
characteristic. A discourse separates what is normal from what is not: for example, it is 
quite normal nowadays to refer  to a plot  of  forest  in terms of its  capacity for  CO2 
sequestration;  it  is  not  normal  anymore  to  refer  to  decomposing  biomass  in  the 
understory of forests as generating toxic efuvia. A discourse, its categories, and its 
concepts are often used to construct a narrative by providing the material to bridge two 
unrelated  events  or  scenarios:  for  example,  if  REDD mechanisms  are  portrayed  as 
effective instruments to halt forest degradation, then this narrative implies that looking 
at  forests  in  terms  of  their  capacity  to  sequester  CO2  is  a  valuable  instrument  to 
understand problems of environmental degradation and solve them. The discourse of 
green governmentality identied by Bäckstrand and Lövbrand is, then, truly a discourse 
as it provides instruments, ideas, and concepts which cross narrative boundaries.
A frame  is  an  unconscious  structure  which  people  use  to  think:  it  includes 
semantic roles, concepts, events, relations, both between different roles and between the 
frame  and  other  frames  (Lakoff,  2010:  71).  For  example,  if  I  say  Ph.D.  student, 
supervisor, research, and article, the frame I elicit by uttering those words is that of 
academia, or higher education, or university. More precisely, this frame species also 
the relations between these roles, and it could do so in the following terms: supervisors 
help Ph.D. students in their research by correcting and providing feedback about their 
articles. Other relations are also possible by combining those same roles and concepts. 
More interesting than the substantive “frame” is the verb “to frame.” The verb implies a 
sort of purposeful agency, i.e. someone doing something with a purpose in mind, i.e. 
framing something.  To frame something is  to  use  specic  words  referring  to  roles, 
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concepts, relations, and events in order to elicit these unconscious structures. Narratives 
are  constructed through the action of  framing.  Imagine there  is  a  complex problem 
which can in principle be explained in a number of different ways; when it gets framed, 
only a handful of events, role, and concepts of the many available are then chosen as 
relevant to the explanation or solution of the problem. 
Finally, a narrative can be a simple or a complex story. If the former, the two 
concepts of narrative and storyline are coextensive: both refer to a temporal structure 
linking at least two events or scenarios. If the latter, it means that there are more simple 
narratives - or story-lines - making up one complex narrative. Some initial thoughts on 
narratives and framing are in order:
(i) Ecological  modernization,  civic  environmentalism,  and  radical 
environmentalism are complex narratives: they are narratives in the less strict sense of 
the term; each of these narratives is in turn made up of a handful of different story-lines. 
That  being  said,  it  is  possible  to  single  out  a  core  story-line  for  each  of  the  three 
narratives. For ecological modernization: problems of environmental degradation (now) 
can be solved with the use of market mechanisms (in the future, but hopefully soon) 
because  economic  growth  correlates  positively  and  possibly  causes  environmental 
protection  (because).  For  civic  environmentalism:  while  markets  and  market-based 
mechanisms might well provide environmental protection, they do not provide equitable 
environmental  protection  (now),  therefore  mechanisms  to  increase  participation  and 
transparency in governance should be introduced (in the future, but again, hopefully 
soon)  because,  by  helping  in  closing  what  can  be  called  a  “participation  gap”  in 
environmental institutions, these mechanisms will increase the redistributive measures 
in favor of those who are negatively affected by market-based environmental protection 
(because).  For radical  environmentalism: market-based environmental  protection and 
the process of commodication that goes with it are bad for the environment and the 
people  dependent  on  it  (now);  therefore  a  powerful  protest  movement  aimed  at 
scrapping  these  mechanisms  should  be  mounted  against  the  “forces  of  the  status 
quo” (in the future, but again, hopefully soon), because otherwise things will continue 
to worsen (because).
(ii) When I say that narratives are constructed through the process of framing, I 
am clearly not referring to some Cartesian evil demon who actively plots and thinks of 
possible ways of framing a problem and building a narrative. Although sometimes this 
sort of individuals do exist, they are called spin doctors and public opinion consultants. 
The process is more the result of ideas that circulate in the public space, get picked up 
by some writers or activists, and then make their way into the common language; from 
there they snowball into the lives and mode of thinking of an ever larger segment of the 
population.
(iii) Framing and narrative building always refer to something partial, i.e. to the 
action - conscious or not - of choosing something and foreground it while discarding 
something  else.  Let  me  take  again  the  issue  of  environmental  degradation  and 
deforestation in tropical countries: it is a complex problem that can be framed in many 
different ways, i.e. social, political, economic, and environmental. It can be framed as a 
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which can in principle be explained in a number of different ways; when it gets framed, 
only a handful of events, role, and concepts of the many available are then chosen as 
relevant to the explanation or solution of the problem. 
Finally, a narrative can be a simple or a complex story. If the former, the two 
concepts of narrative and storyline are coextensive: both refer to a temporal structure 
linking at least two events or scenarios. If the latter, it means that there are more simple 
narratives - or story-lines - making up one complex narrative. Some initial thoughts on 
narratives and framing are in order:
(i) Ecological  modernization,  civic  environmentalism,  and  radical 
environmentalism are complex narratives: they are narratives in the less strict sense of 
the term; each of these narratives is in turn made up of a handful of different story-lines. 
That  being  said,  it  is  possible  to  single  out  a  core  story-line  for  each  of  the  three 
narratives. For ecological modernization: problems of environmental degradation (now) 
can be solved with the use of market mechanisms (in the future, but hopefully soon) 
because  economic  growth  correlates  positively  and  possibly  causes  environmental 
protection  (because).  For  civic  environmentalism:  while  markets  and  market-based 
mechanisms might well provide environmental protection, they do not provide equitable 
environmental  protection  (now),  therefore  mechanisms  to  increase  participation  and 
transparency in governance should be introduced (in the future, but again, hopefully 
soon)  because,  by  helping  in  closing  what  can  be  called  a  “participation  gap”  in 
environmental institutions, these mechanisms will increase the redistributive measures 
in favor of those who are negatively affected by market-based environmental protection 
(because).  For radical  environmentalism: market-based environmental  protection and 
the process of commodication that goes with it are bad for the environment and the 
people  dependent  on  it  (now);  therefore  a  powerful  protest  movement  aimed  at 
scrapping  these  mechanisms  should  be  mounted  against  the  “forces  of  the  status 
quo” (in the future, but again, hopefully soon), because otherwise things will continue 
to worsen (because).
(ii) When I say that narratives are constructed through the process of framing, I 
am clearly not referring to some Cartesian evil demon who actively plots and thinks of 
possible ways of framing a problem and building a narrative. Although sometimes this 
sort of individuals do exist, they are called spin doctors and public opinion consultants. 
The process is more the result of ideas that circulate in the public space, get picked up 
by some writers or activists, and then make their way into the common language; from 
there they snowball into the lives and mode of thinking of an ever larger segment of the 
population.
(iii) Framing and narrative building always refer to something partial, i.e. to the 
action - conscious or not - of choosing something and foreground it while discarding 
something  else.  Let  me  take  again  the  issue  of  environmental  degradation  and 
deforestation in tropical countries: it is a complex problem that can be framed in many 
different ways, i.e. social, political, economic, and environmental. It can be framed as a 
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consequence  of  the  impact  of  globalization  on  poor  rural  areas;  as  a  problem  of 
economic incentives in a market economy; as a legal issue in terms of inadequate land 
tenure systems;  as  a  political  conundrum because elected politician have to balance 
expectation  for  economic  growth  and  protection  of  the  environment;  as  a  shift  in 
cultural values concerning different attitudes towards the environment. Each of these 
perspectives  chooses  a  different  now-problem (a  problem of  incentives,  or  of  land 
tenure, or cultural dimensions), chooses a different future-solution, and mediates the 
two by means of a causal story. The narratives analyzed in the following chapters use 
one or more of these frames.
FRAMING COMPLEXITY
The question at this point might emerge spontaneously: if the act of framing, as well as 
the  narratives  themselves,  are  always  partial  and  problems  touching  on  different 
dimensions (political, economic, environmental, social, cultural) are complex, why do 
politicians, activists, researchers, and concerned people in general frame problems and 
use narratives? The question is  all  the more relevant  if  one considers  that  different 
frames lead to conict and polarizing debates. Using a military metaphor, should not an 
enemy surrender sooner if it is attacked on multiple fronts? If we look at this from a 
political perspective, then one reason for reducing complexity into a narrative through 
the process of framing might be political convenience: to get elected - and reelected -, 
politicians need clear and simple messages which can be understood and supported by 
everyone. From an economic perspective, it might be a problem of resources as not all 
possible policy solutions to tackle a problem can be tested at the same moment. To put 
in the terms of the metaphor above, there might not be sufcient economic resources to 
mount an attack on multiple fronts (economic rationale) or it might be too difcult to 
explain this strategy to our infantry (political rationale).
A  more  important  reason,  however,  is  that  often  there  are  genuine  and 
passionately  diverging  opinions  concerning  the  real  cause  of  a  problem  and  its 
solutions; furthermore, these can be incommensurable between each other: what is a 
solution to a problem is often considered the cause of the same problem for someone 
else.  These  types  of  problem are  often  called  “wicked”  precisely  because  they  are 
resistant to resolution and they generate disputes that become intractable (Rittel and 
Webber,  1973).  Finally,  a  more  radical  perspective  on  this  point  might  be  to 
acknowledge that  this  is  just  how knowledge works  and this  is  how human beings 
navigate the social world: not everything can be apprehended at the same time, it would 
be cognitively impossible, and more or less conscious choices should continuously be 
made in order to frame and tackle the problems we might be faced with.
The rst two responses stress practical and strategic aspects of framing: it might 
be useful and even necessary to frame problems to have a chance to tackle them in a 
more convenient way, whether it is politically or economically convenient. The latter 
two  responses  point  to  the  fact  that  partiality  and  framing  are  to  some  extent 
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inescapable, that complexity is ineliminable and is as much a cause of partial framing of 
a problem which can never really be apprehended as a whole as is its outcome. If this is 
the  case,  then,  what  narratives  do  is  to  negotiate  different  theoretical  aspirations: 
understanding a problem in its complexity as much as possible while at the same time 
reducing it into understandable stories and workable hypotheses, theories, or policies.
TWO MATRICES
Efciency vs. Justice
Analyzing the normative presuppositions behind the environmental narratives is the rst 
step to charting the different positions in the debate about the merits and drawbacks of 
market-based  instruments  and  to  uncover  the  complexities  of  these  policies,  but  it 
cannot be the whole story. This analysis yields a naive picture of the debate, it shows 
some glaring differences among the narratives, but it does not go deeper in showing 
why these differences often develop into environmental conicts which are complex 
and difcult to solve. In order to bring out the specic traits of each narrative, I will 
parse  the  normative  presuppositions  undergirding  the  environmental  narratives  into 
arguments on grounds of justice and arguments on grounds of efciency.
I will rst show how each narrative displays elements which can be traced back to 
both normative concerns (i.e. both efciency and justice), and, second, I will show how 
the  relationship  between  these  two  normative  elements  changes  across  the  three 
narratives.  In  particular,  I  will  show how the  narrative  of  ecological  modernization 
attempts  to  assimilate  justice  to  efciency;  the  narrative  of  civic  environmentalism 
attempts  to  subsume efciency  under  a  broader  conception  of  political  justice;  and 
radical environmentalism tries to reject both the paradigms of efciency and political 
justice  in  favor  of  a  largely  non-anthropocentric  conception  of  justice.  “Largely” 
because, as it will be seen in Chapter 4, radical environmentalism is better described as 
a set of different, and at times, incompatible, environmental stances.
Table 1.1 - The rst matrix: efciency vs. justice.  
A caveat on the distinction between efciency and justice is in order. This distinction is 
not clear-cut, as ultimately normative assumptions of welfare economics on increasing 
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justice,  underpin  the  pursuit  of  efciency.  The  distinction  is,  however,  usually 
unproblematic: arguments on grounds of efciency maintain that a certain policy should 
be carried out if it produces certain benets while costing less than other alternative 
options. These types of argument have an obvious intuitive appeal: if something can be 
done with less effort, then the remaining resources can be used to achieve something 
else.  On the  other  side,  the  notion of  justice  captures  all  those  normative  positions 
which depart from the idea that the equality of something is of paramount importance 
(Gosepath, 2011): equal respect for property rights (libertarians), equal opportunities to 
shape one’s own life (political liberalism), equal respect for life and life-bearing entities 
(non-anthropocentrism).
Clashes, continuities, and blind spots
Whereas  the  rst  matrix  will  map the  debate  by looking at  the  different  normative 
presuppositions informing the three environmental narratives, we will need another set 
of concepts and a different matrix to make sense of the importance of these different 
ways of articulating environmental policy. This second step is all the more important 
when  considering  that  narratives  -  as  I  said  above  -  negotiate  different  theoretical 
aspirations: they try to understand a problem in its complexity as much as possible, 
while at the same time reducing it to understandable stories and workable hypotheses, 
theories, or policies. They do this not only by framing problems, but also by reframing 
alternatives, and by contrasting incommensurable alternatives.
By framing problems, narratives reduce a complex problem to a few identiable 
elements  of  a  story  which  has  a  temporal  structure  (now/future)  and  a  causal 
explanation  (because).  By  reframing  alternatives,  narratives  capture  some  of  the 
complexity being lost through the original process of framing; this is very much a work 
of translation in which some of the elements of the competing narratives are made to t 
the  preferred  narrative.  By  reframing  and  ltering  out  the  normative  positions 
subtending the other narratives, each narrative tries to present itself as an overarching 
and  all-encompassing  story.  Like  many  processes  of  translation,  it  is  not  without 
“costs”: a term in a language does not always nd its exact translation in another one, 
and many times the translated term loses its specic meaning when taken out of the 
context for which it was originally intended. In other words, each narrative, while trying 
to capture the complexity of a problem, also reduces it in a distinctive way. Finally, the 
elements of competing narratives - normative presuppositions included - that are truly 
incompatible with the preferred narrative are either ignored or directly opposed.
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Table 1.2 - The second matrix: clashes, continuities, and blind spots.
Clashes, continuities, and blind spots are, then, the three analytical categories I am 
going to employ to show how each environmental narrative reduces and interprets the 
complexity of environmental politics. Clashes is the rst category I am going to employ 
in  order  to  highlight  the  differences  among  the  narratives.  This  analytical  category 
comes rst as it is the implicit focus around which the Chapter 2, 3, and 4 have been 
built.  Sometimes,  however,  different  narratives  depart  from  similar  fundamental 
normative assumptions which are then interpreted in different ways and evolve in a 
different direction: continuities  is thus the second category I will employ to analyze 
these narratives. What I call a blind spot is what is lost in translation, i.e. what is clearly 
considered from within a certain narrative, but sidelined in another after it  has been 
reframed to t the preferred narrative.  
Whereas  looking  at  the  environmental  narratives  and  their  normative 
presuppositions might  give us indications on how certain policies  are already being 
implicitly  justied  in  the  public  sphere  and  on  the  differences  among  these 
justications, going one step further and analyzing the relationships among the different 
narratives  in  terms  of  clashes,  continuities,  and  blind  spots  will  give  us  valuable 
information concerning what makes the debate on the merits and faults of market-based 
mechanisms in environmental politics endure, i.e. the fundamental points of divergence 
which keep driving the different positions away from each other, or what might, on 
closer  reection,  drive them together.  In other  words,  through the prism of the two 
matrices it is possible to acquire a more rened understanding of the various positions 
currently informing environmental politics and, furthermore, it is possible to make these 
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THE NORMATIVE PRESUPPOSITIONS UNDERLYING THE 
NARRATIVE OF ECOLOGICAL MODERNIZATION
The  narrative  of  ecological  modernization  brings  to  the  policy-making  table  the 
neoliberal message re-packaged for the purpose of environmental protection. Although 
there  are  a  myriad  of  different  denitions  of  what  counts  as  “neoliberal”  -  mostly 
because it is impossible to nd two identical neoliberal policies with similar results in 
different places - a certain family resemblance between the different denitions seems 
to  point  to  the  market  as  the  main  focus  of  neoliberal  policies.  Markets  should  be 
allowed to make major social and political decisions (George, 1999: 1); competitive 
relations  of  the  market  should  be  extended  as  far  as  possible,  keeping  the  state 
intervention to a minimum (Holield, 2004: 286); neoliberalism entails a utopian vision 
of  market  forces  completely  liberated  worldwide  with  the  state  ceding  its  socio-
economic and resource-allocating roles to the market (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). If 
ecological modernization is a disguised neoliberal message for environmental purposes, 
it follows that some of the arguments usually invoked in order to defend free-market 
policies and policies that would increase the roles of markets can also be invoked to 
defend the idea that the environment can be protected through the interplay of market 
forces, competition, and economic growth.
In this chapter, I present some of these arguments. Sometimes it is possible to 
disentangle which normative presupposition clearly lies behind a given policy - maybe 
because the proponent of the policy clearly stated it - but sometimes it is impossible, 
either because more than one presupposition is present and they reinforce each other - 
markets are efcient and protect individual liberties -, or because faith in the miraculous 
power of economic growth is rigidly taken as an unquestioned ideology. Moreover, few 
politicians clearly spell out the normative presuppositions behind their policies, either 
because they do not know them or because it would not be convenient to do so. It is for 
this  reason  that  it  would  not  be  accurate  to  say  that  the  narrative  of  ecological 
modernization as an ensemble of ideas gravitating around environmental protection is 
grounded on a specic pro-market normative substratum. Instead actors that advance an 
agenda in line with ecological modernization implicitly or explicitly rely on some of 
these arguments, and when they do so they explicitly pick and choose those arguments 
that best boost their position from a rhetorical point of view.
Arguments  for  unleashing  market  forces  to  protect  the  environment  can  be 
grouped under arguments on grounds of efciency and arguments on grounds of justice. 
As I said, this distinction is not clear cut, because, for ecological modernization, the 
35
reasons to pursue efciency are ultimately grounded on the increased well-being people 
will receive. Most of the time, however, the distinction is largely unproblematic. The 
waters  are  indeed  more  muddied  as  welfare  economics  embeds  some  important 
utilitarian assumptions; I will ag them when we encounter them. The rst part of the 
chapter will  focus on the efciency arguments informing the narrative of ecological 
modernization, the second, on the arguments on grounds of justice. 
EFFICIENCY ARGUMENTS
Arguments on grounds of efciency maintain that a policy should be implemented if it 
produces certain benets while costing less than other options. These types of argument 
have an obvious intuitive appeal: if something can be done with less of an effort, then 
the remaining resources can be used to achieve something else. According to the rst 
theorem of welfare economics, free competitive markets have the capacity to create a 
surplus and thus make everyone better off up to the point at which no one can be made 
better off without someone being made worse off. This state of affairs is called Pareto 
Optimality. A state of a given system is Pareto Optimal if and only if there is no feasible 
alternative state of that system in which at least one person is better off and no one is 
worse off. A state S1 is Pareto Superior to another S2, if and only if there is at least one 
person who is better off in S1 than in S2 and no one is worse off in S1 than in S2. These 
two Paretian principles are usually seen as the second-best alternative to utilitarianism 
when it comes to evaluating efciency: evaluating social states according to the overall 
utility they produce would be preferable, were it not for the fact that interpersonal utility 
comparisons  cannot  be  made  (Buchanan,  1985).  The  Paretian  principles  avoid 
interpersonal  utility  comparisons  by  requiring  only  that  we  are  able  to  determine 
whether each individual is better off or worse off relative to his own former condition.
“Leave it to the market,” however, is not always a practicable road to effectively 
bring about a needed change, either because markets sometimes fail or because certain 
public domains are not open to free private enterprise. Cost-benet analysis sets out to 
do for government and international actors - like the World Bank, for example - what 
the market does for businesses: comparing costs to benets, to then go with the option 
which  best  maximizes  the  benets  while  minimizing  the  costs.  However,  for  the 
purpose of policy analysis and regulations, the second-best option, Pareto optimality, is 
seldom good enough. This is because it is highly unlikely that the introduction of a new 
large-scale regulation or a social policy will only improve the well-being of a part of the 
population, while leaving the others untouched. These kinds of policies will produce 
both winners and losers. As the Pareto criterion is too stringent, a third efciency test is 
usually employed by policy makers to evaluate new projects or regulations: the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion. According to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, an outcome is more efcient 
than  an  alternative  outcome  if  those  who  are  made  better  off  could,  in  theory, 
compensate those who are made worse off so that an actual Pareto improvement could 
be achieved. This compensation in practice almost never happens; that is why the Pareto 
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improvement is only potential. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion is the bedrock upon which 
the cost-benet analysis procedure to evaluate social policy is rationalized.
Cost-benet  analysis  and free  markets  are  the  two instruments  to  bring about 
efciency  that  are  most  closely  associated  with  the  narrative  of  ecological 
modernization. The usual catchphrases mentioned in the previous chapter - synergies 
maximization, win-win solutions, low-cost carbon storage - capture important aspects of 
the alleged consequences of using these instruments to pursue environmental protection.
I start my review of the arguments associated with ecological modernization from 
the analysis of the cost-benet method: after briey tracing the history of cost-benet 
analysis  as  a  method  to  evaluate  policy  options,  I  will  review  the  methodological 
assumptions  of  cost-benet  analysis,  largely  following the  work of  Kristin  Shrader-
Frechette  (1983,  1998).  Much of  the  criticisms leveled  against  cost-benet  analysis 
revolve around those methodological assumptions. When appropriate, I will provide a 
defense against these criticisms. After that,  I  turn to the role of markets in bringing 
about environmental protection. However, before all this, I need to analyze the basic 
claim upon which the ecological modernization narrative is built upon: that economic 
growth can be good for the environment. To this I now turn.
Economic Growth and the Environment
From growth to environmental protection
The  main  message  conveyed  by  the  narrative  of  ecological  modernization  is  that 
economic growth can be reconciled with, or in some cases is good for, environmental 
protection,  and  that  environmental  protection  can  be  reconciled,  or  is  good  for, 
economic growth: a double win-win. For people like me, born in the late ‘80s, this is 
not a particularly revolutionary message: the expression “sustainable development” was 
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wanted to make an appearance at  the international  institutions.  To older people,  the 
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skepticism. One could - but need not - go back as far as the rst industrial revolution in 
Britain: the negative effects of Britain’s economic expansion on the environment are 
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Italy. Beppe Fenoglio, an Italian novelist, famously wrote that the polluted waters of the 
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river Bormida had the color of coagulated blood and no grass could grow on its banks.  1
The waters of the river were indeed used by the chemical company ACNA, which had a 
permit from the government to take the waters from the river for its operations and 
return the waters to it thereafter. Granted that the connection between economic growth 
and  environmental  protection  is  anything  but  necessary,  one  might  try  to  be  more 
charitable towards those who nd that the link between the two does hold and analyze 
their arguments. It is true that specic cases of pollution strike the mind of the local 
population in a negative way - like my example of the river Bormida -, yet one might 
want to argue that the aggregated effect of economic growth on the environment is, on 
balance, positive. The claim thus deserves more careful consideration. I start from the 
analysis  of  the elements  that  have an impact  on the relationship between economic 
growth and environmental  protection;  then I  move on to  discussing two underlying 
theories which could explain how such elements might indeed increase environmental 
protection while enabling the economy to grow.
The scale of production of goods is the rst element that links economic growth to 
environmental impacts. If the production of a certain good grows, there also needs to be 
a proportional growth in the resources - or input mix - used to manufacture that good, 
other factors in the production being equal. Quite simply, if to irrigate a eld one needs 
x liters of water, 2x liters are needed to irrigate two of the same elds, provided that the 
irrigation  technology  remains  the  same.  The  expansion  of  the  production  impacts 
negatively  on  the  environmental  resources  needed  for  the  production.  This  basic 
relationship between resources and economic expansion is at the core of the Malthusian 
and neo-Malthusian environmental concerns epitomized by the research produced by 
the Club of Rome (Meadows et al., 1972). The output mix of a country-wide economy 
is  a  second element  that  affects  the  relationship  between economic  growth and the 
environment (Janicke et al.,  1997). The idea is that different development stages are 
characterized by different output mixes, which in turn have different impacts on the 
environment.  The traditional  path  to  development  depicts  societies  moving from an 
agricultural  to  an  industrial  resource-intensive  economy  which  increases  emissions; 
then, a further stage of development sees the economy shifting again towards a greener, 
less resource-intensive service sector. A third element is the state of the technology; a 
technological innovation could help produce more output per unit of polluting input or it 
could  nd  a  substitute  for  a  particularly  polluting  input.  In  this  case,  the  total 
productivity will have lower emission per unit of output, making the production more 
energy-efcient.  Other  cultural  factors,  such as  environmental  awareness,  education, 
and environmental regulations, while not impacting directly on the relationship between 
 «Hai mai visto Bormida? Ha l’acqua color sangue raggrumato, perché porta via i riuti delle fabbriche 1
di Cengio e sulle rive non cresce più un lo d’erba. Un’acqua più porca e avvelenata, che ti mette freddo 
nel midollo, specie a vederla di notte sotto la luna». Translation (by me): «Have you ever seen [the river] 
Bormida? The water, it’s the color of coagulated blood, because it takes away the waste of the factories of 
Cengio [a place nearby] and on its banks no grass can grow. Shit water, and poisoned, it makes you feel 
cold in the spine, especially when you look at it under the moonlight» (Fenoglio, 1963).
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economic growth and environmental  protection,  have an effect  on the technological 
research which, in turn, affects the relationship under investigation (Stern 2004).
Assuming that it  were true that economic growth leads to more environmental 
protection - by nding substitutes to polluting inputs, by nding more energy-efcient 
technologies, and by moving the bulk of the economy towards the service sector -, what 
are the underlying reasons which drive development into this greener direction in the 
rst  place?  Two different  theories  could  help  explain  why  economic  growth  might 
create a demand for a greener economy: the post-materialist theory in environmental 
sociology (Inglehart, 1977) and the theory of positional goods in economics (Hirsch, 
1976).  The  two  theories  are  not  competing  and  indeed  might  reinforce  each  other. 
According to Ronald Inglehart, the rise of environmental concerns during the second 
half of the twentieth century is largely due to a shift in cultural values. The generation 
born after the World War II did not witness economic shortages and physical insecurity 
during their adolescence, the crucial formative years for one’s value system according to 
Inglehart. As a result, this younger and economically more solid generation is oriented 
toward satisfying their other, less immediate needs, mostly associated with social bonds, 
self-esteem, stewardship of the environment and quality of life in general.  Inglehart 
arrived  at  this  conclusion  by  conducting  polls  and  surveys  of  citizens  in  the 
industrialized  countries.  A second  theory  -  that  of  positional  goods  -  which  could 2
explain  the  relationship  between  economic  growth  and  increased  environmental 
protection sees the increased concern for the depletion of the environment as a response 
to the decreasing availability of environmental resources and services. The perception 
of scarcity, congestion, and crowding through extensive use of certain environmental 
goods, coupled with their desirability by other people, make environmental resources 
akin to luxury goods. Hence, after a cycle of economic growth through environmental 
depletion, certain societies reach a point at which they want to preserve the remaining 
resources. This is a variation on the theme which sees environmentalism as a response 
to Malthusian concerns.
Whatever  the  reason  behind  the  claim  that  economic  growth  leads  to  more 
environmental protection - materialist, post-materialist or both -, starting from the early 
1990s a large body of research set out to empirically demonstrate the truthfulness of the 
claim.  In  economics,  the  relationship  between  economic  growth  and  environmental 
protection is known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve. It is an inverted-U-shaped 
curve which roughly describes the changing quality of the environment along different 
estimates  for  per  capita  income.  As  income grows,  there  is  a  rst  period  in  which 
resources are intensively extracted and the environment degrades, after which a turning 
point sets in such that more income leads to environmental improvement and increased 
environmental protection. At rst simply a hypothesis, it was tested by Gene Grossman 
and  Alan  Krueger  (1991)  in  a  ground-breaking  study  which  intended  to  study  the 
impacts on the environment of the opening of markets with Mexico in the context of the 
 Ronald  Inglehart  is  the  founding  President  of  the  World  Values  Survey:  a  global  research  project 2
involving a global network of social scientists who conducts national surveys aimed at exploring the 
different people’s value systems, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp (last accessed May 2017).
39
ECOLOGICAL MODERNIZATION
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Whereas politicians in Washington 
feared that Mexico’s adhesion to the trade bloc would invite companies to relocate to 
where  environmental  protection  is  weakest,  Grossman  and  Krueger  argued  that  the 
rising incomes from trade would ultimately have a positive impact on the environment. 
They analyzed the data gathered from the Global Environmental Monitoring System 
(GEMS) - a joint project WHO and UNEP - the objective of which was to improve the 
monitoring of air quality in urban areas.  The data,  which tracks air quality in cities 
around the world and in three different areas of each city (usually city center, suburban, 
industrial), was then related to estimates of economic growth. The ndings of the study 
provided  statistical  evidence  for  a  relationship  between  economic  growth  and 
environmental protection which tracks an inverted-U-shaped curve.
Several  other  studies  in  the early  ‘90s nd a  similar  relationship for  different 
pollutants  and  different  indicators  for  economic  growth  (Shak and  Bandopadhyay, 
1992; Hettige et al., 1992). As economic growth correlates positively with the quality of 
institutions,  a  better  understanding  of  how  policy  interventions  could  foster 
environmental quality also needed to be grounded on how air quality data and several 
“quality of institutions” variables relate to each other. A series of studies in the late ‘90s 
and  early  2000  set  out  to  do  just  that.  Theodore  Panayatou  (1997)  explored  the 
relationship  between  the  Global  Environmental  Monitoring  System  (GEMS)  data 
pertaining  to  sulfur  dioxide  and  ve  different  policy  variables  -  enforcement  of 
contracts, efciency of the bureaucracy, efcacy of the rule of law, corruption, and risk 
of appropriation. He found that good institutions could help atten the Environmental 
Kuznets  Curve  by  reducing  environmental  degradation  at  low-income  levels  and 
speeding up protection at  higher  income levels.  Along the  same lines,  Seth  Norton 
(2002) provided a review of the main literature on the topic and found that economic 
growth,  property rights enforcement,  and environmental  protection are all  correlated 
and reinforce each other: property rights enforcement leads to higher income levels, 
which  in  turn  generates  demand  for  environmental  quality;  also,  strong  institutions 
could better provide a better context to take legal action against those who generate 
pollution.
More recently, the early studies on the Environmental Kuznets Curve have come 
under re because of their allegedly imsy statistical foundations and because newer 
studies on both the same (sulfur dioxide in most cases) and different pollutants do not 
replicate the same inverted-U relationship between economic growth and environmental 
quality (Stern, 2004; Gallagher, 2009). In particular, most of the early studies which test 
the relationship between economic growth and environmental quality, while also trying 
to include additional explanatory variables intended to model proximate factors - such 
as  the  quality  of  the  institutions  -,  are  subject  to  the  problem of  potential  omitted 
variable bias. Early studies showed Kuznets curves for local pollutants, while global 
ones - like CO2 - increased monotonically with economic growth. These ndings, if 
conrmed,  would  have  demonstrated  that  local  impacts  of  pollutants  are  quickly 
internalized within  a  single  economy,  whereas  policy-makers  do not  have the  same 
incentives to regulate pollutants that disperse rapidly in the atmosphere. However, as all 
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the studies rely on quality of air data collected in urban areas, it is also possible that 
pollution follows a well-studied pattern of urban development: at the initial stages, a 
few cities grow quickly and contain much of the modern industry of the country; then, 
as  development  continues,  urban  and  industrial  development  decentralize, 
concentrations of pollutants decrease in urban areas, while the total emissions of the 
pollutants  continue  to  increase.  Recent  studies  show  that  there  is  little  difference 
between local and global pollutants, as both display a monotonic relation with income 
(Stern, 2004). The studies that try to prove the Environmental Kuznets Curve are not 
robust and mostly explain the inverted-U-shaped relationship between concentrations of 
pollutants and income.
Yet somehow, the message that economic growth can function as a panacea for a 
number  of  disparate  environmental  problems  has  remained  the  cornerstone  of 
international environmental policy and has made it into the political mainstream. There 
are  obvious  merits  in  combining  the  two  messages  -  environmental  protection  and 
economic growth -, most importantly the ability to align the most economically capable 
behind the banner of environmental protection. However, if the arguments that underlie 
the  narrative  of  ecological  modernization  are  received  uncritically,  one  might  soon 
encounter unpalatable conclusions. Indeed, by linking environmental concerns to a level 
of physical and economic security, one risks concealing the demands for environmental 
quality by poorer populations. “Are they too poor to be green?”, asks Martínez-Alier 
(1995;  2002)  about  indigenous  people  and  poor  African  and  South  American 
populations. He makes the point that a further consequence of the body of literature that 
sees environmentalism as a response to economic growth is that the demands of the 
poorer populations for environmental quality get redened and reframed in terms of 
different  types  of  conicts:  struggles  for  land,  or,  for  example,  for  the  intellectual 
property rights of genetically modied seeds.
From environmental protection to growth
The Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis sees economic growth as an important 
cause  of  greater  environmental  protection.  However,  the  direction  of  the  “causality 
arrow”  can  also  be  changed:  according  to  the  Porter  hypothesis,  environmental 
protection and stricter regulations on pollutants can spur economic growth by having a 
positive impact on the performance of rms (Porter and van der Linde, 1995a, 1995b). 
This is somewhat different than saying that economic growth, good institutions, and 
environmental protection are all mutually reinforcing - as Norton (2002) does -, on the 
assumption that the acquired demand for environmental quality will help create the sort 
of legal institutions which also positively correlate with economic growth. According to 
Michael Porter and Claas van der Linde, properly designed environmental regulations 
might be benecial to businesses because they push businesses to innovate; in turn, 
these  innovations  will  have  an  impact  on  the  prots  of  the  rms  to  the  point  of 
outweighing  the  costs  of  complying  with  environmental  regulations.  The  Porter 
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hypothesis has thus been divided into different versions thereof, each testing a particular 
claim made by Porter and van der Linde. The “weak” version of the hypothesis focuses 
on the rst claim and submits that environmental regulations produce innovations, while 
leaving aside whether such innovations are good or bad for the performance of the 
rms.  A “strong”  version  of  the  hypothesis  submits  that  such  innovations  produce 
overall  net  benets  regarding the business performance of rms. The main intuition 
behind the Porter hypothesis is that pollution is in many cases a sort of inefciency in 
the production of a good, “a manifestation of economic waste and involves unnecessary, 
inefcient or incomplete utilization of resources, or resources not used to generate their 
highest value” (Porter and van der Linde, 1995b: 105). Since its original publication, the 
literature on the Porter hypothesis focused both on testing the empirical claims and on 
providing  a  theoretical  explanation  of  why  environmental  regulations  might  indeed 
cause better business performance, against the long held, and still popular, belief that 
any environmental regulation will slow down economic growth.
Porter and van der Linde argued that by putting in place stringent environmental 
regulation, a state will give the rst-mover advantage to its rms, which will be forced 
to  adapt  and  develop  new  technologies  in  order  to  become  green  sooner  than  the 
competitors elsewhere. This explanation, however, has two related problems, one more 
serious  than  the  other.  The  rst  and  more  serious  is  that  rms  have  a  rst-mover 
advantage only when a state moved rst in passing environmental regulations. If this 
were the case, then there would be a relationship between the performances of the rms 
and the specic time in which environmental regulations are enacted, and not between 
the rst and environmental regulations per se. The second problem is that, if it is true 
that timing is more important than regulations, then states need to either have a “sense 
of  history,”  i.e.  be  able  to  understand certain  pivotal  trends  in  international  politics 
before they happen, or have the strength to impose new trends and discourses upon 
other international actors. For example, one could read the focus on specic sectors of 
the internet economy of developed countries as a way of anticipating or constructing 
important  trends  of  the  future.  Indeed,  while  most  of  the  efforts  at  the  level  of 
international governance focus on the so-called Sustainable Development Goals (the 
successors  of  the  Millennium  Development  Goals),  focusing,  in  particular,  on  the 
eradication of poverty in all its forms - better nutrition, health, education, etc. - and the 
“greening” of the international economy - phasing out polluting cars, placing cap-and-
trade mechanisms or taxes on polluting industries,  etc.  -,  the developed countries in 
Europe,  Japan,  and  North  America  are  already  focusing  on  one  of  the  next  big 
developments in the international economy, i.e. catering to the needs of an ever-growing 
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aging population, the so-called silver economy.  Regulations that demand that certain 3
smart  technologies  be  installed  in  old  people’s  homes  could  spur  innovation  in  the 
sector and give the rst-mover advantage to certain rms which will, in turn, be able to 
easily enter the markets of those states that in the upcoming decades will witness similar 
demographic changes.
A further  theoretical  argument  which  has  been  put  forward  in  the  literature 
focuses on the behavior of the managers of rms. As managers are often present-biased, 
they prefer to postpone investments in innovation; this is because the cost of innovating 
occurs now, whereas the benets happen later, maybe in a period in which the manager 
will have already moved to a different job. Although innovation might be in the interest 
of the rm, sometimes managers do not have the appropriate incentives to pursue the 
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 The businesses which focus on providing services to the older segment of the population have been 3
around for a while but only relatively recently a common understanding has been developed that this 
sector of the economy has an enormous growth potential. This is why the Directorate General in charge of 
developing the  digital  agenda of  the  European Commission (DG Connect)  in  2014 has  sponsored a 
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of an ever older European population. On this see for example the work of the European Commission on 
Healthy Ageing, https://ec.europa.eu/eip/ageing/home_en (last accessed April 2017).
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regulations have overall a negative impact on the performances of the rm. More recent 
studies  on  specic  sectors  of  the  economy  seem  to  suggest  that  environmental 
regulations might not always be detrimental to productivity. For example, Ebru Alpay et 
al.  (2002)  nd  a  positive  correlation  between  environmental  regulations  and  the 
productivity of the Mexican food-processing industry. There is also a study (Lanoie et 
al., 2007) that tests both the weak and strong versions of the hypothesis by building a 
double regression analysis: the rst tests the weak version by correlating the perceived 
stringency  of  environmental  regulations  with  innovations  in  pollution  abatement 
technology; the second correlates the environmental innovations of the rst regression 
with the productivity of rms. Paul Lanoie et al.  (2007) nd that there is a positive 
correlation between environmental regulations and innovation, thus verifying the weak 
version of the hypothesis; but they cannot nd evidence that environmental regulations 
have a net positive effect on the productivity of the businesses (strong version). They 
conclude  that  the  innovations  spurred  by  the  enactment  of  regulation  do  not 
counterbalance  the  negative  effects  produced  by  the  regulation  itself.  Yet  they  also 
conclude that without the role of innovation, environmental regulation would have been 
much more costly.
Notwithstanding the incoherent evidence testing the Porter hypothesis, the story 
that stringent regulations could benet the economy has found its way into politics. The 
politician  who  most  readily  embraced  this  angle  of  the  narrative  of  ecological 
modernization is Vice-President (under President Clinton) Albert “Al” Gore. To be fair, 
most of his speeches which draw directly on the Porter literature were made before a 
proper empirical literature testing Porter and van der Linde’s claims reached business 
journals. In line with the research started by Porter and van der Linde, Gore makes a 
specic  link  between  environmental  protection  and  innovation  beneting  American 
rms; he claims that taking seriously the option of a bold move toward environmental 
protection “will demand the kind of determined effort that made the Apollo Program so 
productive and inspiring.” And he adds:
“the new (environmental) program could reinvigorate our ability to excel at applied as well as 
basic research, spur gains in productivity, leads to innovations, breakthroughs, and spin off in 
other  elds  of  enquiry,  and  reestablish  the  United  States  as  the  world’s  leader  in  applied 
technology” (Gore, cited in Luke, 1999: 132).
The narrative of ecological modernization sees environmental protection closely tied to 
the  pursuit  of  economic growth by both  causing it  (Porter  hypothesis)  and being a 
consequence of it (Environmental Kuznets Curve). Whether one supports one theory or 
the other makes a big difference to the policies and regulations to be put forward. It 
would be a mistake to suggest that the two theories compete against each other on an 
equal footing: the Porter hypothesis never found its way into the OIRA ofces (I will 
explain the centrality of the Ofce of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the 
American politics in the pages below). This can be due to two different reasons: the rst 
is the mixed empirical evidence which does not unequivocally prove the hypothesis; the 
second is the defeat of Gore - the main and most vocal proponent of revamping the 
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economy through environmental regulations - at the presidential election against George 
W. Bush,  who campaigned on a different  and more traditional  understanding of the 
relationship  between  economic  growth  and  environmental  protection,  i.e.  as  one  of 
conict.
Cost-benet analysis
Once it  is  accepted that  economic growth leads to an increase in the quality of the 
environment, the next step for a responsive green government which has internalized 
the  ecological  modernization  message  is  to  produce  the  conditions  that  will  spur 
economic growth. Cost-benet analysis, by comparing costs to benets and by selecting 
only  the  options  which  fare  better  on  the  cost-benet  scale,  is  a  method  that,  if 
consistently applied, should, in theory, serve the purpose of economic growth. In the 
context of a book on environmental policy, however, the story does not end here. Cost-
benet analysis is also a decision-making tool to evaluate, rank, and choose different 
environmental policies.  To be able to compare benets as disparate as clean waters, 
aesthetic pleasures, and good health to just as many different types of costs, cost-benet 
analysts need to make some important assumptions. Some of these are the cause of 
continuous debate.
What is the relation between the costs and benets of a given policy and its social 
acceptability? I began to explain this in the rst pages of this chapter, but it is now time 
to develop this more deeply. An intuitive answer is that measures which rank high on a 
cost-benet test could help governments to save money; and as money stands as a proxy 
for  virtually  everything  (although  as  we  will  see,  this  point  is  contested  as  well), 
choosing a policy that saves money compared to another one will lead to a surplus of 
money that can also be used to satisfy other desires or implement other policies. The 
normative  force  of  cost-benet  analysis  then falls  back on the  satisfaction  of  those 
desires or preferences. The more preferences are satised, the better the social policy. 
The method of cost-benet  analysis is thus a consequentialist calculus; i.e. a certain 
policy is to be preferred in virtue of the particular outcome it will have and not because 
of some intrinsic characteristic of the policy.
A compensating variation is the amount of money a person would need to receive 
to reach her potential Pareto improvement. Recalling the rst pages of this chapter, a 
potential Pareto improvement is what in theory a policy gainer (someone who has been 
made  better  off  by  a  policy)  should  give  to  a  policy  loser  to  compensate  her  for 
acquiescing to the implementation of a policy that, without such compensation, would 
not  have  been  Pareto  efcient.  Compensating  variations  are  the  basis  of  the  less 
stringent efciency criterion devised by Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks upon which 
the cost-benet  method is built.  I  will  clarify how it  works with an example. If the 
Ministry of Transports decides to build a new railway a few tens of meters from my 
property, the nuisance it would cause me in terms of noise and aesthetic damage would 
make up quite a large negative compensating variation that will need to be weighed 
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against the positive compensating variation of all the passengers of the train that will 
arrive to their destination more quickly. The compensating variations are calculated on 
the basis of how much money I would be willing to accept (WTA) in order to let the 
railways being built, and how much the passengers would be willing to pay (WTP) in 
order to have the option of going to their destination quicker thanks to the new railway. 
In an extremely simplistic manner - because the people directly affected by the railway 
are  not  the  only  ones  whose  CVs  are  taken  into  consideration  -  if  the  passengers’ 
positive CVs outweigh the negative CVs of all the individuals whose property will be 
somehow damaged by the railway, then the railway can be built. Cost-benet analysis 
then consists of three main steps: (1) identifying all the costs, benets (and, sometimes, 
risks in case of risk-cost-benet  analysis) related to a specic policy; (2) converting 
those costs, benets, and risks into economic gures; (3) adding those gures in order to 
see whether benets outweigh costs.
Although the concept of cost-benet dates back at least to an 1844 article by Jules 
Dupuit (Dupuit, 1844 [1969]), it is in the twentieth century that cost-benet appraisals 
really become popular in policy. The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), 
a  U.S.  federal  agency under  the  Department  of  Defense,  has  used it  since  1936 to 
evaluate  waterway  infrastructures.  However,  it  is  only  after  World  War  II,  and,  in 
particular,  in  the  President  Reagan-era,  that  cost-benet  analysis  was  expanded  to 
address  all  types  of  government  policy,  from  health  to  environment,  transport, 
education, etc. By means of the executive order 12,291, President Reagan mandated that 
all regulations pass the cost-benet test before being approved. This job of regulatory 
oversight was assigned to the Ofce of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA); it is 
part  of  the  White  House’s  Ofce  of  Management  and  Budget  (OMB)  and  directly 
reports to the President. A related executive order - 12,498 - requires U.S. regulatory 
agencies to submit to OIRA their annual regulatory plans to ensure “consistency with 
the goals of the administration.” The two executive orders place the OIRA at the very 
center of regulatory planning (Pildes and Sunstein, 1995). Although in theory there is 
nothing that could impede a balanced used of cost-benet analysis - provided of course 
that  one  had  previously  subscribed  to  efciency  as  a  regulatory  ideal  and  welfare 
economics  as  the  theory  to  achieve  it  -,  soon after  Reagan took ofce  an  array  of 
criticisms of cost-benet analysis as a policy evaluation tool started pouring into the 
academic literature.
Having  campaigned  on  a  deregulation  platform,  Reagan  populated  the  small 
OIRA ofces with alumni from well-known neoliberal research center and institutions - 
such as the AEI-Brookings Joint Center, the Mercatus Center, the Cato Institute, and the 
Harvard Center for Risk Analysis (Ackerman and Heinzerling, 2004: 41). The result 
was an ofce biased towards regulatory cost cutting for ideological reasons. But this is 
not the whole story. Also from a procedural point of view, OIRA guarantees that its task 
could only be that of curbing the administrative state. By reviewing regulations after a 
long rule-making process, OIRA could not actively contribute to the drafting of needed 
regulations, but only to forestall their implementation. This is made all the more likely 
by the  fact  that  a  small  staff  has  to  review a  large  amount  of  technically  complex 
46
THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL NARRATIVES
against the positive compensating variation of all the passengers of the train that will 
arrive to their destination more quickly. The compensating variations are calculated on 
the basis of how much money I would be willing to accept (WTA) in order to let the 
railways being built, and how much the passengers would be willing to pay (WTP) in 
order to have the option of going to their destination quicker thanks to the new railway. 
In an extremely simplistic manner - because the people directly affected by the railway 
are  not  the  only  ones  whose  CVs  are  taken  into  consideration  -  if  the  passengers’ 
positive CVs outweigh the negative CVs of all the individuals whose property will be 
somehow damaged by the railway, then the railway can be built. Cost-benet analysis 
then consists of three main steps: (1) identifying all the costs, benets (and, sometimes, 
risks in case of risk-cost-benet  analysis) related to a specic policy; (2) converting 
those costs, benets, and risks into economic gures; (3) adding those gures in order to 
see whether benets outweigh costs.
Although the concept of cost-benet dates back at least to an 1844 article by Jules 
Dupuit (Dupuit, 1844 [1969]), it is in the twentieth century that cost-benet appraisals 
really become popular in policy. The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), 
a  U.S.  federal  agency under  the  Department  of  Defense,  has  used it  since  1936 to 
evaluate  waterway  infrastructures.  However,  it  is  only  after  World  War  II,  and,  in 
particular,  in  the  President  Reagan-era,  that  cost-benet  analysis  was  expanded  to 
address  all  types  of  government  policy,  from  health  to  environment,  transport, 
education, etc. By means of the executive order 12,291, President Reagan mandated that 
all regulations pass the cost-benet test before being approved. This job of regulatory 
oversight was assigned to the Ofce of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA); it is 
part  of  the  White  House’s  Ofce  of  Management  and  Budget  (OMB)  and  directly 
reports to the President. A related executive order - 12,498 - requires U.S. regulatory 
agencies to submit to OIRA their annual regulatory plans to ensure “consistency with 
the goals of the administration.” The two executive orders place the OIRA at the very 
center of regulatory planning (Pildes and Sunstein, 1995). Although in theory there is 
nothing that could impede a balanced used of cost-benet analysis - provided of course 
that  one  had  previously  subscribed  to  efciency  as  a  regulatory  ideal  and  welfare 
economics  as  the  theory  to  achieve  it  -,  soon after  Reagan took ofce  an  array  of 
criticisms of cost-benet analysis as a policy evaluation tool started pouring into the 
academic literature.
Having  campaigned  on  a  deregulation  platform,  Reagan  populated  the  small 
OIRA ofces with alumni from well-known neoliberal research center and institutions - 
such as the AEI-Brookings Joint Center, the Mercatus Center, the Cato Institute, and the 
Harvard Center for Risk Analysis (Ackerman and Heinzerling, 2004: 41). The result 
was an ofce biased towards regulatory cost cutting for ideological reasons. But this is 
not the whole story. Also from a procedural point of view, OIRA guarantees that its task 
could only be that of curbing the administrative state. By reviewing regulations after a 
long rule-making process, OIRA could not actively contribute to the drafting of needed 
regulations, but only to forestall their implementation. This is made all the more likely 
by the  fact  that  a  small  staff  has  to  review a  large  amount  of  technically  complex 
46
regulations, thus causing unnecessary delays.  Finally, OIRA’s reviews only focus on 4
determining whether or not the benets outweigh the costs by concentrating on the costs 
side of the cost-benet analysis. In other words, OIRA tasks itself on checking whether 
or not there is a cheaper option to achieve the same result,  but it  does not conduct 
research on policies which, by imposing greater costs, would yield even greater benets. 
Cost-benet analysis has thus been used by the OIRA ofcials as a “one-way racket” to 
weaken regulation (Bagley and Revesz, 2006). 
The cost-benet method had also been quickly adopted in the development sector 
by  agencies  such  as  UNIDO,  OECD,  and  the  World  Bank  because  it  offered  a 
seemingly easy and consistent analytical approach to the evaluation of a wide variety of 
projects. In particular, two aspects of cost-benet analysis contributed to its adoption in 
the  development  sector:  rst,  the  fact  that  it  made it  possible  to  compare  cost  and 
benets of a project against counterfactual scenarios; second, it made it possible to take 
into  account  distributional  impacts  of  projects  by  applying  variable  weights  to  the 
calculations (Picciotto, 2007). One would be tempted to relate the surge of cost-benet 
analysis in the development sector to the neoliberal framework brought by the so-called 
Washington Consensus,  i.e.  a  set  of economic policies -  among which deregulation, 
nancial  and  trade  liberalization  -  advocated  for  developing  countries  by  the 
international nancial institutions based in Washington (the IMF and the World Bank) 
and the US Treasury. The opposite is true. Whereas cost-benet analysis at the national 
level has been used as a deregulation “one-way racket,” and thus serving the ideology of 
conservative governments, in the development sector it represented an expert-led and 
centrally  controlled  approach  to  development:  economists  would  carry  out  project 
appraisals by calculating the costs and benets of different possible projects, after which 
money would be channeled to the project which ranked better.
According to  Robert  Picciotto,  the  market  fundamentalism wave of  the  1980s 
launched a macroeconomic experiment to connect all developing countries to the global 
economy; “cost-benet calculations would still be carried out but their inuence waned 
as policy makers concentrated their attention on the enabling policy framework within 
which  investment  projects  were  embedded”  (Picciotto,  2007:  115).  The  focus  thus 
shifted  towards  new  lending  mechanisms,  such  as  structural  adjustment  loans  and 
sector-wide loans, which had the potential not only to channel money to developing 
countries but also to create the policy conditions in which development projects would 
be carried out more effectively. The general backlash following the intrusive conditions 
imposed on poor countries led in the 1990s to a softening of neoliberal macroeconomic 
policies;  however,  this  did  not  produce  a  comeback of  massive  cost-benet  project 
appraisals.  As  the  development  agenda  of  the  early  2000s  put  at  center  stage  the 
multidimensional concept of poverty eradication, cost-benet analysis continued to be 
used alongside other evaluation procedures more focused on specic policy aspects, 
 This issue was later partially solved under President Clinton by the issue of a new Executive Order 4




such  as  Environmental  Impact  Assessment,  Life  Cycle  Analysis  or  Health-Health 
Analysis.
The use  of  cost-benet  analysis  did  not  increase  compared to  the  heydays  of 
project appraisals in the 1970s and early 1980s. Moreover, it has been less of a tool to 
halt  regulations  under  Democratic  governments  in  the  US,  compared  to  previous 
Republican governments; this being said, cost-benet analysis is still being widely used 
both nationally and internationally. Not how much cost-benet analysis is employed, 
but the extent to which cost-benet analysis is extended to human domains previously 
beyond  its  grip  is  a  novel  cause  for  concern.  I  turn  now to  discuss  the  normative 
presuppositions of cost-benet analysis.
What  are  the  contested  normative  presuppositions  of  the  cost-benet  analysis 
method  which,  according  to  the  ecological  modernization  reading  of  international 
environmental  policy,  made  economically  computable  different  interventions  on  the 
environment? Unsurprisingly, those presuppositions have as much to do with economics 
as with ethics.  Recall  that,  in order to make social  policy practically possible,  cost-
benet analysis is grounded on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion: a policy is efcient if those 
that are made better off could, in theory, compensate the worse off in order to realize a 
potential Pareto improvement; in order to do this the CVs of different people are added, 
the result of which will tell whether the benets outweigh the costs. Pivotal in this way 
of evaluating policies is the fact that societal welfare can be measured as an algebraic 
sum of compensating variations, and, prior to this, that the individual’s compensating 
variation  tracks  individual  welfare  (Shrader-Frechette,  1983:  1).  The  former  point 
represents the utilitarian principle that everyone’s happiness or preferences count the 
same as those of all others, and they are simply added to one another. Social welfare as 
a simple addition of compensating variation thus ignores the distributional effects of a 
policy  as  long  as  a  universal  improvement  in  well-being  is  realized.  Distributional 
weights  that  are  inversely  proportional  to  levels  of  well-being  (income,  health, 
education) of the affected individuals have been an important addition to standard cost-
benet analysis - they have been used in the past in World Bank project appraisals - and 
could  partially  solve  its  distributional  myopia.  However,  the  role  of  distributional 
weights  is  still  very  much  contested  because  deciding  what  to  weigh  is  a  political 
decision  and  because  distributional  weights  would  justify  avoidable  inefciencies 
(Harberger, 1978). If a distributional weight of 2 is applied in a cost-benet analysis to 
some of the beneciaries, then some of the projects that previously would not have been 
approved  would  now  pass  the  social  protability  test  as  long  as  their  previously 
unweighted benets amount to more than half of their costs. In a sense, a waste of up to 
half of the resources is now acceptable. From the point of view of an egalitarian justice 
scholar this might seem a fair price to pay in order to improve the conditions of the 
worst  off;  however,  economically  minded  scholars  are  more  skeptical  of  such 
conclusions and instead argue that redistribution in society should be carried out by the 
scal system only (Hochman and Rodgers, 1969).
Always related to the fact that societal welfare can be measured as an algebraic 
sum of compensating variations is the claim that by aggregating individual welfare one 
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such  as  Environmental  Impact  Assessment,  Life  Cycle  Analysis  or  Health-Health 
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as with ethics.  Recall  that,  in order to make social  policy practically possible,  cost-
benet analysis is grounded on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion: a policy is efcient if those 
that are made better off could, in theory, compensate the worse off in order to realize a 
potential Pareto improvement; in order to do this the CVs of different people are added, 
the result of which will tell whether the benets outweigh the costs. Pivotal in this way 
of evaluating policies is the fact that societal welfare can be measured as an algebraic 
sum of compensating variations, and, prior to this, that the individual’s compensating 
variation  tracks  individual  welfare  (Shrader-Frechette,  1983:  1).  The  former  point 
represents the utilitarian principle that everyone’s happiness or preferences count the 
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approved  would  now  pass  the  social  protability  test  as  long  as  their  previously 
unweighted benets amount to more than half of their costs. In a sense, a waste of up to 
half of the resources is now acceptable. From the point of view of an egalitarian justice 
scholar this might seem a fair price to pay in order to improve the conditions of the 
worst  off;  however,  economically  minded  scholars  are  more  skeptical  of  such 
conclusions and instead argue that redistribution in society should be carried out by the 
scal system only (Hochman and Rodgers, 1969).
Always related to the fact that societal welfare can be measured as an algebraic 
sum of compensating variations is the claim that by aggregating individual welfare one 
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can actually get  to the welfare of society.  In other words,  it  implicitly excludes the 
possibility  that  social  welfare  is  something  other  than  and  different  to  a  sum  of 
individual welfares. It is implicitly denied that individuals might subscribe to more than 
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aesthetically unappealing for the environment and large solar farms dangerous for the 
birds in the area. In a sense, the fact that by aggregating individual welfare one can get 
to social welfare downplays some of the intrapersonal struggles that people might have 
when it comes to options or choices that can have different normative grounds. From a 
welfare  economics  perspective,  these  internal  struggles  can  always  be  settled  by 
weighing which of the options - that are assumed to be commensurable - satises the 
individual the most.
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further assumptions need to be realized if it is to be true: (i) that an individual’s well-
being depends on how she feels and the satisfaction of her preferences; (ii) that such 
feelings and preferences can be economically measured. The rst of these assumptions 
pertains to the claim that the individual is always the master and best judge of her own 
welfare. Obviously, often people have preferences that will not lead to an increase in 
well-being; a standard example is the choice of a marriage partner. Preferences are thus 
taken at face value on the assumption that most of the time individuals do know what is 
in  their  best  interest  and  that  their  interests  are  considered  normatively  laden;  i.e. 
satisfying preferences is good and it should take place. The second assumption concerns 
the claim that WTP and WTA methods can translate very disparate aspects of human life 
into prices. The point is that when people are asked through a survey to value a policy 
intervention  based  on  their  WTP/WTA,  or  when  WTP/WTA are  inferred  from  the 
choices of people in the market, the evaluators implicitly assume that market prices are 
measures of the value of goods with the consequence of collapsing the fair price of a 
good - its value - into its market price. Market prices diverge from “fair prices” as they 
depend on supply and demand, the presence of monopolies, the presence of externalities 
and scarcity. This, for example, has the consequence that there is no market price - or it 
is extremely low - for natural resources that are widely available, like air, even though 
people might give it quite a high value. Related to this, there is a further problem in 
inferring  what  people  value  through  WTP/WTA.  As  people  replying  to  WTP/WTA 
surveys base their estimates and judgments on their current income or wealth, it follows 
that the richer segment of the population is believed to value environmental protection 
more. As these data are collected and used by the administrators to map where to pursue 
environmental  protection and where it  is  cheaper  to install  polluting factories,  cost-
benet  analysis  might  thus  create  issues  of  segregation  on the  base  of  income and 
reinforce patterns of economic and social inequality.
These dynamics can happen both locally between richer and poorer regions within 
a state, and internationally between richer and poorer states. An example of the latter is 
the  in-famous  “Summers  memo,”  a  memo  on  toxic  waste  and  trade  liberalization 
written in 1991 by Lawrence Summers, then Chief Economist of the World Bank, which 
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was leaked to a Brazilian newspaper by the Brazilian environmental leader, Roberto 
Smeraldi. 5
Another controversial presupposition built into cost-benet analysis is that there is 
a linear relation between the probability of dying and the value of risk avoidance. In 
other terms, the bigger the risk, the more important it is to provide a solution to remove 
such  risks  (Shrader-Frechette,  1983:  3).  It  follows  from this  assumption  that  more 
resources should be channeled to make cars safer than to increase the safety of nuclear 
power plants because many more people die each year as a result of car accidents. This, 
however, overlooks the fact that people, when directly asked, prefer to give priority to 
nding a solution to those bad events in life that happen totally outside their control, 
like,  for  example,  cancer.  Whereas  undoubtedly  man-made,  climate  change  and 
environmental degradation do have this quality of being perceived as something outside 
our control. This is because some climate change is now inevitable even if the world 
population  completely  stopped  emitting  CO2.  And  lastly,  but  not  less  importantly, 
climate  change  will  hit  hardest  those  poor  coastal  communities  who  did  not  even 
remotely contribute to climate change. As the impact of climate change will be mostly 
felt in the future, and as it is difcult to attribute extreme weather events happening 
right now to it, it follows that climate change cannot be considered yet a cause for death; 
and providing a solution to it is felt as a less urgent matter, even though climate change 
does display some of the “inescapability” qualities that people look for when they are 
asked which issues to tackle rst.
There is also a more fundamental set of normative presuppositions of cost-benet 
analysis that does not have to do with the technicalities of the cost-benet method, but 
that calls into question its welfare economics foundations. As a method, cost-benet 
analysis is clearly consequentialist - different options are chosen on the basis of their 
likely outcome -; hence, it is in theory possible to bargain away rights and duties in 
order to satisfy preferences. Defenders of cost-benet analysis obviously do not see the 
problem of this consequentialist implication. Moreover, there is in principle nothing that 
might  impede an evaluator  to  maximize the  benets  intended as  a  particular  set  of 
rights,  thus accommodating a  more deontology-friendly normative framework,  or  to 
include  distributional  weights  to  take  into  account  income  inequalities,  thus 
accommodating a more Rawlsian distributive scheme. In other words, one could “cost” 
inequality, or environmental degradation, or concerns, in general, for distributive issues. 
 The following is an excerpt: “The measurement of the costs of health impairing pollution depend on the 5
foregone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality. From this point of view, a given amount of 
health impairing pollution should be done in the country with the lowest cost, which will be the country 
with the lowest wages. I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest 
wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that.” Available at http://www.whirledbank.org/
ourwords/summers.html (last accessed April 2017). To this, a response addressed directly to Summers by 
Brazil’s  then-Secretary of  the Environment José Lutzenburger followed: “Your reasoning is  perfectly 
logical  but  totally  insane.  Your  thoughts  provide  a  concrete  example  of  the  unbelievable  alienation, 
reductionist thinking, social ruthlessness and the arrogant ignorance of many conventional “economists” 
concerning the world we live in.” Available at the url above.
50
THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL NARRATIVES
was leaked to a Brazilian newspaper by the Brazilian environmental leader, Roberto 
Smeraldi. 5
Another controversial presupposition built into cost-benet analysis is that there is 
a linear relation between the probability of dying and the value of risk avoidance. In 
other terms, the bigger the risk, the more important it is to provide a solution to remove 
such  risks  (Shrader-Frechette,  1983:  3).  It  follows  from this  assumption  that  more 
resources should be channeled to make cars safer than to increase the safety of nuclear 
power plants because many more people die each year as a result of car accidents. This, 
however, overlooks the fact that people, when directly asked, prefer to give priority to 
nding a solution to those bad events in life that happen totally outside their control, 
like,  for  example,  cancer.  Whereas  undoubtedly  man-made,  climate  change  and 
environmental degradation do have this quality of being perceived as something outside 
our control. This is because some climate change is now inevitable even if the world 
population  completely  stopped  emitting  CO2.  And  lastly,  but  not  less  importantly, 
climate  change  will  hit  hardest  those  poor  coastal  communities  who  did  not  even 
remotely contribute to climate change. As the impact of climate change will be mostly 
felt in the future, and as it is difcult to attribute extreme weather events happening 
right now to it, it follows that climate change cannot be considered yet a cause for death; 
and providing a solution to it is felt as a less urgent matter, even though climate change 
does display some of the “inescapability” qualities that people look for when they are 
asked which issues to tackle rst.
There is also a more fundamental set of normative presuppositions of cost-benet 
analysis that does not have to do with the technicalities of the cost-benet method, but 
that calls into question its welfare economics foundations. As a method, cost-benet 
analysis is clearly consequentialist - different options are chosen on the basis of their 
likely outcome -; hence, it is in theory possible to bargain away rights and duties in 
order to satisfy preferences. Defenders of cost-benet analysis obviously do not see the 
problem of this consequentialist implication. Moreover, there is in principle nothing that 
might  impede an evaluator  to  maximize the  benets  intended as  a  particular  set  of 
rights,  thus accommodating a  more deontology-friendly normative framework,  or  to 
include  distributional  weights  to  take  into  account  income  inequalities,  thus 
accommodating a more Rawlsian distributive scheme. In other words, one could “cost” 
inequality, or environmental degradation, or concerns, in general, for distributive issues. 
 The following is an excerpt: “The measurement of the costs of health impairing pollution depend on the 5
foregone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality. From this point of view, a given amount of 
health impairing pollution should be done in the country with the lowest cost, which will be the country 
with the lowest wages. I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest 
wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that.” Available at http://www.whirledbank.org/
ourwords/summers.html (last accessed April 2017). To this, a response addressed directly to Summers by 
Brazil’s  then-Secretary of  the Environment José Lutzenburger followed: “Your reasoning is  perfectly 
logical  but  totally  insane.  Your  thoughts  provide  a  concrete  example  of  the  unbelievable  alienation, 
reductionist thinking, social ruthlessness and the arrogant ignorance of many conventional “economists” 
concerning the world we live in.” Available at the url above.
50
We will  see  later,  in  Chapter  5,  what  are  the  positive  and  negative  aspects  of  this 
standard reply to the critics of cost-benet analysis. 
A distinction must be made at this point, however. On the one hand, cost-benet 
analysis is portrayed as a mere technique that maximizes whatever good, value, or right 
the evaluator is interested in; on the other, cost-benet analysis as a method is seldom 
considered in isolation from its underlying utilitarian and welfare economics roots. And 
whereas there is in the academic literature the understanding that, in theory, the cost-
benet  technique could accommodate several normative frameworks, in reality cost-
benet  analysts  mostly  follow  the  dominant  utilitarian  and  welfare  economics 
interpretation of the technique (Shrader-Frechette, 1998: 512).
For example, in evaluating projects that will have an impact 100 years from now, 
evaluators have to calculate the present value of the benets that will accrue within 100 
years. As money does not have the same value at different times and people usually 
prefer to hold the same amount of money in their hand now than at a future time, cost-
benet analysts are used to applying a discount rate to their calculations. In these cases, 
cost-benet  analysts apply the usual interest rate on money as a discount rate. If by 
putting money into a bank I get 2% more on that amount within one year, then 2% is the 
discount rate to apply if I need to know the present value which that money will have 
within one year. However, as shown by the debate that followed the publication of the 
Stern Report (Stern & Great Britain Treasury, 2006), the choice of the discount rate is 
an extremely value-laden decision. It is not only that people prefer money now - what is 
usually called time discounting or pure time preference -, but also the fact that, as the 
global economy is projected to grow, current generations are worse off in this operation 
of intergenerational redistribution of resources through project funding. In the calculus 
of  the  discount  rate,  a  growth  estimate  is  coupled  with  an  estimate  for  inequality 
aversion, i.e. how much redistribution towards us, i.e. the poorer generation, we should 
be willing to accept. Setting a high discount gure by looking at the market rates - and 
by so doing setting a high pure time preference - has the unpalatable consequence of 
discounting the well-being that comes later in time simply because it comes later in 
time,  as  if  dying  young  were  less  of  a  bad  event  in  100  years  compared  to  now 
(Broome, 2007; IPCC, 2014 [AR5]: WG3, Ch. 3). Whereas cost-benet analysis is open 
to inputs coming from disparate ethical theories - e.g. by choosing a very low discount 
rate -, the accepted standard for calculating discount rates is to look at interest rates for 
savings on the market. This method is believed to be “more democratic” as - according 
to Martin Weitzman (2007) - cost-benet analysts do not need to rely on the subjective 
normative  framework of  the  philosopher-king.  The “more democratic”  solution put 6
forward by Weitzman, however,  takes the satisfaction of preferences as the ultimate 
normative  ground,  and  this  one,  too,  needs  be  justied  somehow.  By  labeling  this 
process  as  “more  democratic,”  or  sometimes  “value-free,”  one  actively  hinders  an 
 Here I referred to the issue of discounting and to the debate following the Stern Review to show the 6
mismatch between what cost-benet analysis could, in theory, accommodate and the received standard 
approach of doing cost-benet analysis.
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honest discussion about the normative groundings of cost-benet analysis, and merely 
passively accepts its standard utilitarian foundations.
Cost-benet analysis, scarce resources, and risks
After having reviewed the most important normative presuppositions built into the cost-
benet  analysis method, and before turning to another instrument of efciency - the 
market -, I need to spend some time on two further arguments usually invoked to defend 
cost-benet  analysis from the critics who pinpoint the arguments reviewed above in 
order to argue for its disposal: (i) it is the best method we have in a world of scarce and 
nite resources; (ii) it is the best method we have in a world full of risks.
Concerning the former defense of cost-benet analysis, Robert Frank argues that 
thinking that two disparate options such as the benets of preventing a number of deaths 
by placing a guardrail on a dangerous road and the cost of placing the safety measure 
are  incommensurable,  and  that  the  guardrail  should  be  installed  no  matter  what, 
“hinders clear thinking about difcult trade-offs” (Frank, 2000: 914). In a world of nite 
resources, the money spent to install the guardrail and save lives cannot be spent in 
order prevent other injuries, perhaps even larger in number, in another policy domain. 
The rights of everyone cannot all be protected and difcult choices must be made. If 
decision makers do not make these choices explicitly, they will be made for them by the 
sheer fact that there will not be enough money for every worthy social policy they might 
wish to see implemented. The critic of cost-benet analysis is thus depicted as someone 
who means well but is unable to deal with the difcult choices which make up day-to-
day politics. Bjørn Lomborg, famous for having written the widely discussed book, The 
Skeptical Environmentalist (Lomborg, 2001), and for his positions on climate change, 
argues in a similar fashion.  He is a strong supporter of welfare economics and cost-7
benet  analysis.  In a  blog post  in which he “plugs” a paper on the UN’s proposed 
Sustainable Development Goals by his own think-tank - the Copenhagen Consensus 
Center, which provides policy papers on environmental and humanitarian issues from 
the  point  of  view  of  welfare  economics  -,  he  emphatically  asserts  that  ending 
malnutrition is not a goal worth pursuing, given our economic resources:
“The UN draft says that we should “end malnutrition,” and the economists warn that while such 
an absolute goal sounds alluring, it  is likely both implausibly optimistic and inefcient.  We 
cannot achieve it, and even if we could, the resources to help the last hungry person would be 
much better spent elsewhere” (Lomborg, 2014).
The argument of those who support cost-benet analysis on the basis that it is our only 
method in a world of scarce economic resources misrepresents, however, the concerns 
 Lomborg’s position on climate change is that the phenomenon is real and man-made, but also that the 7
scarce economic resources available to governments should be used on other problems, waiting for more 
research on more cost-effective solutions to tackle climate change (Elmhirst, 2010).
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of  the  critics  of  the  cost-benet  method.  Their  request  is  that  cost-benet  analysis 
should be given a role as  a  co-protagonist  and not  that  of  the only and undisputed 
protagonist; that decision-making be a more choral show. Putting metaphor aside, they 
request that cost-benet analysis should be used to decide between policy interventions 
that have already been chosen through other methods - referendum, group deliberations 
-  and  on  different  normative  grounds.  However,  to  a  certain  extent,  some of  these 
“different  normative  grounds”  are  always  being  employed,  simply  because  some 
deontological judgment is necessary before beginning the weighing among alternatives. 
When a cost-benet analysis is required to decide between a nuclear and a solar power 
plant to produce energy, a coal power plant is excluded from the weighing on grounds 
which have nothing to do with costs and benets. Without these implicit deontological 
judgments,  the cost-benet  exercise would be potentially innite  (Shrader-Frechette, 
1998: 510). 
Concerning the latter  defense of cost-benet  analysis,  Cass Sunstein compares 
cost-benet  analysis  to  the  precautionary  principle  -  as  both  represent  ways  of 
“organizing environmental protection” - and contends that, although problematic for a 
number of reasons, cost-benet analysis at least gives some guidance to decision makers 
who,  without  some  sense  of  cost  and  benets,  will  be  making  “a  stab  in  the 
dark” (Sunstein, 2005: 354). The precautionary principle is, according to Sunstein, an 
incoherent approach to environmental protection as it cannot distinguish which risks are 
worth taking and which not. This argument is an old hit of Sunstein (Sunstein, 2002, 
2003, 2005). The point is that as risks might well be on both sides of a certain policy 
intervention - both a new regulation and refraining from implementing a new regulation 
might increase some risks -, the principle becomes void and inapplicable. If we need 
some guidance as to which risks are worth taking, then cost-benet analysis must be the 
way to go. Sunstein trivializes, however, the theoretical and ethical underpinnings of the 
precautionary  principle.  The  mere  choice  of  discussing  the  precautionary  principle 
alongside cost-benet analysis, because both can be used to “organize environmental 
protection,” is telling of a general misunderstanding of the precautionary principle.
According to Sunstein,  justications of the precautionary principle rest  on our 
inability  to  deal  with  classical  statistical  problems.  He  reviews  the  literature  on 
psychological  biases  and  argues  that  decision  makers  who  wish  to  apply  the 
precautionary principle to environmental policy are inuenced by those biases: they are, 
for  example,  loss  averse,  they  perceive  nature  as  an  intrinsically  benevolent  and 
harmonious entity, and they tend to overestimate the probability of harm. However, the 
precautionary principle can also be viewed - and perhaps more ttingly - as a response 
to  the  “ethical  turn”  put  forward  by  Hans  Jonas  (1985).  In  this  context,  the 
precautionary principle represents a heuristic of fear vis-à-vis the rather new possibility 
that human beings, and their technologies, could destroy the earth. Translated into the 
literature more akin to the one covered by Sunstein, the precautionary principle is best 
understood as insurance against the possibility of black swans (Taleb, 2008), and not a 
risk management tool to overcome our difculties in dealing with statistical distribution 
in situations in which we do know the probabilities attached to the particular events 
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(Origgi,  2014).  In  a  way,  Sunstein’s  conclusion  still  stands,  although  for  different 
reasons. The precautionary principle cannot be used to decide whether to build a new 
nuclear  plant  or  to install  a  guardrail  on a dangerous road because regulating these 
issues involves dealing with known risks: the precautionary principle was never meant 
to serve that purpose. Indeed, the cost-benet analysis might well be the only method in 
a world full of known risks, but Sunstein argues for it by constructing a straw man.
The role of the markets and market-based mechanisms
Earlier in this chapter I anticipated some of the topics that will now be more thoroughly 
explored. In particular, I anticipated that when markets meet certain conditions, they 
produce a Pareto efcient state of affairs. How does this happen and what does it mean 
for environmental policy focused on efciency? By describing the behavior of idealized 
buyers  and  sellers  in  response  to  a  number  of  situations,  microeconomic  theory 
summarizes how much buyers in the aggregate will buy of a good at a given market 
price and how much sellers are willing to produce of a certain good at a given price.
In  a  standard  supply-demand  model,  lower  prices  lead  to  larger  quantities 
demanded; as the price of a good increases, so does the quantity sellers are willing to 
supply. The combination of quantity and price for which demand equals supply is called 
the market  equilibrium. As long as  certain underlying factors  that  drive supply and 
demand remain unchanged -  people’s  income and tastes,  technology and production 
costs  -  the market  will  gravitate around the equilibrium point.  Markets  are efcient 
when they maximize the total surplus, and this happens at the equilibrium point. Buyers 
buy goods at a price which is inferior or equal to what they would be willing to pay for 
the same good (marginal willingness to pay), while suppliers are able to produce the 
goods and sell them for a prot, and they usually do this up to point at which the cost of 
producing one more unit of the good is less than the good’s price on the market. By 
competing against one another, rms that produce the same good will try to win over 
the buyers by offering them cheaper goods. They are able to do this, for example, by 
developing  a  newer  technology  which  reduces  certain  production  costs,  like  less 
packaging  for  products.  By  placing  resources  in  the  hands  of  producers  who  most 
closely approximate the least costly methods of production, markets increase the size of 
the economic pie.
So  far  so  good.  But  when  politicians  or  negotiators  say  that  the  solution  of 
environmental problems should be left to the markets and their efciency-producing 
mechanisms, what, precisely, do they mean by this? Either one of two different claims: 
(i) markets are clean when they function properly; (ii) environmental problems are a 
necessary  albeit  temporary  evil  on  the  road  to  economic  growth.  We  have  already 
reviewed the latter claim in the opening pages of this chapter. Its foundations are shaky 
at best, but this does not impede policy makers from continuing to resort to it. Yet the 
real force of the ecological modernization reading of environmental problems rests on 
(i): that markets are fundamentally clean mechanisms. Indeed, environmental problems 
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(Origgi,  2014).  In  a  way,  Sunstein’s  conclusion  still  stands,  although  for  different 
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are portrayed as either a consequence of the lack of a market in environmental products 
or as a consequence of a market in environmental products that does not work properly. 
By resorting to either one of the two, it is always possible to both explain and solve 
problems of environmental degradation.
When a market does not exist...
When a market for environmental products does not exist, economic theory explains 
environmental degradation as the result of self-interested actions of individuals, each 
one doing their own business. Garrett Hardin’s tragedy of the commons (1968) is now a 
classic essay in the eld; it is used to explain several environmental problems, from 
overgrazing to pollution and road congestion. When a pool of common resources is 
open to all, rational and self-interested individuals use the resources for their gain with 
no regards for the others.  This, in turn, leads to overexploiting the resources to the 
detriment  of  all.  The  problem  of  the  overexploitation  of  the  commons  has  been 
restricted by Elinor Ostrom (1999) to the global  commons on the ground that local 
communities often do nd a way to sustainably exploit a pool of common resources; 
this happens when the livelihoods of these communities directly depend on the common 
pool of resources and when each individual in the community shares an image of how 
the resource system operates and how everybody’s actions affect it.
The  literature  usually  recognizes  that  the  tragedies  of  the  commons  can  be 
overcome in two possible ways: either by creating institutions which force cooperation 
between the actors in prisoner’s dilemma situations - e.g. allowing only cars with odd 
number plates in the city center on certain days to prevent dangerous level of urban 
pollution - or by better dening and, if necessary, creating property rights. Needless to 
say, given a general distrust for centralized mechanisms of command-and-control, an 
ecological  modernization  reading  of  the  tragedies  of  the  commons  would  favor  a 
solution which sees the division of the commons into lots to be sold to the highest 
bidders. People care about what they privately own and, so the theory goes, they will 
manage the resources sensibly if their exploitation depends solely on them. This is also 
the reason why no one litters in her own garden. 
When it  comes to  land,  privatizing it  is  mostly  a  problem of  political  will:  a 
common eld can be divided and sold. When it comes to air, the problem is mostly 
technical.  Air moves around and it  is  not possible to impede that someone breathes 
someone else’s air. Even if slots of air could be allocated, it would be impossible to 
protect the usual rights attached to the enjoyment of property. Environmental depletion 
is not, however, conned only to land, water, and air. Similarly to air, also the protection 
of  wildlife  species,  and  biodiversity  in  general,  through  privatization  is  technically 
difcult;  yet  there are scholars  who propose just  that.  Species  can be privatized by 
attaching property rights to their genes, while wild animals once sold could be tracked 
with  radio  collars  and  satellite  technology  (Anderson  and  Leal,  1991).  These  ideas 
follow coherently from the theory that at the root of all environmental problems stands 
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the  failure  of  governments  to  clearly  specify  property  rights.  Yet,  for  a  number  of 
reasons, they are not taken seriously outsides the circles of US-based right-wing think-
tanks, even among those who share the ecological modernization worldview: markets in 
wildlife species might not turn out to work well - and sometimes this happens even 
when property rights are well-specied; and people might have a certain reluctance to 
privatize charismatic wild animals, often considered the very symbols of freedom for 
different people.
It is thus generally accepted that not everything can be privatized. In this case, the 
recipe to solve environmental degradation is to try to nd a way to market some of these 
environmental products nonetheless. Behind the idea of the cap-and-trade mechanism, 
like the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), stands a government-
managed market by which polluters for whom it is easy and cheap to reduce emissions 
will cut back rather than pay for pollution rights, whereas polluters for whom emissions 
reduction is expensive will purchase rights to pollute. In this way, the level of reduction 
will  be  achieved  in  the  most  cost-effective  way.  The  European  trading  scheme for 
carbon dioxide emissions is not the only one. In the US, a scheme is in place to trade 
sulfur emissions from coal-burning power plants; the 1987 Montreal Protocol allowed 
the trading of quotas for the emission of chlorouorocarbons (CFCs); and also New 
Zealand and New South Wales (Australia) have government-managed trading schemes. 
Somehow similar to trading is the offsetting of carbon emissions. Instead of buying and 
selling  pollution  rights,  emission  offsetting  enables  companies  to  trade  a  reduction 
action  in  exchange  for  a  pollution  right  which  has  an  equivalent  value.  The  Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) is a system by which companies that invest in green 
projects  in  the  South  are  awarded credits  that  will  count  towards  meeting  the  CO2 
targets of the Kyoto protocol in the home state. This system is often referred to as a 
“exibility mechanism” because it gives companies the ability to pursue CO2 reductions 
where it is cheaper to do so.
Afforestation and reforestation projects are offsetting mechanisms, and as such 
some of  them have  also  been  included in  the  CDM. These  types  of  projects  came 
immediately under attack after their inclusion in the Kyoto Protocol because they would 
allegedly  sponsor  a  new form of  colonialism:  carbon  colonialism -  sometimes  also 
written  “CO2lonialism”  (Bachram,  2004).  According  to  the  critics  of  these  UN-
sponsored projects, by funding projects in the South, northern-based rms will pay a 
relatively small amount of money to continue to pollute, and by so doing they will avoid 
more ambitious plans to cut back CO2 emissions at home. The critics of CDM forestry 
projects mount a moral case against inequality. The territories in the South are used as 
carbon sinks - or, in a more colorful way, carbon dumps - and thus cannot be used in 
alternative  ways;  this  de facto  limits  the  range  of  actions  developing  countries  can 
pursue on their way to growth. On the other hand, developed countries are guaranteed to 
receive an easy and cheap way out to continue with business as usual. Scholars working 
within the Marxist tradition claim that these projects are simply yet another instrument 
by which the logic of capitalism - i.e. constant expansion of opportunities for capital 
accumulation - can continue unfolding: the new carbon commodities will enhance the 
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opportunities  for  capital  accumulation  by  some as  opposed  to  others  (Bohm et  al., 
2012).  The accusation of  carbon colonialism is  specically  pertinent  in  the  case  of 
forest plantation and somewhat different than the accusation that is directed towards 
carbon markets in general. Indeed, for reforestation and afforestation, the additionality 
of the projects is not contested; what is contested are the economic and environmental 
effects of large plantations - sometimes large non-indigenous monocultures. I will return 
on  some  of  these  issues  in  Chapter  4  when  surveying  the  arguments  against  the 
commodication of nature.
The accusations against carbon markets in general move on two different grounds: 
(i) on the one hand, CDM projects might fail to cut CO2 emissions; (ii) on the other 
hand, the critics mount a moral case against CDM projects by saying that one does not 
discharge one’s moral duty by paying someone else to discharge hers. Concerning the 
rst point, the issue is mostly epistemological, i.e. it is not that carbon markets per se 
always fail to reduce CO2; rather, that sometimes they do, and it is difcult to know 
when. Indeed, in order to be a veried CDM project and to be credited the certied 
emission reductions (CER) that will  count towards meeting the CO2 targets,  a quite 
strict and long process of monitoring and independent verication needs to take place, 
including baseline setting and additionality testing. Briey, to get credit, one needs to 
show that  the  project  was  not  already in  the  “pipeline,”  i.e.  part  of  the  established 
development  plan of  the host  developing country.  This  means dealing with difcult 
counterfactuals, especially because the host country has an interest in hiding its original 
development plan in case an opening for additional resources is provided by the CDM 
fund, precisely as happened in India.  Furthermore, even if it could be shown that the 8
projects are truly additional, there are still some situations which give rise to concerns 
whether  the  overall  environmental  impact  is  positive.  As  Tamra  Gilbertson  (2009) 
showed, CDM projects can have quite dramatic impacts on the livelihood of people who 
were completely sustainable before the project, even though the project is additional. 
She studies the case of a CDM biomass power generation project in Thailand which 
burns rice husk as renewable fuel. Prior to the biomass plant, local peasants before the 
biomass  plant  used  the  rice  husk  as  a  natural  fertilizer  and  to  manufacture  bricks; 
however, now that bigger prots can be made by burning it, rice husk has become a 
commodity no longer available to local peasants, or in any case it is not economically 
rational  for  them to  buy  it  anymore.  Accordingly,  they  have  to  resort  to  chemical 
fertilizers, which are more expensive and the production and use of it  are shown to 
contribute to climate change.9
Concerning the second point - the moral case against carbon markets - the debate 
is still very lively. At the heart of the positions of the CDM critics stands the rejection of 
 A cable released by Wikileaks clearly shows and explains why certain CDM projects do not depend on 8
CDM funding and are therefore not additional, https://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08MUMBAI340.html 
(last accessed May 2017), sent by the American Consulate in Mumbai.
 On this see for example the webpage of the EPA on Nitrous Oxide Emissions, https://www.epa.gov/9
ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases (last accessed May 2017)
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the utilitarian idea that an act be judged only by its consequences: if overall carbon 
emissions are eventually the same, then emitting and offsetting and no emitting at all are 
two equal options. But this cannot be the whole story, say the critics of carbon markets, 
as we should also judge these mechanisms based on rights and duties. Additionally, if 
one wants to follow the utilitarian idea to its logical consequences, one must conclude 
that there is no reason to attach the offsetting to the discharging of CO2; better still 
would be not to emit CO2 and to fund clean projects in the South. This debate has been 
exhaustively  surveyed  by  Edward  Page  (2013).  On  a  more  empirical  note,  even  if 
numerically  emitting  and  offsetting  and  no  emitting  at  all  can  be  considered  equal 
options, the carbon stored underground is considered safer and more stable than the one 
stored in trees, as logging and other agricultural activities could always quickly release 
dangerous quantities of carbon into the atmosphere.
When a market already exists...
When  a  market  for  environmental  products  does  exist,  economic  theory  explains 
environmental degradation as a failure to properly price a certain product or service. A 
car manufacturer focused on selling a product that is cheaper than its competitors, if 
regulations allow it,  might be induced, when deciding about how many cars will be 
produced, to consider only its own costs and ignore the damages caused by its pollution. 
This  is  the  problem of  negative  externalities.  In  these  cases,  markets  fail  when the 
actions of  one individual  or  a rm have a direct,  unintentional,  and uncompensated 
effect on the well-being of other individuals or the prots of other rms. Most economic 
textbooks focus on the three words “direct,” “unintentional,” and “uncompensated.” An 
important insight, however, is that an externality is produced only when well-being is 
affected. And well-being is affected only when something is perceived as a problem. In 
this  sense,  it  is  only  when pollution,  or  the  erosion  of  the  soil  or  similar  cases  of 
environmental degradation, are constructed as a problem that markets start to fail. This 
point is well captured by Arnold Marsh, who in 1947 writes: 
“To millions of our town-dwellers smoke is just what comes out of the chimney, as coal is just 
what goes on the re. The idea that smoke is a “problem,” something to be prevented, simply 
does not exist” (Marsh, 1947).
It is not just smoke coming from coal-burning power plants; asbestos, lead, CFCs were 
once not only considered innocuous, but sometimes even benecial. In the nineteenth 
century,  British  people  believed  that  pollution  came  from  natural  and  biological 
processes. Diseases were caused by miasma - they believed -, an invisible gas produced 
by decaying plant and animal matter. Thus, places rich in decomposing biomass were 
also the most polluted; smoke was considered instead a powerful disinfectant of such 
fumes. These beliefs started to change when physicians began to blame smoke for a 
wide array of respiratory diseases, and the new science of bacteriology did away with 
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the notion of miasma (Thorsheim, 2006). Every time the notion of well-being receives a 
new content, because of new advances in technology and science or simply of new ways 
of experiencing the world around us, markets will nd new ways of failing, or, more 
rarely, stopping to fail.
When markets fail because of negative externalities, responsive governments try 
to nd a way to correct the pricing of products so that the negative externalities get 
internalized in the nal price. An obvious candidate is a Pigouvian tax: a corrective tax 
on the polluters, which introduces a gap between supply and demand and forces the 
producers and consumers of polluting goods to incorporate the full costs of their action 
into  their  output  and  consumption  decisions.  The  congestion  charge  in  London 
introduced by Mayor Ken Livingstone in 2003 is one of such taxes. A tax levied on 
goods  helps  internalize  pollution  by  getting  the  price  of  polluting  goods  right;  a 
different  way  to  achieve  a  similar  result  is  to  focus  on  the  amount  of  pollution  a 
government  would  like  to  see  reduced.  A cap-and-trade  system does  precisely  that. 
Apart from being a mechanism that opens a market for newly created property rights 
(rights to pollution), it is a system that could help internalize externalities produced in a 
wide array of industries. The two systems of internalizing externalities differ, however, 
in that under a cap-and-trade mechanism the amount of reduction is xed by the cap, 
whereas with a tax the amount of reduction varies with the marginal cost of production 
of a rm. Regulators prefer to use a cap-and-trade mechanism when a rise in pollution 
produces a sharp increase in damages from pollution: in this case, it is better to ensure 
that a certain reduction is met. When there is not such urgency, because each reduction 
brings more or less the same benet, a simple tax that does not x beforehand a precise 
quantity  of  reduction  might  be  preferable  and  might  give  more  exibility  to  the 
polluting rms.
Market, efciency, and a clean environment
Having  explained  how well-functioning  markets  and  market-based  mechanisms  can 
help the cause of environmental protection by pursuing efciency, we can now go back 
to the question posed a few pages ago: what do politicians mean when they say that the 
solution of environmental problems should be left to the markets and their efciency-
producing mechanisms? Efcient markets are markets in which both consumers and 
producers prot from their interaction. The consumer buys at a price which is equal or 
inferior to her willingness to pay; the producers sells at a price which is superior to the 
cost of production. Markets that function well are also markets in which externalities 
are  internalized.  By dening  pollution  and environmental  degradation  in  general  as 
externalities, well-functioning markets by denition do not produce pollution.
Is this what is meant by the proponents of market mechanisms when they say that 
markets should be allowed to work freely? Only partially. “Efciency” and “efcient” 
are  words  that  have  been  used  and  continue  to  be  used  so  much,  and  in  so  many 
different academic and policy circles, that once they are “out there” they have a life on 
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their own. For example, a market-based mechanism such as cap-and-trade is said to be 
an efcient instrument to reduce CO2 because it allows rms to decide whether or not to 
cut emissions, depending on their ability to do so cheaply. However,  the fact that a 
certain quantity of reduction is achieved in the most efcient way does not mean that 
the whole operation of reducing CO2 is cost-effective from the point of view of the 
economy as a whole. This is, for example, the position adopted conservative politicians 
in the United States Congress following the election of President Obama in 2008. Cap-
and-trade instruments were reframed in terms of “cap-and-tax”; the point here is that, 
even though cap-and-trade might be a good instrument to reduce CO2, it is reducing 
CO2 per se that is seen as a dangerous political choice that would put the USA at a 
disadvantage compared to other world economies, hence the choice of not joining the 
Kyoto Protocol.
Following this vein, the proponents of environmental protection through markets 
need to argue that not government-managed markets but rather free unregulated markets 
are  the  true  recipe  for  environmental  protection,  hence  the  truly  “efcient”  path  to 
follow. Their position is that if people are really concerned about the environment, this 
concern will be reected in the choices of consumers and, consequently, in the choices 
of  producers.  Alternatively,  if  people  are  concerned about  the environment,  yet  this 
concern  is  not  translated  into  greener  products  or  fewer  products  produced  with 
polluting technology, then these people can either sue the polluting companies, asking 
them  for  compensation  in  exchange  for  the  pollution  released,  or  offer  them  a 
compensation in exchange for not polluting, depending on which side has the relevant 
property rights. According to Ronald Coase, in either case a Pareto efcient outcome 
will unfold, provided that transaction costs are low enough (Coase, 1960). However, if 
transaction costs are not low enough and cannot be further lowered, then government 
regulation  is  needed,  such  as  a  cap-and-trade  mechanism.  Thus,  even  the  most 
determined proponent of free unregulated markets must, in some cases, come full circle 
and be willing to accept some form of government intervention.
The very denition of a competitive free market,  together with the framing of 
pollution and environmental degradation as externalities, thus exclude that the latter be 
a  consequence  of  the  former.  Certainly,  markets,  market-based  mechanisms,  and 
regulations based on cost-benet analysis have unpalatable consequences at times: the 
displacement of poorer people to areas next to polluting industries because richer people 
are willing to pay more for environmental quality; urgent action against climate change 
gets postponed because the benets that come later in time are valued less. These, too, 
can be justied from a welfarist perspective: if environmental amenities are located next 
to  those  who  are  willing  to  pay  more  for  them,  then  the  overall  utility  will  be 
maximized; and benets happening later in time are valued less because, among other 
things, future generations will be richer.
Given the all-encompassing nature of economic theory, those who want to argue 
against the claim that markets can have a positive effect on environmental protection 
question  the  normative  presuppositions  subtending  the  ecological  modernization 
narrative on totally different grounds: moral, empirical, and discursive. This issues will 
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come back in later chapters, and mostly in the last chapter, but let me anticipate some 
ideas at this stage of the argument.
The rst one - the moral ground - is precisely the debate outlined few lines above, 
namely, the normative framework one chooses. The critics of markets, market-based 
mechanisms,  and  environmental  evaluation  through  cost-benet  analysis  argue  that 
even  if  it  were  true  that  environmental  markets  could  maximize  environmental 
protection, this would not justify the number of injustices that an environmental policy 
focused on efciency would produce: these are the unpalatable consequences that are 
tolerated within the welfarist  framework as they would maximize preferences at  the 
societal level, but that are resolutely rejected from the point of view of other normative 
frameworks. Accordingly, they not only contest the welfare economics underpinnings of 
the  market  instruments  but  they  also  distance  themselves  from the  other  normative 
arguments  that  might  justify  market  mechanisms  in  environmental  politics.  I  will 
illustrate those below in the context of the justice arguments.
Concerning  the  second,  empirical  ground,  the  critics  argue  that  the  idealized 
conditions for markets to work efciently almost never hold - transaction costs are not 
zero, full information is not available, individuals are not rational, etc. Thus, markets 
are doomed to fail, and environmental markets are no different; and if they fail, then 
also the environmental protection that was to be afforded by their efcient working will 
necessarily  fail.  The  proponents  of  arguments  that  defend  markets  on  ground  of 
efciency have one nal ace up their sleeves, in response to this critique: there is a 
reasonable presumption that an actual market system - even though it might produce 
externalities,  transaction costs  are  high,  etc.  -  is  better  at  producing efciency than 
doing away with a market system altogether. Allen Buchanan calls this the “some theory 
is  better  than  no  theory”  argument  (Buchanan  1985:  44)  and  he  explains  it  in  the 
following way: if one needs to re a cannon at a distant target, and this person only had 
an  elementary  physics  course  which  includes  a  theory  of  the  trajectory  of  an  ideal 
projectile, then she is better off following this theory than no theory at all if she want to 
at least have a shot at hitting the target, even though the cannon ball is not a point mass 
like  the  ideal  projectile  (it  has  extension),  and  its  trajectory  will  not  be  traverse  a 
vacuum but will go through air.
In a similar manner, even though the conditions for markets to work efciently 
most of the time do not hold, one is still  better off following them if  her aim is to 
enlarge the economic pie. One should probably ask whether the main aim of states is to 
grow the national economy (different theories in international relations frame the role of 
the state  differently,  in  terms of  power,  national  interests,  security,  etc.,  and a solid 
economy is a salient element in all of them). But without entering the complexities of a 
debate on the role of the state in the international community, this quote from Richard 
Darman - director of the OMB under President Bush Sr. - brilliantly captures where 
priorities stand when it comes to environmental protection compared to the economy: 
“Americans did not ght and win the wars of the twentieth century to make the world 
safe  for  green  vegetables”  (Wade,  1990).  The  world  is  changing  rapidly,  but  it  is 
probably safe to assume that even though environmental issues are getting more and 
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more recognition compared to two decades ago, macroeconomic issues such as ination 
and  deation,  unemployment,  monetary  policies,  trade,  just  to  list  a  few,  still  rank 
higher. If we are doomed for the time being to piggyback environmental protection on 
economic  growth,  because  the  latter  ranks  higher  than  the  former  among  national 
priorities, then the “some theory is better than no theory” objection has some bite.
Concerning the third, discursive ground, critics contend that proponents both of 
the market and of cost-benet analysis presuppose a particular idealized understanding 
of human being and its relationships (homo oeconomicus). People acting in the market 
are thus portrayed as narrowly self-interested and rational individuals always focused on 
maximizing their utility. Homo oeconomicus is probably the most contested concept of 
economic theory; this idealization has been criticized on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds. Discussing these criticisms would lead me away from my focus, yet some of 
these  issues  will  come  back  in  later  chapters.  Indeed,  critics  of  the  ecological 
modernization worldview would like to see a reduced role for market mechanisms - or 
no role at all - because of what they believe markets do to people. Implicit in their 
argument is  that  homo eoconomicus  is  not  only an idealization of  the human being 
difcult  to  live  up  to  but  also  a  prescriptive  notion  which  sponsors  a  competitive 
understanding  of  the  relationship  among  humans  and  between  them  and  the 
environment  that  is  ultimately  damaging  for  both.  But  this,  too,  perhaps  not 
surprisingly, is a contested claim. The idea here is that by viewing the environment as a 
resource to be managed according to the economic rationale, and by putting a price on 
units  of  pollution,  policy  makers  fail  to  moralize  pollution  -  i.e.  to  give  a  moral 
dimension to it;  in other  words,  to construct  the act  of  polluting and degrading the 
environment as moral failures.
In particular, scholars following the early work of Bruno Frey (1992, 1997) on 
market  incentives  and  environmental  valuation  point  out  that  attaching  economic 
incentives  to  environmental  protection  might  in  the  long  run  have  the  effect  of 
corroding  the  initial  non-economic  motivation  to  protect  the  environment  (Dobson, 
2003; Bazin et al., 2004). More specically, market-based and offsetting mechanisms 
create  two distortions.  The  rst  is  that  they  make economic  actors  believe  that  the 
amount of pollution in place, once all the actors have met their reduction targets, is 
normatively  acceptable;  the  second,  that  they  make  economic  actors  believe  that 
additional  actions  to  protect  the  environment  are  supererogatory  (as  the  amount  of 
pollution normatively acceptable had been already met) and sometimes even dangerous, 
as they would interfere with competitive price formation. These two distortions will 
eventually hinder the original motive of protecting the environment for the sake of the 
environment, as now protection is entirely a byproduct of extrinsic monetary rewards.
Proponents of market-based and offsetting mechanisms have a relatively easy task 
of  rejecting  these  accusations.  They  can  point  out  that  the  empirical  research  on 
economic incentives for environmental protection is mainly based on studies done on 
individuals in controlled settings, and these conclusions cannot be easily exported to 
rms and states acting in very different settings (Page, 2011). Furthermore, they can 
contend  that  there  is  no  point  in  attacking  solely  market-based  and  offsetting 
62
THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL NARRATIVES
more recognition compared to two decades ago, macroeconomic issues such as ination 
and  deation,  unemployment,  monetary  policies,  trade,  just  to  list  a  few,  still  rank 
higher. If we are doomed for the time being to piggyback environmental protection on 
economic  growth,  because  the  latter  ranks  higher  than  the  former  among  national 
priorities, then the “some theory is better than no theory” objection has some bite.
Concerning the third, discursive ground, critics contend that proponents both of 
the market and of cost-benet analysis presuppose a particular idealized understanding 
of human being and its relationships (homo oeconomicus). People acting in the market 
are thus portrayed as narrowly self-interested and rational individuals always focused on 
maximizing their utility. Homo oeconomicus is probably the most contested concept of 
economic theory; this idealization has been criticized on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds. Discussing these criticisms would lead me away from my focus, yet some of 
these  issues  will  come  back  in  later  chapters.  Indeed,  critics  of  the  ecological 
modernization worldview would like to see a reduced role for market mechanisms - or 
no role at all - because of what they believe markets do to people. Implicit in their 
argument is  that  homo eoconomicus  is  not  only an idealization of  the human being 
difcult  to  live  up  to  but  also  a  prescriptive  notion  which  sponsors  a  competitive 
understanding  of  the  relationship  among  humans  and  between  them  and  the 
environment  that  is  ultimately  damaging  for  both.  But  this,  too,  perhaps  not 
surprisingly, is a contested claim. The idea here is that by viewing the environment as a 
resource to be managed according to the economic rationale, and by putting a price on 
units  of  pollution,  policy  makers  fail  to  moralize  pollution  -  i.e.  to  give  a  moral 
dimension to it;  in other  words,  to construct  the act  of  polluting and degrading the 
environment as moral failures.
In particular, scholars following the early work of Bruno Frey (1992, 1997) on 
market  incentives  and  environmental  valuation  point  out  that  attaching  economic 
incentives  to  environmental  protection  might  in  the  long  run  have  the  effect  of 
corroding  the  initial  non-economic  motivation  to  protect  the  environment  (Dobson, 
2003; Bazin et al., 2004). More specically, market-based and offsetting mechanisms 
create  two distortions.  The  rst  is  that  they  make economic  actors  believe  that  the 
amount of pollution in place, once all the actors have met their reduction targets, is 
normatively  acceptable;  the  second,  that  they  make  economic  actors  believe  that 
additional  actions  to  protect  the  environment  are  supererogatory  (as  the  amount  of 
pollution normatively acceptable had been already met) and sometimes even dangerous, 
as they would interfere with competitive price formation. These two distortions will 
eventually hinder the original motive of protecting the environment for the sake of the 
environment, as now protection is entirely a byproduct of extrinsic monetary rewards.
Proponents of market-based and offsetting mechanisms have a relatively easy task 
of  rejecting  these  accusations.  They  can  point  out  that  the  empirical  research  on 
economic incentives for environmental protection is mainly based on studies done on 
individuals in controlled settings, and these conclusions cannot be easily exported to 
rms and states acting in very different settings (Page, 2011). Furthermore, they can 
contend  that  there  is  no  point  in  attacking  solely  market-based  and  offsetting 
62
mechanisms  on  the  ground  that  they  attach  economic  incentives  to  environmental 
protection,  as  any  other  type  of  government  intervention  also  attaches  the  same 
economic incentives, as we have seen in the paragraph on cost-benet analysis, when 
this method is used for the evaluation of environmental projects.
There  is  a  sense,  however,  in  which  this  accusation  cuts  yet  deeper,  and  is 
probably better conceived at the level of a general narrative in environmental politics. It 
is a reminder that there might be intrinsic risks in looking at the world solely through 
the green lens of the almighty dollar, and that, as a result, certain non-material things we 
are used to valuing could one day disappear. This might not turn out to be a dystopian 
society in any way, simply a very different one from ours, and perhaps unwelcome to 
many people. It is rst and foremost a questioning of the general direction taken by 
environmental politics in the last 50 years, and the demand to not passively reify the 
neoliberal positions in environmental politics as an immutable “spirit of the time.”
JUSTICE ARGUMENTS
As  it  has  been  explained  at  the  outset  of  this  chapter,  the  narrative  of  ecological 
modernization  brings  to  the  table  of  environmental  politics  the  neoliberal  message 
repackaged for  the  purpose of  environmental  protection.  The basic  elements  of  this 
narrative  are:  markets,  market-based  mechanisms,  and,  more  generally,  a  certain 
Weltanschauung that sees economics, its competitive relations, and the maximization of 
prots as benecial to the welfare of society at large.
There  are  usually  two  lines  of  argument  to  defend  the  basic  elements  of  the 
narrative of ecological modernization on grounds of justice. The rst is that they enable 
individuals to have the maximum enjoyment of the right of property, which trumps any 
other kind of right that people might claim to have in a given society. The second is that 
they  embody  the  process  of  rational  and  strategic  bargaining  which  is  the  only 
constraint  that  people  could  ever  impose  upon  themselves.  Both  of  these  lines  of 
argument are cashed out in two different theories of justice: Robert Nozick’s theory of 
justice  as  entitlements  and  David  Gauthier’s  theory  of  justice  as  self-interested 
reciprocity.  Chukwumerije  Okereke  (2008)  traces  the  normative  bedrock  of  the 
international  environmental  regimes  -  which  is  his  view can  be  read  as  models  of 
neoliberal  environmental  governance  -  to  these  two  theories  of  justice.  My 
reconstruction will depart from Okereke’s insights; however, while reviewing the two 
theories, I will contend that: (i) while Nozick’s theory and concepts rightly pertain to the 
normative  substratum  of  ecological  modernization,  they  also  highlight  an  internal 
tension between the two normative concerns of efciency and justice. For this reason, 
the specic libertarianism of Nozick - for simplicity, I call it libertarianism à la Nozick - 
gets  often  sidelined  within  the  ecological  modernization  narratives.  (ii)  Gauthier’s 
theory of justice does not actually depart from the normative presuppositions of welfare 
economics. it can thus be understood as an attempt to collapse the justice dimension of 
ecological modernization into the efciency one.
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Nozick, justice as entitlements, and the environment
The dening feature of Nozick’s theory is that individual rights - among which the right 
to  property  is  the  most  important  -  must  never  be  violated (Nozick,  1974).  This  is 
Nozick’s most fundamental intuition. He does not directly argue for this position.10
However, through the famous Wilt Chamberlain example,  he shows how other 11
theories of distributive justice which do not take these rights seriously would produce - 
according  to  him  -  unpalatable  consequences.  If  the  right  to  property  is  the  most 
important thing, then it  follows that a theory must specify how individuals come to 
have,  keep,  and  exchange  their  possessions.  As  long  as  individuals  respect  certain 
principles regarding how they acquire and exchange their possessions, the distribution 
of possessions among all the individuals will be justied, no matter how unequally the 
wealth of the population might come to be distributed. The principle of justice in initial 
acquisition  species  how one  can  obtain  a  property  that  was  previously  unowned: 
similar to John Locke, Nozick argues that a person can acquire property by mixing her 
labor  with  the  natural  object,  provided  that  by  so  doing  she  does  not  worsen  the 
situation of other people compared to when the resource was unused - the so-called 
Lockean proviso.  The principle of  justice in transfer  species how justly acquired 12
possessions can be transferred to other people: a person can transfer her property by 
giving it away as a gift, through trade, sale or inheritance, provided that she got it in a 
similar legitimate way or by just initial acquisition. When the possession of a property 
does not satisfy the two afore-mentioned principles, a third principle of justice - the 
principle of justice in rectication - can be called upon: compensation to restore the 
status quo ante must be made to the victim. It is in this sense that Nozick’s theory is 
 That  is  why  Thomas  Nagel  famously  called  Nozick’s  theory  “libertarianism  without 10
foundations” (Nagel, 1975) and Brian Barry dismissed it by saying that the book’s conclusions - he is 
referring to Anarchy, State, and Utopia - “articulate the prejudices of the average owner of a lling station 
in a small town in the Midwest” (Barry, 1975).
 Suppose that at a certain time the distribution of the resources in a society is just according to some 11
principle of distributive justice, it can also be a patterned principle. Now suppose that a famous basketball 
player, Wilt Chamberlain signs a contract stating that he will receive a small amount of money - $ 0,25 - 
on every ticket sold, and as a result of this arrangement he comes to own a larger amount of money than 
anyone else in the society. If the initial distribution of resources was just, then it follows that all the 
individuals in the initial distribution had a property right in the resources they possessed. Given the fact 
that the new distribution arose through voluntary exchanges of holdings justly distributed, then - Nozick 
concludes,  and  his  readers  with  him  -  also  the  new  distribution  in  which  resources  are  distributed 
unequally must be just. If some end-state redistributive principle was placed upon this new society - for 
example a succession tax - this surely will interfere with the voluntary exchanges made by the people, and 
this in the Nozickian framework cannot be allowed (Nozick 1974: 161).
 I will return later, in Chapter 4, on the Lockean proviso, as it is an important polemic target of eco-12
socialist scholars who believe that the rightful appropriation of an unowned good or natural resource 
should follow different ethical requirements. 
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historical: one can tell if a distribution of goods in a given society is just, merely by 
looking at its history, i.e.  whether all  the acts of acquisition and exchange of goods 
among individuals  respected  the  three  principles  of  justice.  Nozick’s  theory  is  also 
“non-patterned” precisely because, by looking at historical transfers, it also precludes 
that  goods  should  be  distributed  along  the  lines  of  a  particular  “pattern,”  such  as 
maximizing utility, equal distributions, equality of opportunities, or many others.
Along Nozickian lines, then, markets (and markets in environmental products do 
not differ in this respect) could be defended on the grounds that they are the sole non-
patterned mechanism available to distribute property rights - such as carbon rights and 
polluting  rights  -  which  does  not  violate  individual  rights.  If  anything,  their  reach 
should be extended to encompass all the goods that can be distributed within a society. 
A libertarian theory of justice opposes, accordingly, welfare-based redistributions on the 
basis that they would coercively impose transfers of goods, thereby violating the rights 
of those who oppose such transfers. Okereke (2008) nds some distinctive traces of 
libertarian  thought  in  a  few  of  the  current  international  environmental  regimes  of 
supranational institutions. If no one may unwillingly be a resource to other people, then 
state redistribution and redistribution among states cannot be implemented without the 
violation of someone’s property rights. It is by following this line of argument that - 
according to Okereke - the USA and other Western countries objected to the common 
heritage of mankind principle put  forward by Malta,  which postulates that  the deep 
seabed should be preserved for peaceful purposes and its resources distributed on the 
basis of need, welfare, and common ownership. In general, during the negotiations of 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law and the Sea (UNCLOS III), it was 
thought  that  the  ocean  resources  could  be  used  to  counteract  the  economic 
disadvantages suffered by developing countries and that the principle could have been a 
manifestation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) put forward few years 
before by the G-77 (Hossain, 1980). The USA rejected the Convention because of this 
professed  commitment  to  welfare-based  redistribution.  Kemal  Baslar  implicitly 
endorses  Okereke’s  reading  of  the  negotiations  regarding  the  common  heritage  of 
mankind -  and its  rejection  by the  USA -  when he  reviews how different  ways  of 
interpreting the Lockean proviso in initial acquisition informs the different positions 
tabled during the negotiations (Baslar, 1998). 
Another  important  “libertarian  element”  is  the  emphasis  on  property  rights. 
According to Okereke, the core of most of the debates which take place during the 
environmental  regime  development  are  related  to  attempts  by  states  or  corporate 
interests to establish and redene the nature of property rights that exist with respect to 
the given issue. This emphasis, which is usually coupled with the belief that extending 
property rights provides a solution to the over-exploitation of the commons, translates at 
the international level in an expansion of property rights: the extension of the territorial 
sea to 12 nautical miles from the coast, the creation of rights to pollute within a cap-
and-trade mechanism, and the creation of carbon rights in order to refer to the carbon 
stored in the tropical forests, are some of the most striking examples. Consequently, 
libertarians see the role of international regimes only as protectors of those property 
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rights. According to this view, the main goal of cooperation would be to strengthen the 
institutions  required  to  enhance  free  exchange,  and  considerations  of  justice  would 
primarily focus on assessing the validity and legitimacy of claims and counterclaims of 
ownership. It was on the basis of this economic worldview that the USA, during the 
UNFCCC  regime  negotiations,  rejected  proposals  for  the  transfer  of  technology  to 
developing countries on non-commercial  terms,  arguing that  such a move would be 
incompatible with the protection of Intellectual Property Rights (Dasgupta, 1994).
Before analyzing Okereke’s reconstruction of the libertarian-inspired elements of 
the  international  environmental  regimes,  two caveats  are  in  order.  First,  one should 
exercise considerable caution in speaking of libertarianism at the international level, as 
many libertarians à la Nozick would happily do away with the modern welfare states 
altogether. That being said, granting that getting rid of the state is a utopia in the present 
state of international affairs, libertarians scholars who get involved in these debates take 
the  state  system  as  a  given  in  their  analyses  and  try  to  work  out  how  libertarian 
principles would look like between states (Rothbard, 1974). Secondly, whether or not 
theories of  distributive justice devised for  the national  level  can be extended to the 
international level is still a thorny problem. Some scholars have extended local theories 
to the international level - most notably Charles Beitz (1979), Thomas Pogge (1989) -, 
whereas others claim that the factors that usually enable local redistribution - reciprocity 
for example - do not appear at the international level (Rawls 1999). This, however, does 
not pose a problem to Nozick’s theory because he does not postulate the need for social 
cooperation among individuals - as both John Rawls and his cosmopolitan critics do - 
for establishing principles of justice. As having an inviolable right to property means 
rst and foremost self-ownership, individuals - and states if the theory is projected onto 
the international stage - are free to establish a relationship and exchange goods with 
whoever is willing to do so, without any further restrictions.
Okereke’s reconstruction has the merit of showing not only how certain libertarian 
ideas could be found outside the domestic domain, but also how ideas can be stretched, 
molded, and adapted to domains for which they were not initially intended. And it is in 
this  sense  that  Okereke  perhaps  reads  too  much  of  Nozick  into  the  international 
institutions. The libertarian stance applied to global issues seldom produces a coherent 
set of positions, and, as a consequence, it is difcult to trace policies or some of the 
developments  in  the  international  regimes  to  their  true  libertarian  normative 
presuppositions.  A libertarian  theory  of  international  justice  would  try  to  minimize 
interferences  among  states  on  the  ground  that  such  interventions  would  violate 
someone’s right: for example, war produces casualties among civilians, and foreign aid 
produces an increase in taxation of the people of the donor countries (Rothbard 1974).
Following  this  line  of  argument,  international  regime  negotiations  cannot  be 
easily understood from a libertarian perspective as the loci to force the hand of other 
state  actors  to  implement  particular  policies.  For  example,  given  the  constant 
infringement of property rights that pollution and, by turns, big polluters impose upon 
other  people,  the insistence of  the USA on adopting a  non-binding language in  the 
negotiations leading to the UNFCCC - on this more below -, which de facto allowed the 
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big emitters to continue violating other people’s right to clean air, cannot be easily tted 
into a libertarian framework advocated by libertarians à la Nozick. Indeed, if it could be 
shown  that  a  certain  degree  of  unjustied  coercion  is  involved  in  international 
negotiations, then it could be argued that a libertarian à la Nozick would condemn such 
international  regimes.  By  “unjustied  coercion”  I  mean  putting  other  people  in  a 
situation they would not themselves have wanted to be in otherwise, and doing this for 
reasons that  have nothing to do with rectifying a previous infringement of  property 
rights.  However,  placing  the  concept  of  “unjustied  coercion”  at  the  center  of  the 
libertarian position when it comes to issues of global relevance can hardly produce a 
coherent  libertarian stance.  Coercion can be shown to sit  on both sides of a debate 
during  the  international  negotiations,  depending  on  how  problems  are  framed. 
Moreover,  as  coercion  is  justied  when  a  previous  violation  of  liberty  occurred,  it 
becomes  important  to  dene  precisely  when  violations  of  liberty  occur.  But  again, 
situations of violation of property rights lend themselves to different framings: what 
counts as an initial aggression, whether or not one could anticipate the aggression, or 
what is a sufcient ground to argue that aggression was forthcoming, are all issues open 
to  interpretation.  This  is  why,  within  the  libertarian  positions,  extreme  anti-
interventionist positions in foreign policy - those of Republican Congressman Ron Paul, 
for example - live side by side with strong interventionist ones - those advocated by the 
well-known libertarian think-tank Ayn Rand Institute.
Analogously, it would not be impossible to construct very similar positions when 
it  comes to climate change and environmental  degradation in general.  For example, 
positions that would favor tackling climate change ambitiously and in a timely manner, 
on the ground that pollution violates the property rights of people, could live side-by-
side with positions submitting that each state should be free to autonomously decide 
whether to tackle climate change and how, on the grounds that no interference should 
ever be imposed on other state parties. Whereas Okereke’s claim that the emphasis on 
property  rights  is  a  clear  libertarian  feature  of  the  environmental  regimes  is  not 
controversial, it is, however, debatable whether such emphasis has anything to do with 
Nozick’s own brand of libertarianism. What I have so far called “libertarianism à la 
Nozick” is  a  particular  idea of  justice  that  puts  property rights  at  the  center  of  the 
libertarian normative framework: from the fact that no action whatsoever should violate 
property  rights  -  unless  there  had  been  a  previous  infringement  -  a  series  of 
consequences  follow,  e.g.  that  markets  should  be  allowed ample  room to  distribute 
goods among individuals or that taxation by the state is not warranted.
Another  brand  of  libertarianism  sees  the  emphasis  on  property  rights  as 
instrumentally important, rather then important per se. These libertarians - also called 
consequentialist libertarians - think that a well-protected system of property rights and 
markets is the best way to deliver utility to the society. They are philosophically minded 
economists who base their positions on the arguments on grounds of efciency explored 
in the earlier part of this chapter. The differences between the two kinds of libertarians 
can be important: in an article on what it means to take property rights seriously when it 
comes to climate change, Jonathan Adler (2009) juxtaposes the positions of the free 
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market  environmentalist  -  those  that  would  uphold  efciency  arguments  -  to  the 
positions of the libertarians à la Nozick. He shows that taking property rights seriously - 
i.e. à la Nozick - would lead to policies in favor of tackling climate change even though 
they  might  not  be  cost-effective.  Furthermore,  libertarianism  à  la  Nozick  is  even 
compatible  with  an  interpretation  of  the  principle  of  Common  But  Differentiated 
Responsibilities  (CBDR)  akin  to  the  one  developing  countries  would  like  to  see 
recognized  by  the  UNFCCC.  Indeed,  whereas  developed  countries  see  CBDR as  a 
principle of justice that distributes burdens and benets according to a pattern - “to each 
according  to  their  responsibilities  and  capabilities”  -,  developing  states  would  have 
preferred to see CBDR enshrining a historical principle along the lines of the Polluter 
Pays Principle (PPP): those who have historically over-occupied the commons have to 
compensate  -  “rectify  an  infringement  of  property  rights,”  in  a  more  libertarian 
vocabulary - the other countries by bearing all the costs of climate change mitigation. 
What  I  have  called  libertarianism à  la  Nozick  -  i.e.  non-instrumental  emphasis  on 
property rights as a basis for a re-distributive mechanism focused on rectifying coercion 
-  could  be  interpreted  as  a  justice-based  corrective  mechanism  to  an  efciency 
approach,  which is  internal  to  the  ecological  modernization narrative.  However,  the 
element of an environmental regime which would have supported such an interpretation 
- compensation for small emitters and big emitters shouldering the costs of ambitious 
mitigation and adaptation policies where needed - were never fully operationalized into 
the  climate  regime,  even  though it  was  included  in  the  original  1992 treaty  of  the 
UNFCCC.
A further  problem,  when it  comes to  tracing a  given policy  or  elements  of  a 
regime to a certain libertarian normative presupposition, is that, today, libertarian ideas 
are used cynically by those who benet from the status quo. Cost-benet analysis - in 
the case of consequentialist libertarians - is used to slow down or stall regulations - 
although lately less frequently - that would negatively impact on the prots of big rms 
and  corporations.  Property  rights  arguments  are  invoked  to  promote  policies  and 
projects that would create from scratch new property rights the possession of which, in 
turn, will benet  those in a position to acquire these newly created rights. This is a 
concern that has been voiced by NGOs representing the forest communities during the 
initial stages of UNFCCC negotiations on REDD: the central governments who own the 
forested lands might claim to have a legal title to the carbon stored in the trees, thus 
directly beneting from REDD and from the sustainable management of  the forests 
operated by the local communities, which would be left almost empty-handed (Liss, 
2013).
A  general  libertarian  presupposition  is  present  in  the  presumption  against 
redistribution  put  forward  by  developed  countries  in  regime  negotiations.  This 
presumption against redistribution is not motivated along statist lines - i.e. by saying 
that the international order lacks some quid which is relevant for distributive justice, 
which, on the other hand, is present nationally. Instead, it is argued through the rhetoric 
of property rights. The rhetoric of property rights, however, is a double-edged sword 
which can be used to advance positions which could justify both aggressive and costly 
68
THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL NARRATIVES
market  environmentalist  -  those  that  would  uphold  efciency  arguments  -  to  the 
positions of the libertarians à la Nozick. He shows that taking property rights seriously - 
i.e. à la Nozick - would lead to policies in favor of tackling climate change even though 
they  might  not  be  cost-effective.  Furthermore,  libertarianism  à  la  Nozick  is  even 
compatible  with  an  interpretation  of  the  principle  of  Common  But  Differentiated 
Responsibilities  (CBDR)  akin  to  the  one  developing  countries  would  like  to  see 
recognized  by  the  UNFCCC.  Indeed,  whereas  developed  countries  see  CBDR as  a 
principle of justice that distributes burdens and benets according to a pattern - “to each 
according  to  their  responsibilities  and  capabilities”  -,  developing  states  would  have 
preferred to see CBDR enshrining a historical principle along the lines of the Polluter 
Pays Principle (PPP): those who have historically over-occupied the commons have to 
compensate  -  “rectify  an  infringement  of  property  rights,”  in  a  more  libertarian 
vocabulary - the other countries by bearing all the costs of climate change mitigation. 
What  I  have  called  libertarianism à  la  Nozick  -  i.e.  non-instrumental  emphasis  on 
property rights as a basis for a re-distributive mechanism focused on rectifying coercion 
-  could  be  interpreted  as  a  justice-based  corrective  mechanism  to  an  efciency 
approach,  which is  internal  to  the  ecological  modernization narrative.  However,  the 
element of an environmental regime which would have supported such an interpretation 
- compensation for small emitters and big emitters shouldering the costs of ambitious 
mitigation and adaptation policies where needed - were never fully operationalized into 
the  climate  regime,  even  though it  was  included  in  the  original  1992 treaty  of  the 
UNFCCC.
A further  problem,  when it  comes to  tracing a  given policy  or  elements  of  a 
regime to a certain libertarian normative presupposition, is that, today, libertarian ideas 
are used cynically by those who benet from the status quo. Cost-benet analysis - in 
the case of consequentialist libertarians - is used to slow down or stall regulations - 
although lately less frequently - that would negatively impact on the prots of big rms 
and  corporations.  Property  rights  arguments  are  invoked  to  promote  policies  and 
projects that would create from scratch new property rights the possession of which, in 
turn, will benet  those in a position to acquire these newly created rights. This is a 
concern that has been voiced by NGOs representing the forest communities during the 
initial stages of UNFCCC negotiations on REDD: the central governments who own the 
forested lands might claim to have a legal title to the carbon stored in the trees, thus 
directly beneting from REDD and from the sustainable management of  the forests 
operated by the local communities, which would be left almost empty-handed (Liss, 
2013).
A  general  libertarian  presupposition  is  present  in  the  presumption  against 
redistribution  put  forward  by  developed  countries  in  regime  negotiations.  This 
presumption against redistribution is not motivated along statist lines - i.e. by saying 
that the international order lacks some quid which is relevant for distributive justice, 
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actions  to  curb  environmental  degradation  and,  on  the  other  hand,  inaction.  In  this 
sense,  Nozick’s  brand  of  libertarianism highlights  a  tension  within  the  narrative  of 
ecological  modernization  between  a  justication  of  market-based  environmental 
policies in terms of efciency-based and justice-based arguments.
Gauthier, justice as self-interested reciprocity, and the environment
Gauthier’s theory of justice departs from the homo oeconomicus as we left it at the end 
of the section about markets’ role in bringing environmental protection. In particular, 
Gauthier sees justice as an order which arises out of the interaction among rational and 
self-interested individuals. It is in this sense that Gauthier’s theory of justice (Gauthier, 
1986) is only a subpart of a theory of rational choice, and his theory ultimately depends 
upon the idea that satisfying preferences is good. Everything else - for example, the 
moral  codes  that  people  follow out  of  habit  -  is  simply  rational  constraints  agreed 
among individuals that are lost and forgotten in the past.
When  individuals  are  in  a  situation  of  strategic  interaction  -  i.e.  when  the 
achievement  of  someone’s  goal  or  the  satisfaction  of  someone’s  preferences  is 
dependent on the actions of other people - and given the fact that sometimes rational 
decision making produces suboptimal outcomes (in prisoner’s dilemma situations), all 
the utility-maximizing individuals  are better  off  if  they agree to mutually benecial 
constraints  on  the  pursuit  of  their  individual  utility:  these  constraints  are  the  very 
institutions  of  our  society.  Compliance  with  such  constraint  is  rational  provided 
everyone  complies  with  them.  How  then  utility-maximizers  individuals  arrive  to 
cooperate and devise these constraints is an important part of Gauthier’s theory.
According  to  Gauthier,  there  are  two  distinct  aspects  of  this  issue:  (i)  how 
individuals divide the gains of cooperation (the cooperative surplus); (ii) how anyone 
can be sure that other individuals will comply with the constraints. The rst of these two 
aspects is a bargaining problem, and is dealt by Gauthier by resorting to the notion of 
minimax relative concession. The idea of a minimax relative concession is that each 
individual in a bargaining game is mostly preoccupied with the concessions that she 
makes from the initial bargaining position - i.e. the maximum amount of the surplus she 
would like to claim - relative to the concessions that the other players make. If the 
concessions are reasonable compared to the concessions made by the other individuals 
in the game, then an agreement is reached. The concessions are considered “reasonable” 
when the outcome of the bargaining minimizes the maximum concessions of each actor 
partaking of the bargain.
Once a decision has been reached, how then can Gauthier make sure that all the 
individuals stick to their promises and do not walk away with the cooperative surplus - 
i.e. that they would not defect while others cooperate? “Constrained maximization” is 
Gauthier’s answer to the problem: the individuals partaking of the bargaining game will 
forego straightforward maximization and will  not break the agreement because each 
individual recognizes the value of cooperation, i.e. the group is made up of likeminded 
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individuals.  Gauthier’s  answer  begs  the  question,  “but  what  if  cooperation  is  not 
rational?” in case that, for example, the individuals happen to be engaged in a one-shot 
prisoner’s  dilemma?  To  this  Gauthier  replies  that  constrained  maximization  will 
increase future opportunities for cooperation and that, in any case, had there not been a 
mutual disposition to comply among the parties, an agreement - from which it is now 
possible to deviate - would have never been reached in the rst place. Gauthier argues 
that,  utility-wise,  a  society  of  constrained maximizers  fares  better  than a  society  of 
straightforward maximizers; yet the problem remains concerning how exactly such a 
society might emerge and how it could perpetuate itself, even when individuals have 
every incentive to deviate. “Every incentive” means that the individual also considered 
the remote and long-time repercussions of her choice, and notwithstanding this decided 
to deviate. Each aspect of Gauthier’s theory has been subject to intense criticism: both 
the minimax relative concessions criterion (Kavka, 1987) and the notion of constrained 
maximization (Kavka, 1987; Phillips, 1988; Vallentyne, 1991). This is an interesting 
issue on its own: whether our institutions and ultimately our theories of justice can be 
the  product  of  a  hypothetical  agreement  reached  by  self-interested  individuals;  the 
debate is far from settled.
According to Gauthier, however, perfectly competitive markets do not need to be 
justied by recurring to the artice of a hypothetical agreement among actors who try to 
minimize  their  maximum  relative  concessions,  as  one  would  need  to  do  for  the 
redistributive  system  of  society.  This  is  because  in  a  perfectly  competitive  market 
cooperation brings no gain and straightforward maximization does not produce sub-
optimal results. As no individual can singularly affect the prices of the goods, they are 
“morally free zones,” to quote Gauthier’s own expression (Gauthier, 1986: Ch. 4). As 
straightforward  maximization  in  a  perfectly  competitive  market  yields  the  greatest 
utility, there is no need to derive morality - i.e. self-imposed constrained maximization - 
from rationality.  What  is  rational  is  for  each  individual  to  bargain  her  way  to  the 
satisfaction  of  her  preferences,  without  caring  about  the  other  individuals,  as  it  is 
precisely in this way that utility will be maximized. In this sense, perfectly competitive 
markets are a sort of regulative idea for Gauthier: there would be no need for morality if 
all the relationships in life were modeled along the structure of perfectly competitive 
markets.  He  would  probably  defend  markets  and  market  mechanisms  extended  to 
environmental products as long as they try to approximate to this perfectly competitive 
ideal. His defense of the market is thus best understood in terms of a standard efciency 
argument grounded on welfare economics.
According  to  Okereke,  Gauthier’s  idea  of  justice  as  self-interested  reciprocity 
could  also  be  used  to  uncover  some  important  normative  presuppositions  of  the 
international environmental regimes. Gauthier’s theory might not be useful in justifying 
markets  on  ground  of  justice,  but  at  least  it  could  tell  us  something  about  the 
international  regimes  that  made  the  idea  that  markets  should  be  used  to  halt 
environmental  degradation  one  of  the  central  tenets  of  environmental  politics.  In 
particular, he sees the great allowances often made by the developing countries and the 
hardline stances often adopted by the developed countries as the product of a bargaining 
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individuals.  Gauthier’s  answer  begs  the  question,  “but  what  if  cooperation  is  not 
rational?” in case that, for example, the individuals happen to be engaged in a one-shot 
prisoner’s  dilemma?  To  this  Gauthier  replies  that  constrained  maximization  will 
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to deviate. Each aspect of Gauthier’s theory has been subject to intense criticism: both 
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issue on its own: whether our institutions and ultimately our theories of justice can be 
the  product  of  a  hypothetical  agreement  reached  by  self-interested  individuals;  the 
debate is far from settled.
According to Gauthier, however, perfectly competitive markets do not need to be 
justied by recurring to the artice of a hypothetical agreement among actors who try to 
minimize  their  maximum  relative  concessions,  as  one  would  need  to  do  for  the 
redistributive  system  of  society.  This  is  because  in  a  perfectly  competitive  market 
cooperation brings no gain and straightforward maximization does not produce sub-
optimal results. As no individual can singularly affect the prices of the goods, they are 
“morally free zones,” to quote Gauthier’s own expression (Gauthier, 1986: Ch. 4). As 
straightforward  maximization  in  a  perfectly  competitive  market  yields  the  greatest 
utility, there is no need to derive morality - i.e. self-imposed constrained maximization - 
from rationality.  What  is  rational  is  for  each  individual  to  bargain  her  way  to  the 
satisfaction  of  her  preferences,  without  caring  about  the  other  individuals,  as  it  is 
precisely in this way that utility will be maximized. In this sense, perfectly competitive 
markets are a sort of regulative idea for Gauthier: there would be no need for morality if 
all the relationships in life were modeled along the structure of perfectly competitive 
markets.  He  would  probably  defend  markets  and  market  mechanisms  extended  to 
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could  also  be  used  to  uncover  some  important  normative  presuppositions  of  the 
international environmental regimes. Gauthier’s theory might not be useful in justifying 
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international  regimes  that  made  the  idea  that  markets  should  be  used  to  halt 
environmental  degradation  one  of  the  central  tenets  of  environmental  politics.  In 
particular, he sees the great allowances often made by the developing countries and the 
hardline stances often adopted by the developed countries as the product of a bargaining 
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process in which each party wants to minimize the maximum relative concessions. In 
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agreement would be reached in these situations when those who contribute the most to 
the cooperative surplus claim for themselves most of the cooperative surplus and those 
who contribute the least are content with a smaller part as, long as cooperation occurs. 
Translated  into  the  concrete  example  of  the  UNFCCC  negotiations  in  1992,  the 
developing countries are those who would gain the most from an ambitious climate 
treaty but are also those who are willing to accept a more modest climate deal as long as 
some climate deal get signed. Both parties benet from cooperation, but the one who 
loses the most if the other one walks away from the bargaining table should be willing 
to relinquish most of the cooperative surplus. This is exactly what happened during the 
UNFCCC negotiations  in  1992  according  to  William Nitze,  the  leader  of  the  USA 
negotiating team, who adamantly maintained that a climate agreement favorable to the 
position of the USA resulted
“[...] from the unwillingness of either the other OECD countries or the major countries to sign 
an agreement without the participation of the US. These countries determined for themselves 
that an otherwise well-structured convention with non-binding language on short-term targets 
that could be signed by the US was preferable to a similar convention with binding language 
that was not signed by the US” (Nitze, 1994: 188).
The same interpretative lens could well be applied to what happened in the days and 
hours leading up to the nal decision on the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015): in an 
earlier draft of the agreement, Article 4.4 stated that developed states shall  continue 
taking  the  lead  by  undertaking  emission  reductions.  The  nal  version  states  that 
developed countries should continue taking the lead. “Shall” denotes legal obligation; 
this would have put developed states in a more compromising position and the US, in 
particular, could not have ratied the treaty without passing and getting approval from 
the Senate which, when controlled by a Republican majority, holds a climate skeptic 
position.
Gauthier’s  insistence on the fact  that  bargaining among rational  self-interested 
individuals is at the foundations of the institutions of our society, and Okereke’s reading 
of it,  according to which the same processes are involved in treaty negotiations, are 
consistent with a neoliberal institutionalist reading of international relations, as the one 
developed,  for  example,  by  Robert  Kaohane  (1984).  But  whereas  neoliberal 
institutionalists suspend judgment concerning whether or not the emerging order meets 
certain established requirements of justice and content themselves with the explanatory 
power of their theories, Gauthier claims that the byproduct of bargaining among rational 
self-interested actors is in itself a just outcome.
Okereke nds, on the bases of the implicit adoption of Gauthier’s idea of justice - 
the satisfaction of preferences to be achieved through bargaining among rational self-
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interested individuals -, that the emerging international order must have certain basic 
features:  a  certain  aversion  to  welfare-based  redistribution,  overriding  emphasis  on 
property  rights,  and  emphasis  on  free-market  solutions.  And  yet,  while  Okereke’s 
analysis  is  empirically  correct  because  historically,  in  the  short  history  of  our 
international  institutions,  bargaining among international  actors  did  produce policies 
along libertarian lines, thus reecting the bargaining power of those who wanted the 
international institutions shaped by neoliberal principles, he is nonetheless wrong when 
he claims that those basic libertarian features of the international environmental regimes 
are due to the mere implicit adoption of the principles of justice devised by Gauthier: 
minimax relative  concessions  and  constrained  maximization.  What  Okereke  fails  to 
appreciate is that even a Rawlsian society could, in theory, follow from the type of 
bargaining  envisioned  by  Gauthier,  provided  that  this  outcome  is  the  one  which 
minimizes the maximum relative concessions of all the bargaining actors. Gauthier’s 
theory  may  well  justify  the  international  environmental  regimes  and  the  policies 
adopted by them on the basis that the bargaining used to arrive at them meets his own 
requirements of procedural justice, yet Gauthier’s theory ultimately remains silent on 
the normative stances and motivations that originally moved the actors partaking of the 
bargaining game. 
CONCLUSION
There are certain common elements in this chapter that cut across and inform both the 
arguments on grounds of efciency and on grounds of justice: (i) emphasis on utility 
maximization;  (ii)  emphasis  on  property  rights;  (iii)  aversion  to  welfare  based 
redistribution; (iv) a thin conception of the role played by institutions in our society.
The  rst  two  elements  of  the  list  provide  the  true  normative  foundations 
subtending the policies advanced in the narrative of ecological modernization. Utility 
maximization cashed out in terms of the maximization of preference satisfaction is a 
normative notion informing both the different notions of efciency employed to justify 
and implement the environmental policies (market-based and offsetting mechanisms) 
and the evaluative methods (cost-benet analysis) usually associated with the narrative 
of  ecological  modernization.  Utility  maximization  cashed  out  in  terms  of  the 
maximization  of  national  interests  -  similarly  to  neoliberal  institutionalists  in 
international relations - can be read as guiding the idea of justice espoused by Gauthier, 
when his theory is applied to bargaining situations in international contexts.
How  then  do  we  get  environmental  protection  by  placing  the  idea  of  utility 
maximization  at  the  center  of  the  normative  framework?  As  preferences  need  be 
maximized,  there  is  nothing  in  theory  that  might  hinder  people  from  choosing  to 
maximize the actions that have a positive impact on the quality of the environment if 
they  wish  to  do  so;  utility  maximization  is  therefore  perfectly  compatible  with 
environmental  protection.  This  is  not,  however,  how  the  story  is  usually  told. 
Environmental protection is not, or at least not initially, a good to be maximized. It is 
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rather a sort of an acquired taste and a positive consequence along the route to economic 
growth and prosperity.  After one has fullled more immediate needs,  and given the 
increasing  scarcity  of  natural  resources,  one  starts  to  form preferences  in  line  with 
environmental quality and protection. Given that there is only an indirect connection 
between the satisfaction of one’s preferences and environmental protection, mediated by 
the  maximization  of  prots  and  economic  growth,  the  distributional  effects  of 
maximizing  prots  also  have  a  bearing  on  environmental  quality.  Thus,  there  is  a 
perfectly rational explanation as to why poorer communities are often located near to 
polluting factories: housing prices fall near polluting factories and unskilled workers are 
willing to accept riskier jobs in polluting industries. Poorer people are also willing to 
pay less for environmental protection when queried about this in a survey, whence the 
impression that they value less certain environmental amenities, which in turn gives 
reason  to  the  local  administrators  of  poor  communities  not  to  take  action  against 
environmental  degradation.  Property rights are valued both per se  as a foundational 
normative idea from which it is possible to draw the consequence that markets should 
be allowed ample room to work freely as distributing mechanisms; and they are also 
valued instrumentally, given that well-established and well-enforced property rights are 
found to be conducive to economic growth. 
The third element is a direct consequence of taking seriously the normative idea 
that property rights are inviolable.  As a result,  redistribution of resources is seen as 
unjust because, according to the scholars working in this line of libertarian theory, there 
is no reasonable argument to take away something that had been rightly owned. 
The fourth element is a consequence of viewing individuals as economic actors 
competing for the same resources in a strategic manner. This is, for example, the case 
when environmental  degradation is  framed in terms of an externality that  people or 
rms  would  be  willing  to  impose  on  other  people  if  they  are  allowed  to  do  so. 
Institutions are considered merely enablers  to economic growth, they do not provide 
some other valuable social service. Or if they do so, it  is ultimately instrumental to 
economic  growth.  They  do  this  by  forcing  cooperation  in  situations  of  prisoner’s 
dilemmas or the tragedy of the commons, and by creating the conditions for the market 
to work properly - through the creation of property rights and tribunals which decide 




THE NORMATIVE PRESUPPOSITIONS UNDERLYING THE 
NARRATIVE OF CIVIC ENVIRONMENTALISM
“A serious problem is that if we choose climate policy to redistribute rather than to 
reduce  emissions  as  cheaply  as  possible,  we  risk  signicantly  raising  the  cost  of 
emission reductions or reducing their efcacy. Climate change is sufciently serious 
that reducing emissions at the lowest possible cost must be our central task. As the risk 
from climate change increases, the problem becomes more severe: sacricing climate 
change  goals  for  distributive  benets  quickly  becomes  a  bad  trade-off  if  failure  to 
reduce emissions leads to terrible consequences. The greater the risk of catastrophe, the 
more important it is to choose the most effective climate policy. By tying the two issues 
together (i.e. abating CO2 and equity), we risk hurting both goals.” This passage is taken 
from Climate Change Justice, a book by Chicago Law School Professors Eric A. Posner 
and David Weisbach (2010). As the passage makes clear, the main claim of the authors 
is that a climate treaty should set emission levels that are optimal for the globe, and not 
attempt forms of global redistribution. The book has been attacked on several grounds - 
a good overview of the numerous contested issues is provided by Clare Heyward (2012) 
and Daniel  Farber  (2012).  However,  there  are  two controversial  elements  that  have 
passed largely unnoticed in the literature, justly focused on more macroscopic problems 
throughout the book. Even if we accept the claim of the book - that it is not the moment 
to deal with distributive issues - it does not follow that we must reduce emission at the 
lowest possible cost; the authors have in mind market-based mechanisms. As it  was 
made  clear  in  the  previous  chapter,  these  mechanisms  have  themselves  certain 
distributional effects; whereas the position that a treaty need not deal with distributional 
concerns can be defended, it is more difcult to defend the position which endorses the 
employment  of  mechanisms  which,  while  not  directly  aiming  at  redistributing 
resources, would themselves, in certain cases, entrench or worsen certain distributive 
imbalances. An even more deceitful claim made in the passage above takes for granted 
that  agenda-setting  should  be  made  on  grounds  of  efciency  arguments  alone:  the 
authors say that “reducing emissions at the lowest possible cost must be our central 
task.”
In the context of the present chapter the rst element - market-based mechanisms 
might  entrench or  worsen distributional  imbalances  -  is  regarded as  a  distributional 
concern. Whereas in the previous chapter these imbalances were either tolerated in light 
of increased utility for the majority of the people, or seen as a legitimate consequence of 
what talent, hard work, and dedication might produce if left unhampered in a market 
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economy,  here  they  are  seen  as  unfair  distributions  of  wealth.  The  normative 
presuppositions  underpinning  the  positions  which  would  deem  this  distributional 
concern as unfounded have been explored at length in the previous chapter and will 
only require cursory exposition, inasmuch as civic environmentalism offers a criticism 
of it. Where does the distributional concern stem from, considering that it would not be 
possible to form such a judgment from within the normative frameworks employed by 
the proponents of market-based mechanisms? The rst section of this chapter deals with 
this question.  The second element is  a legitimacy concern: efciency arguments are 
often used to set the political agenda of disparate disciplines engaged in environmental 
protection, thus de facto biasing the decision-making process in favor of a particular set 
of  normative  ideas.  The  second  of  these  concerns  does  not  belong  to  the  ideas  of 
ecological modernization per se, but it is a consequence of the fact that the decision-
making  elites  tend  to  converge  towards  a  certain  ideological  framework,  and  this 
ideological framework happens to be the one of ecological modernization. These two 
concerns - for distributions and legitimacy - will help us bring into focus the polemic 
targets of the present chapter. What can be done to steer clear from the two deviations 
targeted by these two concerns is, on the other side, the constructive part of the present 
chapter.
Scholars working in a disparate array of disciplines have found in mechanisms of 
participation  in  and  increased  democratization  of  both  local  and  international 
institutions  a  possible  solution  to  the  two  aforementioned  concerns.  In  the 
environmental  domain,  the  narrative  of  public  participation  and  democratization  is 
usually associated with the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. Well 
before these issues were discussed in Rio, the importance of keeping citizens abreast of 
what  the  local  environmental  planning  authority  is  doing,  and  of  engaging  them 
actively,  was  already  investigated  in  a  1969  report  by  the  Skefngton  Committee 
(Skefngton, 1969). The committee was requested to inquire how public participation 
could be implemented in the framework of the United Kingdom’s Town and Country 
Planning Act (1968). At the same time and on the other side of the Atlantic, in her book, 
Silent Spring, Rachel Carson urged her readers not only to use their “right to know,” but 
also  to  act  upon  it,  i.e.  to  contest  in  the  appropriate  fora  the  use  of  carcinogenic 
pesticides  (Carson,  1962).  The  themes  of  public  participation  in  environmental 
governance were undoubtedly already present. However, two events in particular make 
the  association  of  the  Earth  Summit  with  the  narrative  of  public  participation  in 
environmental  governance more than just  an established convention.  The rst  is  the 
formalization within Agenda 21 - a United Nations non-binding voluntary action plan to 
implement sustainable development - of the so-called “major groups” in the architecture 
of the United Nations system concerning environmental and developmental issues. The 
second is the inclusion among the Rio Principles of a principle precisely dedicated to 
public  participation  in  environmental  governance,  namely,  Principle  10.  Agenda  21 
establishes that there are nine major groups, each representing a different sector of civil 
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society.  Each  one  of  these  sectors  is  in  turn  represented  by  a  handful  of  partner 1
organizations  which  participate  in  the  intergovernmental  process  on  behalf  of  their 
constituencies. The role of the major groups is to convey the requests and aspirations of 
the  constituencies  of  the  partner  organizations  and  voice  them where  decisions  are 
made:  its  representatives  thus  distribute  information,  release  ofcial  statements  and 
position papers, and can informally lobby with Member States. Principle 10 of the Rio 
Declaration states that it is of paramount importance that environmental decisions are 
participatory  -  “environmental  issues  are  best  handled  with  participation  of  all 
concerned citizens” - and it also cashes out the basic components of the principle, which 
have later become the three pillars of the UNECE Aarhus Convention of 1998: access to 
information,  participation  in  decision-making,  and  access  to  justice.  Parallel  to  the 
Aarhus Convention, other international bodies have recognized a right to privacy and 
property  broadly  construed  as  to  incorporate  access  to  information,  participation  in 
decision-making, and access to justice in environmental matters (Redgwell, 2007).
But then how could participation and democratization actually help correcting the 
dynamics linked to the two aforementioned concerns? And what are their normative 
presuppositions? The second part of this chapter deals with these questions. However, I 
am also going to show that, while providing a criticism of the lopsidedness of market 
mechanisms in environmental protection, a certain idea of participation found within the 
narrative  of  civic  environmentalism  -  i.e.  the  idea  of  participation  as  conveying 
information -  does  not  actually  depart  from the more general  mindset  that  sees  the 
satisfaction of preferences as an appropriate means to tackle environmental degradation. 
THE TWO CONCERNS
The distributional concern
Whereas the phrasing of Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration is quite cryptic and leaves 
the  secondary  literature  the  exegetic  work  of  understanding  why  precisely 
environmental issues are best handled in a participatory manner, the phrasing of Chapter 
23 of Agenda 21  gives an indication of where precisely, according to the drafters of the 2
document,  lies  the  importance  of  public  participation  mechanisms.  Broad  public 
participation is said to be a “fundamental prerequisite for the achievement of sustainable 
development”  (UN Conference  on  Environment  and  Development,  1994:  270).  The 
narrative  of  public  participation gained momentum as  a  result  of  a  period of  bitter 
contestation  both  as  to  the  meaning  of  sustainable  development  -  strong  and  weak 
versions of the concept were amply debated (Costanza and Daly, 1992) - and as to the 
 The Major Groups are: Women, Children and Youth, Farmers, Indigenous People, NGOs, Trade Unions, 1
Local Authorities, Science and Technology, and Business and Industry.
 It is the section of the document in which the major groups are formally institutionalized.2
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different  domains such concept  is  supposed to cover:  environmental,  economic,  and 
social.
Stating the importance of public participation for sustainable development can be 
seen as a response to the dominant neoliberal approach to environmental governance. 
This approach is  characterized by two different,  yet  related,  elements:  (i)  a  market-
friendly  interpretation  of  the  meaning  of  sustainable  development,  (ii)  and  the 
marketization of participation.  Both of them can be contested from a point  of  view 
external to welfare economics and libertarianism. These external criticisms ably capture 
the  rst  distributional  concern,  i.e.  that  market-based  mechanisms  might  produce, 
entrench or worsen distributional imbalances. 
The  rst  element  –  the  market-friendly  interpretation  of  the  meaning  of 
sustainable development – derives from highlighting the importance of the economic 
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environmental  degradation  in  the  most  economically  efcient  way  requires,  for 
example,  emission  levels  optimal  for  the  globe  and  ample  room  for  market-based 
mechanisms.  This  would  almost  certainly  produce  some  new  imbalances  in  the 
distribution  of  wealth  and entrench some old  ones,  but  within  this  framework they 
would be justied because CO2 reduction would ultimately increase the utility for the 
majority of the people. 
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usually, people take care of what they privately own and value those resources; if they 
do not, then they might sell it to people who value them more in the form of tradable 
rights or permits. What one values is nothing other than what one is willing to pay or 
accept for a certain resource; its price reveals the person’s preferences concerning the 
management  of  that  resource.  In  the  neoliberal  panorama,  participation  intended  as 
expressing  one’s  view  concerning  the  management  of  a  particular  natural  resource 
cannot but be achieved through participating in the market as a buyer or seller. This 
approach  to  environmental  governance  links  environmental  protection  not  only  to 
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might be genuinely interested in buying and protecting a given natural resource, she 
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might  not  be  able  to  do  so.  Hence,  within  this  understanding  of  environmental 
governance, poorer people have less voice in matters of environmental protection. 
Thus, the marketization of participation and the use of market-based mechanisms 
might produce, entrench or worsen distributional imbalances. How do we go from this 
to saying that this is unfair, especially if market-based mechanisms increase the overall 
utility of a population, and if we assumed that the original allocation of the resources to 
be protected through the markets was fair?
The criticism in terms of unfair imbalances departs from a different understanding 
of  the  individual  rights  and  liberties  that  ground  both  welfare  economics  and 
libertarianism.  Indeed,  the  theories  which  provide  the  normative  substratum  to  the 
narrative of ecological modernization depart from the idea that citizens are free and 
equal and that there is a set of individual rights,  civil  and political,  that need to be 
guaranteed to these autonomous citizens above anything else; they differ however in the 
way  they  operationalize  these  ideas  and  rights  into  politics.  For  example,  whereas 
libertarians maintain that  protecting those rights  entails  a  minimum amount of  state 
interference  in  the  lives  of  its  citizens,  even  though  this  might  create  extremely 
imbalanced  distributions  of  wealth  (recall  Nozick’s  Chamberlain  example  from the 
previous chapter), for more “socially conscious” liberals the opposite is actually true: 
protecting those rights means providing at least a minimum of opportunities, resources 
or goods in order to be actually able to enjoy the rights that otherwise would be only 
formally guaranteed. From this point of view, a distributional imbalance becomes an 
unfair distribution when certain groups of people do not have the means to fully enjoy 
their fundamental liberal rights or, compared to other groups within the same society, 
have considerably fewer means to exercise their rights. 
The legitimacy concern
Two  shifts  took  place  in  the  twentieth  century  that  might  explain  why  efciency 
arguments had been successful in shaping the environmental agenda both within states 
and  in  the  international  institutions:  the  rst,  managing  the  environment  has  been 
portrayed  as  a  technical  task;  and  second,  economics  has  become  –  or  has  been 
presented  as  –  a  technical  value-free  discipline  which  can  provide  or  recommend 
solutions to value-laden issues. Even before the ‘60s and ‘70s, when, according to the 
vulgate,  environmental  conscience started to emerge,  environmental  degradation had 
been  portrayed  as  a  technical  problem  requiring  a  technical  solution  provided  by 
technical personnel. At the beginning of the twentieth century, these tendencies were 
already visible in the U.S. Forest Service. Gifford Pinchot, the initial leader and “father” 
of the Forest Service, conducted a bureaucratic revolution by stafng the agency with 
university-educated agronomists and foresters chosen on the basis of merit, instead of 
elected  politicians.  He  also  pushed  for  conservation  policies  based  on  scientic 
management of natural resources and long-term sustainable commercial use of forests; 
he disapproved of both timber companies, which wanted a faster exploitation of the 
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resources, and preservationists à la John Muir, who looked at the forests as wild and 
sacred places to be left untouched, not “managed” (Balogh, 2002). The effects of such 
“technication”  in  the  forestry  domain  were  clearly  visible:  a  bureaucracy  largely 
autonomous from the changing political landscape, free to apply the internal criteria of 
its discipline in order to achieve its objectives, and which, as a consequence, is also less 
accountable to the general public in possible cases of mismanagement.
Disciplines  frequently  interfacing  with  the  interest  of  a  larger  public  and  not 
purely theoretical, like forestry – climatology and medicine can be further examples –, 
are not immune from the question “what for?”, i.e. what is the value, or set of values 
which inform the “public face” of a technical discipline? Or,  put more bluntly still, 
which interests is its bureaucracy supposed to serve? At bottom, the dispute between 
conservationists  à  la  Pinchot  and preservationists  à  la  Muir  at  the  beginning of  the 
twentieth century concerned precisely such value-nding questions: whereas Pinchot 
saw value in sustainably exploiting the natural resources for the benet of the citizens, 
Muir contended that value was to be given to natural resources as they are found in 
nature, that value is intrinsic in nature. Such questions, however, seldom can be settled 
within the boundaries of the very discipline and with its tools; in a sense, “what agenda 
should the forestry bureaucracy put forward?” is not a question for agronomists and 
foresters.3
It is in this context that economics emerged as a powerful ancillary science for 
many disciplines whose technical practitioners occupy public, policy-making roles: by 
aggregating preferences the economists could then answer those value-nding questions 
that lie outside the boundaries of the discipline. This had been made possible by the 
perceived unique position of economics among the other sciences: softest among the 
hard sciences; hardest among the soft ones. “Hard” and “soft” to refer to sciences are 
colloquial terms that have been somewhat discredited after Thomas Kuhn’s work on the 
structure of scientic revolution (Kuhn, 1962 [2012]).  The distinction, however, is still 4
useful in this context to better understand the success of economics in informing the 
political agenda of disciplines which aim at shaping public policy. Two elements of 
economic science, one hard and one soft, made this possible. The rst one is familiarity: 
scholars in economics do try to provide testable predictions, employ quantiable data, 
and  control  experiments;  their  methods  are  similar  enough  to  those  employed  by 
 This claim has been made a number of times also from within the forestry domain from scholars critical 3
of the direction taken by the forestry profession. A seminal article is (Behan, 1966); see also (Chase, 
1995) and (Luckert, 2006).
 Hard sciences – which use testable predictions, quantiable data, controlled experiment – from time to 4
time progress not without leaps; and sometimes new paradigms are accepted not on the basis of veriable 
controlled experiments. Soft sciences, on the other hand, do not rely on the prescriptions of the scientic 
method: the theories are not always testable, there is ample room for qualitative analysis of data, and 
often consist of looking at the same objects or events from a different point of view, i.e. putting forward a 
new narrative. Humanities, as an example of soft sciences, are not less rigorous than the exact sciences, 
but they are accountable to different criteria of rigorousness, such as internal cohesion.
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scholars  in  other  hard  disciplines.  Secondly,  by  aggregating  preferences  scholars  in 
economics supposedly provide an indication of what a society values. This is usually 
portrayed  as  a  clean  process  where  the  economist  does  not  get  her  hands  dirty  by 
projecting her own values onto a value-laden issue. This is a deceiving image of the 
profession; the ethical debate over the last decade on discounting the future in climate 
economics  unmasks  it.  Yet  the  common  perception  is  that,  while  employing  hard 5
methods, economists deal with issues dear to soft sciences. It is this double nature – a 
value-free  science  of  what  people  value  –  that  made efciency-based arguments  so 
popular in various disciplines, such as the environmental ones, whose recommendations 
affect public policy. 
The problem lies not in the fact that practitioners within different disciplines rely 
on economic arguments for their policy recommendations per se, but rather in the fact 
that in the environmental domain efciency-based recommendations have crowded out 
other normatively different considerations. This is what is implied when scholars say 
that the narrative of ecological modernization is a hegemonic narrative in environmental 
politics (Hajer, 1995); or when they complain about a loss of socio-diversity following 
the adoption of policies whose rationale hinges on Rational Choice Theory (O’Hara, 
1995).  The  problem  is  not  that  efciency-based  recommendations  produce  specic 
unwanted results: rather, that the ultimate policy decisions are the product of a process 
which  fails  to  reect  a  wider  spectrum of  positions,  ideals,  and  values.  When  this 
happens at the level of supranational institutions such as the World Bank, the UNFCCC, 
the WTO, and others, a problem of legitimacy of these institutions opens up. How can 
these entities ask regional or national actors to comply with their demands if they fail to 
consider their points of view in their deliberations? This is mostly a procedural concern: 
if  efciency arguments are consistently used to set  the political  agenda of disparate 
disciplines engaged in environmental protection, the result will be a bias towards and 
overrepresentation of a particular set of normative ideas, i.e. the utilitarian framework 
underpinning welfare economics, thus creating a problem of political legitimacy.
THE NARRATIVE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AS A RESPONSE
How  precisely  could  public  participation  mechanisms  challenge  the  neoliberal 
environmental governance in dealing with the distributional and legitimacy concerns? 
First of all, we need to agree on a denition of public participation. Subsequently, we 
can  analyze  what  it  entails  and  how it  could  provide  a  correction  to  the  problems 
highlighted by the two concerns.  The denition of  the International  Association for 
Public Participation seems a good place to start,  not only because it comes from an 
authoritative  source,  but  also  because  it  is  analytically  simple.  IAP2 denes  public 
 On this see the debate among Stern, Nordhaus, and Weitzman following the publication of the Stern 5
Review on the Economics of Climate Change and Broome's account of it. See (Stern & Great Britain 
Treasury, 2006), (Nordhaus, 2007), (Stern and Taylor, 2007), (Weitzman, 2007), (Broome, 2012).
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participation as “any process that involves the public in problem-solving or decision-
making and uses public input to make better decisions.”  The IAP2 denition has the 6
advantage of being analytically simple because it does not focus on elements difcult to 
ascertain,  such as the ever-shifting balance of power between citizens and decision-
makers.  Furthermore, the denition does not necessarily exclude that forms of market 7
participation might be realized, yet by placing emphasis on “involving the public” and 
by assuming that a public sphere for decision-making actually exists, it undermines the 
idea  that  participation through the  market  could  be  the  only  possible  way to  affect 
environmental governance. 
The rst distributional concern is that market-based instruments alone might well 
provide environmental  protection but  it  is  contested that  they can provide equitable 
environmental protection. The second concern - over the legitimacy of the decision-
making process - is that efciency arguments are consistently used to set the political 
agenda of disparate disciplines engaged in environmental protection; the consequence 
of this is a bias towards, and overrepresentation of, a particular set of normative ideas.
By  asking  directly  to  the  people  affected  by  a  specic  project,  or  to  some 
organizations  which  represent  them,  to  voice  their  opinions  regarding  how  their 
livelihoods will  be impacted as a result  of the project – i.e.  providing inputs in the 
vocabulary of the denition – decision-makers could put in place a plan in order to 
counterbalance,  or  at  least  alleviate,  the  inequitable  effects  of  the  project.  In  this 
context, what is important is that, by participating in the decision-making process, the 
people affected by a project provide valuable information. The important currency in 
this context is not participation per se, but information. The more distant the loci of 
decision from the base (e.g. international), the more likely that decision-makers lack 
relevant information to provide equitable policies. These dynamics are intensied by the 
fact that in non-democratic societies certain instances might never arrive at the decision-
making table,  whereas pork-barreling, intense lobbying, campaign contributions,  and 
inuence over the media, might equally screen-out the demands of important parts of 
the population in democratic ones.
 Preamble  of  the  IAP2's  Code  of  Ethics  for  Public  Participation  Practitioners,  available  at:  http://6
www.iap2.org/?8 (last accessed May 2017).
 Denitions  of  public  participation  are  often  contested;  for  example  many  denitions  start  from a 7
presumption of change, i.e. participation is something that happens when a partial shift of power between 
decision-makers  to  citizens  occurs.  For  an  overview  of  these  denitions  see  Ann  Richardson’s 
Participation (1983: 23). A famous example of one of such denitions is Sherry Arnstein’s “ladder of 
participation”: participation is something that occurs when a signicant amount of power is redistributed 
to  the  advantage  of  the  people  who did  not  have  it  before.  The  “intensity”  of  this  redistribution  is 
exemplied by the concept of a ladder where at the bottom there is little to none redistribution, hence no 
participation, at the top there is full redistribution, hence full participation. The following is the “ladder”, 
starting from the lowest case of (non-)participation: (i)  manipulation, (ii)  therapy, (iii)  informing, i.e. 
access  to  information  in  the  language  of  the  present  article,  (iv)  consultation,  (v)  placation,  (vi) 
partnership, (vii) delegated power, (viii) citizen control (Arnstein, 1969: 216)
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Often, distributive problems cannot be effectively tackled by simply adding more 
information;  this  happens when there  are  contesting positions  of  what  counts  as  an 
equitable outcome in the rst place. In these cases, trying to solve the distributional 
problem without having previously addressed the question of what it means for a policy 
outcome to be equitable at all will, more often than not, produce a half-baked policy 
solution. In other words, in certain cases, a distributional problem cannot be tackled by 
means of a technocratic approach which adds more information. Instead, it requires a 
procedural approach which subjects the main ideas for resource redistribution available 
in  a  community  to  political  deliberation.  By  doing  so,  this  procedural  approach  to 
participation is  also able to dispel  the legitimacy concern over the undue weight of 
certain  epistemic  communities  (including  economists)  in  pushing  their  substantive 
values in both setting the policy agenda and in providing policy solutions.
By allowing certain organizations,  communities or even specic individuals to 
take part in the decision-making process – “involving the public” in the denition – the 
decision-makers give these actors the power to subject the shortcoming of economic 
efciency to political deliberation. Participating people can thus frame the issues dear to 
them  in  their  specic  vocabulary,  choose  which  normative  ideas  they  would  like 
environmental politics to be informed by, and, ultimately, inuence politics. Smith tells 
the story of a Natural Resources Canada-sponsored conference she attended in Montreal 
in 2005 in which an Inuit hunter gave a compelling testimony about the impacts of 
climate change in the Arctic region. She recounts that the speaker “put a much needed 
human face on the issue of climate change” and that he reminded her “of the voices, 
human and natural, that are too often marginalized from the world of targets, timetables, 
science,  and  international  negotiations”  (Smith,  2007:  197).  In  this  context,  it  is 
participation intended as presence at the decision-making table which is the important 
element, potentially able to dispel both of the concerns identied above.
One the one hand, more and better information to help decision makers design 
more equitable policies and projects and, on the other, inuencing the decision-making 
process  by  subjecting  distributional  problems  to  political  deliberation,  are  the  two 
drivers  of  participation  which  present  a  challenge  to  the  neoliberal  approach  to 
environmental protection. There is some conceptual overlap between the two drivers, as 
both conveying information and being present have the potential of inuencing policy; 
furthermore  “input”  in  the  denition  offered  by  IAP2  is  a  term generic  enough  to 
capture  both.  However,  the  distinction  stands  from  an  analytic  point  of  view,  as 
inuencing  by  being  present  captures  a  broader  set  of  actions  which  include,  for 
example, bargaining or informal lobbying. Finally, the two drivers of participation are in 
turn informed by different normative presuppositions, albeit similar. To these issues I 
turn now.
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Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration – and later the Aarhus Convention – crystallized the 
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The normative presuppositions informing access to information
The right of access to information is usually assimilated to the right to know in the 
environmental  domain.  From  a  purely  analytical  point  of  view,  there  are  some 8
differences between “having information” and “having knowledge,” as the latter is what 
comes out of a process of reection and analysis for which information is one of the 
main  inputs.  In  theory,  these  differences  also  have  a  bearing  on  the  corresponding 
 For example, Sharon Beder (2006), in her introductory book on environmental politics, treats the two 8
rights together without making distinctions between them.
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duties:  providing  information  requires  less  effort  on  the  actor  disclosing  the 
information, as compared to providing knowledge. Looking at how legislation on these 
matters developed in practice,  the opposite is  true.  Right-to-know legislation,  which 
emerged  in  the  1960s  and  1970s,  required  polluting  rms  to  make  information 
accessible only upon request through a formal bureaucratic process, and information 
was more fragmented and not user-friendly. The disclosure initiatives from the 1990s 
onwards,  following  the  narrative  of  participation  which  emerged  from  the  Earth 
Summit, and thus more directly associated with the concept of access to information, 
display a more proactive and user-friendly publication of environmental  information 
(Mol, 2008: 134).
Access to information as a strategy to bring about environmental protection has 
often been described as  the third wave of  regulation;  the rst  being command-and-
control and the second market-based mechanisms. The three ‘waves’ actually coexist as 
today  all  three  approaches  to  environmental  protection  are  employed,  yet  the 
terminology is useful in reecting the progressive appearance of each strategy on the 
international stage. Roughly, the rst one emerged in the 1970s, the second one in the 
1980s, and the third one in the 1990s. Ann Florini (1998) was the rst to capture and 
popularize  this  new  trend  toward  more  transparent  governance  –  she  called  it 
‘regulation by revelation’ – in a wide array of domains: security, politics, economics and 
environmental.  A decade later, Aarti Gupta (2008) gave new momentum to the research 9
on the third wave of regulation in the specic domain of environmental governance. 
The  state  of  research  is  now  marginally  better,  as  studies  on  this  third  wave  in 
environmental politics have started pouring in (e.g. Gupta and Mason, 2014b), along 
with  more  technical  studies  on  the  economic  rationale  behind  regional  disclosure 
initiatives.  This section partially draws on these studies.10
There are two main arguments on the grounds of efciency as concerns the right 
of  access  to  information.  Both  of  these  arguments  justify  the  right  of  access  to 
information  by  establishing  a  direct  link  between  the  disclosure  of  environmental 
information  and  environmental  protection.  The  rst  argument  depicts  access  to 
information as a low-cost regulation because of the simple enforcement procedures they 
require on the part of states. In this case, a state requires that certain industries disclose 
how  much  toxic  chemicals  are  released  into  the  environment  or  whether  certain 
products are manufactured in an environmentally-friendly way. This does not require 
the environmental agency to ensure compliance by directly regulating plants: it only has 
to gather information, publish and keep an updated database, and monitor the rms’ 
reporting of pollution (Bui and Mayer, 2003; Wang et al.,  2004). Examples of these 
 At the same time, other scholars examined the implications for the environment of what has come to be 9
known as informational regulations. See (Konar and Cohen, 1997) and (Tietenberg, 1998).
 For example, China’s Green Watch Program and the PROPER programme in Indonesia have received 10
considerable  attention,  in  part  because  of  the  different  institutional  background  of  these  initiatives, 
compared to Western disclosure initiatives such as US Toxic Release Inventory or the UK’s Pollutant 
Inventory. See (Wang and Wheeler, 2003) and (Dasgupta et al., 2006)
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types of regulation include the various release inventories such as the US Toxic Release 
Inventory or the UK’s Pollutant Inventory and ecolabels such as the Forest Stewardship 
Council or the Energy Star. Most of the eco-labelling initiatives are nowadays initiated 
and  managed  by  NGOs  but  states,  supranational  institutions,  and  international 
organizations retain the power to set the standards that the various ecolabels have to 
meet; they thus prevent customers from being deceived by greenwashing operations. 
Behind pollution inventories and ecolabels stands the idea that consumer patterns are 
pivotal for environmental protection. The dynamic between information disclosure and 
increased quality of the environment has been called ‘shock and shame’: the release of 
pollution information will rst shock the citizens, the markets, and the media, and it will 
then  shame  the  respective  companies,  which  will  be  more  prone  to  change  their 
production  to  meet  better  environmental  standards  (Stephan,  2002).  By  providing 
information concerning the environmental impact of rms and products, citizens and 
customers will orientate their choices – it is hoped – in a greener direction. For these 
initiatives to work, however, a few boxes of important assumptions made along the way 
need  be  ticked.  First,  a  state  needs  to  be  at  least  partially  populated  by  already 
environmentally conscious citizens. A culture of environmentalism of some sort already 
needs to be present for citizens to be responsive to ecolabels and pollution inventories. 
We can  speculate  that  these  initiatives  might  spur  curiosity  towards  knowing  more 
about the health hazards linked to certain pollutants or the manufacturing of certain 
products,  but  the  link  between  ecolabels  and  the  formation  of  an  environmental 
consciousness  has  yet  to  be  investigated.  Second,  the  idea  that  environmentally 
conscious citizens will respond to such initiatives presupposes both an idea of personal 
autonomy and  an  idea  of  citizens  as  rational  self-interested  individuals,  reacting  to 
external incentives, and furthering their aims in a strategic manner. Third, the idea that 
environmental protection can be brought about by incentives triggered by people and to 
which  business  will  respond  underpins  the  neoliberal  idea  of  public  participation 
through the market. This argument thus depicts access to information as contributing to 
environmental protection through the pressures of environmentally conscious citizens; 
this is said to be an efcient way to contribute to environmental protection, as the state 
achieves this level of environmental protection through a low-cost regulation.
The second argument on the grounds of efciency justies access to information 
in  terms  of  a  cost-effective  way  for  the  polluting  businesses  to  contribute  to 
environmental protection (Hauer, 2010; Gupta and Mason, 2014a). More specically, 
by voluntarily  disclosing information about  the  environmental  impacts  of  their  own 
activities, and showing their commitment to the environmental cause, these rms seek 
to avoid more stringent mandatory regulations on the part of states and international 
institutions.  A  correlation  between  voluntary  commitments  and  lower  regulatory 
standards has been witnessed with respect to internal certied auditing systems – such 
as  ISO  14001.  In  particular,  companies  with  certied  auditing  standards  are  less 
frequently subject to inspections (Mol, 2008: 171; Stevens, 1999: 79). Without stringent 
regulations,  rms have more room to  choose by themselves  the  most  cost-effective 
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options to reduce pollution without being required to employ any specic technology to 
do so, meet any specic timetable, or comply with any specic quota of abatement.
For  this  strategy to  work,  however,  there  rst  needs to  be a  gap between the 
expectations of the stakeholder and the intentions of a legislator.  The environmental 
performance of the polluting rm has to be virtuous enough so that the environmentally 
conscious  stakeholders  will  not  react  in  the  marketplace  by  changing  consumption 
patterns or turn to the legislators for stricter regulation, but not so virtuous to the extent 
that  the  rm  incurs  in  costs  comparable  to  those  it  would  incur  under  regulation. 
Second, the costs of gathering and reporting information need to be low: indeed, in 
some cases also the controlling of types and amounts of pollutants released requires 
costly technologies (Graham, 2002). Third, the risks of unintended use of information 
need be low as well: as the amount of pollution released is often a good indication of the 
efciency of a production process (Porter and van der Linde, 1995b: 105), publishing 
this information – when not already prohibited by competition law rules – might reduce 
or eliminate the competitive advantage of a rm against its competitors, and it might 
trigger corporate spying. However, if the strategy works, rms are free to reduce their 
environmental  impacts  in  a  exible  manner,  whereas  the  state  achieves  the  low 
monitoring and enforcement costs linked with disclosure policies.
There is one major argument on the grounds of justice underpinning the right of 
access to information, which  justies access to information with reference to personal 
autonomy. Much like the right to be informed about possible risks before undergoing a 
medical operation, access to information in the environmental domain, such as being 
informed about the amount of arsenic in drinking water, is grounded on a principle of 
autonomy or self-determination, i.e. the capacity to reect, endorse, and act upon our 
own  values  and  commitments.  Withholding  information  might  violate  a  person’s 
autonomy; this happens when a person’s decision under full information would have 
been different from the one taken under partial information. A person willing to relocate 
if arsenic in the drinking water of her area surpasses a certain threshold might see her 
autonomy violated if the information that certies that the water does indeed present 
certain dangerous level of arsenic is withheld. For most people, paternalism, the idea 
that someone or something – like a state – interferes with us and does so for our own 
good, is disturbing precisely because it interferes with the idea of autonomy that we so 
highly hold in esteem. The idea of autonomy as a value is at the center of disparate 
philosophical traditions at the basis of liberalism. Two names may sufce: John Stuart 
Mill,  who considered  it  ‘one  of  the  elements  of  well-being’ (Mill,  1859),  and  thus 
worthy of being maximized, and Immanuel Kant (1788), who built his moral edice on 
the capacity of human beings to freely use reasons to choose their own actions.
Finally, there is a pragmatic rationale which justies access to information with 
reference to participation in politics, as opposed to market participation. This is what is 
meant  by ‘ancillary’:  to  be  an active  citizen and be  able  to  fully  participate  in  the 
political  life  of  one’s  own  community  and  the  decisions  affecting  one’s  own 
environment, one needs to be informed about such matters. As such, there is not a direct 
connection  between  access  to  information  and  environmental  protection;  the 
86
THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL NARRATIVES
options to reduce pollution without being required to employ any specic technology to 
do so, meet any specic timetable, or comply with any specic quota of abatement.
For  this  strategy to  work,  however,  there  rst  needs to  be a  gap between the 
expectations of the stakeholder and the intentions of a legislator.  The environmental 
performance of the polluting rm has to be virtuous enough so that the environmentally 
conscious  stakeholders  will  not  react  in  the  marketplace  by  changing  consumption 
patterns or turn to the legislators for stricter regulation, but not so virtuous to the extent 
that  the  rm  incurs  in  costs  comparable  to  those  it  would  incur  under  regulation. 
Second, the costs of gathering and reporting information need to be low: indeed, in 
some cases also the controlling of types and amounts of pollutants released requires 
costly technologies (Graham, 2002). Third, the risks of unintended use of information 
need be low as well: as the amount of pollution released is often a good indication of the 
efciency of a production process (Porter and van der Linde, 1995b: 105), publishing 
this information – when not already prohibited by competition law rules – might reduce 
or eliminate the competitive advantage of a rm against its competitors, and it might 
trigger corporate spying. However, if the strategy works, rms are free to reduce their 
environmental  impacts  in  a  exible  manner,  whereas  the  state  achieves  the  low 
monitoring and enforcement costs linked with disclosure policies.
There is one major argument on the grounds of justice underpinning the right of 
access to information, which  justies access to information with reference to personal 
autonomy. Much like the right to be informed about possible risks before undergoing a 
medical operation, access to information in the environmental domain, such as being 
informed about the amount of arsenic in drinking water, is grounded on a principle of 
autonomy or self-determination, i.e. the capacity to reect, endorse, and act upon our 
own  values  and  commitments.  Withholding  information  might  violate  a  person’s 
autonomy; this happens when a person’s decision under full information would have 
been different from the one taken under partial information. A person willing to relocate 
if arsenic in the drinking water of her area surpasses a certain threshold might see her 
autonomy violated if the information that certies that the water does indeed present 
certain dangerous level of arsenic is withheld. For most people, paternalism, the idea 
that someone or something – like a state – interferes with us and does so for our own 
good, is disturbing precisely because it interferes with the idea of autonomy that we so 
highly hold in esteem. The idea of autonomy as a value is at the center of disparate 
philosophical traditions at the basis of liberalism. Two names may sufce: John Stuart 
Mill,  who considered  it  ‘one  of  the  elements  of  well-being’ (Mill,  1859),  and  thus 
worthy of being maximized, and Immanuel Kant (1788), who built his moral edice on 
the capacity of human beings to freely use reasons to choose their own actions.
Finally, there is a pragmatic rationale which justies access to information with 
reference to participation in politics, as opposed to market participation. This is what is 
meant  by ‘ancillary’:  to  be  an active  citizen and be  able  to  fully  participate  in  the 
political  life  of  one’s  own  community  and  the  decisions  affecting  one’s  own 
environment, one needs to be informed about such matters. As such, there is not a direct 
connection  between  access  to  information  and  environmental  protection;  the 
86
relationship between the two is mediated by what access to information contributes to in 
terms of a participatory decision-making process.
The linkages between information and participation are multiple, complex, and 
important,  therefore  it  is  necessary  to  map them out  clearly.  There  is  an  efciency 
rationale  behind access  to  information which is  instrumental  to  what  I  have  earlier 
called  the  marketization  of  participation.  In  other  words,  accessible  information 
displayed through ecolabels and pollution inventories is useful in driving customers to 
greener  spending  habits  and  rms,  reacting  to  the  mood of  the  citizens  on  matters 
related to the environmental impact of their operations, to greener production processes. 
There is a pragmatic rationale behind access to information which is instrumental to 
more meaningful forms of participation - compared to market participation - which are 
what I called participation as conveying information and participation as presence. Both 
these forms of participation require that citizens have access to information before being 
in a position to meaningfully interact with decision-makers or participate themselves in 
the decision-making process.
The  following  gure  summarizes  the  multiple  linkages  among  the  various 
components of the narrative of public participation and also anticipates some of the 
arguments that will be developed below.
Figure 3.1 - Summary of civic environmentalism’s multiple linkages. 
The normative presuppositions behind
the two drivers for participation
After having reviewed the presuppositions informing the right of access to information, 
which  supposedly  is  ancillary  to  participation,  but,  as  we  have  seen  before,  it  has 
become  an  instrument  for  environmental  protection  on  its  own,  let’s  now  turn  to 
participation - strictly speaking, meaningful participation in the gure above - and to 
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the analysis of its normative presuppositions. What is interesting to analyze at this point 
is  -  rst  -  whether  the  two ideas  of  participation  in  environmental  governance,  i.e. 
participation as conveying information and participation as presence, are the products of 
separate and different normative presuppositions, and if so, of which? Secondly, are the 
normative ideas informing mechanisms of participation fundamentally different from 
those encountered in the previous chapter?
Let’s rst start with the similarities between the two ideas of participation and 
their general presuppositions. Both ideas start form the central tenets of liberalism, yet 
they end up emphasizing different aspects of it. Liberalism departs from the idea that 
the  main  task  of  any  government  is  to  safeguard  individual  liberties.  Furthermore, 
freedom, and the right to property in particular, is not opposed to equality of men. These 
are the founding ideas of the liberal tradition. Claiming that the citizens are free and 
equal means that the interests of everyone are equally important and should receive 
equal consideration.
It follows from the idea that the interests of everyone should count equally that the 
only  form  of  government  acceptable  for  this  kind  of  individuals  is  one  in  which 
coercion can only ever be self-imposed: a (liberal) democracy. In other words, those 
who make the decisions and those who bear the burden to comply with those decisions 
are the same people. There are at least two different ways of intending democracy: as a 
method and as an ideal. For example, Friedrich Hayek, while certainly a liberal, was 
very skeptical of enabling the majority principle - the basic tenet of democracy - to 
dictate  different  aspects  of  a  society  and  believed  that  individual  rights  should  be 
protected  even  against  the  will  of  the  majority,  which  at  times  can  be  oppressive 
(Petrucciani, 2003). Hayek implicitly upheld an idea of democracy as a method, i.e. as a 
simple decision-making tool to aggregate preferences. Others would contend that an 
oppressive majority is no democracy at all, that whereas democracy certainly means to 
decide according to the majority principle because it minimizes the number of people 
that feel coerced by a given decision, mechanisms should be put in place in order not to 
allow the majority to violate the rights of the minority. Daniele Archibugi, for example, 
is one of the scholars who claims that a commitment to democracy means at the same 
time respect for a set of individual rights, much broader than property rights alone; in 
other  words,  for  him,  democracy  is  an  ideal  of  communal  and  participatory  living 
(Archibugi, 2008). While both ideas of democracy remain true to democratic liberalism 
by upholding both its founding principles - liberty and equality -, they operationalize 
them in  different  ways.  According  to  the  aggregative  model,  citizens  are  primarily 
voters, and the “type” of equality that matters is the equality of votes: one vote, one 
person. Equality of votes presupposes equality of preferences. As a consequence, liberty 
is framed primarily as the lack of impediments in forming and putting forward one’s 
own preferences. According to the participatory model, the reverse is true: the voters are 
primarily citizens, i.e.  people embedded in a social environment which gives rise to 
rights and duties that go beyond simply voting. The equality that matters is the one in 
the process  of decision-making, and in which participating in decision-making has a 
political  value  of  its  own.  The  process  of  decision-making  can  be  characterized 
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primarily citizens, i.e.  people embedded in a social environment which gives rise to 
rights and duties that go beyond simply voting. The equality that matters is the one in 
the process  of decision-making, and in which participating in decision-making has a 
political  value  of  its  own.  The  process  of  decision-making  can  be  characterized 
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narrowly - one that takes place only in the decision-making institutions - or broadly - 
deliberations in public places. In either case, if equality in the decision-making process 
has to be realized, it follows that not only everyone should be allowed to do so (lack of 
formal impediments) but also that they have the means (physical and intellectual) to do 
so.
In  modern  societies,  direct  self-government  on  the  model  of  Greek  poleis  or 
Italian city-states is not possible anymore - mainly because of the technical difculties 
of actively involving large numbers of citizens in making decisions -; some form of 
representation is therefore needed. It follows that a perfect identity between decision 
makers  and bearers  is  not  possible;  however,  government  through representatives  is 
considered a worthy substitute. Self-government through representatives presupposes a 
sort  of  symmetry,  not  identity,  between  the  decision-makers  -  those  who make  the 
decisions  -  and  the  decision-bearers  -  the  recipients  of  political  decisions.  This 
symmetry breaks down when a certain decision has repercussion on people other than 
those  who  were  allowed  to  vote  or  deliberate  on  that  specic  issue  and  when 
representatives cannot be held accountable by the citizens who put them in power.
Both ideas of participation are a response to the potential failure of this symmetry, 
which in the domain of environmental politics happens rather frequently. The symmetry 
might fail when environmental projects are decided extra-territorially and imposed onto 
a local population, or when the decisions of a neighboring state or region have cross-
border repercussions. By participating in the management of a specic project, a local 
population  could  redraw  the  geographical  boundaries  of  political  decisions.  The 
symmetry can also fail when there is a cushion between the voters and the decision 
makers, such as in the case of the forestry bureaucracy introduced above. But the same 
also applies to the professionals working in the environmental institutions such as the 
various environmental agencies or bodies of the UN (e.g. UNEP, UNECE, UNFCCC, 
and many others) and to country representatives, which can or cannot be elected, but 
who  are  in  any  case  very  politically  distant.  If  to  this  we  add  the  ongoing  trends 
examined above about the technication of the bureaucracy, then we have nally come 
full  circle and we can begin to understand why more participation might eventually 
contribute to redrawing the boundaries of the political discourse, i.e. to guarantee that a 
group of people affected by a political decision recognize their normative ideas being at 
least  considered  during  the  decision-making  process,  and  ultimately  to  increase  the 
legitimacy of the environmental institutions by contributing to design new redistributive 
policies.
In  the remainder  of  the chapter  I  am going to  argue that  while  both ideas  of 
participation are rooted in democratic liberalism - as they both try to reestablish the 
symmetry between decision makers and subjects - they uphold different versions of it: 
participation as conveying information as a response to a deciency of inclusiveness in 
the economy is more directly linked with an economically inspired aggregative model 
of democracy, whereas participation as presence as a response to procedural unfairness, 
with the participatory model of democracy. 
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Participation as conveying information:
the idea of democratic efciency
The rst driver of participation - participation as conveying information - is informed by 
the idea that,  by directly involving the people impacted by a project,  the symmetry 
between decision-makers and bearers can be reestablished. Secondly, there is the idea 
that more and better information about the impact of a project or a policy will translate 
into a less inequitable project or policy. I start from the latter and work my way toward 
the  former,  to  eventually  argue  that  the  mechanism  of  participation  as  conveying 
information is driven by the idea of a democratic aggregation of preferences grounded 
on the tenets of Rational Choice Theory.
There are two elements behind the idea that more and better information about the 
impact of a project or a policy will translate into a less inequitable project or policy, and 
which need be  analyzed separately.  Firstly,  there  is  the  idea  that  asking the  people 
directly  impacted  by  a  project  will  provide  decision-makers  with  more  and  better 
information; it is about the quality of the information. Secondly, there is the idea that 
this will prove useful for designing less inequitable projects and policies; it is about use 
and  usefulness  of  the  information.  The  idea  that  most  of  the  time  high-quality 
information on how a project or a policy will impact a community cannot be conveyed 
by anyone else other than the people of that very community has to do with the fact that 
information is a sort of value-laden testimony. In other words, to say that a project will 
impact a community in a certain way, one has to know the practices of that community, 
what its people place value on, and only after having gained this knowledge can one 
characterize  certain  impacts  as  bad,  good  or  neutral.  Whether  an  external  project 
evaluator could come up with such testimony is uncertain,  but in any case unlikely 
given  the  constraints  they  usually  face,  such  as  strict  “terms  of  reference,”  which 
already  establish  which  information  is  required,  tight  deadlines  and  tight  budgets 
(Goldman, 2004: 55). There is often a trade-off between the quality of the information 
and  the  costs  of  acquiring  such  information  when  this  task  is  delegated  to  project 
evaluators.
The  idea  that  better  information  will  translate  into  better  decisions  constructs 
inequitability as a sort of coordination failure among different actors due to information 
gaps,  only  requiring  more  inputs  and  corrections,  not  a  radical  rethinking  of  the 
approach; what Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2007) aptly called the idea of “democratic 
efciency.” However, even if inequitability was indeed a sort of technical problem only 
requiring better inputs, its solution would still depend on a number of conditions: (i) 
whether the underlying interests of the participating people providing information and 
those  of  the  decision-makers  truly  match;  (ii)  whether  the  decision-makers  use  the 
information provided; (iii)  and if  so,  how they will  use it.  Each of these conditions 
offers a possible point of departure for decision-makers to falsify the equation that sees 
more and better information as a recipe for more equitable policies and projects. The 
rst point, in particular, is problematic, as the interests of the participating base and 
those of the decision-makers are often not the same; the latter sometimes have to take 
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into account the interests of a wider segment of the population who might benet from 
the  project.  A  clash  between  different  interests  might  happen  in  “all-or-nothing 
situations,” when a project cannot be made more equitable by additional investment. In 
these cases, the simple fact that a project is carried out will dramatically and irreparably 
impact  the  livelihoods  of  certain  communities  while  beneting  others.  Large  dam 
projects  such  as  the  famous  Nam  Theun  2  in  Laos,  which  sometimes  require  the 
resettlements  of  entire  villages,  are  a  concrete  example  of  this  type  of  situations 
(Lawrence, 2009).11
There are two possible ways of framing what is at stake in an information gap: 
rst, decision makers lack the informational requirements to put forward more equitable 
policies. This is an epistemic problem. Second, people with the necessary information 
are not allowed or are somehow unable to deliver their information. This is a technical 
problem. This second sense of “information gap” is what makes policies undemocratic, 
i.e. what makes the symmetry between decision makers and bearers fail. Often, the two 
go together: when policy makers lack information because those who could provide it 
are unable to do so.
Participation as conveying information supposedly corrects the inequitability of a 
certain policy by reestablishing the symmetry. But if this is the case, then participation 
as conveying information presupposes a particular idea of what it means to participate: 
it means to give someone else the means to make the decisions which satisfy people’s 
preferences.  Participation  in  this  sense  is  best  framed  as  an  aggregative  model  of 
democracy, i.e. the idea that citizens express their own preferences on how they would 
like the common resources to be managed. If all the people affected by a decision are 
allowed to express their preferences, and these are aggregated according to the principle 
that everyone counts equally, then not only the democratic symmetry stands (I assumed 
this by saying “all the people affected by a decision”) but also the choice following the 
aggregation will  be  automatically  equitable.  This  is  what  follows from constructing 
inequality as an epistemic problem whose solution requires more informational inputs, 
and  as  a  technical  problem whose  solution  requires  channeling  those  informational 
inputs.
There are two problems with this approach to participation. The rst is that the 
society’s arrangements which emerge from this way of intending public participation 
will always be the result of power and numbers instead of civic deliberation. I specify 
three occasions in which this might happen. In certain cases, political decisions will be 
the output of the preferences of a majority. A majority is not necessarily oppressive, it 
could, for example, institute guarantees for minorities. The problem with this, however, 
is that the majority might do so by resorting to their private reasons and values, which 
might not make much sense to those who are affected by these guarantees, and thus risk 
feeling disenfranchised from the community of which they are part.  In certain other 
cases, majorities are not rock solid and the democratic alternation and fragmentation 
 The ofcial documents and reports of the Nam Theun 2 World Bank project can be found at: http://11
documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/docsearch/projects/P049290 (Last accessed May 2017).
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guarantee that a large section of the community has a say in policy-making through log-
rolling.  Log-rolling  is  the  widespread  practice  of  exchanging  votes  by  legislative 
members in order to enact the proposed legislations of each separate member. Yet again, 
this is far from ideal, because it is not clear how a certain piece of legislation enacted in 
this way is to be justied. As a consequence, the different private reasons to support the 
policy have nothing to do with the standard of justication which should be ideally 
employed in politics. In other words, there might not be a coherent story which justies 
the enactment of the policy, and some strategic supporters might not even want their 
names associated with it. And nally, on certain other occasions, there might even be a 
sort of overlapping consensus when different parties genuinely support a policy for their 
private  reasons.  This  scenario  is  undoubtedly  the  most  appealing  among  the  three 
surveyed, but it opens itself to the criticism that the policy thus approved still lacks a 
coherent justication. Sunstein argued that in these cases the justication for a policy 
might  be  “incompletely  theorized”  (Sunstein,  1994)  because  the  different 
comprehensive doctrines upon which the different parties rely in order to justify the 
policy  cannot  be  brought  into  relation  with  one  another  in  an  exercise  of  mutual 
justication which can be bestowed upon the community as a whole. These three cases 
tell us that political decisions arrived at through the aggregative method are justied by 
resorting  to  the  private  reasons  of  the  majority  -  stable  or  temporary  -  of  the 
participants. This, once again, opens up a problem of legitimacy of the policies. Or, to 
put it differently, we cannot rely on this model to solve the legitimacy concern identied 
at  the  outset  of  the  chapter;  this  is  why  the  model  of  participation  as  providing 
information can at most be a solution to those sorts of distributional problems which are 
not too controversial and where the very denition of what counts as equitable is not 
debated. We will see in the following section that the model of participation as presence 
aims to correct these shortcomings by subjecting policy decisions to the requirement of 
public reason.
The second problem of intending participation as conveying information is that 
the  aggregative  model  of  democracy  which  underlies  it  shares  with  neoclassical 
economics the rational choice model of explaining social behavior: human are rational, 
they have preferences, and they choose and act according to them. But if this is so, then 
there is nothing in principle that might impede rational persons to look for other means 
to satisfy their preferences, instead of relying on politics through democracy. The idea 
behind the great liberalizations of the ‘80s - from shifting certain main services from the 
public to the private domain - stems from the notion that there is no salient difference 
between different ways of satisfying preferences, as long as they get satised. Indeed, 
what compels certain states to retain certain services within the public domain is not the 
fact  that  the state provision of these services is  to be preferred on the grounds,  for 
example, that it creates social cohesion, but rather the mere awareness that sometimes 
people lack the means to acquire these services and satisfy their preferences if they can 
only be accessed through the market. Incidentally, this is why the correction of certain 
imbalances  created  by  market-based  mechanism  has  to  be  subjected  to  political 
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deliberation  and  cannot  be  simply  internalized  into  economic  theory  as  welfare 
economists would like.
Let us take a standard case of social cost imposed onto a local population by a 
rm which pollutes the waters in a certain geographic area.  According to economic 
theory, if the local population is entitled to clean water, then it can make the polluting 
rm internalize the cost of polluting the waters either through compensation or by going 
to court and asking the rm to install lters or making it relocate. All of this, however, 
presupposes that the local population has the time and money to force the polluting rm 
to internalize its social costs. If this is not the case, perhaps because of wide disparities 
in  power,  money,  and  (legal  and  economic)  knowledge  between  multinational 
corporations and developing countries’ local populations, then the inputs of the local 
population simply do not come with a dollar symbol attached to them. And in a prot-
driven environment, these inputs risk being systematically overlooked.
While  participation  as  conveying  information  already  goes  some  way  in 
preventing  that  policy  outcomes  mirror  the  distributional  imbalances  produced  by 
market-based mechanisms, because it subjects these policies to a strict egalitarian test - 
one  person,  one  vote  -,  it  cannot,  however,  dispel  the  more  subtle  ways  in  which 
policymaking gets biased: through agenda setting, through the input in the decision-
making process of privileged epistemic communities, or through the crafting of the very 
procedures  used  to  aggregate  the  preferences.  If  not  channeled  politically  through 
mechanisms of political deliberation, the inputs which people can bring by providing 
information to the policy-makers can seldom correct the inequalities created by market 
mechanisms.
Participation as presence: justice as procedural fairness
The idea that democratic deliberation channeled through just procedures is capable of 
making the perceived interests  of the individual people and the real  interests  of the 
society at large converge is the second driver of participation - participation as presence. 
Redistributive  policies  which  are  the  outcome  of  this  process  of  procedurally  just 
democratic deliberation are thus also equitable. These are the central tenets of Rawls’s 
theory of justice; in the following section I reconstruct Rawls’ theory (1971; 1993) and I 
will explain why it is relevant to understand the normative presuppositions supporting 
participation as presence.
Apart from the procedural approach to justice, there are also other reasons why 
Rawls’ theory of justice ably represents the underlying normative commitments of those 
positions in environmental politics which see public participation as a possible solution 
to the imbalances created by market mechanisms and market-mimicking policies. First, 
his research, throughout his entire life, embodies the commitment to hold together both 
the normative goals of efciency and justice to the point of being ambivalent about 
them (I will come back to this in Chapter 4). This resonates among the proponents of 
civic  environmentalism:  like  Rawls,  they  do  not  want  to  do  entirely  away  with 
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efciency-producing market mechanisms or policies, but instead want to nd a social 
arrangement in which such mechanisms and policies, along with their shortcomings, are 
subjected to political deliberation, in order to serve the social good of the community. 
Second, similarly to Rawls, their approach to increasing participation is best understood 
as instrumental to the realization of a shared idea of communal living and not as an end 
in itself; in this case, a shared idea of equitable environmental protection. 
Participation in terms of presence as a potential solution to both the inequalities 
generated by market-based mechanisms and the undue inuence of  efciency-based 
arguments in policy-making operationalizes a different and much thicker understanding 
of the political equality of citizens in the decision-making process: not simply having an 
equal right to vote and provide information when required to do so, but also equality in 
the deliberation process. I use a metaphor to illustrate the difference between the two 
approaches  to  decision-making equality.  Votes  and information are  the  hard data  of 
politics. They can be quite straightforward, such as in referenda, or they can be messy, 
such as election votes in a multi-party system. When they are not messy, they accurately 
track the citizens’ opinions on a policy, this is the case of a yes or no referendum on, for 
example,  nuclear  power  plants  (here,  of  course,  one  needs  to  assume  that  the 
referendum question is not voluntarily formulated in ambiguous terms and that access to 
accurate information has been provided). From non-messy data, it is easy to extrapolate 
information. When they are messy, a similar straightforward inference cannot be easily 
made. In a system with a right and a left party, far-right and far-left ones, and a green 
party, the citizens’ opinion on nuclear power plants is dispersed. A green party voter 
might be favorable to nuclear power but decided to vote green because she has at heart 
animal  welfare.  Similar  mismatches  are  frequent  in  nation-wide  elections.  In  these 
cases,  to  get  from data  to  knowledge  of  what  are  the  people’s  opinions  on  certain 
policies, data need to be manipulated, and information constructed. Deliberations within 
the  democratic  institutions  is  the  data  manipulation  of  politics.  Equality  in  “data 
manipulation” presupposes that a person is given the formal and substantial means to 
contribute to the extrapolation of information from data; in other words, if an active role 
for  citizens  within  the  decision-making  institutions  is  sought,  then  it  needs  to  be 
facilitated  by  formally  opening  the  doors  of  the  decision-making  institutions  and 
through some redistribution along the lines of social welfare states (Rawls went further 
still, and argued in favor of a property-owning democracy).
In pluralistic societies, however, straightforward inference from votes is very rare, 
and some form of “data manipulation” is, therefore, a constant feature of our political 
systems.  Albeit  the  proponents  of  both  models  of  democracy  -  aggregative  and 
participatory - recognize that they have to deal with this simple fact - Rawls called it the 
fact of pluralism - they do it differently. The fact of pluralism is that in big, complex, 
and modern societies it cannot be expected that everyone agrees on just one shared set 
of values. From the point of view of preference aggregation, pluralism manifests itself 
when a vote does not produce a clear winner, in cases, for example, in which there are 
not single-peaked preferences.  These types of situations are usually dealt  with more 
rened  procedures  (different  rounds  of  votes),  log-rolling,  or,  in  some  cases, 
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facilitated  by  formally  opening  the  doors  of  the  decision-making  institutions  and 
through some redistribution along the lines of social welfare states (Rawls went further 
still, and argued in favor of a property-owning democracy).
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and some form of “data manipulation” is, therefore, a constant feature of our political 
systems.  Albeit  the  proponents  of  both  models  of  democracy  -  aggregative  and 
participatory - recognize that they have to deal with this simple fact - Rawls called it the 
fact of pluralism - they do it differently. The fact of pluralism is that in big, complex, 
and modern societies it cannot be expected that everyone agrees on just one shared set 
of values. From the point of view of preference aggregation, pluralism manifests itself 
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gerrymandering. The scholars who subscribe to political liberalism take pluralism more 
seriously:  as something that  does not go away by redening the rules of the game; 
people have to learn to live with it. Taking pluralism seriously means that sometimes 
certain sets of values cannot be reframed in the vocabulary of another’s comprehensive 
doctrine. For example, the strong egalitarian bent premised on human dignity of the 
positions that criticize the inequality produced by market-based mechanisms to achieve 
environmental  protection  cannot  be  easily  reconciled  with  the  welfare  economics 
underpinning of these mechanisms. How then can policy makers arrive at implementing 
any contested policy? 
Rawls  responds  to  this  impasse  with  a  two-pronged theory:  rst,  he  needs  to 
clarify the nature of the challenge that liberal democratic institutions face when there 
are contrasting ideas about the principles which should guide policy-making; second, he 
has to devise a procedure in order to determine what goods an ideal community of 
people with differing comprehensive doctrines places value on, and how to distribute 
them. The rst prong is Rawls’ theory of political liberalism; the second is his theory of 
justice as fairness. 
Rawls argues that a diverse citizenship holding several different comprehensive 
doctrines (i.e. values and ideas of what is good) could live side-by-side within a liberal 
state on condition that the rules of the state can be justied by resorting to arguments 
and ideas which those citizens could reasonably endorse (this  is  the requirement of 
public reason mentioned earlier). Given that no comprehensive doctrine could provide 
such arguments and ideas, Rawls turns to the public political culture of the state to nd 
them.  The public political culture of the state is written into the very institutions which 
the state has decided to give itself over the years, in the founding documents, texts, and 
speeches which have become common knowledge of its population. The Gettysburg 
Address  -  which  young Americans  learn  by heart  -  can  be  considered  one  of  such 
speeches which nicely capture the public political culture of the American democratic 
society. According to Rawls, the public political culture of a democratic society features 
three fundamental ideas: that citizens are free, are equal, and that society should be fair. 
These three ideas form what Rawls calls a political conception of justice, which is what 
each  person,  while  pursuing  her  specic  idea  of  the  good,  could  be  expected  to 
reasonably endorse. Already, this political conception of justice puts some constraints 
on the design of the democratic institutions: according to Rawls, for example, basic 
health care for all citizens is a non-negotiable aspect of institutions modeled after the 
liberal political conception of justice.
Now  that  a  framework  has  been  created  within  which  citizens  can  meet  on 
common ground - i.e. the political conception of justice -, Rawls can begin to answer a 
new set of pressing issues with which democratic societies have to deal. Given that the 
institutions of a society have a pervasive inuence on the life of the citizens because 
they distribute  benets  and burdens,  what  kind of  just  institutional  design does  the 
political conception of justice give rise to? Rawls respond to this challenge by arguing 
that cooperation among the citizens should be fair to all, and called his theory justice as 
fairness.  Rawls’ idea is simple and powerful: there are many individual traits which 
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have no moral worth which nonetheless inuence massively the prospects of life of the 
individual holders, such as one’s sex, race, or inherited social status. On the other hand, 
there are things in life that are more important than the welfare of the society. Even if it 
could be shown that a racist or sexist society could maximize utility, this would not be a 
good reason to promote policies which curtail  the basic rights of  the individuals:  it 
would not be fair to everyone.
In order to dene the design of just institutions of a society, Rawls begins by 
assuming  that  social  cooperation  among  the  citizens  is  possible  and  necessary  (he 
follows  Hume’s  circumstances  of  justice):  although  there  are  enough  resources  for 
everyone’s most pressing needs, there are not enough for everyone to lead decent lives; 
as a consequence, how the fruits of cooperation are distributed is not unimportant, and a 
liberal theory of distributive justice is supposed to come up with a system of distribution 
which is fair to citizens which are free and equal.
As  we  have  seen,  what  is  morally  arbitrary,  according  to  Rawls,  should  not 
determine how well a person do in terms of primary goods, which are “things that every 
rational man is presumed to want” to further one’s own ends in life.  But what is  a 
morally  arbitrary  source  of  inequality?  Rawls  reviews three  possible  alternatives  of 
justifying inequalities in the distribution of primary goods, and hence of dening what 
is  morally  arbitrary:  (i)  the  system of  natural  liberty,  (ii)  liberal  equality,  and  (iii) 
democratic equality. The rst of these alternatives traces the idea of equality enshrined 
in libertarian theories of justice where equality means to have the same legal right of 
access to all advantageous social positions. The problem with this idea, and in general 
with libertarian theories of justice,  is  that  the distribution of resources at  any given 
period is affected by the initial distribution of assets at the beginning of that period: we 
thus  have  a  stratication  of  past  events  and  contingencies  that  determine  future 
distribution of goods.  The second alternative views equality in terms of the idea of 
equality  of  opportunity:  persons  with  similar  characteristics,  talent  and  ability, 
dedication  in  and  commitment  to  using  those  talents,  should  have  the  same 
opportunities in life no matter their initial starting point in terms of culture and income. 
Rawls  clearly  writes  that  “the  expectations  of  those  with  the  same  abilities  and 
aspirations should not be affected by their social class” (Rawls, 1971: 73). And yet, this 
idea of equality of opportunity can only ever be carried out imperfectly because there is 
a  further  element  which is  beyond any person’s  control:  talent  and abilities  are  not 
equally distributed. This deeper sense of what counts as morally arbitrary is captured by 
the third alternative: democratic equality. Democratic equality expresses the idea that 
sometimes  it  is  precisely  the  natural  lottery  in  charge  of  distributing  genetic 
endowments that matters the most in how a person will fare in life. If everything which 
determines unequal outcomes in life is then morally arbitrary - respectively (i) previous 
distribution, (ii) favorable home and social class, and (iii) genetic endowments - then 
nothing but equality can be allowed in the distribution of primary goods. In other words, 
given that everything that leads to inequality in life is not deserved, then there is a 
presumption  to  treat  everyone  as  fundamentally  equal,  which  leads  to  an  equal 
distribution of resources.
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Rawls  treats  this  equal  distribution  of  resources  as  a  baseline:  different 
distributions of resources are possible provided that everyone stands to gain from the 
new distribution. Rawls in this respect is clear when he says “injustice is inequality that 
is not to the benet of all” (Rawls, 1971: 62). According to Rawls, departing from an 
equal distribution, it is possible to push forward the Pareto frontier, i.e. to have gains 
without  someone  being  made  worse  off.  Then,  the  so-called  difference  principle  is 
helpful is choosing a specic point on this Pareto frontier. These ideas are built into the 
two principles of justice, which are the guidelines to the just institutions of the society:
(i) Each person has the same indefeasible  claim to a  fully  adequate  scheme of  equal  basic 
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all;
(ii)Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:
(a)  They are to be attached to ofces and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity
(b)They are to be to the greatest benet of the least-advantaged members of society (the 
difference principle) (Rawls, 1971: 42-43)
These  principles  are  formally  justied  by  resorting  to  the  ctional  situation  of  the 
original position. In a move which epitomizes Rawls’ procedural approach to justice, 
Rawls claims that fair terms of cooperation among citizens - i.e. the two principles of 
justice  -  are  those  that  would  be  chosen  by  free  and  equal  citizens  under  a  set  of 
idealized  fair  conditions.  In  other  words,  asking  directly  what  are  fair  terms  of 
cooperation would be too contentious and our intuitions too unreliable. It is better to 
approach the question from a procedural point of view.  The veil of ignorance under 12
which free  and equal  citizens are  to  be placed is  the  artice which guarantees  that 
arbitrary factors could not unfairly inuence the deliberation among the parties in the 
original  position  and  that  they  are  not  biased  towards  their  interests.  Among  other 
things, the citizens under the veil of ignorance do not know their race, income, gender, 
age, talents, the type of society in which they are in, etc. The two principles are chosen 
in  the  original  position  because  they  ultimately  represent  an  overlapping  consensus 
among comprehensive doctrines of the good, justied through the requirement of public 
reason.13
The  normative  presuppositions  of  political  liberalism  and  justice  as  fairness 
inform the idea of participation as presence at the decision making table. Just political 
decisions cannot be the product of opaque considerations internal to specic epistemic 
communities, but rather of democratic discussions among parties who meet under fair 
 This is far from being an uncontentious move, we will see in Chapter 5 the inherent problems of the 12
procedural approach to justice.
 It should be noted that this represents a signicant departure from Rawls’ own earlier position - as 13
expressed in A Theory of Justice (1971) - according to which the two principles are justied by resorting 
to the reective equilibrium type of justication. The position Rawls takes in Political Liberalism (1993) 
thus moves away from the possibility of justifying political principles and arrangements by resorting to 
true comprehensive doctrines of the good.
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conditions of deliberation. These political decisions are justied against the standard of 
the political conception of justice and by recurring to the requirement of public reason. 
What  differentiates  Rawls’ public  reason  approach  from  the  economically  inspired 
models of aggregative democracy is the fact that the political process is understood as a 
search for the common good of society, instead of a struggle for power among rival 
groups,  each  with  particular  interests.  In  this  sense,  the  political  process  is  one  of 
integration  -  rather  than  aggregation  -  of  preferences,  desires,  and  values  of  the 
participating individuals. What is at stake in this integrative model of democracy, which 
subtends participation as presence, is putting to the test, in processes of mutual reason-
giving, individual perspectives on the proper orientation of collective action. Now that 
managing and protecting the environment has wide social implications - environmental 
policy creates winners and losers -, these issues are rightly seen as pertaining to the 
realm of public deliberation. These distributive justice issues related to the environment 
become  part  and  parcel  of  asserting  and  articulating  the  common  good  of  society. 
Furthermore, one of the salient features of the integrative model - one frequently cited 
in  the  literature  on deliberative  democracy (Bohman and Rehg,  1997:  xiii)  -  is  the 
educational  aspect  of  the  process  of  mutual  reasons-giving.  In  other  words,  by 
collectively  deliberating  on  the  distributive  merits  and  demerits  of  various 
environmental policies, citizens develop a culture of sustainability; this, in turn, will 
guarantee that the adopted policies have a greater degree of compliance. This would 
allegedly work toward bonding the community together instead of dispersing it  into 
ever more polarized rival groups.
A concrete  example  in  which  these  specic  ideas  of  public  engagement  and 
deliberation - participation as presence - have been implemented, along with their policy 
outcomes,  is  provided  by  Richard  Kuper  (1997).  Kuper  studied  the  case  of  waste 
management  in  the  Hertfordshire  County  in  1996.  The  Labour-Liberal  Democratic 
administration of the County assembled a citizen jury in order to help the administration 
decide which type of waste management strategy was more appropriate for the County: 
incineration,  landll,  recycling,  etc.  The 16 members  of  the  jury  had been selected 
among a random sample of 3000 citizens. After the various options for waste disposal 
had been presented by experts drawn from the private sector, academia, environmental 
activism,  and  government,  the  jury  agreed  that  recycling  was  recommended, 
incineration  was  seen  as  second  best  and  recommended  only  in  case  the  recycling 
strategy  failed;  landll  disposal  was  discouraged.  Witnessing  this  process  of  public 
deliberation  at  rst  hand,  Kuper  argues  that  engagement  with  the  public  generates 
enthusiasm around the issues debated and commitment to the policy proposed (Kuper, 
1997: 150). Julian Agyemen and Briony Angus (2003), who provide a review of the role 
of citizen participation on the resulting sustainability of local communities, found these 
positive consequences to be a common feature of policies of public engagement and 
deliberation.
At the end of this chapter it is appropriate to take stock of the various reasons 
behind participation as presence, and, to do this, it is appropriate to go back once again 
to the shifts in international environmental politics that are associated with the narrative 
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on public participation. New momentum was given to this narrative at the beginning of 
the ‘90s, and we have seen above how the Earth Summit institutionalized it through the 
Major  Groups  institution  and  Principle  10  of  the  Rio  Principles.  Two  events,  in 
particular, enable us to historically situate the narrative and why it gained momentum so 
quickly. The rst one was the publication of the infamous Summers memo; the second, 
the opening of a new season in international environmental politics, one that pits North 
against  South instead of  East  against  West.  The Summer’s  memo (see the previous 
chapter) made patent that there was an elite pushing international environmental politics 
that was so sheltered behind a specialized knowledge and language as to being detached 
from  common  sense.  The  same  feeling  of  detached  knowledge  monopolized  by 
efciency arguments came out again and again during the debates over the value of a 
statistical life in the Second Assessment Report (SAR) of the IPCC.  These issues were 14
not felt as unimportant legitimacy concerns but rather as potentially having a profound 
distributional impact on environmental politics. All the more so if one considers that the 
new North vs. South season in international politics ofcially inaugurated a dynamic by 
which states are divided in terms of their capability in economic terms to contribute to 
climate mitigation. Depending on the different estimates of, say, the value of a statistical 
life, more, less or no money at all need be transferred from rich to poor countries. In 
other  words,  specialized,  partial,  and  unequally  distributed  knowledge  started  to  be 
considered a powerful instrument by which a state could potentially free ride on the 
commitments taken, thus opening issues of both distribution and legitimacy within the 
international order.  This created the drive to “occupy” these institutions by bringing 
more lay people, NGOs, and local actors into the environmental institutions to embed 
these  specialized  and  detached  discourses  into  a  wider  framework  in  which  policy 
proposals are subjected to procedurally just and open public deliberation.  
CONCLUSION
It is still too early to draw conclusions that go beyond the scope of the present chapter, 
but some important elements have already emerged that can help explain why, from the 
point  of  view  of  both  efciency  and  justice  arguments,  the  narrative  of  civic 
environmentalism  represent  a  sort  of  intermediate  ground  between  the  other  two 
narratives,  namely,  ecological  modernization  and  radical  environmentalism. 
Mechanisms of public participation act as a corrective to efciency arguments which 
sometimes  can  generate  unequal  distributions  of  wealth  and  natural  resources  (the 
distributional concern). They do so, on the one hand, by providing information that is 
irrelevant or not available from the perspective of market-centered decision making, i.e. 
what  I  have  called  participation  as  providing  information.  However,  this  model  of 
participation,  grounded  upon  the  aggregative  model  of  democracy,  also  has  some 
 A good reconstruction of the events which led to the SAR controversy and the controversy itself is 14
provided by Bernie Lewin (2013).
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intrinsic limitations: it remains locked into the Rational Choice Theory understanding of 
human  behavior  and,  as  a  consequence,  political  decisions  remain  the  outcome  of 
numbers and power, and the decision-making process remains hostage to the substantive 
value commitments of specic epistemic communities which have privileged access to 
the decision-making process. On the other hand, the model of participation as presence 
at the decision-making table - whose core tenets and normative presuppositions are to 
be  found  in  the  theory  of  political  liberalism  -  can  offer  a  response  to  both  the 
distributional and legitimacy shortcomings left unaddressed by the more technocratic 
approach  to  participation  (i.e.  as  providing  information).  It  does  so  by  intending 
participation as  the  practice  of  subjecting political  decision to  open and fair  public 
deliberations, and to a process of mutual justications aimed at forming an overlapping 
consensus among the various comprehensive doctrines of the good. This approach to 
public participation is thus able to dispel both the concerns identied at the beginning of 
the chapter: the distributional concern and the legitimacy concern. 
There is another sense in which the narrative of public participation can be said to 
represent  a  middle  ground  between  the  efciency-focused  narrative  of  ecological 
modernization  and  the  anti-growth  sentiment  expressed  by  the  radical 
environmentalists. The normative presuppositions behind the model of participation as 
presence - Rawls’ theory of political liberalism and justice as fairness - do not claim that 
considerations of efciency should never be used as rationale for allocating resources; 
and, as a matter of fact, efciency remains an important element of justice embedded 
into  the  difference  principle;  yet,  within  Rawls’ distributive  edice,  the  efciency 
rationale is subjected to deliberation, and it is not surreptitiously slipped into policy-
making through the privileged access of specic epistemic communities to the decision-
making table. We will see in the following chapter how this aspect of the normative 
presuppositions  behind  the  mechanisms  of  public  participation  -  i.e.  not  moving 
decidedly away from an efciency-based distributive system of justice - is a contentious 
point for radical environmentalist scholars. 
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modernization  and  the  anti-growth  sentiment  expressed  by  the  radical 
environmentalists. The normative presuppositions behind the model of participation as 
presence - Rawls’ theory of political liberalism and justice as fairness - do not claim that 
considerations of efciency should never be used as rationale for allocating resources; 
and, as a matter of fact, efciency remains an important element of justice embedded 
into  the  difference  principle;  yet,  within  Rawls’ distributive  edice,  the  efciency 
rationale is subjected to deliberation, and it is not surreptitiously slipped into policy-
making through the privileged access of specic epistemic communities to the decision-
making table. We will see in the following chapter how this aspect of the normative 
presuppositions  behind  the  mechanisms  of  public  participation  -  i.e.  not  moving 
decidedly away from an efciency-based distributive system of justice - is a contentious 
point for radical environmentalist scholars. 
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CHAPTER IV
THE NORMATIVE PRESUPPOSITIONS UNDERLYING THE 
NARRATIVE OF RADICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM
Radical environmentalism is as old as Western environmentalism itself. According to 
the contemporary categories, Western environmentalism was born “radical” and then 
progressively de-radicalized as the voices, ideas, and ideologies that raised the original 
demands  for  environmental  quality  have  been  pushed  to  the  fringes  of  a  bigger 
discourse on the state of the environment which grew over the years. But then “What’s 
in a name?” What makes radical environmentalism radical? To what and who do we 
award this label, at least in the environmental domain? To answer these questions, it is 
not  necessary  to  go  back  in  time  and  trace  the  modern  history  of  the  Western 
environmental movement, when it was born, when it changed, and when the radicals 
started to be addressed as  radicals,  and why.  For the purpose of  this  chapter,  when 
precisely the environmental narrative changed is less important that the fact that indeed 
it changed. Following Andrew Hoffmann (2001), this change can be summarized with 
only two specic events that well represent this rupture, without going into the ner 
historical  details.  The  rst,  a  survey among US companies  in  1974,  found that  the 
majority  of  companies  “treat  pollution  control  expenditures  as  non-recoverable 
investments,” and treat environmental management as a threat (Lund, 1974: 2). Two 
decades  later,  in  1995  -  the  second  event  -,  Porter  and  van  der  Linde  argued  that 
environmental  management could be viewed as an opportunity for rms to increase 
their competitive advantage (Porter and van der Linde, 1995a; also in Chapter 2), and 
indeed in 1991 a similar US survey to the one made in 1974 showed that US companies 
were starting to integrate environmental management into their operations (Morrison, 
1991). “From heresy to dogma,” this is how Hoffmann describes this rapid shift: the 
heresy of  thinking that  environmental  expenditures  could be compatible  with  rms’ 
protability, to the dogma of thinking that rms protability cannot be achieved without 
a fundamental greening of industrial practices. 
The story of how this shift came about is now a reassuring refrain: from Carson’s 
Silent Spring in the 1960s, passing from the Blue Marble - the rst picture of the Earth 
from space -, the Club of Rome Limits to Growth study, and the Stockholm Conference 
in the 1970s, to the Earth Summit in the early 1990s; it is the story of the awakening - 
fast or slow, according to the point of view - of the environmental conscience, which is 
now a force to be reckoned with. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, environmentalism 
itself was radical, because the main understanding of it was that it  could potentially 
impose losses on polluting rms; environmental concerns and rms protability were 
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seen as a zero-sum game. When the main environmental narrative changed in the 1980s, 
the idea of win-win scenarios gained ground and “sustainable development” became a 
catchphrase, environmentalism lost its radical edge, and the radical label has since been 
attached only to those positions that still cling to the idea of a zero-sum relationship 
between the environment and the market. In one clear sense, “radical” is then used in 
opposition to a set of fairly stable interests within society that want to maintain the 
primacy of economic growth among other policy objectives, and believe in the idea of 
economic  growth  as  a  recipe  that  will  eventually  cure  all  social  “diseases,”  from 
environmental  degradation,  to  poverty,  lack  of  education,  and  gender  gap.  Radical 
environmentalism thus comprises both the earlier environmentalism that was critical of 
the environmental effects of unregulated or poorly regulated economic activity - the 
case of carcinogenic pesticides is an oft-quoted case thanks to Carson’s popular book 
(Carson, 1962) - and the more recent group of environmental stances that are critical of 
win-win narratives and market-friendly environmental protection.
“Radical” is not only used to refer to a set of environmental concerns which are 
critical  both  of  market-induced  pollution  and  of  market-driven  environmental 
protection, but also refers to the intensity of this criticism. In particular, since the 1960s, 
the  idea  that  the  environmental  threat  is  essentially  a  distributive  problem  gained 
ground. The idea being that environmental problems could be contained if  the right 
people could get hold of the right resources. Pivotal in forming this new narrative have 
been  the  works  of  Coase  (1960)  and  Hardin  (1968).  “Right  people”  and  “right 
resources” then receive different interpretations according to the different principles of 
justice  invoked  by  the  market-based  environmental  protection  enthusiasts  or  their 
critics. To the former - the enthusiasts -, resources should go to those who are able to 
squeeze the most prot from them, thus helping the economy and welfare grow; to the 
latter  -  the  critics  -,  suspicious  of  market  environmentalism but  short  of  full-blown 
radicalism, resources should go to those who most need them (where “need” can, in 
turn, be characterized in a number of different ways). This opposition has played out in 
a number of different situations in the environmental domain during the years: most 
notably, within the climate change regime, and earlier in the attempt to create a New 
International Economic Order in the 1970s, whose agship achievement was going to 
be the equitable management of seabed resources (UNCLOS III).
While radicals do not disdain from time to time to couch their positions in the 
language  of  distributive  justice,  especially  when  it  furthers  their  aims  in  a  specic 
environmental  struggle,  they  are  much  more  wary  of  the  environmental  and  social 
implications  of  framing  environmental  problems  as  distributive  issues.  It  is  indeed 
implicit  in  this  distributive  approach  (i)  to  treat  resources  as  commodities  that  can 
quickly and easily change hands, and (ii) to take for granted that if something should be 
(re-)distributed,  then  it  should  be  made  available  in  the  rst  place.  These  two 
presuppositions  often  go  unchallenged  both  among  those  who  favors  market 
instruments  for  environmental  protection  and  among  those  who,  while  criticizing 
market distributions, would like to retain the markets’ productive capacity and see some 
other sorts of distribution, more egalitarian ones, such as the polluter pays principle or 
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seen as a zero-sum game. When the main environmental narrative changed in the 1980s, 
the idea of win-win scenarios gained ground and “sustainable development” became a 
catchphrase, environmentalism lost its radical edge, and the radical label has since been 
attached only to those positions that still cling to the idea of a zero-sum relationship 
between the environment and the market. In one clear sense, “radical” is then used in 
opposition to a set of fairly stable interests within society that want to maintain the 
primacy of economic growth among other policy objectives, and believe in the idea of 
economic  growth  as  a  recipe  that  will  eventually  cure  all  social  “diseases,”  from 
environmental  degradation,  to  poverty,  lack  of  education,  and  gender  gap.  Radical 
environmentalism thus comprises both the earlier environmentalism that was critical of 
the environmental effects of unregulated or poorly regulated economic activity - the 
case of carcinogenic pesticides is an oft-quoted case thanks to Carson’s popular book 
(Carson, 1962) - and the more recent group of environmental stances that are critical of 
win-win narratives and market-friendly environmental protection.
“Radical” is not only used to refer to a set of environmental concerns which are 
critical  both  of  market-induced  pollution  and  of  market-driven  environmental 
protection, but also refers to the intensity of this criticism. In particular, since the 1960s, 
the  idea  that  the  environmental  threat  is  essentially  a  distributive  problem  gained 
ground. The idea being that environmental problems could be contained if  the right 
people could get hold of the right resources. Pivotal in forming this new narrative have 
been  the  works  of  Coase  (1960)  and  Hardin  (1968).  “Right  people”  and  “right 
resources” then receive different interpretations according to the different principles of 
justice  invoked  by  the  market-based  environmental  protection  enthusiasts  or  their 
critics. To the former - the enthusiasts -, resources should go to those who are able to 
squeeze the most prot from them, thus helping the economy and welfare grow; to the 
latter  -  the  critics  -,  suspicious  of  market  environmentalism but  short  of  full-blown 
radicalism, resources should go to those who most need them (where “need” can, in 
turn, be characterized in a number of different ways). This opposition has played out in 
a number of different situations in the environmental domain during the years: most 
notably, within the climate change regime, and earlier in the attempt to create a New 
International Economic Order in the 1970s, whose agship achievement was going to 
be the equitable management of seabed resources (UNCLOS III).
While radicals do not disdain from time to time to couch their positions in the 
language  of  distributive  justice,  especially  when  it  furthers  their  aims  in  a  specic 
environmental  struggle,  they  are  much  more  wary  of  the  environmental  and  social 
implications  of  framing  environmental  problems  as  distributive  issues.  It  is  indeed 
implicit  in  this  distributive  approach  (i)  to  treat  resources  as  commodities  that  can 
quickly and easily change hands, and (ii) to take for granted that if something should be 
(re-)distributed,  then  it  should  be  made  available  in  the  rst  place.  These  two 
presuppositions  often  go  unchallenged  both  among  those  who  favors  market 
instruments  for  environmental  protection  and  among  those  who,  while  criticizing 
market distributions, would like to retain the markets’ productive capacity and see some 
other sorts of distribution, more egalitarian ones, such as the polluter pays principle or 
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common but differentiated responsibilities. In advocating for a stop or at least a serious 
slowdown of the idea of managing natural resources, radical scholars place themselves 
beyond  the  liberal  positions  which  support  more  egalitarian  distributions  of 
environmental resources. This chapter concerns the analysis of the two presuppositions 
(i) and (ii), which can be summarized in terms of commodication and growth. In other 
words, according to radical scholars, both economics and our theories of distributive 
justice implicitly treat natural resources as commodities, and implicitly frame economic 
growth as a policy goal worth pursuing. From a radical perspective, both assumptions 
are deeply problematic. The chapter will survey how, from the radical perspective, these 
presuppositions have a negative impact on social and environmental issues.
The chapter is complex and covers a lot of ground; therefore, a few words which 
introduce how it is structured in its entirety might be particularly helpful to the reader. 
In the following short section, I review the main positions and movements which can be 
associated  with  the  narrative  of  radical  environmentalism  and  I  clarify  some 
methodological aspects of the radical environmentalism literature. Then, the rst half of 
the chapter will deal with the issue of the commodication of natural resources. There, I 
explain  that  there  are  two  senses  in  which  a  natural  resource  can  be  said  to  be  a 
commodity: an economic sense and one implicit in the theories of distributive justice. 
Radical scholars criticize both these senses of commodication by resorting to a battery 
of arguments, both consequentialist and deontological. The second part of the chapter 
will deal with the issue of economic growth. First, I explain what it is about economic 
growth which particularly concerns radical environmentalists; then, I proceed to survey 
the  ways  in  which  radical  environmentalist  scholars  criticize  the  normative 
presuppositions of economic theory which are instrumental to economic growth, along 
with its centrality in economics; nally, I also survey the stance of radical scholars who 
criticize  the  normative  presuppositions  of  liberal  theories  of  justice  which  are 
instrumental to the continuing pursuit of economic growth as a policy goal. Throughout, 
the chapter can be read as a double criticism of the competing environmental narratives 
in politics. In particular, the criticisms of both the economic sense of commodication 
and  the  normative  presuppositions  of  economic  theory  which  are  instrumental  to 
economic  growth  can  be  understood  as  a  criticism  of  the  narrative  of  ecological 
modernization. On the other hand, the criticisms of both the sense of commodication 
implicit  in  the  theories  of  distributive  justice  and  the  normative  presuppositions  of 
liberal theories of distributive justice which are instrumental to the pursuit of economic 
growth  as  a  policy  goal  can  be  understood  as  a  criticism of  the  narrative  of  civic 
environmentalism. As a result  of  this  double polemic focus,  the narrative of  radical 
environmentalism can be understood as a range of attempts aimed at reconsidering the 
role  of  efciency  and  justice  in  environmental  politics.  More  specically,  whereas 
ecological  modernization  and  civic  environmentalism  subordinate  nature  to  human 
beings  for  the  purposes  of  their  interpretations  of  efciency  and  justice,  radical 
environmentalism claims to forefront nature in a way that (i) calls into question the 
assumption that efciency is a core value to be met by environmental policy and (ii) 
calls for a drastic redenition of what is to count as justice, inasmuch as justice can no 
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longer be simply, or solely, conceptualized in terms of social justice. However, it is not 
possible to associate the narrative of radical environmentalism to a coherent competing 
theory of justice: the various radical positions do coalesce around the rejection of the 
status  quo  in  environmental  politics,  but,  as  they are  quite  diverse  -  and,  at  times, 
inconsistent  -  in  the  alternatives  they  propose,  they  cannot  put  forward  a  common 
positive  theory  of  environmental  justice  or  a  common  agenda  in  the  face  of 
environmental challenges. To these various positions I turn now.
RADICAL POSITIONS AND
SOME METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS
A short  summary  of  the  main  positions,  movements,  and  currents  associated  with 
radical environmentalism will give the reader a somewhat more concrete idea of what 
we will deal with in this chapter. In general, given the pervasiveness in our modern 
societies of both the process of commodication of nature and natural resources and the 
political  role  of  economic  growth,  it  is  no  wonder  that  the  radical  positions  which 
provide an environmentally-based critique of both these elements end up espousing a 
profound rejection of what are perceived to be some of the very basic structures of our 
current societies.
The deep ecology movement, for example, rejects the widespread belief in our 
society of biological inegalitarianism, that all living things should not have an equal 
right  to  life.  The  creation  of  the  deep  ecology  philosophy  -  and,  subsequently, 
movement  -  is  credited  to  Arne  Naess  (1973)  -  he  was  a  philosopher  and  a  quite 
accomplished mountaineer - who characterized his environmental view in oppositions 
to a “shallow” one. In particular, he rejected that the environment be a resource for 
human beings,  the pursuit  of  economic growth instead of satisfying simple material 
needs,  and  consumerism  in  general  instead  of  nding  pleasure  in  simple  things 
(Schnurr, 2011: 100).  
Ecocentrism is  a  more  general  position  in  environmental  ethics  which can be 
associated with the deep ecology movement, albeit the two are not co-extensive. Like 
deep ecology, ecocentrism puts forward the idea that intrinsic values do not reside only 
in  humans  but  also  in  other  entities  (Woods,  2011:  116).  Ecocentric  scholars  nd 
intrinsic  values  in  whole  ecological  entities  and  natural  processes,  whereas  deep 
ecologists are mainly, yet not exclusively, associated with biocentrism (value is to be 
found in all living things). Holmes Rolston III, one of the most well-known ecocentric 
scholars, argues that humans, animals, and, crucially, also plants have intrinsic value 
because they have biological  identities which are asserted genetically over time. He 
then broadens this logic to ecosystems, arguing that ecosystems, too, have identities - 
ecological identities - which are asserted over time and, hence - in his view -, have 
intrinsic value. Furthermore, ecosystems and natural processes have to receive moral 
consideration - according to Rolston III - because they enable species and organisms, 
which  are  valuable  in  light  of  their  stable  identities,  to  thrive.  In  this  sense,  also 
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longer be simply, or solely, conceptualized in terms of social justice. However, it is not 
possible to associate the narrative of radical environmentalism to a coherent competing 
theory of justice: the various radical positions do coalesce around the rejection of the 
status  quo  in  environmental  politics,  but,  as  they are  quite  diverse  -  and,  at  times, 
inconsistent  -  in  the  alternatives  they  propose,  they  cannot  put  forward  a  common 
positive  theory  of  environmental  justice  or  a  common  agenda  in  the  face  of 
environmental challenges. To these various positions I turn now.
RADICAL POSITIONS AND
SOME METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS
A short  summary  of  the  main  positions,  movements,  and  currents  associated  with 
radical environmentalism will give the reader a somewhat more concrete idea of what 
we will deal with in this chapter. In general, given the pervasiveness in our modern 
societies of both the process of commodication of nature and natural resources and the 
political  role  of  economic  growth,  it  is  no  wonder  that  the  radical  positions  which 
provide an environmentally-based critique of both these elements end up espousing a 
profound rejection of what are perceived to be some of the very basic structures of our 
current societies.
The deep ecology movement, for example, rejects the widespread belief in our 
society of biological inegalitarianism, that all living things should not have an equal 
right  to  life.  The  creation  of  the  deep  ecology  philosophy  -  and,  subsequently, 
movement  -  is  credited  to  Arne  Naess  (1973)  -  he  was  a  philosopher  and  a  quite 
accomplished mountaineer - who characterized his environmental view in oppositions 
to a “shallow” one. In particular, he rejected that the environment be a resource for 
human beings,  the pursuit  of  economic growth instead of satisfying simple material 
needs,  and  consumerism  in  general  instead  of  nding  pleasure  in  simple  things 
(Schnurr, 2011: 100).  
Ecocentrism is  a  more  general  position  in  environmental  ethics  which can be 
associated with the deep ecology movement, albeit the two are not co-extensive. Like 
deep ecology, ecocentrism puts forward the idea that intrinsic values do not reside only 
in  humans  but  also  in  other  entities  (Woods,  2011:  116).  Ecocentric  scholars  nd 
intrinsic  values  in  whole  ecological  entities  and  natural  processes,  whereas  deep 
ecologists are mainly, yet not exclusively, associated with biocentrism (value is to be 
found in all living things). Holmes Rolston III, one of the most well-known ecocentric 
scholars, argues that humans, animals, and, crucially, also plants have intrinsic value 
because they have biological  identities which are asserted genetically over time. He 
then broadens this logic to ecosystems, arguing that ecosystems, too, have identities - 
ecological identities - which are asserted over time and, hence - in his view -, have 
intrinsic value. Furthermore, ecosystems and natural processes have to receive moral 
consideration - according to Rolston III - because they enable species and organisms, 
which  are  valuable  in  light  of  their  stable  identities,  to  thrive.  In  this  sense,  also 
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processes, such as natural selection, and relationships, such as predation, have intrinsic 
value (Rolston III, 1988).
The ecofeminist positions are grounded on the understanding that the oppression 
of  women  and  the  domination  of  nature  are  interlinked  (Köppel,  2011:  119).  The 
guiding idea of many ecofeminist accounts is that men dominate the environment as 
they do with women; and they hypothesize that by getting rid of the patriarchal structure 
in our economic, political, and cultural systems, also the human-nature relationship will 
improve. Ecofeminist scholars analyze the linkages between women’s oppression and 
nature’s exploitation through historical or symbolic studies. For example, they see a 
connection in how people talk about nature and women, both being, at times, “wild” or 
“untamed.” Furthermore, they analyze how the texts which give identity to different 
cultures, such as the epics of Homer, associate women with nature and, by stressing the 
need to tame the latter, implicitly justify the oppression of the former (Köppel, 2011: 
120). By rejecting the status quo based on the domination by male human beings of the 
earth, ecofeminists, too, can be numbered among the radical environmentalist positions.
Ecosocialism is an environmental theory which stresses the role of the capitalist 
mode  of  production  in  the  current  environmental  crisis.  Ecosocialist  scholars  use 
Marxist  theories  and  categories  to  analyze  the  environmental  conicts  and,  as  a 
consequence, their positions are grounded on an anthropocentric understanding of the 
relationship  between  human  beings  and  nature.  They  argue  that  the  roots  of 
environmental  problems are  to  be  found in  issues  of  social  justice  and capitalism’s 
intrinsic contradictions (Foster et al., 2011).
The positions associated with the degrowth movement appropriate some of the 
stances presented above in order to argue that the recipe for environmental protection 
can only be achieved through the progressive slowing down of the capitalist economy 
(Latouche, 2005). They share with the ecosocialists the analysis of capitalism and its 
contribution  to  the  current  environmental  problems,  and  with  the  deep  ecology 
movement  some  of  the  solutions  to  those  problems:  changing  our  habits,  nding 
pleasure in simpler things, and steering clear of rampant consumerism.
A  series  of  positions  in  ecological  economics  intersect  with  the  radical 
environmentalist theories and movements surveyed so far. In particular, research in the 
‘60s and ‘70s on the physical underpinnings of economic processes (Boulding, 1966; 
Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; Meadows et al., 1972; Odum, 1971) still provides much of 
the  background  for  ecosocialists  and  degrowth  supporters  to  argue  that  economic 
systems should be built  in accordance with the natural processes, not the other way 
round, i.e. adapting natural processes to the necessities of standard economic theory.
While not all of the scholars linked to the positions surveyed here would readily 
accept the radical environmentalism label - because it comes with a heavy baggage in 
politics,  where  calling  someone  “radical”  often  means  that  her  positions  can  be 
justiably silenced - it needs to be claried that “radical environmentalism” is here used 
as  a  stipulative  denition  which groups  the  various  positions  in  the  social  sciences 
which mostly reject the belief that economic growth is a valuable pursuit of politics and 
that the environment should be used as a resource for human beings.
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Three caveats are in order before delving into the normative complexity covered 
by the radical criticisms and contributions. First, it might seem to be an odd choice to 
focus on two rather abstract issues such as commodication and growth; are not radical 
environmentalists  after  all  concerned  more  with  issues  of  land  grabbing,  neo-
colonialism, and food security, just to list a few examples? They are, but while these 
issues are expressed in a vocabulary which is closer to real-life problems, they can be 
subsumed under the more abstract headings of “commodication” and “growth.” For 
example,  in  the  analyses  of  radical  environmentalists,  land  grabbing  in  Southern 
countries can be framed in terms of an adhesion to the economic imperative of growth 
by  Northern  rms  who  look  at  new  commodity  frontiers  to  accumulate  capital. 
Examples throughout the article will help in bridging the abstract nature of a discussion 
about the normative presupposition of radical environmentalism with the vocabulary of 
radicals’ day-to-day struggles.
Second,  an  important  element  to  analyze  the  place  of  the  radical 
environmentalism  narrative  in  relation  to  the  other  narratives  is  to  understand  its 
“anchors”, i.e. states of affair or beliefs that represent the departure point for radical 
criticisms and contributions.  In particular,  radical  environmentalist  scholars maintain 
that  environmental  degradation  and  environmental  disasters  are  real.  This 
acknowledgment is no small thing: accepting that environmental problems are real, and 
not constructed by powerful actors, means relying on the same scientic knowledge that 
created the basis for the exploitation of the natural resources in the rst  place. It  is 
indeed rapid technological progress that rst made possible the Industrial Revolution, 
with  its  environment-depleting  energy demands,  which  now enables  us  to  study its 
consequences.  Most  of  the  research  on  climate  change  is  nowadays  done  through 
models  which try to  establish how sensitive the climate is  under  different  emission 
scenarios and the impact of global warming at different warming scenarios. Forest cover 
and forest carbon storage analyses are mostly done through remote sensing. Local and 
indigenous knowledge - ofcially included in the Fourth IPCC report (Solomon et al., 
2007:  833)  -  is  only  a  tiny  part  of  the  vast  body  of  scholarship  used  by  radical 
environmentalists to advocate for more environmental protection.
Third,  a  note  on  radical  environmentalist’s  methodology  is  due.  The  biggest 
challenge of all for radical environmentalism scholars is that of destroying the typical 
inertia  that  comes  with  a  narrative  that  is  now  considered  mainstream,  such  as 
ecological  modernization.  In other  words,  certain ideas are  so ingrained in how we 
perceive the world around us and make sense of it that subverting them is a Herculean 
endeavor,  and  often  a  Sisyphean  one  as  well.  News  outlets  are  monopolized  by 
economic data and statements - the dangers and merits of austerity measures versus 
policies focused on growth, the risks of defaulting on debt, the requests of markets and 
capital for more exible jobs, the work of credit rating agencies, etc. - and even our very 
language is shaped by these concepts, as the verb “to monopolize” shows. The domain 
of environmental politics is no different: in the generalist press, climate action is mostly 
considered  in  relation  to  points  of  GDP pledged  by  the  leaders  of  the  advanced 
economies, and “green economy” is an expression that reminds us that environmental 
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Three caveats are in order before delving into the normative complexity covered 
by the radical criticisms and contributions. First, it might seem to be an odd choice to 
focus on two rather abstract issues such as commodication and growth; are not radical 
environmentalists  after  all  concerned  more  with  issues  of  land  grabbing,  neo-
colonialism, and food security, just to list a few examples? They are, but while these 
issues are expressed in a vocabulary which is closer to real-life problems, they can be 
subsumed under the more abstract headings of “commodication” and “growth.” For 
example,  in  the  analyses  of  radical  environmentalists,  land  grabbing  in  Southern 
countries can be framed in terms of an adhesion to the economic imperative of growth 
by  Northern  rms  who  look  at  new  commodity  frontiers  to  accumulate  capital. 
Examples throughout the article will help in bridging the abstract nature of a discussion 
about the normative presupposition of radical environmentalism with the vocabulary of 
radicals’ day-to-day struggles.
Second,  an  important  element  to  analyze  the  place  of  the  radical 
environmentalism  narrative  in  relation  to  the  other  narratives  is  to  understand  its 
“anchors”, i.e. states of affair or beliefs that represent the departure point for radical 
criticisms and contributions.  In particular,  radical  environmentalist  scholars maintain 
that  environmental  degradation  and  environmental  disasters  are  real.  This 
acknowledgment is no small thing: accepting that environmental problems are real, and 
not constructed by powerful actors, means relying on the same scientic knowledge that 
created the basis for the exploitation of the natural resources in the rst  place. It  is 
indeed rapid technological progress that rst made possible the Industrial Revolution, 
with  its  environment-depleting  energy demands,  which  now enables  us  to  study its 
consequences.  Most  of  the  research  on  climate  change  is  nowadays  done  through 
models  which try to  establish how sensitive the climate is  under  different  emission 
scenarios and the impact of global warming at different warming scenarios. Forest cover 
and forest carbon storage analyses are mostly done through remote sensing. Local and 
indigenous knowledge - ofcially included in the Fourth IPCC report (Solomon et al., 
2007:  833)  -  is  only  a  tiny  part  of  the  vast  body  of  scholarship  used  by  radical 
environmentalists to advocate for more environmental protection.
Third,  a  note  on  radical  environmentalist’s  methodology  is  due.  The  biggest 
challenge of all for radical environmentalism scholars is that of destroying the typical 
inertia  that  comes  with  a  narrative  that  is  now  considered  mainstream,  such  as 
ecological  modernization.  In other  words,  certain ideas are  so ingrained in how we 
perceive the world around us and make sense of it that subverting them is a Herculean 
endeavor,  and  often  a  Sisyphean  one  as  well.  News  outlets  are  monopolized  by 
economic data and statements - the dangers and merits of austerity measures versus 
policies focused on growth, the risks of defaulting on debt, the requests of markets and 
capital for more exible jobs, the work of credit rating agencies, etc. - and even our very 
language is shaped by these concepts, as the verb “to monopolize” shows. The domain 
of environmental politics is no different: in the generalist press, climate action is mostly 
considered  in  relation  to  points  of  GDP pledged  by  the  leaders  of  the  advanced 
economies, and “green economy” is an expression that reminds us that environmental 
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concerns could be benecial for economic growth. This incessant juxtaposition between 
the pervasive role of markets and environmental politics is the reason why most of the 
“holy books” of the radical environmentalism tradition come from the eld of history, 
or include some historical analysis: Karl Marx’s Das Kapital (1867), Marcel Mauss’ 
Essay sur le don (1925), along with Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation (1944). It 
is indeed a powerful rhetorical strategy to show that the certain central elements of our 
society,  such  as  commodity  markets,  or  governments’ obsession  with  the  idea  of 
economic growth, which we now take for granted as if they have been handed down 
unchanged  through  the  generations  from  time  immemorial,  actually  come  from 
somewhere,  a  specic  point  in  time  and  space.  These  structures  were  responses  to 
specic changes and pressures in our society. Analyzing these structures through the 
lens of history makes them less inevitable, and thus more susceptible to be changed if 
the right conditions are created.
The tendency to adopt historical analysis can be seen throughout the literature: 
recently the practice of referring to ecosystem services in monetary terms has come 
under  attack using historical  arguments.  By reconstructing the context  in  which the 
notion of ecosystem services arose, Richard Norgaard argues that framing ecosystem 
services in monetary terms in the early 90s was simply a way to start a dialogue with the 
decision-makers and make them sensitive to the issue of environmental conservation by 
using a language closer to the dominant ideology. The act of framing ecosystem services 
in monetary terms was not initially intended by conservation biologists as an actual step 
towards the marketization of nature, but only to raise awareness (Norgaard, 2010).
COMMODIFICATION IN ECONOMIC THEORY AND THEORIES OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Two senses of commodication
When  people  speak  of  “free  market  environmentalism”,  “marketizing  nature”  or 
“neoliberal environmental governance,” they usually use these expressions to refer to 
the  narrative  according  to  which  environmental  resources  can  be  more  efciently 
managed through economic instruments which either facilitate the operation of markets 
(like creating scarcity by at  through an emission cap) or  mimic them (cost-benet 
analysis). To do this, the reach of economic instruments is extended to domains not 
previously  touched  upon  by  the  “economic  logic”:  air,  genetic  materials,  animal 
welfare, aesthetic views, etc. It is towards this extension that radical environmentalists 
point their ngers. Can it be done? Should it done? What does it involve? Let us start 
from the latter, as it will then be easier to reply to the other two questions.
This  extension is  what  commodication  is  about  and it  involves  at  least  four 
different stages: economic framing, monetization, appropriation, and commercialization 
(Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez, 2011). The rst involves framing the functions of 
nature in terms of services lato sensu, and seeing how they contribute to the well-being 
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of  human  beings.  This  operation  “anthropocentricizes”  the  workings  of  natural 
processes; it does so by relating them to our interests and preferences, and it thus makes 
them intelligible to us. The second consists in attaching a price to those services. The 
third  formalizes  property  rights  in  a  way  that  nature’s  services  can  be  allocated  to 
people. The nal stage creates procedures such that the property rights corresponding to 
nature’s  services  can  be  bought  and  sold.  In  the  remainder  of  this  section  on 
commodication  I  have  decided  to  hold  on  to  Erik  Gómez-Baggethun  and  Manuel 
Ruiz-Pérez’s  four-stage  analysis  of  commodication,  even  though  it  is  not 
uncontroversial.  A rst  objection is that if  one understands the services provided by 
nature stricto sensu  as  those identied by ecosystem services theory and contingent 
valuation methods,  one could easily reply that  nature is  and was commodied long 
before people started to attach prices to it.  Second, it  could be argued that  Gómez-
Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez got steps two forward and four back, and that pricing is 
unnecessary:  all  that  is  needed for  commodication  is  transferrable  property  rights. 
Once the rights are in place and markets are available, prices will emerge on their own. 
That being said, having a separate category for the monetization phase will allow me to 
survey  a  contested  part  of  literature  which  deals  with  the  technical  and  conceptual 
difculties in pricing natural process, functions, and resources.
Sometimes, however, natural resources could be referred to as commodities also 
in a subtler sense: the one implicit in theories of distributive justice. It is not until very 
recently that environmental problems have been approached through the framework of 
distributive justice. Surely, the relationship between man and nature had been explored 
at length, but never in terms of who should appropriate a certain environmental good or 
another, let alone on grounds of justice. This simple reection points to the fact that 
throughout most of history people were born and stayed in stable social positions: what 
they  were  entitled  to  was  unchangeable  and  dictated  either  by  God  or  the  highest 
political authority. Indeed, in the Western world, it is mostly with modern representative 
democracy that citizens started to come to terms with the fact that government decisions 
could be inuenced.  This,  in  turn,  created a  context  in  which issues  of  distributive 
justice  came to  be  seen as  something worth  discussing.  The distributive  issues  that 
preoccupied welfare democratic states at their inception were many - health, education, 
taxation, industry, pensions - but the environment was not one of them, at least not 
systematically.  That  human  activities  could  lead  to  environmental  hazards  and 
environmental  degradation  was  plain  for  all  to  see.  Tales  of  human  environmental 
destruction  go  as  far  back  as  the  Pleistocene  when,  according  to  a  popular  theory, 
Australian  megafauna  became  extinct  because  of  the  arrivals  of  early  Australian 
Aboriginals (Diamond, 2005). Vittoria Calvani and Andrea Giardina (1979) report that 
Plinius the Elder noticed how the clearing of forests - conifers in particular - to produce 
tar  used to waterproof boats could have been a cause for oods and malaria in the 
Roman age. Smog in the cities during the Industrial Revolution, the destruction caused 
by the two World Wars and the Vietnam War, are just two further more modern cases 
which come to mind. All these cases, however, called for responses along the lines of 
restorative justice, if they called for a response at all.
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in a subtler sense: the one implicit in theories of distributive justice. It is not until very 
recently that environmental problems have been approached through the framework of 
distributive justice. Surely, the relationship between man and nature had been explored 
at length, but never in terms of who should appropriate a certain environmental good or 
another, let alone on grounds of justice. This simple reection points to the fact that 
throughout most of history people were born and stayed in stable social positions: what 
they  were  entitled  to  was  unchangeable  and  dictated  either  by  God  or  the  highest 
political authority. Indeed, in the Western world, it is mostly with modern representative 
democracy that citizens started to come to terms with the fact that government decisions 
could be inuenced.  This,  in  turn,  created a  context  in  which issues  of  distributive 
justice  came to  be  seen as  something worth  discussing.  The distributive  issues  that 
preoccupied welfare democratic states at their inception were many - health, education, 
taxation, industry, pensions - but the environment was not one of them, at least not 
systematically.  That  human  activities  could  lead  to  environmental  hazards  and 
environmental  degradation  was  plain  for  all  to  see.  Tales  of  human  environmental 
destruction  go  as  far  back  as  the  Pleistocene  when,  according  to  a  popular  theory, 
Australian  megafauna  became  extinct  because  of  the  arrivals  of  early  Australian 
Aboriginals (Diamond, 2005). Vittoria Calvani and Andrea Giardina (1979) report that 
Plinius the Elder noticed how the clearing of forests - conifers in particular - to produce 
tar  used to waterproof boats could have been a cause for oods and malaria in the 
Roman age. Smog in the cities during the Industrial Revolution, the destruction caused 
by the two World Wars and the Vietnam War, are just two further more modern cases 
which come to mind. All these cases, however, called for responses along the lines of 
restorative justice, if they called for a response at all.
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It  is  only  between  the  1970s  and  the  1980s  that  the  issue  of  environmental 
degradation  was  seen  through  the  lens  of  distributive  justice.  Two  things  became 
apparent: rst, environmental inequalities, such as disparities in access to safe drinking 
water, could be mapped onto the already existing social inequalities (Bullard, 1983). 
There  was  something  about  the  environment  that  was  already  being  implicitly 
distributed, and distributed along well-known racial and income lines, and this was true 
both nationally and internationally. Perhaps not incidentally, this is also the moment in 
which ministries of environment started to appear: it is indeed a quintessential political 
problem  to  decide  how  to  distribute  and  redistribute  environmental  benets  and 
burdens;  even though the received narrative  links  the  mushrooming of  environment 
ministries  with  the  1972  UN  Conference  in  Stockholm.  Second,  at  the  very  same 
Stockholm Conference, the idea that not every state had the same capacity to tackle 
global environmental problems started to make the rounds, and therefore a rudimentary 
- compared with a full-edged theory of distributive justice - principle of distributive 
justice  in  line  with  what  we  would  call  today  the  principle  of  Common  But 
Differentiated Responsibilities  was then adopted.  Indeed,  the Stockholm Declaration 
emphasized the need to consider “the applicability of standards which are valid for the 
most advanced countries but which may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost 
for the developing countries” (Principle 23 of the Stockholm Declaration).
It was now on the political agenda, both national and international: environmental 
degradation as a problem of distributive justice. Philosophers took notice of it. And by 
the 1990s,  environmental  distributive justice  had become a research program on its 
own.  To  systematize  the  growing  literature  in  the  eld,  Dale  Jamieson  (1994) 
distinguished  three  different  ways  of  understanding  the  concept  of  environmental 
justice, of which only the third fully captures the elements constituting environmental 
distributive justice. The rst is the idea that considerations of justice should be extended 
to environmental entities as well: humans owe duties of justice towards animals, plants, 
and  ecosystems.  Put  differently,  the  word  “environmental”  within  the  expression 
“environmental justice” refers to an expansion of the class of the beneciaries of justice. 
The second idea points instead to “environmental” as a limiting condition on the pursuit 
of justice. In this case, while theories of distributive justice continue to deal with the 
same beneciaries of justice - humans -, what changes are the conditions with which 
specic instances of redistribution or restitution have to comply. For example, within 
this framework it would not be justiable to redistribute resources from a richer entity 
to  a  poorer  one  if  this  involves  environmental  destruction.  According  to  the  third 
understanding of the concept of environmental justice, the environment is a commodity 
whose distribution should be governed by principles of distributive justice. The actual 
environment cannot, most of the time, be distributed in a physical manner, but the costs 
and benets of its management can.
Viewed through  the  lens  of  this  third  understanding  of  environmental  justice, 
Northern developed countries incurred in a signicant environmental debt towards the 
Global South: they overused the sinks and input resources such as coal and oil; they 
reduced biodiversity and threatened the stability of the “spaceship Earth” system. Yet 
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these are not the by-products of a careless North, but the systemic costs of development. 
If  this is  so,  and given the pervasiveness of the narrative of economic development 
shared by both developed and developing countries, a transfer now has to be made; but 
not along the lines of restorative justice. The representatives of developing countries - 
except those of small  island states and states with very low costal  zones,  which do 
actually  fear  for  the  survival  of  their  countries  -  do  not  think  that  the  clock  of 
development should be turned back, rather they feel that it is now their turn to develop 
and they should be allowed somewhat looser international environmental regulations to 
do so. It is now the turn of developing states to use the resources and sinks while the 
developed ones should pick up the bill for the mitigation and adaptation measures now 
needed. What is implicit in this idea of environmental distributive justice is that there is 
nothing peculiar about environmental commodities; like many other commodities they 
could impose costs and bring benets.  And as such, they could be used to pursue a 
determinate  idea  of  just  distribution.  Indeed,  although  there  has  been  substantial 
disagreement over the proper principles of distribution, since at least the discussions 
leading to the Kyoto Protocol the very idea of distribution on the basis of the enjoyment 
of benets and burdens of the environmental commodities is not widely contested in the 
international  fora.  Contestation  at  the  deeper  level  of  which  idea  of  environmental 
justice the world leaders should pursue usually stays at the fringes of the institutional 
debates, and it is usually undertaken by those small island states which do not stand to 
gain anything from a free pass to development, by the few states such as Bolivia which 
remained remarkably insulated in respect to the narrative of development, and by NGOs 
and activists participating at the colorful side-events of international conferences.
According to Jamieson, who wrote about this in 1994, when philosophers and 
decision-makers talk about environmental justice they mostly have in mind the last of 
the three meanings: environment as a commodity to be distributed. This still rings true 
today, and it is certainly the case of the research on environmental justice directly linked 
with climate change.  Being mostly caused by measurable anthropogenic greenhouse 
gasses emissions on the global  scale,  the climate change problem lends itself  to  be 
approached from a distributive perspective. The problem of allocation of future GHGs 
emission is one of the most discussed issues in the literature of climate justice, and 
disagreement over it is what contributed to preventing an ambitious post-Kyoto deal for 
climate mitigation for many years.
Other cases of environmental degradation could, from a layman’s perspective, be 
more easily associated with, and dealt within, a different and non-distributive approach 
of environmental justice. Think of protection of biological diversity. Animals, plants 
and whole ecosystems seem perfect beneciaries of a limited set of obligations aimed at 
protecting them from predatory prot-seeking practices - the rst idea of environmental 
justice.  This  is  not,  however,  the  approach  adopted  by  the  1992  Convention  on 
Biological  Diversity,  which considers biological  diversity a resource to be exploited 
sustainably and to be accessed on an equitable basis according to intra-generational and 
intergenerational  principles  of  distributive justice (Schroeder  and Pogge,  2009).  The 
other two approaches to environmental justice - the rst and second understandings of 
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gain anything from a free pass to development, by the few states such as Bolivia which 
remained remarkably insulated in respect to the narrative of development, and by NGOs 
and activists participating at the colorful side-events of international conferences.
According to Jamieson, who wrote about this in 1994, when philosophers and 
decision-makers talk about environmental justice they mostly have in mind the last of 
the three meanings: environment as a commodity to be distributed. This still rings true 
today, and it is certainly the case of the research on environmental justice directly linked 
with climate change.  Being mostly caused by measurable anthropogenic greenhouse 
gasses emissions on the global  scale,  the climate change problem lends itself  to  be 
approached from a distributive perspective. The problem of allocation of future GHGs 
emission is one of the most discussed issues in the literature of climate justice, and 
disagreement over it is what contributed to preventing an ambitious post-Kyoto deal for 
climate mitigation for many years.
Other cases of environmental degradation could, from a layman’s perspective, be 
more easily associated with, and dealt within, a different and non-distributive approach 
of environmental justice. Think of protection of biological diversity. Animals, plants 
and whole ecosystems seem perfect beneciaries of a limited set of obligations aimed at 
protecting them from predatory prot-seeking practices - the rst idea of environmental 
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environmental  justice  -  albeit  rather  ourishing  in  terms  of  scholarly  output,  are 
sidelined  in  ofcial  policy-making  circles.  The  most  important  work  which  clearly 
inscribes itself within the rst understanding of environmental justice is probably Peter 
Singer’s  Animal  Liberation  (1975).  The  book  utilizes  an  utilitarian  framework  and 
argues in favor of extending consideration of justice to animals on the basis of their 
capacity to experience suffering; even though Singer himself would probably reject the 
language of  justice  for  a  more  properly  utilitarian  moral  vocabulary.  The book had 
undeniably far-reaching impacts, and it is by many considered the theoretical expression 
of the ideas put forward by the animal liberation movement and by the organization 
PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) (Newkirk, 2015). However, while 
something has been changing lately in developed states - in 2012 the EU banned the use 
of barren battery cages - Singer’s work has been mostly received as a plea to change 
individual lifestyles:  in a way, closer to a treatise about private morality than about 
public justice. Furthermore, the debate to advance animal welfare in policy circles is 
often framed in terms of food security: the extension of certain benets to animals is 
ultimately justied in anthropocentric terms, which in turn places the issue of animal 
welfare only imperfectly within the rst understanding of environmental justice. But if 
environmental justice within policy circles is mostly discussed in terms of distribution 
of benets and burdens of managing environmental resources, then it follows that the 
environment is mostly perceived as a commodity. This is something that draws together 
economic theory and theories of environmental distributive justice in the face of radical 
positions, as both economic theory and theories of distributive justice - explicitly or not 
- present commodication as a necessary prerequisite for their smooth workings. In the 
rst  case,  commodication  is  the  necessary  condition  to  manage  scarce  natural 
resources efciently; in the second, to manage them equitably. 
A distinction at this point should be made between the two different senses of 
commodication of nature and their implications from a radical perspective. The rst 
sense is the one we have reviewed in the rst part of this section: natural resources and 
processes become commodities when they go through a four-stage procedure: economic 
framing,  monetization,  appropriation,  and  commercialization.  This  procedure  is 
instrumental to market exchanges which rely on well-dened property rights to work 
efciently.  Natural  resources  and  processes  become commodities  when they  clearly 
have a price, clearly have an owner, and they can be exchanged.
The second sense of commodication is the one presented above, as implicit in 
the  third  understanding  of  the  idea  of  environmental  justice.  In  that  context, 
environmental processes and resources are referred to as commodities by means of an 
analogy with actual natural  commodities,  i.e.  those entities that  go through the four 
stages of commodication. In other words, the environment is treated as if it were a 
commodity. Certain features of what it means to be a commodity are singled out and 
then compared with the implicit understanding of “environment” as given within the 
third idea of environmental distributive justice. What emerges from this comparison is 
an  idea  of  nature  as  an  item,  i.e.  an  entity  with  boundaries,  which  can  be  freely 
exchanged, albeit not always in an actual marketplace, and whose benets and burdens 
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can be  traded away.  Furthermore,  at  an  even more  fundamental  level,  what  is  also 
implicit  in treating nature as if  it  were a commodity is  the idea of dominance over 
nature, something that can be controlled and that should be managed. In the radical 
literature,  this  approach  to  nature  is  belittled  as  a  form  of  “domestication  of  the 
earth” (Wuerthner et al., 2014). The idea of domesticating the earth captures the aspect 
of environmental distributive justice that more than any other is problematic from a 
radical perspective: the idea that nature is out there for us.
The economic concept of a commodity is more specic and ne-grained, whereas 
the one implicit in distributive justice theories sits at a more abstract level. According to 
the latter,  natural  resources are commodities  because they are economically framed, 
monetized,  appropriated  and  exchanged  even  when they  do  not  explicitly  receive  a 
numerical estimate tracking their monetary value and are not exchanged in an actual 
market,  but  also when they are traded in international  conferences,  in  exchange for 
things whose values cannot really be put into prices, like international stability, or the 
appeasement  of  an  assertive  country.  Theories  that  mostly  criticize  the  economic 
understanding  of  commodity  tend  to  put  forward  technical  remarks  and  they  are 
informed by a different understanding of how natural processes work - this strand of 
research is usually carried out by ecological economists - whereas those that aim to 
criticize both senses of commodity tend to put forward remarks informed by alternative 
theories of environmental justice. In what follows I have divided these two types of 
criticisms as pertaining to two different questions.
Commodication: Two questions
Let us now go back to the two questions posed at the beginning of this section. By 
replying to the question, “Can nature be commodied?”, scholars look at the technical 
difculties involved in creating markets out of nature’s functions. By replying to the 
question, “Should nature be commodied?”, scholars look at the potentially disruptive 
consequences  for  humans  and  for  nature  itself  of  framing,  pricing,  and  allocating 
environmental  resources  and  services.  This  question  can  be  answered  from  an 
anthropocentric perspective - disruptions that commodication will cause to us - and 
from a non-anthropocentric one - there is intrinsic value in nature that impedes us from 
trading its functions as a trivial object. 
These two simple questions - “Can nature be commodied?” and “Should nature 
be commodied?” - are not clearly distinguished in the literature. For example, while 
Douglas  McCaulley  (2006)  is  often  presented  as  an  inuential  voice  in  the  radical 
literature, one that argues that some things ought not to be for sale because of non-
anthropocentric  reasons  (Gómez-Baggethun  and  Ruiz-Pérez  2011:  621),  it  is  often 
overlooked  that  he  puts  forward  his  case  by  relying  on  technical  consequentialist 
arguments only (a review of his arguments is  provided below). A somewhat similar 
remark  on  the  state  of  the  literature  has  been made by  Karen  Bakker  (2005),  who 
laments the lack of ne-grained analysis when it comes to the impacts of markets upon 
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the environment: “commodication, markets, and private sector are understood to be 
pernicious,  the  impacts  of  neoliberalism  upon  the  environment  are  assumed  to  be 
largely  negative”  (Bakker  2005:  544,  emphasis  is  mine).  She  also  laments  that 
“analytical  imprecision and the  failure  to  make explicit  the  normative  bases  of  our 
arguments [the radical arguments] have signicant consequences [...] undermining the 
progressive potential of critical scholarship” (Bakker 2005: 544). In other words, much 
of the radical scholarship puts forward technical criticisms for why markets might be 
considered bad for the environment but fails to clearly make a connection between these 
criticisms  and  deeper  normative  presuppositions  that  inform  them  and  leaves 
unexplained why other instruments for environmental conservation should be explored. 
Normative presuppositions and alternative approaches to environmental protection are 
usually left to the readers to gure out; this task is sometimes made easier by the choice 
of the journal in which radical scholarship usually appears: the very placement of an 
article  in  journals  such  as  the  Marxist-leaning  Capitalism  Nature  Socialism  makes 
explicit  some  of  the  normative  bases  implicit  in  the  criticisms  of  market-based 
approaches.
In what follows I will divide radical arguments into either technical arguments 
that  reply to the Can question,  or deontological  and consequentialist  arguments that 
reply to the Should question.
(i) Nature cannot be properly commodied, therefore it should not. (Analyzed in the present 
section)
(ii) Nature should not be commodied, and there is no point in even asking about the Can 
question and the related technical problems (to be dealt with in the second part of the section 
about commodication)1
In case of (i), the arguments put forward in order to argue that nature should not be 
commodied are of the consequentialist type; they point to negative consequences that 
might unfold as a result of the fact that nature cannot be properly commodied from a 
technical point of view. As such, these arguments are best understood as directed against 
the  economic  notion  of  commodication.  Arguments  that  point  to  technical 
shortcomings of economic theory in commodifying nature can be further divided in 
terms  of  the  four  stages  of  commodication  introduced  above.  In  case  of  (ii),  the 
arguments  put  forward  in  order  to  argue  that  there  is  no  point  in  even  trying  to 
commodify  nature  are  mostly  non-consequentialist  and  can  be  both  anthropocentric 
(eco-socialism)  and  non-anthropocentric  (biocentrism  and  ecocentrism).  These 
 There is,  obviously,  another possibility which,  however,  has no place among the positions held by 1
radical environmentalists: i.e. nature cannot be properly commodied, however it should be commodied 
nonetheless, albeit imperfectly. In other words, one could argue that no money value can represent the 
true value of natural resources/systems, but it may be practically valuable to place a contingent monetary 
value on these resources/systems because otherwise they are discounted and effectively valued at zero, 
which leads to excessive rates of destruction and destructive consumption. Most defenders of contingent 
valuation hold this view, or something like it. This is a popular argument in pro-market circles, and, as 
such, it has been already reviewed in Chapter 2.
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arguments are best understood as directed against both notions of commodication: the 
economic one and the one implicit in theories of distributive justice.
From “can” to “should”
I start from (i) and follow the order of the commodication stages. The rst stage of 
commodication frames environmental functions as services that are useful to human 
welfare.  One  of  the  technical  problems  in  framing  economically  environmental 
functions is that complex ecosystems are treated as if they were bounded and discrete 
(Kosoy and Corbera,  2010:  1232).  The same point  is  also made by Arild  Vatn and 
Daniel  Bromley  (1994),  who  argue  that  environmental  mechanisms  are  complex, 
interrelated and are shaped through a trial-and-error process over thousands of years. 
Sometimes we do not know about the function of an environmental process until it has 
disappeared. The problem raised by Vatn and Bromley is cognitive. Humans now do not 
have the instruments to understand and analyze nature’s function as discrete entities, 
and, given the head start of nature in terms of evolution compared to the Homo Sapiens, 
it  can  be  doubted  whether  humans  will  ever  get  to  that  point.  The  difculty  in 
compartmentalizing nature’s functions translates into actual problems for environmental 
protection  once  nature’s  functions  have  been  imperfectly  singled  out.  With  these 
observations  I  am  thus  moving  into  the  Should  question.  The  main  problematic 
consequence that might follow from imperfectly compartmentalizing nature’s functions 
is that of ultimately harming nature and the human beings dependent on it. For example, 
once forests are mainly understood in terms of the CO2 they store, and their complex 
functions  reframed  in  terms  of  the  service  lent  to  us  by  storing  carbon,  then 
conservation efforts get translated into amounts of CO2 stored and into maximizing this 
gure - or keeping it constant while other parameters might change. “Green deserts,” a 
negative expression to refer to reforestation projects which aim to plant fast-growing 
non-native  trees  in  deforested  areas,  can  be  precisely  understood  in  terms  of  this 
dynamic: while these trees, such as the eucalyptus, store great amounts of CO2, they 
might eventually harm the environment in terms of the biodiversity which they cannot 
harbor. Apart from this oft-quoted example, there might be a myriad of other cases in 
which  even  the  best  efforts  and  intentions  towards  conservation  and  environmental 
protection,  when  coupled  with  imperfect  compartmentalization,  produce 
counterproductive results.
The second stage of commodication is that of monetizing the services provided 
by  nature.  One  of  the  technical  problems  in  monetizing  nature’s  functions  is  that 
environmental goods, even when already framed as services, resist pricing. This is, for 
example, clear in contingent evaluation surveys which are used by the economists in 
order to evaluate how much certain resources are worth. Sometimes, respondents seem 
to attach incredibly large existence values (the expression used by economists to refer to 
intrinsic value) to even those animal species whose use values are very clear to us, such 
as edible shes. The problem is a mismatch between the xed categories of economic 
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theory - e.g. preferences need to show some transitivity to be worked out - and what 
people  feel  about  the  environment.  From the  economist’s  point  of  view,  laypeople 
would value the existence of mice less than cod, of cod less than elephants, and of mice, 
cod, and elephants less than a new medical procedure to save human lives. One would 
think that there is no point in donating money to save the elephants if, with the money 
one has left, one can no longer afford a previously affordable life-saving drug. This, 
however,  is  not  always  shown in  surveys;  it  does  not  mean  that  these  people  will 
actually prefer to save the elephants,  but it  shows that certain people have an inner 
repulsion  towards  putting  a  price  on  nature;  sometimes  they  refuse  to  answer, 
sometimes they give an incredibly large amount as a response. Technical problems arise 
when all these responses need nonetheless be converted into a monetary gure. Few, or 
many, protest responses at contingent evaluation surveys will not change anytime soon 
the trend towards the monetization and commodication of nature; “the genie is out of 
the bottle,” said Markus Peterson et al. referring to this trend (2009: 117). But if this is 
the case, then the monetary gures cannot but be constructed by the economist who will 
select data more or less consistent with mice less than cod, less then elephants, less than 
a new medical life-saving procedure for human beings, which is what the economist 
needs to make no-nonsense recommendations to the policy-maker.
The problem of nature which resists pricing can be analyzed from two different 
points of view: the rst is purely technical. It is the idea that economists do not know 
yet  how to  convert  responses  which deal  with  the  evaluation of  nature  into  prices; 
perhaps  they  only  require  a  more  elaborate  procedure  to  extrapolate  people’s  real 
preferences. The second explanation of why nature resists pricing is based on the idea 
that  nature  has  an  intrinsic  value  which  cannot  be  exactly  priced,  no  matter  how 
elaborate the procedure to do so. To be fair, these claims are not universally accepted, 
and  would  be  roundly  rejected  by  some  ecosystem-services  analysts.  Indeed,  it  is 
common to urge that contingent values given to ecosystem services will  represent a 
lower limit on the value of the resource itself. Furthermore, many things that have non-
market intrinsic value are for sale on the market with little discussion, including life-
saving medicines, books, artworks, animals, food, etc. Those who urge that we should 
not prohibit the sale of transplant organs or sex do not and need not deny that these 
things have a value that cannot be properly expressed as a dollar price. Yet, while the 
arguments about the difculty of pricing nature cannot be sufcient, on their own, to 
object to its commodication, they should be considered in connection with the likely 
consequences  that  inexact  prices  produce  in  a  market  economy.  Indeed,  if  properly 
pricing nature’s functions is not yet possible, or outright impossible, because a sizable 
sector  of  people  nd  the  very  idea  insulting,  then  doing  it  nonetheless  cannot  but 
produce problems for environmental protection, because, in economics terms, it  will 
lead to unavoidable market failures.
Indeed, there are times in which even the correct price is not enough to protect a 
natural  resource.  This  is,  for  example,  the  case  in  which  economic  growth  and 
environmental protection are genuinely mutually exclusive goals: putting the two goals 
on  the  same  scale  by  pricing  environmental  functions  makes  trade-offs  potentially 
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damaging for the environment a whole lot easier. A case in point is the example offered 
by McCauley (2006): the introduction of the invasive Nile perch into the Lake Victoria, 
which, while boosting the economy around the lake, destroyed its biodiversity; similar 
cases of environmental species or functions which are “worth more dead than alive” 
abound. Another potential drawback unleashed by the mechanism of pricing nature is 
that of making environmental protection sensitive to the vagaries of markets, which are 
far  from  being  stable  and  reliable  institutions.  McCauley  offers  the  example  of 
pollination services the values of which oscillate with the values of the product in need 
of pollination. If a particular agricultural market is in recession, then the incentives to 
protect its pollination services will also take a comparable dip. A further argument put 
forward by McCauley is that by expressing the value of conservation in monetary terms, 
humans will “commit the folly of betting against human ingenuity” (McCauley, 2006: 
28). In other words, if certain functions are valued so long as they are useful to us, then 
once  humans  will  nd  cheaper  substitutes,  those  nature’s  function  will  stop  being 
worthy of  protection;  natural  watersheds  which naturally  lter  waters  are  a  case  in 
point. 
The  third  stage  of  commodication  is  that  of  appropriating  the  now 
compartmentalized  services  provided  by  nature.  There  are  non-trivial  difculties  in 
creating property rights for environmental functions in places where the very notion of 
property rights is foreign. In certain Native American or Aboriginal cultures, it is the 
Earth  which  “owns”  the  human beings,  not  the  other  way around (Global  Oneness 
Project,  2009).  Secondly,  even  in  cultures  more  in  tune  with  the  idea  of  human 
supremacy  over  nature,  there  might  be  no  concept  of  a  limited  property  right  and 
ownership  is  often  contested  by  many  social  groups.  One  of  the  problems  of 
implementing REDD projects has been precisely the fact that there are overlapping right 
claims by different actors, and with this the fear that those who reap the largest benets 
from REDD projects might not be those responsible for sustainably managing them, and 
this  often  disrupts  long-kept  and  delicate  balances  in  the  management  of  natural 
resources (Gover, 2016).
A somewhat similar argument is also put forward concerning the fourth stage of 
commodication. The creation of markets for newly introduced commodities does not 
raise particular technical difculties, sometimes only political will is necessary, together 
with a few conferences, the opening of some ofces, and the hiring of some technical 
and administrative personnel. But as it is well-known that, once new property rights 
regimes are created people scramble to get their hands on them, bureaucrats such as UN 
professionals, in drafting rules for market-based projects implementation, try to prevent 
clear  misconduct,  graft,  and  theft  by  buyers  and  sellers  on  the  market.  Complex 
provisions  establishing  who  can  do  what  and  when,  and  various  monitoring  and 
accountability  mechanisms,  sometimes  result  in  long technical  documents  which  de 
facto create an entry barrier to the market for poorer people who might wish to sell their 
management of certain environmental services which they legitimately control. This, in 
turn, reinforces patterns of inequality. 
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From “should” to (not asking about) “can”
Appropriation and common property theory
Radical  environmentalism  scholars  have  two  further  arguments  to  oppose  the 
commodication  of  nature  when  it  comes  to  the  appropriation  stage;  both  of  them 
depart from a Marxist reading of the relationship between man and nature. The rst is a 
consequentialist argument (the only one to be discussed in this section). According to 
contemporary Marxist scholars, the creation of property rights for natural resources will 
worsen existing inequalities and map them onto the environmental domain. In other 
words,  the creation of  property rights  will  facilitate  the process of  appropriation by 
those  who  own  important  nancial  resources,  which  is  an  integral  part  of  capital 
accumulation. Prot and capital accumulation are seen as the main motives moving the 
economy, in line with a Marxist pre-neoclassical reading of economic relations. Harvey 
calls this mechanism “accumulation by dispossession” and sees forestry market-based 
instruments such as REDD as a paradigmatic case of this process (Harvey, 2004).
The difference between this argument and the one surveyed above is that it does 
not  depart  from a  technical  shortcoming or  a  technical  difculty  in  the  creation  of 
property rights: bad consequences will follow no matter how accurate the newly drawn 
boundaries around property rights track the previous uses of a natural resource: who had 
access to it,  who managed it,  who could exclude others from using it,  etc.  In other 
words, it is the act of creating property rights per se where there were none before and 
where resources were managed commonly that will deepen existing inequalities. Where 
new property rights regimes are introduced, these tend to reect, either initially or after 
a short while, the existing power asymmetries, with those with economic and social 
power in a better position to appropriate the natural resources. This dynamic in the past 
has even resulted in the forced eviction of local populations from the areas they used to 
inhabit from immemorial time, as in the case of the Sengwer population in Kenya (UN 
News Service, 2014; World Bank Group, 2016; Chepkorir Kuto, 2016).
Within  this  strand  of  research,  common  property  theory  gave  new  tools  to 
understand  the  dynamics  of  overexploitation  of  natural  resources  following  the 
introduction of property rights (Pokrant, 2011; Robbins, 2012). These critical tools were 
largely developed as a response to the new paradigm of the Tragedy of the Commons 
introduced by Hardin (1968) who claimed that a resource open to all would eventually 
be depleted, as the most rational response for every party involved is to adopt non-
cooperative behavior, overexploiting the resource for fear that the other parties might do 
the same; a situation largely similar to a prisoner’s dilemma. As we have seen above in 
Chapter 2, two scenarios follow from Hardin’s argument to solve the potential problem 
of overexploitation. The rst is the introduction of property rights: everyone is allocated 
an amount of natural resources, from which it follows that every actor will have to look 
after the resource so that its yield can be sustained in the future as well. The second is 
the introduction of exogenous institutional rules for the access and use of the natural 
resources. Needless to say, in the years of strong market environmentalism storytelling, 
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coupled  with  the  decreasing  appeal  of  centralized  regulation,  the  second  scenario 
implicit  in Hardin’s argument has been largely forgotten.  As Hardin’s argument has 
been mostly received as a call for privatization, common property theorists sought to 
understand whether the introduction of property rights could actually solve the dilemma 
of collective resources.
While the theory of the tragedy of the commons is theoretically elegant, there is a 
vast  literature  on  the  management  of  common  resources  that  provides  countless 
exceptions  to  the  very  premise  of  the  dilemma (see  the  collection of  papers  in  the 
National Research Council Report, 1986; Van Laerhoven and Ostrom, 2007; Ostrom et 
al.,  2002).  In  other  words,  non-privatized  and not  institutionally  regulated  common 
resources are not prone to be overexploited as easily as Hardin thought they would have 
been in those situations. Hardin’s mistake was to believe that a common resource is a 
free  for  all  unowned good,  when in  reality  open pastures,  sheries,  and forests  are 
perceived by the locals accessing them as commonly held properties largely governed 
by implicit rules. What Hardin really did was to analyze the tragedy of the much rarer 
free  access  resources,  not  the  commons  (Martínez-Alier,  2002:  74).  However,  by 
mischaracterizing  what  commons  truly  are  -  and  even  though  Hardin  identies  the 
source of the problem as structural, not moral -, a narrative took shape that shifted the 
fault of environmental degradation onto local communities, while prescribing the need 
that those resources be managed more efciently. The risk is that once external players 
are brought in through the privatization of the commons, a different dynamic is likely to 
materialize:  powerful  private  actors  will  use the resource to its  fullest,  especially if 
negative externalities are poorly accounted for, causing degradation and then move onto 
the next resource, as the capital accumulated from the fast exploitation of the resources 
would allow the private actor to acquire new resources (Robbins, 2012: 54).
Appropriation and natural resources to be enjoyed as public wealth
The  second  argument  against  appropriation  does  not  rest  on  the  evaluation  of  the 
consequences following the creation of property rights. Rather, it points to a principle of 
equity in managing natural resources which appropriation would directly oppose. Marx 
hints at this argument at various points in his work, but never in a comprehensive way. 
It rests on a basic intuition rst put forward by James Maitland, better known as the 
Lord of Lauderdale, and recently recalled by three eco-socialist scholars: John Bellamy 
Foster,  Richard  York,  and  Brett  Clark  (Foster  et  al.,  2011).  There  is  an  inverse 
correlation between public wealth and private riches, such that if one increases the other 
diminishes; this is known as the Lauderdale Paradox (Maitland Lord of Lauderdale, 
1804). The difference between the two is that public wealth consists of “all that man 
desires,  as  useful  or  delightful  to  him”  (Maitland  Lord  of  Lauderdale,  1804:  46), 
whereas private riches are “all that man desires, as useful or delightful to him, which 
exists  in  a  degree  of  scarcity”  (Maitland Lord of  Lauderdale,  1804:  47).  From this 
follows  that  when  a  resource  that  had  been  previously  abundant  becomes  scarce, 
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individual riches -  and aggregatively the riches of the country - increase, but at  the 
expenses of public wealth. An example of this dynamic provided by Foster et al. is the 
following: if a reserve of water freely available for everyone is appropriated and a fee is 
placed upon its use, the private riches of the appropriator would increase at the expense 
of  the  increasing  thirst  of  the  other  people.  At  the  heart  of  the  paradox stands  the 
distinction between use value and exchange value, and the fact that both can be attached 
to a single object or natural resource. As scarcity increases,  an exchange value gets 
attached to natural resources on top of their use value, which progressively diminishes. 
Marx took the Lauderdale Paradox and made it into one of the central tenets of Das 
Kapital, as he claimed that in capitalistic societies the earth is used as a reservoir from 
which use-values are to be extracted (Marx and Engels, 1867).
According to Marx, and in this he is remarkably similar to Kant,  the stock of use-2
values  made available  by the  Earth  should be  managed according to  a  principle  of 
equitable use for current and future generations. This principle cannot be enforced when 
land stops being a common resource. Of course, one could argue that even though the 
accumulation of private riches robs the earth of public wealth, it is always possible to 
return something in the form of taxation to those that  according to the principle of 
equity were entitled to a share of public wealth. In that case, a principle of equity would 
still be enforceable, even if the land is no longer a common resource. Yet this would 
miss the point. Sometimes, the passage from public wealth to private riches involves a 
degradation of the environment which is instrumental to the increase of the exchange 
values of the resources and which taxation cannot possibly revert. Going back to the 
Lord of Lauderdale, he saw this dynamic in action every time the 18th-century Dutch 
colonialists burned spices in particularly fertile periods (Maitland Lord of Lauderdale, 
1804: 44). Furthermore, even when the passage from public wealth to private riches 
does not involve an actual degradation of the resource, as in the example of restricted 
water  access,  the  compensation  is  still  qualitatively  different  from  what  originally 
people were entitled to. For example, the value of monetary compensation is subject to 
the vagaries of markets in different products and cannot always guarantee the access to 
a  share  of  the  appropriated  resource  as  large  as  the  one  the  person  was  originally 
entitled to. In this sense, both the distinction between two modes of enjoying goods - as 
public wealth and as private riches - and the principle that natural resources should be 
viewed primarily in terms of public wealth to be enjoyed by everyone on the basis of a 
principle of equity - which Marxist theorists would probably esh out in terms of needs 
- enabled Marx to go well beyond a leftist reading of the Lockean proviso.
The  Lockean  proviso  is  a  clause  within  Locke’s  Second  Treatise  on  the 
Government  (Locke,  1690  [2015]),  and  later  recalled  and  discussed  by  Nozick  in 
Anarchy,  State and Utopia  (1974),  according to which the initial  appropriation of  a 
resource  is  subject  to  some  limitations  on  grounds  of  justice.  The  basic  difference 
between the various interpretations of the proviso - even the leftist ones - and Marx’s 
 Kant claimed in Toward Perpetual Peace that the “use of the right to the earth's surface which belongs 2
to the human race in common” (Kant 1795 [2006: 8:358])
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idea of equity in access to natural resources is that the former remain rooted in the 
understanding of natural resources as commodities to be distributed, whereas the idea of 
natural resources as something to be enjoyed as public wealth enables Marx to refrain 
from this position. Scholars have identied up to three different versions of the Lockean 
proviso (Widerquist 2010: 7), even though most of the scholarship on Locke’s initial 
appropriation theory focuses on what is known as the enough-and-as-good limitation; 
this  is  due  to  Nozick  who  called  it  “the  Lockean  proviso”  (Nozick  1974:  178-82, 
emphasis is mine). According to this version of the proviso, appropriation is justied 
when enough and as good is left for others. Several readings have been given of the 
Lockean proviso,  going from the Nozickian version thereof,  which requires  that  no 
individual be made worse off by the use or appropriation of a natural resource compared 
with  non-use  or  non-appropriation,  to  more  stringent  ones.  According  to  a  centrist 
reading, the proviso requires that those who have not appropriated the natural resources 
be left with an adequate share of natural resources; then, depending on the scarcity of 
the resources and the conception of adequacy, the proviso can be rendered more or less 
strict. According to a leftist reading which, analogously to Marx, sees natural resources 
as belonging to everyone, the proviso requires either that one leaves an equally valuable 
share of natural resources for the others, or that one leaves a share of natural resources 
which is enough for others to have as good an opportunity for well-being.
Starting  from the  Nozickian  reading,  the  readings  of  the  proviso  listed  above 
become progressively more demanding: the rightist reading (the Nozickian one) bases 
compensation  towards  those  who did  not  acquire  the  resources  on  their  reservation 
price, i.e. the lowest payment that would make the two scenarios - appropriation or non-
appropriation  by  another  person -  indifferent  to  them.  The  centrist  reading  is  more 
demanding,  but,  similarly  to  the  rightist  one,  departs  from the  premise  that  natural 
resources  found  in  nature  are  not  held  in  common,  and  thus,  provided  adequate 
compensation is forthcoming, their benets can be reaped by the rst person who claims 
to use a natural resource. On the contrary, the leftist readings recognize that natural 
resources are held in common and maintain that this fact is normatively signicant in 
how the  resources  should  be  distributed.  The  leftist  reading  based  on  equal  initial 
shares, while intuitively appealing, does not account for the possibility that different 
situations in life beyond the control of the individual might bring different people to use 
the resources differently, thus consequently allowing great disparities in well-being. The 
leftist reading based on equal opportunity is closest to Marx’s idea of equity in the use 
of  public  wealth,  as  it  allows for  resources  to  be  distributed differently  in  order  to 
achieve a similar level of well-being, and - as the other leftist reading - it departs from 
the idea that natural resources are held in common.
But  all  the  scholarly  discussions  around  the  different  understandings  of  the 
proviso seem to depart  from a fundamental  assumption which eco-socialist  scholars 
following Marx are not willing to accept; and this refusal puts them in a better position 
to resist the various processes of commodication of nature. The assumption is that we 
have already exhausted the resources to be appropriated and that now the debate about 
the appropriate understanding of the Lockean proviso is mainly to be framed in terms of 
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the different amounts of compensation which the appropriators of natural resources, or 
their contemporary descendants, should give to the others. The assumption is not totally 
wrong. Locke was writing at a time when the frontier line in America was starting to 
move westwards to places very sparsely settled. Now the opportunities to appropriate 
resources, while leaving “as much and as good” for everybody else - 9 billion by 2050 
according to the UN estimates (UN DESA, 2015) - seem scant at best, if not outright 
impossible. However, the Marxian theory of capital accumulation makes eco-socialists 
better  placed  to  understand  appropriation  not  only  as  a  geographical  endeavor  - 
although  appropriation  had  never  only  been  a  geographical  endeavor  -,  but  also  a 
conceptual one. In other words, the Marxian theory is more attuned to understanding 
appropriation not only as discovering new physical places, but also conceptual ones.
According  to  David  Harvey,  capital  always  looks  for  new  “commodication 
frontiers” to keep accumulating: even if one day all the oil deposits have been found, 
and  all  mines  discovered,  the  commodity  frontier  will  have  already  moved  to 
bioprospecting  or  ecotourism,  and  to  other  yet  undiscovered  opportunities  for 
commodication. In other words, eco-socialists better understand that there are plenty 
of natural resources that, while sitting on already appropriated land from a geographical 
point of view, are not yet conceptually appropriated, i.e. they are still enjoyed as public 
wealth and they are not yet scarce. Using the vocabulary of economics, one could say 
that  appropriated resources sometimes provide positive externalities  that  are  not  yet 
accounted for,  as  in  the  case  of  many ecosystem services.  But  they soon might  be 
accounted for, and appropriated. Talking of appropriation in geographical terms only 
and,  as  a  consequence,  assuming  that  everything  is  already  appropriated,  leads  the 
various interpreters of the Lockean proviso to frame the issue of acquisition only as a 
matter  of  compensation.  Yet  requiring  compensation  from  a  not  yet  conceptually 
appropriated resources both legitimizes and incentivizes the exploitation of the resource 
and hides the fact that in certain cases it could still be possible to commonly enjoy the 
resource qua public wealth, i.e. in the form in which it is found in nature.
Nature as an end-in-itself
Eco-socialist critiques are not the only positions which radical environmentalists can 
resort to when replying negatively to the Should question.  Radical environmentalists 
argue that nature should not be commodied because, independently of whether it could 
be technically feasible to do such a thing, there is intrinsic value in natural resources 
and processes. Intrinsic value per se is too vague a concept to have the thrust to stop 
processes of commodication. In the literature, four different understandings of it are 
usually distinguished (Woods, 2011: 249): rst, intrinsic value means non-instrumental 
value; second, it could mean that the bearer of intrinsic value is an end-in-itself and as 
such admitted to the moral community; third, it could mean that there is a value that 
inheres in the thing itself, i.e. a non-relational property whose value does not depend on 
the existence of something else; fourth, it could mean that there is value that is mind-
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independent, something that exists independent of whether humans perceive it or not; 
John  Searle  would  call  it  a  “brute  fact”  (Searle,  1995).  The  rst  and  second 
understandings of intrinsic value seem to be the best to support the radical arguments 
against commodication, i.e. something that has intrinsic value is an end-in-itself which 
has  moral  standing  and  which  has  non-instrumental  value.  The  third  and  fourth 
understandings seem to push for a realistic account of intrinsic value which is, however, 
not needed to ground meta-ethically a non-anthropocentric ethic, as something can have 
intrinsic value, and yet this can only be recognized by the value-recognizing activity of 
the human mind.
Something that has intrinsic value generates a prima facie moral duty on the parts 
of human beings to safeguard it and refrain from damaging it. The argument here is 
modeled after the Kantian categorical imperative: the idea that the recognition of an 
end-in-itself calls for a very special and different treatment of the holder of the end-in-
itself, usually persons or in the case of environmental ethics, also animals and natural 
resources; in other words, an end-in-itself cannot be simply used as a means to further 
our own ends. Kant himself never extended the categorical imperative to nature and 
animals because they are not in his view rational beings. He claims for example that 
cruelty towards animals is only bad because it makes humans accustomed to cruelty 
towards other beings, and ultimately to other humans. In doing so, he was reecting 
both the state of the research on animal cognition at the time - animals were mostly 
conceived  as  responding  to  instincts  over  which  they  have  no  control  -  and  the 
quintessentially  anthropocentric  tradition  of  both  Western  philosophy  and  Judeo-
Christian thought. According to the latter, the Bible in the Genesis book makes clear 
that God created the earth so that humans could have dominion over it to satisfy their 
desires;  similarly,  Aquinas  claimed  that  non-human  animals  are  “ordered  to  man’s 
use” (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, ch. 112, paragraph 12). It is not 
until the ideas of St. Francis have received scholarly attention that the traditional view 
of  domination  of  man  over  nature  has  come  to  be  openly  questioned  within  the 
Christian scholarship (White Jr., 1967). Similarly the Western philosophical tradition: 
before the Copernican revolution, it put human beings at the center of its moral edice 
because of their God-given superior importance. And after the revolution, it still put 
human beings at the center in light of their capacity to elevate themselves above the 
natural world through the sole use of their rationality.
While Kantian ethics might give a good indication of what it means to be an end-
in-itself and what kind a response an end-in-itself elicits from human beings, it is not 
helpful in actually locating ends-in-themselves in anything other than human beings. 
There are three possible strategies to argue against the idea that only human beings are 
end-in-themselves:  the  rst  is  a  negative  one  and  by  way  of  an  analogy  with  the 
progress of morality (Goodin, 1996). As moral progress throughout history has almost 
always taken the shape of an enlargement of moral consideration to an ever greater class 
of beneciaries - based on gender, color, location, ability, etc. -, then surely we must be 
doing  something  similar  when  drawing  a  boundary  around  the  human  species  and 
considering  human  beings  as  the  only  beings  worthy  of  moral  consideration.  The 
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argument  is  largely  inductive:  given our  bad record of  putting boundaries  and then 
surpassing  them,  limiting  moral  considerations  to  humans  seems  the  umpteenth 
prejudice which sooner or later philosophers will have to come to recognize as such and 
ultimately  overcome  (Singer,  1975).  After  all,  would  not  elephants  restrict  moral 
standing on the grounds of weight, or cheetahs on speed, if they could? That human 
beings give prominence to rationality, i.e. what they are best at, seems no different, and, 
to many non-anthropocentric scholars, equally ridiculous.
While rationality might seem an overly anthropocentric principle to discriminate 
between who has moral standing and who does not, there are other principles - this is 
the second strategy - that seem more inclusive towards a greater group of beings. The 
criterion of the capacity of suffering - made a central feature of morality by Jeremy 
Bentham and revived by Singer  for  the  purpose of  animal  moral  consideration -  is 
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right  and  wrong  in  our  interactions  with  nature.  This  thought  experiment  has  been 
introduced by Richard Routley (1973) and describes the hypothetical situation in which 
just one person - the “last man” - survived a world catastrophe which annihilated all the 
other  human  beings.  Imagine  that  this  last  man  goes  around  the  world  painlessly 
eliminating all the other animals and plants, and every other living thing. Depending on 
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we  genuinely  have  strong  moral  intuition  about  sparing  the  environment  from 
unnecessary destruction while still considering human beings in a position to make use 
of the environment for their non-capricious needs. For this, one would need to allow for 
degrees of intrinsic value, and hence of moral worthiness, and in this layered system 
human beings would still sit on top; and commodication would still be justied if it 
furthers the ends of those sitting on top.
The  development  of  environmental  ethics  towards  not  only  an  ever  greater 
enlargement of the species worthy of moral consideration - from anthropocentrism to 
zoocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism -, but also an ever greater homogenization - 
all the species taken together are important - might be read precisely as a strategy to 
reject the idea of a clearly layered natural world, which facilitates human domination 
over it. Compared to an anthropocentric ethic, the idea of ecosystems being intrinsically 
valuable lends itself less to the exploitation of nature by human beings (even though 
both  anthropocentric  and  non-anthropocentric  ethics  ultimately  seek  to  protect  the 
environment), as it categorically precludes that humans could in principle select which 
natural resources to exploit. From within an understanding of nature as a complex and 
interlinked whole, human beings, by selectively exploiting certain resources, would not 
only damage a specic natural object but also spoil and tamper with a complex balance. 
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Some  of  the  criticisms  to  environmental  economics  from  the  part  of  ecological 
economists  departs  precisely  from  the  assumption  that  there  is  a  complex  balance 
worthy of being protected and which cannot be preserved through the mere substitution 
of similar resources.
Concluding remarks on commodication
It bears mentioning at this point that, as theories of distributive justice implicitly frame 
nature as a commodity to be distributed, both of the normative stances used by radical 
environmentalists  to  argue  against  commodication  on  normative  grounds  -  eco-
socialism and biocentrism/ecocentrism - indeed espouse a different understanding of 
environmental justice, which does not implicitly commodify nature. The eco-socialist 
critique of commodication, which departs from the principle that nature is best enjoyed 
in common and as public wealth - as opposed to private riches -, can be read as an 
instance  of  the  second  sense  of  environmental  justice  (here  I  am  referring  to  the 
taxonomy developed by Jamieson (1994) and surveyed above).  Indeed, the fact that 
there  is  a  proper  modality  to  enjoy  natural  resources  poses  an  additional  limiting 
condition in the way we interact with one another and with nature. Natural resources are 
still out there for us, however we are limited in the way we can use them.
The radical critique of commodication which departs from the recognition that 
there  is  intrinsic  value  in  nature  which  requires  us  to  refrain  from  certain 
environmentally degrading activities can be read as an instance of the rst  sense of 
environmental  justice.  Indeed,  the  recognition  in  another  entity  as  an  end-in-itself 
requires us to extend the circle of the beneciaries of justice to that entity as well.
Going back to the categories of efciency and justice, we have seen that radical 
environmentalist  scholars  reject  efciency  and  social  justice  as  core  values  to  be 
pursued by environmental policy. They do this, rst, by showing, through a battery of 
arguments  -  both  consequentialist  and  deontological,  anthropocentric  and  non-
anthropocentric  -,  that  the  commodication  of  nature  has  a  negative  impact  on 
environmental protection efforts. They do so, secondly, by problematizing the role of 
the  commodication  of  nature  within  economic  theory  and  liberal  theories  of 
distributive justice, arguing that commodication represents a pre-requisite for both. For 
the  former,  commodication  is  a  necessary  condition  to  manage  natural  resources 
efciently; for the latter, it is often a necessary condition to manage them equitably.
GROWTH ASSUMPTIONS IN ECONOMIC THEORY AND IN LIBERAL 
THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
The case  for  economic growth as  a  policy objective  rests  in  a  mixture  of  different 
reasons that cross the different epochs of economic thinking about growth. According to 
Heinz Arndt (1978), who compiled a short history of the idea of economic growth, there 
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are ve main reasons why economic growth is so appealing as a policy objective: it 
provides sustained material progress, it enables policy-makers to decide on competing 
claims for resources with greater ease, it enables them to achieve very low gures of 
unemployment rates, society is generally happier, and it enables governments to keep up 
with the development of other countries. The last reason is clearly a relic of the cold war 
epoch in which rivalry between USA and URSS was also based on the two economies’ 
productive output as a form of mutual muscles exing. Yet, it found nonetheless new 
life  in  the  context  of  Europe’s  current  policy  in  which  the  homogenization  of  the 
development of different European regions is the main aim of the EU cohesion policy.
While the 1960s and 1970s have witnessed a lively academic debate on the merits 
(Beckerman, 1974, 1995) and costs (Galbraith, 1958; Mishan, 1967; Schumacher, 1973) 
of  economic  growth  as  an  overreaching  policy  objective  within  the  discipline  of 
economics, it was not until the famous study Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 1972) 
that the issue of economic growth started to be seriously questioned from a distinctively 
environmental point of view. More specically, computer simulations had been run for a 
series of variables - such as food supply, pollution, natural resources, etc. - and then 
confronted with the carrying capacity of the earth for each of these elements. “Malthus 
with a computer,” this is how Christopher Freeman (1973), an early critic of the report, 
unatteringly  characterized  it.  There  is  some truth  to  it,  though.  Albeit  Thomas  R. 
Malthus (1798) only took the growth of the population as the variable determining the 
collapse  of  the  economy,  the  story  is  the  same  old  one:  growth  cannot  continue 
indenitely in a closed system, such as that of the earth.
The study of the Club of Rome split many opinions, especially because it touches 
a subject, that of economic growth, which in some way has always been in the mind of 
the economists since the very inception of the economic discipline.  The debate that 
ensued in the wake of the Limits to Growth report can be parsed into three different 
questions  and  related  responses:  should  the  economic  discipline  accommodate  the 
requests  of  the  environmentalists  who  demand  that  our  economies  stay  within  the 
ecological limits of the earth? Can the economic discipline accommodate such requests? 
If so, how? I will introduce the radical positions in the debate by reviewing the rst two 
questions.  I  will  not  discuss  the  last  position,  as  radical  scholars  do  not  think  that 
mainstream economic theory could accommodate the requests for an environmentally 
bounded economy.
(i) Should the economic discipline accommodate the requests of the environmentalists 
who demand that our economies stay within the ecological limits of the earth? Many 
of the early critics of the report replied negatively to this question. According to 
them, there is no need to ddle with an already quite sound economic theory, which 
predicts that the economy will adapt on its own to the new shortage situations we 
might encounter in the future. They point out that the computer models of the Club 
of Rome scholars run into limits simply because a price mechanism had not been 
built into the models (Lomborg, 2012). Had they done so, the authors of the Limits to 
Growth study would have found that it is very difcult to reach the limits of a given 
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resource. This is because, once a resource becomes scarce, its price increases up to a 
point at which it is cheaper to adopt a substitute. Those who reply afrmatively to 
this  question,  argue  that  the  price  mechanism  does  not  always  work  well 
(externalities,  monopolies,  ill-dened  property  rights,  etc.),  and  that,  while 
environmental  protection  might  be  attained  without  a  complete  overhaul  of  our 
current economic thinking, the global economy does need a gentle push in the right 
direction, usually through market-based instruments that correct for systematic errors 
in  the  price  mechanism.  These  two  positions  represent  two  different  strands  of 
market  environmentalism: one more radical,  the other  more moderate (associated 
with  the  narrative  of  ecological  modernization).  Similarly  to  radical  market 
environmentalists,  radical  environmentalists  think  that  we  should  not  bother 
tinkering with our current economic theories. But for a different reason: not that our 
economic theory is so solid that it will adapt on its own to the future challenges, but 
because a solution cannot be found from within the same neoclassical framework.
(ii) Can  the  economic  discipline  accommodate  such  requests?  While  pro-market 
environmental  scholars  argue that  instruments  can be  devised to  make economic 
thinking more in tune with the problem of our time - the above-mentioned gentle 
push - radicals are resolute in thinking that whatever update to our best economic 
theories we might make, it will not cause our global economy to slow down. It is not 
so much about updating current mainstream theories; instead, coming up with a new 
approach  is  what  is  truly  needed.  Economic  growth,  the  main  culprit  for 
environmental  degradation,  is  too  embedded  within  economic  theories  for 
environmental scholars to be able to throw out the bathwater without the baby. In 
other words, it is not possible to continue to use a mainstream economic approach 
built around economic growth - such as market-based instruments to curb climate 
change - while at the same time protecting the environment. The following sections 
review the arguments used by radical scholars to argue in favor of this position.
According  to  radical  market  environmentalists,  we  should  not  adapt  our  economic 
theory because it already works well. According to moderate market environmentalists, 
we  can  adapt  our  economic  theory  and  we  should.  According  to  radical 
environmentalists, our current neoclassical economic theory cannot be adapted to the 
demands for a global economy which stays within the ecological limits of the earth. 
Therefore we should not bother about it and instead focus our attention on completely 
overhauling our approach to environmental protection.
Rening the argument against economic growth
Before  surveying  the  radical  arguments  against  the  possibility  of  using  our  current 
economic framework to reply to the current and future environmental challenges, I need 
to briey go back to one fundamental question that I have left in the background: what 
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is  it  about  economic  growth  that  is  so  harmful  to  the  quality  of  the  environment? 
Malthus and his computer-bearing descendants would have a quick and straightforward 
reply: every economic process originates from input resources that, through energy and 
labor, produces outputs plus waste. If the economy keeps growing, there will be less and 
less input resources and more and more waste to deal with; this harms the environment, 
animals, and us, human animals. Following this logic, then, one should conclude that 
what radicals really are concerned about is that kind of economic growth that greatly 
depletes  input  resources  and  produces  great  amounts  of  waste.  Pro-market 
environmentalists argue that the two things - economic growth and resource depletion - 
do  not  necessarily  go  together;  that  the  price  mechanism  will  decouple  economic 
growth  from resource  depletion  as  soon  as  the  demands  for  economic  growth  and 
environmental  quality  are  both  high  on  the  priority  list  of  people.  The  hypothesis 
contained in the environmental Kuznets curve is precisely that, after a certain point, 
economic  growth  seems  to  decouple  from  resource  depletion  and  environmental 
degradation.
Apart from the fact that evidence supporting the EKC hypothesis is scarce at best 
(Stern, 2004), radical scholars also take issue with the very sense in which an economy 
is said to be decoupling. While there is evidence that in developed countries relative 
decoupling is slowly taking place - real GDP grows more than the total GDP demands 
on the environment (in terms of energy, waste, air quality, etc.) -, the evidence which 
aims to prove that decoupling is taking place in absolute terms - real GDP growing 
while the other indicators for environmental degradation fall - is still patchy and non-
conclusive. By comparing GDP and growth of domestic material consumption (DMC) 
data between 1980 and 2008, a Sustainable Europe Research Institute (SERI) Report 
about  green  growth  found  that  only  a  handful  of  developed  countries  (i.e.  big 
economies) achieved absolute decoupling; however there are a number of factors that 
might explain this without committing to the conclusion that green growth is actually 
happening in those economies (Dittrich et al.,  2012).  The study cites low economic 
growth and the pollution heaven hypothesis - i.e. the outsourcing of material-intensive 
production to other parts of the world with lower environmental regulations, which the 
DCM data cannot track - as major factors contributing to absolute decoupling in certain 
developed economies.
While  radical  scholars  might  use  the  fact  that  evidence  proving  absolute 
decoupling is still largely lacking as support for their claim against economic growth, 
what they seem to be putting forward when they oppose economic growth is a stronger 
claim: that the two - economic growth and environmental quality -  are theoretically 
incompatible. This claim needs to be analyzed in detail.
It is fair to assume that radical scholars who take issue with economic growth in 
all  its  form,  are  informed  by  the  work  of  Nicholas  Georgescu-Roegen  on  the 
relationships between entropy and economics. Unfortunately, the name of Georgescu-
Roegen is usually quickly mentioned in relation to a famous quote taken from his main 
work The Entropy Law and the Economic Process (1971), and it reads: “Had economics 
recognized the entropic nature of the economic process, it might have been able to warn 
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its co-workers for the betterment of mankind - the technological sciences - that ‘bigger 
and  better’ washing  machines,  automobiles,  and  superjets  must  lead  to  ‘bigger  and 
better’ pollution” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971: 19). However, few scholars actually took 
the time to analyze his theory in detail. According to Georgescu-Roegen, all economic 
processes of transformation of input resources through energy have to be understood 
ultimately  as  evolutionary  processes.  Neoclassical  economics  is  built  around  a 
Newtonian-mechanical framework: what this means, according to Georgescu-Roegen, 
is  that  economists  consider  economic  processes  as  time  reversible;  like  the  motion 
equations in Newtonian physics describing the orbital motion of a planet. The problem 
with this is that the transformations of materials and energy within a given economy are 
irreversible; in the vocabulary of thermodynamics, the entropy of a system - and the 
global economy is such a system - never decreases, but always increases.
The idea behind the concept of increasing entropy is that, given two bodies with 
different energy, energy will always ow from the body with higher energy to the one 
with lower energy. As a result, energy becomes more distributed in space and in a form 
that is increasingly less usable and less ordered. Life on earth depends on a constant 
supply of low entropy: human beings are a collection of atoms that are highly ordered. 
To stay in such a state they need food, fuel, and, depending on the one’s place and 
culture, many other objects as well. Life on earth, i.e. the struggle of living things to 
constantly keep a state of low entropy, always happens at the expense of a compensating 
increase of entropy in the surroundings. In other words, we use resources and energy to 
perpetuate our species and to shape the world around us such that it is comfortable to us. 
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Figure 4.1 - The graph is taken from the SERI Report Green Economies Around the World? 
(Dittrich et al., 2012).
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However, this inevitably results in an increase of the entropy of the whole earth system: 
energy get dispersed and unusable.
According to Georgescu-Roegen, what economics should ultimately be about is to 
nd ways of procuring low entropy and converting it to high entropy for the enjoyment 
of human life. The Industrial Revolution can be read exactly in these terms: coal is a 
source  of  cheap  energy  that  shaped  the  world  around  us  by  transforming,  through 
industrial processes, low entropy into high entropy. But as the terrestrial stocks of low 
entropy - such as coal, oil, and gas - will one day be exhausted, and provided that new 
substitutes are not easily found each time, humankind will be forced to revert to the 
energy provision of pre-industrial times; only renewable energy will then be available. 
The problem with the supply of low entropy coming from renewable sources is that, 
even though they are innite - at least in the timeframe which concerns humankind - 
they ow at a specic rate. For example, the only solar radiation available is the one 
that can be captured by the land (and what is built on it), and at the rate it arrives. This, 
ultimately,  will  involve  making  trade-offs  between  using  solar  radiation  to  grow 
produce or to produce heat and energy through solar panels. What the radical literature 
does  not  sufciently  emphasize  is  that  Georgescu-Roegen never  explicitly  said  that 
economic growth is necessarily bad for the environment, even though his famous quote 
can  be  made,  with  some  slyness,  to  claim precisely  that.  He  said  something  quite 
different: given the law of entropy increases, we should use the terrestrial stocks of low 
entropy wisely for our benet and those of the future generations, and we should plan 
ahead for when they will be exhausted. This means that while economic growth could 
still be a theoretical possibility, it should stop being the overarching policy objective of 
our global economy. If economic growth is pursued no matter what, instead of being a 
pleasant occasional addendum on our way to more worthy policy goals, then resource 
exhaustion and environmental degradation are likely to follow. This is because we do 
not currently have the technology to keep the current rates of growth while relying on 
renewable sources of low entropy only. To use Peter Victor’s expression, we should start 
“managing without growth” (Victor, 2008), and in a way that is consistent with the rate 
of the renewable supply of low entropy and the capacity of sinks to absorb waste. We 
are doing none of those things.
As  we  have  seen  above,  there  is  room to  attack  economic  growth  solely  on 
environmental grounds: in factual terms, by pointing out that we are still well at some 
distance from generalized absolute decoupling; and in theoretical terms, by pointing out 
that  economic  growth  as  a  policy  objective  is  at  odds  with  making  energy  policy 
choices  consistent  with  the  rate  of  the  renewable  supply  of  low entropy.  However, 
radical  scholars  seldom present  their  positions  solely  in  such  environmental  terms: 
according to them, the xation with economic growth of governments and businesses is 
the root cause of a series of wider and deeper social problems of which environmental 
degradation is only the umpteenth epiphenomenon.
For  example,  Serge  Latouche,  one  of  the  most  vocal  radical  scholars  in  the 
literature against  economic growth,  puts  forwards an anthropological  critique of  the 
pervasiveness in the social  sciences of the homo oeconomicus  model,  the effects  of 
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which go far beyond the environmental domain. Indeed, in his book Farewell to Growth 
(2009),  apart  from  reiterating  -  in  Georgescu-Roegen’s  footsteps  -  that  growth  is 
entropically unsustainable, he also takes issue with the idea of development as growth 
as  such,  which  -  he  argues  -  after  having  corrupted  us,  is  corrupting  non-Western 
cultures. In criticizing the way growth has been pursued in Western societies during the 
post-war  years,  Latouche  points  to  the  effects  of  implementing  economies  of  scale 
which  forced  people  to  move  into  “peripheral”  estates  and  social  housing,  which 
homogenized mass-produced goods, pushing local initiatives out of business, and which 
created the system of marketing and mass-media to continue fueling this “treadmill of 
production and consumption.” Globalization is the same phenomenon all over again, but 
on an even bigger scale as marginal costs in non-developed economies are lower thanks 
to  lower  labor  and  environmental  standards  and  the  availability  of  cheaper  raw 
materials.  Latouche’s broader critique of growth (i.e.  not only the one motivated by 
environmental considerations) and the early radical environmentalism meet here as both 
take cue from the cultural critics of the economic boom of the post-war years: Guy 
Debord (1967),  John Galbraith (1958),  Herbert  Marcuse (1964),  Pier  Paolo Pasolini 
(1961). 
Growth and economics: radical criticisms
Having rened the radical arguments against economic growth, we have seen that there 
are  three  different  reasons  to  criticize  economic  growth  from  a  radical 
environmentalism  standpoint:  (i)  in  the  global  economy,  economic  growth  is  not 
absolutely decoupled; (ii) economic growth cannot be an overarching policy objective, 
given the physical underpinnings of our advanced economies, and (iii) there is also a 
broader consideration to be made against economic growth from the point of view of 
the  cultural  critique  of  the  Western  society  of  the  post-war  years.  Why  -  ask  the 
ecosocialists and radical environmentalists associated with the degrowth movement -, is 
economic growth so central in policy-making?
There are two possible ways to answer this question. First,  one could point to 
competing  accounts  which  frame  economic  growth  as  a  worthwhile  policy  goal: 
following the above-mentioned list compiled by Arndt (1978), there are ve sensible 
reasons which explain the success of economic growth as an enduring and overarching 
policy objective. Furthermore, the normative presuppositions informing the narrative of 
ecological modernization can explain how economic growth might have positive effects 
on the quality of the environment. In other words, economic growth remains central in 
policy making because the link between economic growth and environmental problems 
made  by  the  radical  scholars  is  not  uncontroversial,  i.e.  it  is  not  the  only  possible 
account of the environmental effects of economic growth.
There is, however, another way to answer this question: what makes economic 
growth a necessary pursuit of politics? Or, put in another way, what impedes policy-
makers from doing away with economic growth as an overarching policy objective, 
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even if  they were reasonably convinced of  its  negative effects  on the environment? 
Radical scholars reply to this question by criticizing some of the theoretical assumptions 
governing  economic  theory  (in  this  section)  and  governing  liberal  theories  of 
distributive justice (explored in next section). In so doing, these criticisms can be read 
as targeting the main elements of the competing narratives of ecological modernization 
and civic environmentalism, and the core values of efciency and social justice that 
subtend them.
In particular, concerning economic theory, they argue that the fact that consumer 
preferences  cannot  be  externally  judged  locks  economic  theory  into  the  pursuit  of 
economic  growth,  and  this,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  previous  section,  hurts  the 
environment. Departing from the principle that the preferences of the consumer cannot 
be questioned, one arrives at the conclusion that the pursuit of economic growth is built 
into economic theory through two different  routes.  According to the rst,  economic 
growth is an insurance against the possibility that the preferences of future people might 
be radically different from ours, and from those we thought future generations would 
hold. In other words, if we now spoil the environment in order to satisfy other more 
pressing and important preferences compared to the preference for a clean environment, 
this is likely to produce two possible outcomes for people in the future: either (i) future 
people will be disappointed by our choices to spoil the environment, or (ii) they will 
feel no loss as they will not be particularly interested in a clean environment. In the rst 
case, they will be disappointed, but it is not our fault, as we had no way of knowing 
their preferences towards environmental quality, and we cannot be expected to act upon 
knowledge that is inaccessible to us. In the second case, we cannot be blamed as no loss 
is involved. In the rst case, the present generation is not responsible, in the second, it 
did  nothing  wrong.  However,  in  case  future  generations  might  fall  within  the  rst 
scenario, what we could do now is to guarantee them the same level of well-being as 
ours, and to do this we should invest in economic growth. As noted by Bryan G. Norton 
(1994), the argument seems self-serving as it furthers the cause of economic growth 
while justifying the degradation of the environment. But closer consideration suggests 
that  such  is  not  necessarily  the  case.  Given  each  generation’s  inaccessibility  to  the 
future generations’ preferences,  economic growth is  the best  way to maximize total 
welfare across time. This argument assumes that the strong sustainability thesis is false, 
and conversely assumes that natural capital can be substituted by manufactured capital, 
i.e. that there is an amount of money, for example, that could substitute for an aesthetic 
view or a wilderness experience. Radical environmentalists would argue against such 
approach on the basis of the intrinsic value of nature and its intrinsic unsubstitutability.
Furthermore, Mark Sagoff (2008) would argue that the premise of the argument 
upon which the necessity to pursuit economic growth is built is also wrong: assuming 
that  environmental  degradation  will  be  pervasive  to  the  point  of  making  the 
environment  very  different  from  ours,  future  people  cannot  have  a  preference  for 
something which they do not know or have not experienced before, such as a nice and 
clean environment. This point is ably explored by Martha Nussbaum (2001a) in relation 
to women empowerment in women-oppressive societies; she argues that preferences are 
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adaptive; the preferences of a person are formed in response to the specic environment 
in which that person is situated. For this reason - continues Nussbaum -, the theory 
which prescribes that  a person’s welfare consists  of having her preferences satised 
should not be employed as the basis to organize the distribution of goods in a society.
The second route to appreciate how economic growth is built into our economic 
theory again departs from the impossibility of making value judgments concerning other 
people’s preferences. In particular, given the well-established and well-studied fact of 
human  competition  with  peers  and  given  the  impossibility  of  judging  certain 
preferences as not really conducive to well-being from some vantage point, the result is 
an economic system that incites growth as a possible escape from the possibility of 
being left behind. Fervent critics of this system call it the “rat race” (Foster Wallace, 
2009); others prefer the more neutral expression “keeping up with the Joneses” (Mason, 
2000).  Radical  environmentalists  note  the  obvious  pointlessness  of  this  dynamic:  if 
everyone is better off in absolute terms, no one is better off in relative terms, which, 
according to the research, is what truly matters.  Indeed, the satirist  Henry Mencken 
dened wealth as “any income that is at least $100 more a year than the income of one’s 
wife’s sister’s husband” (quoted in Perelman, 2011: 219) - his adult life coincided with 
the rst  half  of  the twentieth century,  which explains both the low monetary gure 
(which,  in  today’s  terms,  would  be  around $2000)  and  a  certain  taste  for  outdated 
gender roles. Popular culture is not the only source for these ndings: in a survey made 
among students and academics at the Harvard School of Public Health, almost half of 
the respondents claimed that they rather live in a world where the average income is 
25,000 and they earned 50000, than one where they earned 100,000 but the average was 
200,000 (Solnick and Hemenway, 1998). These ndings are also consistent with the 
famous work on happiness economics conducted by Richard Easterlin who discovered 
that increased incomes do correlate with increased happiness, but only up to a certain 
point (Easterlin, 1974). Once that point is reached - a recent study placed this point at $ 
35,000 (Proto and Rustichini, 2014) - the correlation either stops and becomes negative 
or the curve attens out. Indeed, both studies shed light on the fact that well-being is 
relational: in case of the Easterlin paradox, the curve attens or turns negative because 
after immediate needs are met, a person tends to look for positional goods in order to 
satisfy preferences, i.e. goods that signal our position compared to our peers, friends or 
compatriots  and  whose  desire  for  possession  depends  on  other  people’s  desire  for 
possession (Hirsh, 1976). Easterlin’s studies came under considerable attack since they 
rst appeared in the 1970s: depending on how one treats the data, and the very choice of 
data, one can nd results more or less in line with the Easterlin paradox. For example, a 
recent  study  concluded  that  there  is  no  point  at  which  the  curve  attens  or  turns 
negative;  instead,  there  is  a  point  at  which  happiness  increases  at  a  slower  rate 
compared to increases in income (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008).
Radical environmentalists are used to attacking these arguments on three different 
grounds. (i) Top-down starting from the Easterlin paradox: if economic growth, having 
passed a certain point of income, does not make us happier, or substantially happier, 
what is the point of relentlessly pursuing it nonetheless? (ii) From the middle: if our 
132
THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL NARRATIVES
adaptive; the preferences of a person are formed in response to the specic environment 
in which that person is situated. For this reason - continues Nussbaum -, the theory 
which prescribes that  a person’s welfare consists  of having her preferences satised 
should not be employed as the basis to organize the distribution of goods in a society.
The second route to appreciate how economic growth is built into our economic 
theory again departs from the impossibility of making value judgments concerning other 
people’s preferences. In particular, given the well-established and well-studied fact of 
human  competition  with  peers  and  given  the  impossibility  of  judging  certain 
preferences as not really conducive to well-being from some vantage point, the result is 
an economic system that incites growth as a possible escape from the possibility of 
being left behind. Fervent critics of this system call it the “rat race” (Foster Wallace, 
2009); others prefer the more neutral expression “keeping up with the Joneses” (Mason, 
2000).  Radical  environmentalists  note  the  obvious  pointlessness  of  this  dynamic:  if 
everyone is better off in absolute terms, no one is better off in relative terms, which, 
according to the research, is what truly matters.  Indeed, the satirist  Henry Mencken 
dened wealth as “any income that is at least $100 more a year than the income of one’s 
wife’s sister’s husband” (quoted in Perelman, 2011: 219) - his adult life coincided with 
the rst  half  of  the twentieth century,  which explains both the low monetary gure 
(which,  in  today’s  terms,  would  be  around $2000)  and  a  certain  taste  for  outdated 
gender roles. Popular culture is not the only source for these ndings: in a survey made 
among students and academics at the Harvard School of Public Health, almost half of 
the respondents claimed that they rather live in a world where the average income is 
25,000 and they earned 50000, than one where they earned 100,000 but the average was 
200,000 (Solnick and Hemenway, 1998). These ndings are also consistent with the 
famous work on happiness economics conducted by Richard Easterlin who discovered 
that increased incomes do correlate with increased happiness, but only up to a certain 
point (Easterlin, 1974). Once that point is reached - a recent study placed this point at $ 
35,000 (Proto and Rustichini, 2014) - the correlation either stops and becomes negative 
or the curve attens out. Indeed, both studies shed light on the fact that well-being is 
relational: in case of the Easterlin paradox, the curve attens or turns negative because 
after immediate needs are met, a person tends to look for positional goods in order to 
satisfy preferences, i.e. goods that signal our position compared to our peers, friends or 
compatriots  and  whose  desire  for  possession  depends  on  other  people’s  desire  for 
possession (Hirsh, 1976). Easterlin’s studies came under considerable attack since they 
rst appeared in the 1970s: depending on how one treats the data, and the very choice of 
data, one can nd results more or less in line with the Easterlin paradox. For example, a 
recent  study  concluded  that  there  is  no  point  at  which  the  curve  attens  or  turns 
negative;  instead,  there  is  a  point  at  which  happiness  increases  at  a  slower  rate 
compared to increases in income (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008).
Radical environmentalists are used to attacking these arguments on three different 
grounds. (i) Top-down starting from the Easterlin paradox: if economic growth, having 
passed a certain point of income, does not make us happier, or substantially happier, 
what is the point of relentlessly pursuing it nonetheless? (ii) From the middle: if our 
132
preferences for positional goods do not make us happier, and if pursuing them might 
even  endanger  our  planet,  we  should  educate  our  preferences  so  that  we  can  nd 
pleasure in simpler things, sharing experiences, being part of a community and helping 
others, etc. (iii) Bottom-up, starting from questioning what truly makes us competitive, 
if anything at all: radical environmentalists argue that competition among ourselves is 
less of a biological fact than a cultural one. It is an often-repeated anecdote: economics 
students  are  much  more  likely  to  play  defect  in  prisoner’s  dilemma  interactions 
compared to non-economics majors. It is actually a famous experiment: non-economics 
students  tend  to  be  more  naturally  cooperative,  and  then  some  of  them  educate 
themselves out of cooperativeness once they have assimilated the nuts and bolts of the 
utilitarian underpinnings of economic theory (Frank et al., 1993; see also Kirchgassner, 
2005  for  a  review  of  the  existing  literature  on  similar  experiments  and  whether 
economics “corrupts” people).
It  is  the  pervasiveness  of  the  homo  oeconomicus  model  which  elevates 
competition to a social trait worth preserving: as human beings ultimately chase self-
interest  and  the  satisfaction  of  their  preferences  -  even  altruism  gets  redened  as 
something that makes the giving actor happier -, competition becomes viewed both as a 
natural consequence given self-interest and scarce resources and, when embedded in a 
market mechanism, can be even made to work towards the greater good: more efcient 
production,  cheaper  prices,  better  customer  service,  etc.  The  utilitarian  assumptions 
underpinning  competition  are  openly  questioned  by  the  radical  environmentalists 
associated with the degrowth movements by resorting to the literature developed by the 
MAUSS-group (an acronym which stands for Antiutilitarian Movement in the Social 
Sciences).  In  particular  the  work  of  Caillé  (2000,  2004),  who  takes  his  cue  from 
Mauss’s triadic structure of the gift (giving, receiving, reciprocation). He argues that the 
utilitarian paradigm which colonized the social sciences cannot really explain one of the 
most fundamental traits of human sociality: that of reciprocity. Reciprocity, as displayed 
in  gift  exchanges,  is  both  selsh  and  unselsh,  and  geared  towards  strengthening 
relational bonds instead of dispersing them into increasingly atomized societies (Caillé, 
2004; Muraca, 2013: 157).
Growth and distributive justice: radical criticisms
The aim of this section is not to nd out what growth can do for justice, but the other 
way  around,  what  justice  -  or  better:  theories  of  justice  -,  can  do  for  growth.  Put 
differently,  the aim of the section is to look at ways in which liberal approaches to 
distributive justice strengthen the pursuit of economic growth as an overarching policy 
objective. It is in this sense then that it is possible to speak about theories of justice as 
contributing to the necessity of  economic growth when it  comes to putting forward 
different overarching policy objectives than, and alternative to, economic growth.
It  is  important  to note that  the radical  environmentalists  who work on growth 
issues have been interested, for the most part,  in discovering when, and under what 
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conditions, a distribution of resources is sufcient. In other words, they are interested in 
providing a critique of several distributive schemes in order to prevent our societies 
from exceeding scientically proven planetary boundaries. Until quite recently, research 
in political philosophy did not offer much room to tackle these issues. Some political 
philosophers  -  most  notably,  Harry  Frankfurt  (1987)  -,  argue  that  a  distribution  of 
resources  is  just  when everyone  has  sufcient  resources  to  get  by,  and  he  remains 
largely  uninterested  in  other  distributive  criteria.  Clearly,  these  are  two  different 
meanings of “sufciency” (Kanschik, 2016; Spengler, 2016). In one case “sufciency” 
refers to upper limits to distribution which should not be surpassed, in the other,  to 
lower limits under which people should not fall. In conjunction with the awakening of 
the  environmental  conscience  in  the  ‘70s,  however,  some  environmentally-minded 
philosophers have tried to understand whether a case can be made in favor of placing 
upper limits upon the distribution of resources within liberal  theories of distributive 
justice, and whether or not there is a constitutive connection between liberalism and 
economic growth. Here I offer a reconstruction of some of the positions by departing 
from Rawls’ theory of justice. At the end of this section I also explain why, according to 
radical environmentalists, the pursuit of economic growth is premised on a reductive 
idea of justice as social justice. I will hint, at this point, at arguments that are further 
developed in the next chapter.
There are several reasons why my treatment mainly concerns Rawls’ theory: (i) it 
is immensely inuential in political philosophy (Nussbaum, 2001b); additionally, most 
of the early work on the connection between economic growth and liberalism departs 
from Rawls‘ theory (Grey, 1973; Hubbard, 1978; Narveson, 1976; 1978); (ii) it enables 
me to establish a connection with, and a criticism of, some of the positions explored in 
the previous chapter, where Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness is seen as informing 
some  of  the  normative  presuppositions  of  the  narrative  of  civic  environmentalism. 
Following this motivation, and for the sake of completeness, I will also briey survey 
whether and how economic growth is embedded in liberal theories which presuppose an 
aggregative model of democracy.  Finally, (iii) Rawls’ theory is taken into consideration 
during  the  negotiations  of  various  environmental  regimes.  On  this  last  point,  in 
particular, Okereke (2008) argues that while neoliberal ideas have successfully co-opted 
the sustainable development  discourse,  the ideas of  liberal  egalitarianism have been 
perceived as the only alternative whereby developing countries can make a dent in the 
dominant pro-market narrative. A sort of difference principle is implied, for example, in 
what has come to be known as the Common But Differentiated Responsibility principle 
(CBDR, Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration), especially when understood according to a 
“Northern  interpretation”  of  it.  In  other  words,  to  avoid  admitting  wrongdoing  for 
emitting greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere during the period of strong economic 
development, developed states have always pushed for an understanding of CBDR as a 
principle of distributive rather than restitutive justice. The “responsibility,” and with it 
the obligation to clean up the environment, in the wording of the principle, comes from 
the superior economic ability to tackle climate change challenges, and not from their 
past mistakes.
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To appreciate in what way economic growth is a built-in presupposition within 
Rawls’ theory, we need to take a look at the difference principle. As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, according to Rawls, departing from an equal distribution, it is possible 
to further push the Pareto frontier, i.e. to have gains without someone being made worse 
off.  The  difference  principle  is  helpful  in  choosing  a  specic  point  on  this  Pareto 
frontier. But then why does Rawls allow for the possibility of Pareto improvements? 
And what does it involve?
Rawls subscribes to Hume’s circumstances of justice, which are “conditions under 
which  human  cooperation  is  both  possible  and  necessary.”  Moderate  scarcity  also 
features among these conditions. Indeed, under conditions of abundance, distributive 
justice  would not  be  needed as  everyone can obtain  as  many goods as  they please 
without affecting the others. Under conditions of extreme scarcity, such as famines, on 
the other hand, people would live in a constant zero-sum game in which resources are 
immediately put to use to satisfy immediate needs instead of cooperatively worked on to 
obtain a bigger share in the future. With moderate scarcity, instead, it seems sensible to 
devise a system of cooperation so that everyone can get a decent share of the goods and 
even try to improve one’s share. Given the assumption of moderate scarcity, it follows 
that everyone has a claim to as much as possible. In this situation, it is rational, for 
Rawls, that people are maximizers, because only in this way can they try to fulll all 
their legitimate claims (Schramme, 2006).
Rawls takes the circumstance of justice of moderate scarcity at face value, as his 
theoretical building does not allow him to question to which extent the resources to be 
distributed are truly scarce. In other words, for Rawls, all  aspirations for a share of 
primary goods are legitimate aspirations and,  as  not  all  aspirations can be satised, 
goods are scarce by denition.  If  it  were possible to distinguish between legitimate 
aspirations and illegitimate ones, then also scarcity,  instead of being assumed at the 
beginning and taken at face value, would be a real condition some of the time, and an 
unreal one at other times, when certain goods are available for all legitimate demands. 
However, to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate aspirations, Rawls would 
need to  venture  into  treacherous  terrain.  To question  the  legitimacy of  demands  he 
would need a substantive theory of the good. This, however, would take him to espouse 
a perfectionist theory of justice. Rawls’ idea of the good for people focuses on the idea 
that one should pursue a rational life-plan, yet this is a very thin, supposedly formal, 
denition of the good.
From these two features of Rawls’ theory - moderate scarcity and the avoidance of 
a substantive theory of the good - the justication of a system of distributive justice 
follows which allows Pareto improvement as a way to satisfy the greatest amount of 
demands  without  having  to  question  their  legitimacy.  Rawls’ difference  principle  is 
largely instrumental  to this aim. It  had been already noted in the rst  reviews of A 
Theory of Justice that in Rawls’ ideal society citizens would act selshly in the market 
and would vote altruistically at the ballot box by supporting a government which wishes 
to implement the difference principle (Grey, 1973). This is because there are in Rawls’ 
theory two opposite tendencies, one towards equality, the other towards entitlements. 
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According to Grey, Rawls’ difference principle is a clumsy attempt to reconcile these 
two souls of Rawls’ theory, which are fundamentally conicting. According to the rst, 
which is closer to socialist systems of production, it should not be possible to bargain 
for more than an equal share by threatening to withdraw one’s talents, because those 
talents are morally arbitrary according to Rawls’ theory, and so doing would be viewed 
as a sort of extortion. According to the second, which is closer to capitalist systems of 
production, if those talents truly belong to the people and are not a social asset, then no 
coercion can be justied which imposes redistributing the fruits of a person’s talents. 
However, if it is accepted that everything that contributes to different nal outcomes in 
society is arbitrary, should not a just society produce the maximum possible output and 
redistribute it equally, without the need to introduce an economic reward for the people 
of superior productive capacity? By saying that people are entitled to a bigger share of 
resources compared to an equal distribution, as long as there is a Pareto improvement, 
Rawls introduces a system of economic motivation within his theory, and thus admits 
that people will be moved not by justice, but greed. 
Narveson  (1976,  1978),  while  agreeing  with  Grey  on  the  impossibility  of 
theoretically reconciling the two different souls in Rawls’ theory, acknowledges that the 
difference principle is useful in motivating people to produce more; in an ideal society 
we  would  not  need  the  difference  principle  as  everyone  would  be  moved  to  share 
equally and everything would be redistributed equally. The inequalities allowed under 
the difference principle are not strictly speaking just, but ultimately defensible: a sort of 
second-best  principle  which  takes  into  account  real  people’s  social  behaviors  and 
attitudes.
In conclusion, once Rawls assumes moderate scarcity, he needs to make space for 
Pareto  improvements  upon  the  equal  distribution  of  primary  goods  -  which  is  the 
quintessentially just distribution following his idea that everything that makes a person 
more productive is morally arbitrary - to avoid turning his theory into a perfectionist 
theory of justice. The difference principle is instrumental to this system as something 
useful to pick the most egalitarian distribution on the Pareto frontier while at the same 
time not stiing the desire of people to get a bigger share of the goods. The introduction 
of such economic motivation through the difference principle follows from the need to 
overcome  moderate  scarcity,  and  ultimately,  it  is  the  priority  of  the  right  over  the 
(substantive) good within the Rawlsian theory of justice which justies a system in 
which economic growth becomes the price to pay if one wants to keep avoiding having 
to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate claims to appropriate primary goods.
Liberal theories of justice which decide distributive issues by aggregating political 
preferences, instead of subjecting them to political deliberation like Rawls’, seem even 
more ill-suited to prevent that economic growth be chosen, implicitly or explicitly, as an 
overarching policy objective. One of the few liberal aggregative theories which openly 
recognizes  the  environmental  risk  of  pursuing  growth  is  provided  by  Marcel 
Wissenburg  (1998).  According  to  him,  liberal  institutions  are  predicated  on  the 
possibility of reconciling antithetical preferences, and economic growth need not be the 
only way to reconcile these preferences, even though it almost always is the case. He is 
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which economic growth becomes the price to pay if one wants to keep avoiding having 
to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate claims to appropriate primary goods.
Liberal theories of justice which decide distributive issues by aggregating political 
preferences, instead of subjecting them to political deliberation like Rawls’, seem even 
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willing to claim that political preferences are not always equally legitimate, and resorts 
to  a  so-called  restraint  principle  to  decide  which  preferences  are  worthy  of  being 
satised rst, and which are not. He claims that conditional rights, which are wants for 
frivolous possessions such as red sport-cars, should be distributed in a way that does not 
reduce the scope for realizing unconditional rights, which are basic needs such as food 
and shelter. He also claims that, if possible, conditional rights should remain available 
for redistribution. This reasoning applies to the members of one generation only, but it 
can be extended to future people by noting that successive generations overlap for a 
certain lapse of time. In other words, the pursuit of economic growth could be limited if 
it impedes that future contiguous generations could realize their unconditional rights. 
The  problem  with  Wissenburg’s  proposal  is  that,  while  in  theory  the  pursuit  of 
illegitimate preferences could be curtailed, he still retain the idea that the state should 
remain neutral among competing doctrines of the good, and this,  according to Piers 
Stephens  (2001),  restricts  the  capacity  of  his  theory  to  “green”  liberal  democracy. 
Furthermore, by treating social preferences as given, Wissenburg is not willing to argue 
in favor of a state which assumes the role of preference-shaper; and by leaving under-
theorized  the  account  of  how people  come  to  form green  preferences,  Wissenburg 
simply points to a desirable form of liberalism without telling us how to get there.
There is a broader claim to be made about economic growth in the context of 
liberal theories of distributive justice. We have seen that economic growth is premised 
on making certain types of inequality justiable - a point, this one, also developed by 
Ted Trainer (2012). The view upheld by Rawls is that citizens would not be prone to 
supporting egalitarian justice if they did not see that their efforts, talents, and merits are 
somehow rewarded compared to those who lack those qualities. By incorporating this 
view into his theory, Rawls’ distributive justice is premised on a very anthropocentric 
concern and, within this anthropocentric framework, on an egoistic concern. From the 
point of view of radical environmentalist scholars, liberal distributive justice leads to a 
reductive understanding of justice - narrowly focused on social, political, and economic 
relations - because it departs from distinctively human motivations and intuitions which 
are premised on a human ontology.
Naess proposed instead to promote an environmental ontology as superior to an 
environmental ethics grounded on a human ontology because, according to him, what 
determines  our  relationship  with  the  natural  world  are  our  consciousness  and 
experiences. In other words, if we manage to recognize the natural world as part of us - 
Naess talks about “identication” - there would be no need for moral exhortation to do 
the supposedly right thing, nor would a person feel pressured to do it (Naess, 2005). 
This sort of argument seems to be implicitly accepted by Rawls, who recognizes that his 
theory of justice as fairness excludes non-human animals, plants, and nature in general 
on the basis that they cannot participate as moral parties to an agreement and uphold 
principles of justice. They could, however, be part of a more environmentally inclusive 
distributive justice, provided that a different “theory of the natural order and our place 




I started this chapter by introducing radical environmentalism in terms of a negative 
narrative which claims not  only that  markets  and economic growth are  bad for  the 
quality  of  the  environment,  but  which  also  refutes  the  more  recent  environmental 
narratives (ecological modernization and civic environmentalism) which try to portray 
economic growth and environmental quality as mutually achievable. I then specied in 
which  ways  these  two claims  could  be  analyzed  through  the  lenses  of  two  central 
notions within radical environmentalism circles: the perils of the commodication of 
nature and of economic growth for the quality of the environment.  Commodication 
and  economic  growth  are  the  two  issues  around  which  disparate  positions  in 
environmental thought coalesce in order to criticize the socio-economic arrangements 
premised on the normative presuppositions undergirding the competing narratives of 
ecological  modernization  and  civic  environmentalism.  On  the  one  hand, 
commodication is a prerequisite of efcient allocations and just distributions; on the 
other  hand,  economic  growth  is  the  consequence  of  such  efcient  allocations  of 
resources and of distributive schemes which remain neutral among substantive doctrines 
of the good.
More specically, the rst part of the chapter - on commodication - is partly 
historical  and  covers  the  history  of  the  idea  of  ‘commodication’  in  radical 
environmentalism literature. To identify the normative assumptions informing radical 
environmentalism,  I  rst  systematized the commodication debate  by distinguishing 
questions about whether nature can be commodied from questions about whether it 
should.  Technical  “can”  questions  aim  to  uncover  the  normative  presuppositions 
governing  consequentialist  arguments  against  commodication.  Normative  “should” 
questions  aim  to  uncover  the  normative  presuppositions  underpinning  mostly 
deontological arguments and a few consequentialist ones. In this part of the chapter, I 
presented  the  debate  on  commodication  as  hinging  on  normative  presuppositions 
linked either  (i)  to  anthropocentric  stances  which,  however,  depart  from a  different 
conception  of  nature  than  that  usually  conveyed  by  economic  theories  and  liberal 
theories of distributive justice. Nature is portrayed by radical scholars as poised in a 
delicate  balance;  its  functions  and  inner  workings  are,  for  the  most  part,  still 
inaccessible to us, the human beings. Or (ii) the debate is linked to eco-socialism, which 
departs  from a  principle  of  justice  according  to  which  natural  resources  should  be 
enjoyed  collectively  as  public  wealth.  Or  (iii),  nally  the  debate  turns  on  non-
anthropocentric stances which stress the intrinsic value of natural processes, functions, 
and resources.
The  second  part  of  the  chapter  -  on  economic  growth  -  sought  to  better 
characterize which aspects, specically, radical scholars are concerned about when they 
talk  about  economic  growth.  They  are  mostly  concerned  about  (i)  the  fact  that, 
notwithstanding  the  pomp  and  circumstance  of  the  supporters  of  the  narrative  of 
ecological  modernization  about  decoupling  growth  from  resource  depletion,  such 
decoupling  has  yet  to  be  achieved  on  the  large  scale  of  the  global  economy;  (ii) 
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The  second  part  of  the  chapter  -  on  economic  growth  -  sought  to  better 
characterize which aspects, specically, radical scholars are concerned about when they 
talk  about  economic  growth.  They  are  mostly  concerned  about  (i)  the  fact  that, 
notwithstanding  the  pomp  and  circumstance  of  the  supporters  of  the  narrative  of 
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economic  growth,  not  per  se,  but  as  an  enduring and overarching policy  objective. 
While,  according to radical  environmentalist  scholars,  the most  sensible response to 
these two concerns would be, on the part of our decision-makers, to start “managing 
without growth,” this does not seem to be happening. The nal part of this chapter asks 
what makes economic growth a necessary pursuit in our socio-economic systems. In 
order to do so, I offered a reconstruction of radical positions as a critical excavation of 
the normative presuppositions - welfare economics and liberal theories of distributive 
justice - which inform ecological modernization and civic environmentalism. In welfare 
economics,  economic  growth  is  (i)  an  insurance  against  the  possibility  that  the 
preferences of future generations will be radically different from ours and (ii) it is the 
“natural” consequence of a social system grounded on competition. In Rawls’ liberal 
theory of justice of Rawls, economic growth is the price to be paid not to have to dirty 
one’s hands with the thorny problem of dening what counts as a substantive good 
while,  at  the  same time,  allowing that  justice  be pursued through the pursuit  of  an 
anthropocentric and egoistic motivation. Both these presuppositions are grounded on an 
understanding  of  human  motivation  premised  on  a  human  anthropology,  which  is 
roundly rejected as  reductive from within certain radical  environmentalism circles  - 





CLASHES, CONTINUITIES, AND BLIND SPOTS:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE THREE ENVIRONMENTAL 
NARRATIVES
It is one of the oldest tricks in the book. The book is called “Ars Oratoria” and everyone 
who has been exposed to a great deal of argumentative reasoning has implicitly read it. 
The trick is called climactic order. It is the idea of arranging arguments in a crescendo 
from  the  weakest  to  the  strongest.  Lawyers  and  politicians  use  it  quite  often:  in 
presenting the various possible scenarios for how a specic event might have unfolded, 
they start from the most implausible ones and they work their way through the more 
convincing ones;  they take their  audience by the hand by carefully crafting a weak 
frame of reference against which they compare their preferred scenario, with the aim of 
steering  the  conversation  or  the  narrative  towards  a  particular  desired  direction. 
Sometimes, however, when it is not clear which of the different positions or arguments 
can be legitimately considered stronger or more plausible, the sheer act of arranging 
them in a specic order might per se steer the discourse in a specic direction. Indeed, 
there is a sort of expectation towards climactic order; readers and listeners often assume 
that what comes later is also better. Authors and speakers can and sometimes do exploit 
this expectation. I might be accused of having done precisely this. 
The  order  in  which  I  decided  to  arrange  the  various  views  in  environmental 
politics - from ecological modernization to radical environmentalism - partially masks 
the fact that none of these views is immune from criticism. This is the fundamental 
insight from which to start the work to be done in this chapter. The ground covered in 
the previous chapters leave us with some indications as to the general argumentative 
lines pursued by each narrative in response to the others. In other words, it suggests how 
each  narrative  can  be  criticized  from  the  external  point  of  view  of  a  competing 
narrative. But it  is now time to zoom in on these various relations and make direct 
comparisons among the different narratives and relative normative presuppositions, in 
order  to  show  how  each  narrative  is  built  by  improving  upon  the  perceived 
shortcomings of other competing narratives (continuities),  where they directly clash, 
and what the normative substratum of each narrative is more attuned to grasp and what 
remains outside its visual cone. In other words, environmental narratives are not born 
and do not develop in a vacuum. Rather, they develop in continuity with each other, 
while also seeking to redress concerns which are considered as unjustiably too central 
in  competing  narratives  (clashes),  perhaps  because  certain  concerns  which  are 
considered central  to a narrative are sidelined in competing narratives (blind spots). 
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CHAPTER V 
CLASHES, CONTINUITIES, AND BLIND SPOTS:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE THREE ENVIRONMENTAL 
NARRATIVES
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this expectation. I might be accused of having done precisely this. 
The  order  in  which  I  decided  to  arrange  the  various  views  in  environmental 
politics - from ecological modernization to radical environmentalism - partially masks 
the fact that none of these views is immune from criticism. This is the fundamental 
insight from which to start the work to be done in this chapter. The ground covered in 
the previous chapters leave us with some indications as to the general argumentative 
lines pursued by each narrative in response to the others. In other words, it suggests how 
each  narrative  can  be  criticized  from  the  external  point  of  view  of  a  competing 
narrative. But it  is now time to zoom in on these various relations and make direct 
comparisons among the different narratives and relative normative presuppositions, in 
order  to  show  how  each  narrative  is  built  by  improving  upon  the  perceived 
shortcomings of other competing narratives (continuities),  where they directly clash, 
and what the normative substratum of each narrative is more attuned to grasp and what 
remains outside its visual cone. In other words, environmental narratives are not born 
and do not develop in a vacuum. Rather, they develop in continuity with each other, 
while also seeking to redress concerns which are considered as unjustiably too central 
in  competing  narratives  (clashes),  perhaps  because  certain  concerns  which  are 
considered central  to a narrative are sidelined in competing narratives (blind spots). 
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Continuities, clashes, and blind spots are the three categories I am going to employ to 
analyze the three narratives -  ecological modernization, civic environmentalism, and 
radical environmentalism - and their respective normative presuppositions.
However, before going forward, it is necessary to pause a little and dedicate a few 
words to some preliminary issues: we need to better delimit the eld in which these 
different narratives are allowed to criticize, clash with, and improve on each other.
HOUSTON, WE ALL HAVE AN ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM
The research endeavor of comparing the three environmental narratives in order to see 
where precisely they differ the most is made possible by the fact that at least on some 
fundamental level it makes sense to compare them to each other, i.e. all the scholars 
working within the different narrative strands agree with each other on something. In 
the terminology employed throughout this book, this fundamental agreement is not so 
much  a  continuity  among  the  different  narratives;  they  are  not  specic  values  or 
normative  presupposition  which  move  across  different  narratives.  Instead,  it  is  a 
common playing eld. This much is certain across the three narratives surveyed in the 
previous chapters: they all agree that business-as-usual is unsustainable in the long-term 
for human life on earth and for other valuable entities (however one might want to 
dene  “valuable”),  i.e.  they  all  agree  that  an  environmental  problem  does  exist. 
Furthermore, they all agree that something should be done about it. This does not seem 
to have limited the eld of inquiry massively, yet it already excludes notable scholarly 
positions which do not agree that an environmental problem exists, while also positing 
claims related to the environment.
This boundary excludes, at the right end of the environmental spectrum, a set of 
positions  which  are  often  mistaken  with  the  narrative  of  ecological  modernization 
because of  some afnity between the two concerning the role of  economics and of 
markets in bringing environmental protection. I briey reviewed these positions in the 
previous  chapter  and  called  them radical  market  environmentalists  -  as  opposed  to 
moderate ones more in line with the narrative of ecological modernization. According to 
these  positions  at  the  right  of  ecological  modernization,  the  market  forces  make  it 
theoretically  impossible for something to be a problem and not at the same time be 
tackled; in other words, an environmental problem - or any problem - exists only when 
a demand for its solution exists. The price mechanism and laissez-faire  sufce for a 
problem to be identied and addressed. This is different from the position taken by 
scholars working within the strand of ecological modernization who do not solely rely 
on  economic  theory  in  order  to  identify  policy  problems  but  instead  work  at  the 
crossroad of different social domains: a problem is identied not only by an economic 
demand for its solution but also by scientic research which might or might not make it 
all the way into the public sphere and thus create a demand for its solution; its solution 
seeks to harness market forces by creating a suitable economic environment for them, 
yet this environment might not necessarily be one in which government intervention is 
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reduced  to  a  minimum.  And  those  who  make  tackling  environmental  degradation 
possible are not only entrepreneurs and consumers but crucially also public ofcials 
who  craft  market-friendly  legislation.  Scholars  working  within  the  ecological 
modernization  strand  do  not  disapprove  of  taxes,  cap-and-trade  or  other  economic 
mechanisms to solve an environmental problem.
Similarly,  this  boundary  line  excludes,  at  the  left  end  of  the  environmental 
spectrum, a set of positions which go beyond the anti-commodication and anti-growth 
message by which I sought to summarize the radical environmentalism narrative and 
put forward an almost religious idea of the earth which in its entirety is the only locus of 
moral concern. Furthermore, these theories, which take their cue from the research done 
on the Gaia hypothesis (Lovelock, 1972), picture planet Earth as an entity which is so 
much bigger and all-encompassing, a self-regulating mechanism always more powerful, 
that any possible human intervention upon it is bound to be negligible in the long run. 
Humans,  with  all  their  plastics,  heavy  industry,  and  unnecessary  waste  of  natural 
resources are but a temporary nuisance in the huge timescale of planet Earth. These 
positions  are  seldom  held  by  people  who  use  them  as  an  actual  justication  for 
business-as-usual, yet these two positions are certainly compatible (Carlin, 1992).
This,  then,  has  to  be  the  starting  point  for  our  analysis:  the  environment  is 
something worth taking care of.  This  common ground does not  have to necessarily 
depend on a shared understanding of the environment: one person might want to take 
care  of  the  environment  for  religious  reasons,  i.e.  the  protection of  a  sacred space, 
whereas another one might have economic reasons.  However,  when it  comes to the 
health of the environment, it is often the case that a shared understanding does exist: 
shermen complain about falling catch rates, Inuit hunters about the thickness of the 
ice, mayors of coastal cities about having to spend more on adaptation measures against 
rising seas and more extreme weather events. There is thus a shared picture of the state 
of the environment and a shared understanding of the environment as something worth 
taking care of, albeit for different reasons. But if this much is agreed, what “taking care 
of the environment” means concretely and how such a goal should be pursued are the 
two issues which inevitably raise deep conicts. 
CLASHES
The preceding three chapters have been built around the different ways in which three 
environmental narratives relate to the two normative concerns of efciency and justice. 
By so doing, I have implicitly explored how the three narratives differ from and clash 
with each other. In this section, by following the normative presuppositions analyzed 
before, I will further explore these clashes and give a ner-grain picture of where rifts 
between narratives are to be located. To make these clashes emerge, I will, in particular, 
take  a  look  at  what  is  believed  to  be,  within  the  different  narratives,  the  type  of 
information which is most relevant to policies of environmental protection (relevant 
information). Furthermore, I will clarify what role the individual people have in order to 
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before, I will further explore these clashes and give a ner-grain picture of where rifts 
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facilitate  environmental  protection  (individual  agency),  and  where  ideally  they  are 
supposed to collectively meet in order to achieve this goal (locus of decision making). 
These  different  arrangements  will  give  rise  to  different  ideas  concerning  the  most 
appropriate  model  of  governance  to  be  employed  in  order  to  make  environmental 
protection possible. 
Ecological modernization
Ecological modernization scholars pursue a political model of environmental protection 
which can be termed technocratic-aggregative. According to ecological modernization 
scholars, as we have now seen in a number of different ways, environmental protection 
can be pursued by harnessing market forces; consequently, the information which is 
most relevant to accomplish this endeavor is the economic preferences of individuals. 
These preferences allegedly contain everything which is important (how this has come 
to  be  the  case,  we  will  see  it  later,  in  the  section  on  blind  spots)  to  make  policy 
decisions:  what  people  want  and  how  badly  (i.e.  the  rankings  of  these  wants). 
Furthermore, these preferences can be aggregated and disaggregated at will according to 
different indicators to yield a ne-grained picture of the well-being of people: spatial 
and temporal distribution of preferences; their distribution according to class divides; 
trends and patterns. It follows that knowledge about economic preferences is incredibly 
powerful  information  in  the  hands  of  those  who  are  in  the  position  to  steer  the 
administrative machine in order to pursue societal goals. This is generally a good thing.
This understanding of what is relevant is built upon a very specic idea of who 
these individual people are and of the type of society they live in. Individual persons 
are, rst and foremost, understood as consumers. They have preferences, desires, tastes 
which are taken by the policy-maker as largely exogenous and treated as normatively 
neutral. Of course, it is not denied that choosing the color of one’s pants is somewhat 
different than choosing between whether or not to build a dam; yet Rational Choice 
Theory has proven to be a method exible enough to be adapted to different situations 
which  involve  choosing  between  options.  One  fundamental  characteristic  of  the 
individual-as-consumer model put forward by this narrative is that individual people 
have  well-structured  preference  rankings  which  are  supposed  to  recompose  all  the 
internal  conicts  a person might have.  Yellow pants or red pants? According to the 
theory  of  rationality,  there  can  be  only  three  possible  choices:  either  one  option  is 
preferred,  or  the  other,  or  the  two  options  are  totally  indifferent.  This  approach  to 
choices  also  remains  valid  when  more  complex  choices  are  at  hand:  as  a  private 
individual, I would like to be able to freely enjoy my polluting vintage car on b-roads as 
well as in city centers; as an individual embedded in a community which values the 
environment, I would like to see steeper taxes and limitations on polluting vehicles. But 
which of the two do I give my preference to? Again, one, the other, or indifference must 
be the answer. This means that both options must be placed on the same ranking: the 
option  which  further  people’s  interests  as  well  as  the  option  which  involves  one’s 
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morality and commitments.  This is possible because allegedly moral choices can be 
converted into the language of well-being if they “make us feel better”; i.e. doing the 
right thing also maximizes our well-being. I will review in the section on blind spots 
below the origin of this idea of economic preferences as an all-encompassing normative 
currency, and its problems.
The model  of  the individual-as-consumer elevates  efciency to a  standard not 
only to be achieved at the end of the process of decision-making but also during this 
process: the work of thinking and balancing and compromising between preferences is 
already being done when the preferences “go public,” revealed in market behavior or as 
responses to surveys. There is, in theory, no need to organize deliberation platforms or 
capacity-building  conferences  and  workshops;  briey,  no  need  to  educate  people. 
Furthermore, the model implies that private and public are one and the same, the public 
is simply the collection of many private concerns, preferences, desires, and wants which 
meet on a common platform to exchange things: the market.
It is easy to get carried away by words. Matthew Arnold called the mentality of 
the commercial and industrial class “philistine” because it was depriving people of the 
pursuit of higher goals in life (Muller, 2007: 212). Before that, consumerism already 
received a bad connotation because of the potentiality of the new powerful bourgeoisie 
to  subvert  the  traditional  aristocratic  social  order  through  material  means  (Stearns, 
2001). And going back still further, the whole of Western culture has always had an 
ambivalent  relationship with  those who dedicated themselves  to  the  acquisition and 
exchange of goods. However, when talking about the type of individual constructed by 
the  normative  presuppositions  informing  the  narrative  of  ecological  modernization, 
“consumer” is here intended in technical terms as the individual who chooses rationally 
according to her preferences,  which might or might not be petty and mundane, and 
where rationality is in turn dened in a very specic way in terms of transitivity and 
completeness.
Ultimately  the  merit  of  this  view of  politics,  which  elevates  efciency  to  its 
normative standard, and economic preferences as the type of information most relevant 
to achieve it, rests on whether we think of ourselves as being capable of carrying the 
computing  effort  implicitly  demanded  of  us  by  the  theory  of  rational  choice,  and 
whether it is desirable at all. On a descriptive level, the issue is far from being settled. 
Against  a  denition  of  rationality  in  terms  of  having  complete  and  transitive 
preferences, and the capacity to weigh options, it is easy to prove that human beings do 
not always live up to this standard of rationality. Yet it can be doubted whether these 
observations are enough to falsify a theory which in its most basic applications - such as 
the theory of market equilibrium as the intersection of supply and demand curves - has 
proven to be remarkably robust and sufciently accurate. But even if we are not this 
admirable computing machine that Rational Choice Theory pretends we are, this does 
not exclude that we should not try to live up to the standard of rationality of the homo 
oeconomicus. One could well argue that, for all its limitations, the welfare economics 
presuppositions  upon  which  the  narrative  of  ecological  modernization  is  built  still 
provide us with a blueprint for a materially prosperous society worth living in. And this 
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has always been one of  the best  arguments in favor of  the reliance upon economic 
instruments and their ability - in certain situations - to enlarge the economic pie: to 
remind critics that before the Industrial Revolution and before the utilitarian mindset 
became prevalent in Western societies, even one of the most splendid kings of Europe - 
Le Roi Soleil - had to have servants who would continuously agitate the wine during 
winter banquets to prevent it from freezing.
The model of governance favored by the scholars working within the ecological 
modernization strand relies heavily on the gure of the expert who appears at various 
stages of the administrative machine: economists are needed when preferences need be 
aggregated into social welfare functions, and panels of economists are summoned when 
controversies arise about the most appropriate ways of aggregating these preferences. 
Economists are also needed to extrapolate economic preferences from surveys and from 
observations of consumers’ market behavior. Earth scientists research the boundaries of 
the earth’s vital  support  systems (such as ocean acidity,  freshwater use,  biodiversity 
loss, etc.) and prepare different scenarios under which such boundaries can be hit or not. 
Researchers  -  both  scientists  and  economists  -  are  also  consulted  on  the  economic 
feasibility of responding to each of these different scenarios.
According  to  this  model  of  governance,  which  might  be  called  technocratic, 
researchers and scientists are responsible for choosing both the policy objectives and the 
means to realize these objectives,  while leaving the implementation of the proposed 
solutions to policy-makers (Edenhofer and Kowarsch, 2015). It is not denied that the 
denition of policy objectives might involve grappling with ethical values. However, it 
is  argued  that  researchers  alone  have  the  conceptual  apparatus  to  negotiate  all  the 
information  and  values  involved  in,  for  example,  large-scale  environmental 
assessments. Furthermore, large environmental assessments, such as those made by the 
IPCC, involve not  only the work of  scientists  but  also of  economists,  philosophers, 
anthropologists, sociologists - in brief, professional gures who are specically trained 
in dealing with value questions. According to this model, researchers should softly yet 
resolutely whisper into the ears of policy-makers in order to advise them that the policy 
goal to be pursued by the environmental regime is, for example, to stay below a 1.5°C 
rise in global average temperatures above pre-industrial level, and what to do in order to 
achieve this target. They arrive at such an estimation by taking into consideration the 
impacts of rising temperatures on food systems, animals, plants, human population, and 
their historical pattern of migration in response to changing environments, costs of later 
mitigation efforts, and much more data. What is implied in all of this is that researchers 
alone  can  compile  all  information  in  a  rigorous  way  and  arrive  at  a  sound  policy 
objective.
Civic Environmentalism
Civic environmentalism scholars pursue a political model of environmental protection 
which can be  termed democratic-participatory.  According to  civic  environmentalism 
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scholars,  the  idea  that  environmental  protection  can  be  pursued  through  market 
mechanisms  alone  runs  into  two fundamental  issues:  rst,  prices  are  sensitive  to  a 
number  of  distortions  which  impact  the  distribution  of  goods  in  society;  second, 
handling  those  economic  preferences  requires  both  making  use  of  a  great  deal  of 
technical expertise and - what is truly contentious - passing a lot of behind-the-scenes 
value judgments. Civic environmentalism scholars are skeptical of the fact that value 
matters  can  be  settled  with  a  technical  approach.  This  is  why  participation  and 
democratization of politics are fundamental aspects of civic environmentalism. 
Ulrich Beck was among the rst to understand that the new political currency of 
modernity  -  risks  -  offers  resistance  to  the  methods  of  science  (Beck,  1986).  In 
particular, since the 1970s, modern advanced economies had to increasingly deal not 
only with the redistribution of wealth, but also with the distribution of risks. Modern 
advanced economies - in Beck’s reading of modernity - are no longer primarily focused 
on  overcoming  scarcity  but  in  overcoming  -  or  better  minimizing,  disposing  of, 
reinterpreting - risks, i.e.  the by-products of societies which have plenty. Whereas a 
chemical analysis of potable waters in a specic area can return a list of all the chemical 
elements  in  the  waters,  it  cannot  tell  us  what  are  the  acceptable  levels  of  these 
components. In its commitment to remain value-free, science - chemistry in this case - 
seems ill-suited to establish what are the acceptable average and absolute levels of the 
toxic elements in drinking water. And these are particularly value-laden questions which 
bear on a person’s idea of what, ultimately, is a good life. Beck himself speculated that 
with modernity made reexive of its own risks, and with it of the need to dene and 
distribute such risks, new spaces for public debate and popular decision-making would 
have opened up (Beck 1986 [2013: Ch.2]).
Sheila  Jasanoff  paints  a  similar  picture  in  her  study  on  the  role  of  scientic 
committees advising the U.S. regulatory agencies such as the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and the Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) (Jasanoff,  1990).  Far 
from being authoritative gures always speaking in unison, scientists disagree, are often 
afliated to  various political  think-tanks,  they are  ideologically  committed,  they are 
willing to negotiate and bargain. Scientic committees are as politicized as any other 
political  institution.  The debate  on anthropogenic  climate  change in  the  last  twenty 
years  offers  a  stellar  example  of  the  politicization  of  science:  disagreements  were 
amplied in the media, research from skeptic scientists had been lavishly funded by 
foundations linked to the coal and oil industries and given more voice than it deserved 
(Dunlap and McCright, 2011), the phantom of a lack of scientic certainty had been 
invoked to stall much needed early mitigation efforts. This was not just peculiar of the 
debate on climate change but of all issues involving signicant risks to human beings 
which reach political attention, and which could potentially mobilize a lot of nancial 
resources. The debate that led to the phasing out of leaded gasoline went through a very 
similar path (Denworth, 2008): Patterson’s research linking leaded gasoline to mental 
illness was rst ostracized and the phasing out of leaded gasoline was slowed down for 
decades by reversing the burden of proof onto those who claimed that it was poisonous - 
Robert Kehoe’s famous “show me the data” paradigm (Nriagu, 1998). Whereas Beck 
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depicted scientists as ultimately incapable of grappling with value-laden issues, Jasanoff 
simply argued that when they do try to grapple with these issues, they de facto stop 
wearing their scientist’s hats. In their advice, they might well be informed by science, 
but  their  decisions  are  then  driven  by  normative  commitments  external  to  their 
disciplines. 
In this general panorama in which the sciences’ spokespersons themselves - and 
economists in the case of economic science - are seen either as partisan as any other 
political actor or unable to deal with value-laden questions, it seemed almost natural to 
turn  to  mechanisms  of  participation  and  democratization  to  solve  the  problems  of 
perception and distribution of environmental goods, bads, and risks. After all, in the late 
1980s and 1990s,  various “end of history” arguments in favor of  liberal  democracy 
seemed  still  very  plausible,  and  this  momentum  was  also  felt  in  the  domain  of 
environmental politics. Behind this movement of democratization at the heart of civic 
environmentalism stand the normative presuppositions of  liberalism in which policy 
decisions  are  ultimately  grounded  on  political  preferences  (aggregative  model)  and 
reasons  for  action  (integrative  model).  According  to  the  aggregative  model  of 
democracy, which is grounded in Rational Choice Theory, and which is more closely 
linked  with  the  paradigm  in  which  participation  is  instrumental  to  providing 
information, political preferences are largely similar to economic preferences: they are 
stable over time and exogenous; the difference with economic preferences being the 
content  and  holders  of  these  preferences.  The  economic  preferences  are  held  by 
consumers, whose theoretical underpinnings, as we have seen, are linked to the homo 
oeconomicus  idealization.  Political  preferences  are  held  by  an  individual  allegedly 
moved by “enlightened self-interest” (Judt, 2015: 307). According to the participatory 
model of democracy, political reasons for action are not stable, they can be transformed, 
and are endogenous to the deliberation.  What determines the nal shape of policies 
within this integrative model of democracy does not depend on the particular desires of 
the individuals but on the underlying political values which individuals bring with them 
into the deliberations. In other words, they are willing, through collective reasoning, 
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inaccessible to external actors. The resultant force coming out of this process of mutual 
justication is - according to the scholars following the civic environmentalism strand - 
the  all  too  elusive  “public  interest”  or  “common  good.”  Behind  this  thicker 
understanding of society stands an idea of  individual  people as able to differentiate 
between private desires and public values, and behind it, in turn, stands the idea that it 
would be a categorial mistake to put on a par - i.e. on the same preference ranking - 
choices which further our private interests or desires and choices which we make out of 
a moral commitment to the public interest. This point has been made multiple times, yet 
perhaps never more cogently than by Amartya Sen who, in an article titled Rational 
Fools, argues that the homo oeconomicus might well increase economic efciency but is 
a “social moron” (Sen 1977: 336).
The  model  of  governance  favored  by  the  scholars  working  within  the  civic 
environmentalism strand  relies,  too,  on  experts,  yet  they  enter  the  decision-making 
process in different stages. Researchers and scientists are needed to provide different 
scenarios of where the earth might be going in terms of environmental sustainability. 
Economists, philosophers, and sociologists might be called, too, to clarify what are the 
implicit value judgments involved in choosing one policy objective rather than another. 
Experts are also called again at  a later  stage of policy-making when, once a policy 
objective has been decided, the appropriate means need be found. According to this 
model of governance, which might be called participatory, policy objectives are settled 
by the elected politicians who, having a more or less direct connection with the public, 
and having been informed through voting and collective reasoning of the community’s 
public interest, are better suited to decide upon value-laden issues. For the same reason, 
political decision-makers have a broader scope in an integrative model of democracy 
than  in  an  aggregative  model  thereof.  Being  presented  with  some  initial  research 
concerning the impacts of climate change, decision-makers decide the mitigation target 
to  pursue  -  let’s  say  2°  C  rise  above  pre-industrial  levels  -,  which  will  reect  the 
political  priorities  and  underlying  values  of  the  represented  people  and  leave  to 
researchers the task of nding the means to achieve this: market mechanisms, a change 
in the regulatory landscape, or other measures. Afterward, a particular set of solutions 
proposed by researchers is approved by decision-makers and, eventually, implemented 
(Edenhofer and Kowarsch, 2015).
Radical environmentalism
  
Radical environmentalism scholars pursue a political model of environmental protection 
which  can  be  termed  emancipatory  and  anti-status  quo.  What  characterizes  their 
worldview is a rejection of the fundamental features of our modern societies, which can 
be cashed out both in terms of a refusal to commodify nature and natural resources, and 
in terms of a refusal of economic growth as the main policy objective to be pursued by 
our political and economic systems.
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The biggest source of concern for those who hope that the movement towards 
increasing democratization could provide some corrections to the distortions brought 
about by market mechanisms is that the world of politics is far from being immune to 
the inuences of players who play the political game with prot motives. Dryzek (2013: 
119) offers a brief yet illuminating overview of the standard tools and practices which 
big corporations have at their disposal to tilt  the environmental debate in the public 
sphere to their favor. Big corporations can and do sponsor organizations and think-tanks 
with “environmental-sounding names” which actually challenge established science on 
issues of climate change and environmental degradation. Not infrequently, corporations 
offer employment opportunities to those activists who once were in the enemy camp. 
Advertising material, which often puts forward corporate images greener than actually 
would be the case, is yet another strategy by which corporations can alter the terms of 
the  public  debate.  The  threat  of  disinvestment,  a  sort  of  retaliation  in  case  strong 
environmental  regulations  were  to  be  enacted,  could  also  affect  democratic  policy 
deliberations.  The  more  general  point  to  be  drawn from this  brief  list  of  corporate 
practices is that to a certain extent it is inevitable that the policy debates, and with it the 
political ideas of the citizens, are affected and distorted by particular interests. This is 
the consequence of a political system - capitalist democracy - in which private actors 
are not only allowed but even encouraged to provide essential  public services.  This 
system  de  facto  makes  business  and  corporate  actors  privileged  interlocutors  of 
decision-makers. In other words, the political model of civic environmentalism does not 
not only eschew market capitalism but, in certain cases, it does not even manage to offer 
those counterweight mechanisms it was intended to provide because the lines between 
regulators  and regulated are  sometimes too blurred for  democracy’s  own good.  For 
radical environmentalism scholars, this is the umpteenth conrmation that this whole 
system of environmental protection which seeks to gradually and incrementally green 
the status quo is fundamentally corrupt.
On  a  more  fundamental  level,  both  ecological  modernization  and  civic 
environmentalism  are  compatible  with  a  stance  in  environmental  politics  which 
preaches the stewardship of nature (Ehrenfeld, 2014) - something that in the last two 
decades has become a buzzword expression. In other words, all these positions bestow 
an  important  role  on  human  beings.  There  is,  one  the  one  hand,  a  more  or  less 
complacent awareness that we now live in the so-called Anthropocene epoch (Crutzen, 
2002) - the epoch in which human activities have an impact on global earth systems - 
and, on the other, the awareness that only human beings themselves could limit such 
impact. Human beings are thus the guardians of the gates through which policies and 
activities which have an impact on the earth system as a whole need to pass. This role is 
bestowed upon them because of their unique capacity for critical reasoning, which is at 
the same time a curse and a blessing: a curse because it is what makes us capable of 
dominating (or believing we could dominate) nature; and a blessing, because it could 
stop  this  relationship  of  dominion  from  turning  for  the  worse.  The  concept  of 
stewardship thus incorporates this idea of the uniqueness of the humans as beings both 
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inside and outside nature. It is precisely this uniqueness of human beings which radical 
scholars dispute. 
Radical environmentalism scholars who focus on the commodication side of the 
debate nd environmental problems to be a consequence of the way human beings have 
come to experience the natural world. Until quite recently in human history, the idea 
that nature is out there for us coexisted with the notion of it being capricious, powerful, 
surprising, dangerous, a sort of wild animal which human ingenuity can overpower, but 
never  tame.  With René Descartes  (1637),  a  change in attitude towards nature starts 
materializing:  nature  is  not  only  out  there  for  us,  but  it  is  also  somehow  more 
predictable, more “mechanistic.”  Instrumental to this change of perception is a neat 1
separation  operated  by  Descartes  between  the  physical  world  and  the  mental  or 
psychological  world.  According to  the  method of  systematic  doubt  which bears  his 
name,  the  French  philosopher  accepts  as  true  and  indubitable  only  that  knowledge 
which is formed by “clear and distinct ideas”; the result of this is that the psychological 
realm attains a certainty of itself which does not hold for the physical one. According to 
Descartes, there is thus a fundamental ontological difference between the two domains 
which never come in contact with each other. The perception of this profound dualism 
facilitated what was - and in many ways still is - a quintessentially modern Western way 
of looking at the natural world: as a machine, behaving according to mechanical laws 
which  can  be  discovered  and  used  to  our  own advantage.  This  is  not  a  horizontal 
distinction which keeps apart two domains of equal dignity, but a vertical one: there is a 
hierarchical  relationship  between  a  knower  and  an  object  of  knowledge  which  is 
analyzed and dissected through a rational and scientic method. This rupture in the way 
nature is experienced, according to the radical scholars, is thus characterized by a lost 
relationship  with  nature,  which  was  allegedly  more  genuine,  and  which  instilled  a 
sentiment of humility in men, due to their belief of being a negligible element in the 
natural  order.  The  theme  of  humility  particularly  resonates  among  those  radical 
environmentalists who resolutely reject the assumption that human beings should have 
any specic role  in  the management  of  nature  (Pianalto,  2013):  there  should be no 
management of nature to begin with. Not only man does not stand in a relationship of 
lordship over nature, but he is not even a primus inter pares, which would make him a 
steward; he is simply a member of a bigger community (Lovelock, 2006; Palmer, 1992 
[2006]). Practically, this humility would manifest itself by experiencing nature as it is in 
all its aspects, appreciating it, and ultimately withdrawing from interfering with it. This 
would  amount  to  a  very  specic  program  of  restoring  nature:  it  would  not  be  a 
 Here I follow Tim Hayward’s reconstruction of the causes behind modernity’s attitude towards nature 1
and the environment (Hayward, 1995).  However,  boundaries are always contested and the claim that 
Descartes  is  the  philosopher  who  ushered  the  Western  world  into  a  modern  understanding  of  the 
relationship between man and nature is contested, to say the least. “Descartes” may well be a placeholder 
for many other intellectuals who around the same period have treated nature as an external entity to be 
analyzed in a detached way, such as Isaac Newton or Galileo Galilei.  Lynn Townsend White Jr.,  for 
example, goes further back and claims that “the historical roots of our ecological crisis” (the title of its 
most famous article) are to be found in the Judeo-Christian thought which permeates the Western mode of 
thinking concerning the relationship between man and nature (White Jr., 1967)
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managerial program in which trees and vegetation in general are planted and animals 
reintroduced into their original habitat, but simply it would let nature run its course and 
be,  by withdrawing all  human intervention altogether.  Geo-engineering interventions 
would have no place,  as  they are  extreme and paradigmatic  cases  of  human hubris 
(Kiehl,  2006),  and  market-based  mechanisms  would  be  similarly  opposed  as  they 
necessarily  rely  on  a  concept  of  nature  which  is  disenchanted,  divided  into  human 
categories and managed according to our needs and instrumental to our human affairs. 
Radical environmentalism scholars who focus on the growth side of the debate are 
mostly concerned on how commodication has being pursued and what it led to. The 
mechanisms  and  methods  which  were  supposed  to  provide  us  with  the  critical 
instruments  to  pursue  the  ideal  of  sustainable  environmental  protection  -  economic 
theories,  principles,  and idealizations (ecological  modernization),  the mechanisms of 
participation behind the movement of democratization (civic environmentalism) - did 
not live up to this task or, worse, facilitated and implicitly justied the exploitation of 
nature  which  has  come  to  be  associated  with  the  current  period  (starting  with  the 
Industrial  Revolution)  of  economic  growth  and  material  wealth.  Whereas  scholars 
following the narrative of ecological modernization and civic environmentalism see the 
utilitarian  mindset  underpinning  welfare  economics  as  instrumental  to  a  better 
management of natural resources, the critics of this mindset see it as something which 
changed our very perceptions of nature.
As the market forces historically begun to take center stage in Western societies, 
two consequences unfold: preference satisfaction became a normative currency and the 
old value systems disintegrated,  and with them a cultural  framework which had the 
power  to  provide  appropriate  guidance  to  individual  choices.  Family,  religious  and 
political institutions all saw their power to guide behavior dwindle in the face of the 
alluring message of markets that there are no intrinsically wrong choices, apart from 
those ourselves deem so, individually or collectively, through conventions. According to 
radical  environmentalists,  our  perception  of  nature  and  our  understanding  of  the 
relationship we should maintain with it witnessed a similar fate. The old value system, 
in  which nature  carried  an  intrinsic  normativity,  gave way to  uid  arrangements  in 
which everything is valued so long as it is, or can be, exchanged on the market. In other 
words, we might well save nature but at the price of commodifying it, and this will have 
a  lasting  impact  on  how we  relate  to  nature,  to  the  point  of  undermining  its  non-
economic  appreciation.  Once  this  intrinsic  normativity  has  been  forgotten,  the 
protection of the environment will depend solely on the vagaries of the markets.
Both the radical environmentalism scholars who focus on the commodication 
side of the debate, those who focus on growth, and those who deal with both issues 
agree on certain fundamental issues. Individuals in society are enmeshed in a thick net 
of reied meanings of which they are seldom aware. Whereas in the narratives explored 
above individuals are actors who engage in different types of active behavior in the 
public space - as consumers they buy and sell in the market, as citizens they meet, talk, 
and  vote  -  here  individual  persons  are  at  rst  passive,  subjected  to  more  powerful 
forces,  and  are  not  able,  by  themselves,  to  change  anything  in  the  society.  These 
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powerful forces are what makes the public space hostile, and which forces sensitive 
people to withdraw from it, sometimes in a literal sense (Henry David Thoreau’s retreat 
to Walden Pond continues to provide the ideal model of resistance to generations of 
radical environmentalists), sometimes only guratively. These forces are powerful not 
in the economic or political sense - or at least not primarily so - but in their capacity to 
guide behavior through ideologies and the construction and imposition of those reied 
meanings. If this is the case, what is needed is a criticism of the mainstream narratives 
that unmasks their implicit assumptions, cases of problem closure, etc. There is no pre-
dened set of data on which the radical scholar can safely rely, although it seems that 
general culture about the intellectual debates which shaped our current understanding of 
the world, and knowledge and research into the history of ideas, all have an important 
role.
However, there is often a wide gap to bridge between this type of research and 
green policies or actions of protest on the ground which can be said to be inspired by 
such research. In other words, whereas this research is publicly available, albeit  not 
always easily, it is not acted upon by the sectors of the society which should allegedly 
steer the communities towards greener policies. “Enlightened individuals” also have an 
important role to play within this narrative; they are often environmental scientists or 
highly educated people turned into environmental activists (Vandana Shiva is a case in 
point), who make use of their technical insights into a humanistic or scientic domain to 
translate complex research into understandable facts ready to be turned into actions.
Political change is then achieved through what has been called the “politics of 
critical social science” (Fay, 1987). In other words, change is not achieved through the 
manipulation of some external variable (preferences, data) but through the educative 
power of critiques targeting current social arrangements. This process should eventually 
bring individuals to have a different idea about themselves, their wants, and their place 
in the world, and should eventually emancipate them. This work of criticism leaves the 
door open for other narratives and ideologies to provide a different set of meanings to 
individuals;  yet,  ideally,  emancipated  individuals  should  now be  able  to  choose  by 
themselves  the  lesser  evil  among  all  the  paradigms  of  environmental  protection 
proposed.  Once  liberated,  the  individual  implicitly  construed  by  this  narrative  is 
someone who, witnessing the lack of initiatives by institutional actors, takes it upon 
herself  to  contribute  to  environmental  protection.  If  necessary,  sometimes  this 
individual is willing to go the extra mile and, from the safe space into which she retired 
and which she share with like-minded individuals who experience nature in a similar 
manner,  will  organize and plan the actions of  protests  against  the given order.  This 
individual is not only an activist but also a veritable partisan; she is the maquis hiding in 
the mountains of the Haut-Jura, secretly planning acts of resistance and occasionally 
going down the valley to blow up a bridge. Most of the time this is just a colorful 
analogy as protests take the form of peaceful marches, but from time to time also more 
violent actions have been carried out; the American Earth Liberation Front (ELF) - and 
the associations afliated to it - are known for engaging in criminal and violent protests 
(eco-terrorism or ecotage) aiming at symbols of Western environmental degradation, or, 
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in any case, what are considered as such by them: SUV dealerships, or luxurious resorts 
in previously pristine areas.
CONTINUITIES
In this section, I show how each narrative builds upon other competing narratives in 
order  to  put  forward  its  own  distinct  message.  I  have  identied  two  layers  of 
continuities. The rst, deeper, continuity concerns all the three narratives and is centered 
on the role of scarcity and its signicance within the different narratives. The second 
layer  of  continuities  concerns  the  narratives  of  ecological  modernization  and  civic 
environmentalism and is centered on the role of economic growth in providing the basis 
for environmentally sustainable preference satisfaction and fair wealth redistribution.
The  scholars  across  the  narrative  divides  offer  different  interpretations  of  the 
signicance of the scientic notion that under a business as usual scenario there are 
limits to the supplies made available by the earth. Even more so in an age of population 
growth and economic expansion in developing countries. In other words, the Club of 
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environmentalism. 
Scarcity is framed by environmental economists working within the ecological 
modernization framework as a challenge to be met by always more rened allocations 
so that shrinking input resources end up in the hands of those that are able to create the 
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liberal  distributive  theories  of  justice  from turning into  perfectionist  theories  of  the 
good.  A  distributive  theory  which  distinguishes  legitimate  demands  for  the 
appropriation of goods from illegitimate ones might, in certain cases, do away with the 
notion  of  scarcity  in  cases  when  there  are  enough  resources  to  meet  all  legitimate 
demands.  Finally, (iii) it provides the justication for a redistributive system which, 
within the limits of a politically agreed fair system of distribution, pursues economic 
growth  through  the  efcient  allocations  of  goods,  along  the  lines  of  a  difference 
principle. Radical environmentalist scholars, on the other hand, treat scarcity both as a 
fact and as a consequence of the policy solutions so far proposed by the environmental 
scholars  who  follow  competing  environmental  narratives.  Instead  of  treating 
preferences of individuals as given, they prefer to work directly on those preferences, 
trying to challenge and change them. In this sense, it is no accident that Dryzek, in his 
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book The Politics of the Earth (Dryzek, 2013), decides to present the radical voices - he 
calls  them green  radicalism  -  under  the  chapter  heading  “Changing  People:  Green 
Consciousness.”
A similar understanding of the notion of scarcity brings both the scholars working 
within  the  strand  of  ecological  modernization  and  those  within  that  of  civic 
environmentalism  to  agree  that  environmental  protection  can  be  achieved  through 
market-based mechanisms which, concurrently, pursue economic growth. They differ 
only in the importance they attribute to the distributional imbalances created by such 
mechanisms. For the former, they are the price to pay for having truly effective policies 
which curb environmental degradation; for the latter, this price is sometimes too steep: 
corrective measures are needed. In other words, the model of political liberalism, on 
which the ideal of participatory environmental governance is modeled, does not eschew 
a  market-based  economy;  it  simply  seeks  to  offer  mechanisms for  social  justice  as 
redistributive  measures  in  the  face  of  distributive  distortions  wrought  by  market 
mechanisms.
According to the scholars working within the ecological modernization narrative, 
human  interventions  upon  nature  often  translate  into  a  frenzied  and  short-sighted 
exploitation of  natural  resources  which does  not  work towards bettering the human 
condition at the aggregate level. This happens when environmental projects and policies 
not  only  benet  some  at  the  expenses  of  others  -  which  within  this  framework  is 
sometimes  justied,  or  reluctantly  accepted  -  but  also  undermine  the  long-term 
prospects  for  further  improving  the  human  condition.  Economic  growth  can  be 
unsustainable; however, the core message of ecological modernization scholars is that 
economic growth does not have to be unsustainable. In this context, the knowledge of 
economic theories and principles are what enables successfully bridging a demand for 
sustainability - partially endogenous to a growing capitalist system (Chapter 2; Hirsch, 
1976; Inglehart, 1977) - with concrete sustainable policies and projects.
The economist’s toolbox enables policy makers to convert green preferences into 
green policies, either by devising mechanisms which prevent markets from failing or by 
mimicking through the  cost-benet  method the  efciency-producing capacity  of  the 
markets. In doing this, economists are facilitated by knowledge of and insights they 
claim  to  have  into  human  psychology,  or,  in  any  case,  into  that  part  of  human 
psychology which is most relevant to create a system of efcient exchanges through 
individual actions. In other words, it is not denied that men sometimes reciprocate gifts 
(homo reciprocans) or follow rules and play roles which not always is in their interest to 
follow  or  play  (homo  sociologicus),  or  that  they  are  not  able  to  actually  choose 
rationally,  even if  they would like to,  due to their  bounded rationality.  Yet,  when it 
comes to obtaining goods within the market, it is claimed that the human psychology 
displays  certain  regularities,  and  that  the  construction  of  the  homo oeconomicus  is 
considered a good - albeit not perfect - description of these regularities. For example, 
cap-and-trade mechanisms aimed at cleaning the environment through a cap to selected 
polluting substances should work because the introduction of scarcity through the cap 
makes rational agents more willing to satisfy wants of higher priority. The cap changes 
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the incentive schemes of rational agents: those for whom reducing pollution is cheap 
will now do so and sell carbon credits to acquire goods which have a higher priority for 
them.  This  system  is  grounded  upon  a  fundamental  law  of  economics,  that  of 
diminishing marginal utility. The law of diminishing marginal utility, the idea that the 
utility of  consuming a product  progressively declines with the consumption of each 
additional  unit  of  that  product  -  the  proof  of  which  is  mostly  obtained  through 
psychological introspection - is one of those instruments which economists can claim to 
have harnessed in order to bring economics to the service of social goals; in this case, 
environmental protection.
Pivotal  to  this  understanding  of  environmental  protection  is  the  claim  that 
economics is indeed a set of instruments which can successfully be employed to solve 
the social and environmental problems brought about by environmental degradation. In 
other  words,  the  social  reality  and  the  ontology  of  economics  (prices,  preferences, 
individuals, rms, etc.) match. However, in order for green preferences to develop into 
green policies, a complex administrative machine needs to be constantly steered and 
navigated, markets in environmental products need to be introduced or facilitated; as a 
consequence, public ofcials, especially those charged with administrative roles, need 
to know the nuts and bolts of standard and environmental economics.
The  distribution  of  environmental  amenities  and  hazards  following  the 
employment  of  market-based  mechanisms  often  enough  deepens  already  existing 
imbalances of wealth along rich/poor lines. From the point of view of the libertarian 
presuppositions  of  ecological  modernization,  this  is  a  perfectly  legitimate  outcome 
produced by talent and hard work, which often leaves a sediment of material wealth 
across many generations, and which is enabled by the fundamental individual freedom 
to accept or reject the terms of a commercial contract. From the point of view of the 
welfare economics presuppositions of ecological modernization, imbalances of wealth 
are  sometimes  an  acceptable  by-product  of  policies  which  pursue  efciency  by 
aggregating individual preferences, which cannot aspire to the ideal of Pareto efciency 
- large scale policies always produce winners and losers - and thus have to settle for 
what  many  would  consider  a  morally  lower  degree  of  efciency:  Kaldor-Hicks 
efciency. This standard of efciency claims that an outcome is efcient if and only if 
those who are better off as a result of a redistribution of resources could in principle 
compensate the worse off, such that they could at least restore their welfare to their pre-
redistribution levels. Direct compensation of the losers almost never happens, but it is 
usually argued that the role of compensating those who have been negatively affected 
by redistributive policies should be left to the scal system.
Yet,  even  if  one  accepts  this  rejoinder,  and  accepts  that  the  denitions  of 
efciency employed within welfare economics manage to steer clear from distributive 
issues,  distributive  issues  cannot  be  easily  swept  under  the  carpet  altogether. 
Presuppositions  about  how we  collect  preferences,  aggregate  them,  add  or  subtract 
them, and more fundamentally still, whether economic preferences are a good metrics to 
evaluate wellbeing, all have distributive repercussions at the societal level which often 
worsen or reinforce wealth imbalances. It is, for example, well-known that economic 
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preferences inferred from market  behavior,  as  well  as contingent  evaluation surveys 
establishing willingness to pay and accept for environmental goods and bads - upon 
which policy decisions are then taken -, are often biased by ability to pay. Often such 
differences are not smoothed out, even after the researcher has controlled the results for 
income. Smoothing out such systemic differences requires the researcher to control for 
level of education, political system, pervasiveness of the rule of law, and more or less 
everything  one  could  nd morally  suspicious  to  discriminate  on.  Yet,  the  more  the 
researcher controls for variables the causal relevance of which is considered morally 
arbitrary, the more the space for market-based mechanisms to operate shrinks. From an 
economic perspective, it makes sense for different areas of economic development to 
have  different  perceptions  of  environmental  goods  and  bads  -  without  questioning 
whether these perceptions come from arbitrary facts of life -, such that trading between 
different economic zones could occur. If this is the case, then the different perceptions 
about the environment,  albeit  generated by morally arbitrary social  elements,  are an 
accident  on the road which will  take everyone,  some sooner than others,  to  greater 
levels of well-being. The history of the international climate regime, for example, is 
punctuated  by  controversies  regarding  seemingly  distributively-neutral  and 
uncontroversial  technical  issues having important  distributive repercussions (e.g.  the 
value of a statistical life, the discount rate in mitigation policy). Even the choice of not 
dealing with distributive issues is at bottom a distributive one. 
The  employment  of  market  mechanisms  is  premised  on  a  fundamental 
anthropocentric  idea  which  is  central  to  the  ecological  modernization  narrative,  but 
which  is  also  shared  by  the  scholars  working  within  civic  environmentalism:  that 
environmental  protection  should  not  make  things  worse  for  us,  human  beings. 
Ecological modernization scholars cash out this anthropocentrism in terms of policies 
which, while pursuing environmental protection, manage to enlarge the economic pie. 
While  not  wholeheartedly  sharing  the  normative  presuppositions  behind  the 
employment of market-based mechanisms (i.e. welfare economics and libertarianism), 
civic environmentalism scholars, too, allow environmental protection to be pursued by 
means  of  market-based  mechanisms.  For  example,  a  proponent  of  civic 
environmentalism such as Dryzek - although he would not probably categorize himself 
as such -, claims that one of the fundamental features of our response to the current 
environmental challenge is that it “should not overlook the dominant political fact of 
our time”, i.e. the pervasiveness of market capitalism (Dryzek, 2013: 233). However, 
what  differentiates  the  two  narratives  -  ecological  modernization  and  civic 
environmentalism  -  is  how  the  anthropocentric  idea  is  cashed  out:  civic 
environmentalism scholars attach a different understanding to what “not making things 
worse  for  us,  the  human  beings”  means.  In  other  words,  in  addition  to  economic 
efciency,  they  attach  a  much more  egalitarian  reading to  the  requirements  that  an 
environmental policy should meet in order to qualify as viable. Mechanisms of public 
participation - which are at the heart of the narrative of civic environmentalism - do 
sometimes offer some corrective measure to redress these distributional imbalances and 
implicitly provide stricter equity requirements for environmental policies. Needless to 
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say, when more people are allowed to vote on a certain issue, most of the time this 
actually means opening the franchising to “more previously marginalized people.” In 
particular,  as  distributive  policies  will  reect  the  expectations  of  the  new  median 
participant,  the  more  that  poorer  or  previously  marginalized  people  participate  in 
politics, the more the policies yielded by this democratic process will be redistributive. 
Furthermore, when participation is intended as actual presence at the decision-making 
table,  then  not  only  some measure  of  output  redistribution  is  likely,  as  when more 
people  are  allowed to  vote,  but  also  some form of  input  redistribution needs  to  be 
implemented.  In other  words,  if  a  particular  institution wants  to  extend the pool  of 
people partaking of political deliberations, then it also needs to invest in education and 
capacity building beforehand.
While,  on  the  one  hand,  assuming  scarcity  at  the  outset  of  their  normative 
presuppositions brings ecological modernization and civic environmentalism scholars 
down the path of pursuing environmental protection in a manner which is consistent 
with continued economic growth and, thus, of employing market-based mechanisms, on 
the  other,  framing  scarcity  as  a  real  consequence  of  capitalistic  accumulation  and 
neoliberal  dispossession  brings  radical  environmentalist  scholars  to  critique  market-
based environmental protection.
According  to  radical  environmentalists,  economic  growth  -  and  the 
commodication of nature it necessarily entails - is the true culprit of environmental 
degradation. Radical environmentalism scholars criticize environmental economists by 
arguing that the conceptual categories normally used to refer to nature do not track the 
categories actually existing in nature, and that, in any case, human beings have no way 
of  knowing  this  for  sure.  Devising  environmental  policies  on  the  basis  of  such 
categories - trees, lakes, tons of CO2 - can only ever be a tentative endeavor: positive 
results will depend more on brute luck than on an actual knowledge of nature. A similar 
position is taken by the eco-socialists who claim that access to natural resources should 
be  dictated  by  the  natural  metabolism of  the  earth,  its  cycles  of  renewable  energy 
production and sink absorption, not by the drive for capital accumulation.
By  taking  scarcity  for  granted,  instead  of  carefully  working  out  what  makes 
natural resources scarce, ecological modernization and civic environmentalism scholars 
can be accused  -  from a radical environmentalism perspective -  of grounding their 
policy proposals upon scientic research which is built on what is technically known as 
“problem closure.” Problem closure is the pre-construction of the scope of the inquiry. 
By  remaining  rooted  in  an  anthropocentric  perspective,  these  scholars  produce 
knowledge for “technical cognitive interest,” which is the most fundamental type of 
problem closure in contemporary scientic research, according to Habermas (1974). By 
doing so, they most of the time accept the given denitions of specic environmental 
problems,  e.g.  that  deforestation  is  an  environmental  problem having  an  impact  on 
climate  change  rather  than  a  social  problem by  which  local  communities  see  their 
resources  diminishing.  The  debate  I  have  presented  in  Chapter  4,  between  an 
understanding of the deforestation problem as caused by free rider behavior in open 
access settings - inspired by Hardin (1968) -, and that privileged by political ecologist 
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who stress the impact of globalization and powerful actors on local communities, can be 
identied as a typical case of conicting problem closures.
Another typical case of conicting problem closure is the pre-denition of what 
an  environmental  problem ultimately  is:  those  who favor  the  price  mechanism and 
market instruments to provide solutions often implicitly subscribe to an understanding 
of environmental problems in terms of resource exhaustion. And they can, therefore, 
claim that an environmental problem does not exist - or it is easily resolvable - because 
the price mechanism will provide substitutes to scarce resources. On the other hand, 
those who favor policies such as the restoration of degraded ecosystems are more likely 
to  frame  environmental  problems  in  terms  of  the  diminishing  quality  of  the 
environment. The two are not the same. Nowadays we live in a world which has much 
more resources,  because  of  our  extracting technologies,  yet,  according to  numerous 
indicators,  the  environment  is  in  a  worse  state  than it  used to  be.  Needless  to  say, 
problem closure  has  an impact  on policy-making down the  line;  in  the  case  of  the 
example provided in Chapter 4, this resulted in policies of privatization of open access 
areas (Vreeland et al., 2001).
The way of presenting the continuities among the narratives employed so far, as a 
progressive renement (i) of the notion of scarcity - shared across the narrative divides 
- and, within the debate between ecological modernization and civic environmentalism, 
(ii)  of  the  notion  of  economic  growth  (how  and  within  which  limits  it  should  be 
pursued), gives the wrong impression that ecological modernization is not a response to 
the other environmental narratives but only to an internal demand for sustainability and 
to  an  internal  rejection  of  business-as-usual  models  of  economic  development.  By 
reversing the order in which I have so far presented the continuities among the different 
environmental narratives, in the remaining of this section I will analyze other important 
continuities which have so far remained under my analytical radar.
Radical  environmentalists  who  expose  the  faulty  assumptions  of  competing 
positions  are  usually  viewed  as  a  healthy  counterweight  in  environmental  debates; 
however,  once  they  make  the  move  from  being  a  critical  force  to  becoming  a 
constructive one, few would be willing to follow their proposals all the way to their 
nal theoretical consequences. In particular, by starting from the non-anthropocentric 
stance at the heart of some radical environmentalist positions, and by taking it seriously, 
one  would  be  compelled  to  acknowledge that  sometimes  radicals,  when faced with 
serious dilemmas pitting the enduring enjoyment of what we take to be fundamental 
against  the  protection of  the  environment,  drift  away to  positions  that  many would 
dene as deeply misanthropic: the restriction of dietary choices and reproductive rights 
and the limitation of free movement are some of the striking examples that come to 
mind. By rejecting these conclusions, many would argue that environmental protection 
needs to be in line with the enjoyment of our liberties, not the other way around.
From there to arguing that  our political  institutions should merely provide the 
conditions for the individuals to pursue what it is valuable to them, is but a short step. 
And as in contemporary societies the satisfaction of disparate needs and desires depends 
on some monetary exchange, it follows that enlarging the economic pie is the best way 
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From there to arguing that  our political  institutions should merely provide the 
conditions for the individuals to pursue what it is valuable to them, is but a short step. 
And as in contemporary societies the satisfaction of disparate needs and desires depends 
on some monetary exchange, it follows that enlarging the economic pie is the best way 
158
to  satisfy people’s  demands.  If  this  is  the goal,  then governments should create the 
conditions for markets to work freely and efciently. It is not in principle denied that 
what is valuable to people might also entail the protection of the environment. But as 
determining  market  prices  is  a  fundamentally  democratic  process  which  no  one 
individual can singularly affect - unless the market is rigged by monopolies, asymmetric 
information,  high  transaction  costs,  etc.,  which  admittedly  is  not  unusual  - 
environmental protection will be an efcient business model only when more and more 
people come to appreciate it and produce a demand for it.  The sustainability of this 
model depends on the fact that economic growth allegedly produces its own demand for 
green  products  and  lifestyles,  and  on  the  capability  of  farsighted  administrators  to 
anticipate  the  future  needs  and  demands  of  individuals,  as  well  as  the  needs  and 
demands of future individuals, and thus craft legislation which is both market-friendly 
and goes in the direction of greater sustainability. This is how the position of ecological 
modernization scholars can be considered a response to radical environmentalism: on 
the one hand, it takes seriously the demand for environmental protection, on the other, it 
aims to improve on those aspects which are felt  most in need of improvement. The 
promise of economic growth enables individuals to do away with the limitations of 
personal freedoms sometimes required by the normative theories proposed by radical 
environmentalists.
Within this second argumentative line, it is also possible to argue that the implicit 
democracy  of  market  prices  is  more  than  enough  to  understand  what  people’s 
preferences  are  and  what  they  want;  more  political  participation  and  redistribution 
would in certain situations stie economic growth, as valuable resources would get into 
the hands of those who do not know what to do with them. Furthermore, as talented 
people will not see their effort rewarded due to redistributive measures, they will lack 
motivation and economic incentives to continue innovating and growing their business, 
perhaps their green business, into the future. The usual metaphor in these cases is to 
picture redistributive policies as the act of moving water from one place to another by 
means of leaking buckets. Is it really worth it if a half or even just a quarter of the initial 
available water is lost along the way? If our intuition and our reasoning bring us to say 
that  no,  it  is  not  worth  it,  then  we  can  successfully  claim  that  the  model  of 
environmental  protection  espoused  by  ecological  modernization  scholars  indeed 
represents a better solution to environmental degradation compared to the redistributive 
model of civic environmentalism. 
BLIND SPOTS
We  have  seen,  across  the  different  narratives,  that  there  are  aspects  which  clearly 
distinguish  them  and  we  have  analyzed  these  “clashes”  in  terms  of  four  different 
categories: (i) the nature of relevant information, (ii) the role of individuals, (iii) the 
locus of decision-making, and, nally, (iv) the model of governance. We have also seen 
that across all the narratives there are some important continuities and, in particular, we 
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have seen that the three narratives depart from a fundamental notion of environmental 
scarcity which, however, is interpreted in different ways.
Some of those differences come from deeply ingrained cultural differences, such 
as those, for example, between ecological modernization and radical environmentalism; 
others are mainly due to different sensitivities when it comes to issues of allocation or 
distribution,  such  as  those  between  ecological  modernization  and  civic 
environmentalism. Differences in sensitivities are not to be underestimated in any way - 
and  the  fact  that  Western  politics  in  the  last  half  century  can  be  read  along  the 
coordinates of efciency vs. justice (Okun, 1975) attests to how deep these differences 
in  sensitivities  can  run  -,  yet  they  do  not  go  further  in  questioning  the  cultural 
presuppositions governing our understanding of the environment.
Given what I called the common playing eld in which these narratives meet, and 
given the continuities among the narratives, how come these differences and clashes 
emerge?  In  other  words,  what  drives  these  narratives  apart?  The  work  done  in  the 
previous chapters offers a clue and some initial responses to this question. One has to 
look at the normative presuppositions informing the narratives to understand why these 
clashes emerge. And yet this is not enough: the role of narratives is not simply to dress 
up  in  a  story  an  underlying  normative  theory  but,  most  importantly,  to  frame  the 
intrinsic complexity of environmental policy and make it intelligible, hence actionable, 
to policy-makers and individual people alike. In other words, the recipes offered by the 
various  narratives  -  market-based  mechanisms,  public  participation,  reversing  the 
process of commodication and pursuing degrowth - cannot simply alienate a part of 
the population by offering solutions that appeal to only the subset of this population 
who  already  share  some  fundamental  convictions  about  what  is  and  what  is  not 
appropriate in politics. An important role played by environmental narratives is thus to 
translate the normative concerns linked to the normative presupposition of a competing 
environmental narrative into the normative currency of the chosen narrative. Clashes 
then emerge because it is not possible to translate all these normative concerns into an 
alternative  normative  currency.  This  impossibility  creates  areas  that  remain  in  the 
shadow, and which I have called “normative blind spots.” To these I turn now.
Ecological modernization
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel famously wrote that philosophy is necessarily a system 
because it begins with a simple thought and then develops and follows the development 
of this thought into other thoughts, thus forming categories, and from then to an all-
encompassing system.
“Philosophy is a system. [...] The real meaning of ‘system’ is totality, and only as such is a 
system true, a totality beginning from what is simplest and becoming ever more concrete as it 
develops” (Hegel, quoted in Lauer, 1983: 82).
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If there is a discipline that today most deserves the label of “system,” it must certainly 
be  welfare  economics.  Even  if  one  is  profoundly  critical  of  the  direction  taken  by 
welfare economics in the last half century, which has no doubt enabled and facilitated 
the advancement of the commodication frontier to domains not previously touched by 
the logic of the market, one cannot remain indifferent to the mammoth literature which 
has been generated by departing from few, well-dened, and simple principles. In many 
ways, mainstream welfare economics is one of the most remarkable achievements of 
modernity.
As we have seen, welfare economics is the main normative point of reference for 
all  those  scholars  and  practitioners  who  believe,  in  line  with  the  ecological 
modernization  narrative,  that  environmental  protection  has  to  pass  through  the 
employment  of  market  mechanisms.  This  is  usually  achieved  either  by  introducing 
markets or by mimicking the capacity of markets to produce efciency - this is done by 
implementing policies which have previously passed the cost-benet test. In Chapter 2 I 
briey mentioned some of the basic principles and normative underpinnings of welfare 
economics,  while  reviewing  the  contested  normative  presuppositions  of  cost-benet 
analysis. These were: social welfare is the algebraic sum of individual welfare; well-
being  is  nothing  but  preference  satisfaction;  preferences  can  be  priced  through  the 
observation of how individuals behave in the market or through surveys; and there is a 
linear  relation  between  the  probability  of  death  and  the  value  of  risk  avoidance. 
Although all  of  these  points  can be separately  criticized from the point  of  view of 
alternative normative presuppositions, there is one normative principle which is more 
foundational  than the others,  which deserves more careful  consideration,  and which 
explains  how normative  economics  has  come to  be  employed in  so  many different 
elds, environmental protection included.
Welfare economics identies well-being with the satisfaction of preferences; at 
face value, there seems to be nothing controversial about this: it simply states that well-
being depends on how much the desires of a person are frustrated or satised. Theorists 
of welfare economics arrive at this principle by means of a theory of rationality plus two 
fundamental  assumptions.  First  some  words  about  the  theory  of  rationality:  the 
preferences of an individual are rational if they are transitive and complete. Preferences 
are transitive if, given three different objects a, b, and c, a is preferred to b and b is 
preferred  to  c.  Then,  according  to  the  requirement  of  transitivity,  a  is  necessarily 
preferred to c. Preferences are complete when all pairs of alternatives can be compared 
with each other, in other words, given two alternative objects, a person can prefer one 
over  the  other,  or  the  opposite  or  be  indifferent  between the  two.  Second,  the  two 
additional assumptions are that individuals are self-interested and that they have perfect 
knowledge.
According to  the  assumption of  self-interestedness,  if  nothing but  self-interest 
affects a person’s preferences, then this person prefers one particular object over another 
if and only if she believes that this object is strictly better for her compared to the other 
one. In other words, rational and self-interested individuals always have a preference for 
what they think is better for themselves over what they think is worse. According to the 
161
CLASHES, CONTINUITIES, AND BLIND SPOTS
assumption of  perfect  knowledge,  self-interested individuals  with perfect  knowledge 
prefer one object over another, if and only if this object is, in fact, better for them. From 
rationality plus the two assumptions of self-interestedness and perfect  knowledge,  it 
follows that one can tell how well-off an individual is simply by looking at how well 
satised her preferences are; nothing else is needed. Hence, for normative economics, 
well-being and the satisfaction of preferences become the two sides of the same coin. 
Everyday practice in normative economics, which allows economists to choose among 
different policies and advice governments, begins when this simple equation between 
well-being and preference satisfaction is  coupled with a moral  principle of  minimal 
benevolence. This principle is so innocuous to be considered almost a tautology, i.e. 
other things being equal, it is a morally good thing if people are better off. If this is so, 
and if people are better off when their preferences are satised, it follows that, other 
things  being  equal,  policies  aimed  at  increasing  the  size  of  the  pool  of  satised 
preferences  are  justied.  The  use  of  markets,  market-based  mechanisms,  and 
government interventions aimed at bringing efciency are independently justied by 
reference to their capacity of producing (Pareto) efcient outcomes (rst and second 
theorems of welfare economics).
But  what  are  these  “things”  that  should  “stay  equal”  for  the  satisfaction  of 
preferences, hence for the corresponding increase in well-being, to be a good thing? 
What welfare economists say is that, under certain conditions, it is a morally good thing 
to increase the well-being of people by satisfying their preferences or by creating the 
conditions such that they can satisfy their preferences. This statement implies that under 
certain other conditions, while the satisfaction of preferences might still increase the 
well-being of certain people, it might not actually be a morally good thing to do.
Some readers might wonder “how can something satisfy preferences and not be a 
good thing?” (If you are among them, you might discover that your mindset is more 
neoliberal than you think!). If anything - the surprised reader might rejoin -, a wedge 
should be inserted between well-being and preference satisfaction; in other words, not 
anything that satises preferences increases well-being, but those actions that do satisfy 
preferences and also increase well-being, should automatically be morally good. I have 
already  surveyed  this  popular  counter-argument  to  microeconomics  in  Chapter  2: 
breaking  up  the  identity  between  satisfaction  of  preferences  and  well-being  means 
pointing to the fact that some of our everyday actions - like smoking, eating too salty 
food, and marrying the wrong person - satisfy our preferences but do not increase our 
well-being.
This argument has some empirical merits,  but its theoretical grip on economic 
theory  is  rmly  dismissed  by  the  assumption  of  perfect  information.  For  economic 
theory,  the person who - to an external observer -  indulges a bit  too much in wine 
drinking is  not  some weak-willed  character,  but  rather  someone who has  rationally 
weighed up the costs of purchasing wine, the health cost of heavy drinking, and many 
other things against the pleasure of lightheadedness just before being hit by the one-
glass-too-many feeling and the pleasure of tasting different wines, which might be both 
physical and intellectual. In this respect, the heavy-wine-drinker of economic theory is 
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more similar to the nancial analyst in charge of deciding whether or not to grant a loan 
than  to  the  failing  moral  characters  of  The  Sun  Also  Rises.  In  other  words,  the 
assumption of perfect information rules out the possibility of an external point of view 
from which to  judge certain  actions  as  truly  conducive to  well-being and creates  a 
relationship  of  strict  necessity  between  preference  satisfaction  and  well-being.  The 
results  are  sometimes  truly  surprising,  yet  perfectly  sound  within  the  economic 
framework  of  rationality  plus  the  assumptions  of  perfect  information  and  self-
interestedness: drug addiction thus becomes rational drug addiction; addiction is, in fact, 
a pattern of consumption which maximizes the discounted utility of the addict (Becker 
and Murphy, 1988).
After this digression on the identity between the satisfaction of preferences and 
well-being,  we  can  now  go  back  to  the  original  problem:  under  what  conditions, 
precisely, is the increase of well-being not a good thing? The idea here is that there are 
moral dimensions other than well-being, and in this plural normative space, well-being 
is  one  normative  metric  among many others.  Let  me clarify  this  with  an  example: 
imagine there is a society with two individuals, A and B. A’s and B’s well-being can be 
represented with natural numbers: A has 5 and B has 7. Following a distribution of 
resources,  the  map  of  well-being  distribution  in  this  society  now  turns  into  the 
following: A has 6 and B has 22. In this new society, there has been an increase of well-
being, both at the individual and aggregate levels. It is also very noticeable that the 
inequality of the society has increased. Incidentally, let me also remark that this new 
distribution  would  be  justiable  both  along  welfare  economics  lines  and  along 
egalitarian prioritarianism ones - à la Rawls - as the new distribution improves the lot of 
the worst-off. This new distribution would not be justiable along strictly egalitarian 
lines as the distance between the two individuals in terms of well-being has increased. 
Imagine now also a third society in which A has 6 and B 8, but, following this new 
distribution of resources, a signicant degradation of the environment has also occurred. 
It is easy to see how the two new distributions - in the second and third societies - might 
be criticized from a normative point of view external to welfare economics: the second 
society  creates  a  spike  in  welfare  inequality,  the  third  creates  environmental 
degradation.  Inequality  and  environmental  degradation  are  thus,  in  the  examples 
provided, the “things” which have not “stayed equal,” and which could stop a decision-
maker from implementing a policy which would increase well-being. In these cases, 
increasing well-being might not be a morally good thing to do.
Every  student  of  economics  is  told,  when  these  situations  occur,  that  Pareto 
improvements  are  to  be  clearly  separated  from  issues  of  justice.  Economic  theory 
merely provides decision-makers with reports giving guidance on how to increase the 
size of the economic pie; whether it is worth moving to the distribution which increases 
the pie and well-being is a political decision. What happens after the economists hand in 
the reports is not their business anymore. However, this simple mantra - “efciency is 
not justice” - is easily forgotten when the students continue and take more advanced 
economic classes, and even more so when they leave the university: there efciency - 
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gains  in  terms  of  preference  satisfaction  -  and  justice  -  other  moral  dimensions 
alternative to well-being - become increasingly intertwined.
Here is  how the reasoning goes:  the two above-mentioned societies  -  the one 
which creates inequality and the one which creates environmental degradation - would 
not  represent  any  improved  state  of  affairs  compared  to  the  rst  society  if  the 
individuals  of  those  societies  really  cared  about  inequality  or  environmental 
degradation.  If  inequality  itself  imposes  costs  upon  certain  individuals  low  in  the 
social-economic ladder - i.e. certain individuals care about inequality and how resources 
are distributed - then we would see that in the second society of the example, once 
everything has been considered, the new distribution would actually be something like 
A has 4 and B has 22. The same argument can be made with the case of environmental 
degradation:  if  environmental  degradation  imposes  costs  upon  individuals  -  i.e. 
individuals care about the environment - then we would see that in the third society of 
the example, again once everything has been considered, the new distribution would not 
actually represent any improvement, or could even entail a loss of well-being.
It  is worth spending some time on these special clauses, “once everything has 
been considered,” or “if the individuals really cared about x,” because they represent the 
point at which welfare economics, as it has been taught in university rst-year courses, 
and  welfare  economics  as  it  is  now  practiced  in  a  wide  array  of  economic  side 
disciplines - such as environmental economics -, actually go different ways. There has 
been a constant movement of erosion of alternative normative dimensions from within 
welfare economics by subsuming every possible concern - material,  intellectual, and 
moral - into individual preferences the satisfaction of which is necessary for well-being 
to  improve.  In  other  words,  well-being,  from  being  one  among  many  normative 
dimensions, moves to center stage by internalizing alternative normative dimensions. 
This erosion of alternatives is what seemingly prohibits inserting a wedge between a 
choice  which  satises  preferences  and  the  moral  goodness  of  this  choice:  if  every 
possible normative concern - equality, freedom, environmental protection - is already 
internalized into preferences, then everything which increases preferences is also ipso 
facto morally good. Once every possible moral dimension is successfully internalized 
into preference satisfaction and well-being, then the principle of minimal benevolence 
can do all the work: more is better than less, nothing else is needed, no “ceteris paribus” 
clause is required anymore.
It is also possible to pinpoint the historical origins of this movement of erosion, 
which,  at  least  initially,  roughly  overlaps  with  the  work  of  Gary  Becker.  He  later 
became a Nobel laureate for having initiated this work of erosion/absorption of other 
disciplines by bringing them into the realm of welfare economics; or,  in the precise 
words of the Nobel commission, “for having extended the domain of microeconomic 
analysis  to  a  wide range of  human behaviour and interaction,  including non-market 
behaviour.”  As much as Becker’s  extensive scholarship,  also his  own words,  when 2
 For  the  press  release  announcing  the  winner  of  the  prize  and  the  motivation  see:  http://2
www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1992/press.html  (last  accessed  May 
2017).
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welfare economics by subsuming every possible concern - material,  intellectual, and 
moral - into individual preferences the satisfaction of which is necessary for well-being 
to  improve.  In  other  words,  well-being,  from  being  one  among  many  normative 
dimensions, moves to center stage by internalizing alternative normative dimensions. 
This erosion of alternatives is what seemingly prohibits inserting a wedge between a 
choice  which  satises  preferences  and  the  moral  goodness  of  this  choice:  if  every 
possible normative concern - equality, freedom, environmental protection - is already 
internalized into preferences, then everything which increases preferences is also ipso 
facto morally good. Once every possible moral dimension is successfully internalized 
into preference satisfaction and well-being, then the principle of minimal benevolence 
can do all the work: more is better than less, nothing else is needed, no “ceteris paribus” 
clause is required anymore.
It is also possible to pinpoint the historical origins of this movement of erosion, 
which,  at  least  initially,  roughly  overlaps  with  the  work  of  Gary  Becker.  He  later 
became a Nobel laureate for having initiated this work of erosion/absorption of other 
disciplines by bringing them into the realm of welfare economics; or,  in the precise 
words of the Nobel commission, “for having extended the domain of microeconomic 
analysis  to  a  wide range of  human behaviour and interaction,  including non-market 
behaviour.”  As much as Becker’s  extensive scholarship,  also his  own words,  when 2
 For  the  press  release  announcing  the  winner  of  the  prize  and  the  motivation  see:  http://2
www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1992/press.html  (last  accessed  May 
2017).
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receiving the coveted prize, give a real indication of the fundamental insight which has 
driven  his  research  along  the  years.  According  to  Becker,  “individuals  maximize 
welfare  as  they  conceive  it,  whether  they  be  selsh,  altruistic,  loyal,  spiteful,  or 
masochistic.”  In  other  words,  he  claims  that  preference  satisfaction  encompasses 
domains previously conned to moral talk only, such as those of loyalty or altruism 
referred to in his quote.
Becker opened the gates: research into the social sciences through the methods of 
economics has grown ever since to the point that the political scientists Donald Green 
and Ian Shapiro, in a book titled Pathologies of Rational Choice, complain about the 
extent to which Rational Choice Theory is being unreectively used in political science 
to  explain  disparate  social  phenomena:  how  social  mobilization  occurs,  how 
authoritarian  regimes  hold  on  to  power,  how racial  segregation  is  created  in  urban 
settings, etc. (Green and Shapiro, 1994). In their book, Green and Shapiro introduce a 
felicitous distinction between method-driven research and problem-driven research to 
explain when pathologies in the use of Rational Choice Theory are likely to develop. 
Method-driven research occurs when a social phenomenon is chosen and presented in a 
particular  way in  order  to  justify  a  particular  theory instead of  characterizing more 
adequately a problem whose importance is not dependent on the theory. Problem-driven 
research, on the other hand, starts with the problem and asks why a social phenomenon 
is the way it is. This approach requires the researcher to look at the previous attempts to 
account for the social  phenomenon, weigh their  strengths and weaknesses,  and then 
evaluate  whether  a  different  method  could  improve  our  understanding  of  the 
phenomenon. One of the consequences of the surge in method-driven research, as per 
the  method  of  Rational  Choice  Theory,  is  to  have  increased  the  pool  of  actions, 
behaviors, or simple attitudes which can be read through the lens of market relations. 
Individuals are now interpreted as reacting to incentives, collaborating with others to 
improve their  expected  pay-offs,  free-riding  on collective  efforts,  etc.  even when it 
never occurred to these individuals to act and think by reference to payoffs and costs in 
the rst place.
Since  the  publication  of  Green  and  Shapiro  back  in  1994,  the  pendulum has 
swung so far away from problem-driven research that method-driven research has even 
made it into popular culture. I am here referring to the fortunate Freakonomics series of 
books, podcasts, newspaper articles, and even a movie, by Steven Levitt and Stephen 
Dubner.3
Becker led the way by showing how every possible individual aspiration could be 
shoehorned into a preference in need of being maximized, and a generation of scholars 
in the social sciences followed him by looking for phenomena which could, in principle, 
be  adapted  to  the  methods  of  microeconomic  theory.  If  everything  can  be  seen  as 
maximizing or frustrating some preferences, decision-makers, to act correctly, only need 
to count  properly.  In order  to see if  the decision to convert  a  forested area into an 
 For an overview of the material produced under the label “Freakonomics” see: http://freakonomics.com/ 3
(last accessed May 2017).
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amusement park is justied, the decision-maker needs, rst, to identify all the people 
affected by that decision - no small endeavor considering that policies often affect not-
yet-born people, and those living outside the borders of the political decision - and, 
second, she has to make sure that all the preferences of the affected people are counted 
properly. Surveys and market observations are all instrumental to this difcult counting 
exercise. If something falls beyond this calculus, then it is not possible to act correctly, 
or in any case, it is less likely that the outcome will actually improve people’s well-
being. Bad outcomes then happen when something which is supposed to be inside the 
calculus remains outside; usually, it is a failure to include some of the preferences of the 
affected individuals or a failure to identify all the affected individuals.
This is why we usually associate the verb “to internalize” to something positive, 
and in many ways within this normative framework it is indeed positive: “a polluting 
rm is being forced to internalize the environmental costs of its operations” means that 
the polluting rm can no longer pollute the environment and remain unaccountable for 
such actions. By “internalizing,” a pollution rm has to pay taxes and nes, compensate 
the  losers,  buy  emission  credits  from  someone,  or  spend  money  in  costly  greener 
production technologies. It also means that before “internalizing” there was a group of 
individuals who cared about the environment, that the pollution activities of the rm 
were  frustrating  some  of  their  preferences,  and  hence  impacting  their  well-being 
negatively without there being consideration of their condition. By internalizing, the 
polluting rm itself - when the internal public relations department is well aware of the 
nancial losses of bad publicity -, or the authorities who impose upon polluting rms 
corrective measures, recognize that, when individuals really care about the environment, 
the distribution of resources produced by polluting the environment not only fails to 
increase the well-being of the affected people but is also morally bad.
I do not want to dismiss this method-driven scholarship lock, stock, and barrel, 
which in many ways brought a new perspective to bear on old problems and has, if 
anything, considerable heuristic value. However, it is instrumental to my argument to 
show how the erosion of previously autonomous normative domains and their inclusion, 
or internalization, into welfare economics has progressively and signicantly rendered 
more shallow the political space in which conicts among different normative positions 
have  a  legitimate  place.  The  narrative  ecological  modernization  translates  every 
normative concern into preferences that should be maximized in the most cost-efcient 
way, premised on the assumption that this is the most “natural” way of deciding on 
competing policy issues. This is a blind spot because the normative concerns which are 
clearly considered from within a certain competing narrative are sidelined within the 
ecological modernization framework.
Once alternative normative concerns have been successfully internalized into yet 
another set of preferences to be satised, they lose their original normative force, they 
become the empty shells of what they once were. This is because these internalized 
concerns lose the force that comes from having an independent source of normativity. 
Big development  projects  such as  infrastructure building of  roads and dams always 
impact heavily on the lives of local populations. In an increasing effort to ensure that 
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such impacts are minimized as much as possible, institutional donors require project 
managers to provide additional safeguards concerning the extent to which social and 
environmental costs have been taken into consideration - i.e. internalized - and properly 
addressed in the design of  the development project.  For dam projects,  for  example, 
environmental  costs  include  biodiversity  loss  both  up-  and  downstream  the  dam, 
changes of chemical and physical properties of the rivers affected, and alteration of the 
landscapes. Social costs include the creation of the gure of the dam refugee, i.e. people 
displaced  as  a  consequence  of  the  construction  of  the  dam  or  its  effects  once  in 
operation.  As  these  “costs”  might  suggest,  the  construction  of  big  dams  can  be 
normatively contested both on environmental grounds and on grounds that it  affects 
negatively the lives of peasant populations.  By internalizing these concerns into the 
design of  the  projects,  project  managers  guarantee  that  some compensation goes  to 
displaced populations and that environmental mitigation, such as environmental ow 
releases  to  sustain  downstream  ecosystems,  are  put  in  place.  Environmental 
compensation  is  also  a  possibility,  i.e.  the  creation  of  a  national  park  or  the 
rehabilitation  of  previously  disturbed  land  elsewhere  to  compensate  for  the  loss  of 
biodiversity  in  the  dam area.  However,  by internalizing these  concerns,  hence once 
everything has been taken into consideration, and once sufcient consideration to what 
the people really care about has been paid, the policy outcome, were the project to go 
through nonetheless, becomes unimpeachable. Indeed, only two possible problematic 
outcomes  could  follow  from  the  implementation  of  a  project  whose  approval  was 
conditioned upon the internalization of  social  and environmental  costs:  (i)  there are 
negative social and/or environmental impacts which are not properly accounted for; (ii) 
there are negative social and/or environmental impacts which are already accounted for. 
Outcome (i) points to a mere technical problem, something that remained outside the 
cost-benet calculation and that should be included. This outcome commands a solution 
which remains internal to the normative framework of preference satisfaction. Outcome 
(ii) points instead to an apparent problem: once everything has been properly counted, 
the remaining social and environmental impacts, such as a spike in income inequality or 
environmental degradation, are nothing but empty observations lacking normative bite. 
Once  internalized,  inequality  is  not  inequitable  anymore,  nor  is  environmental 
degradation.
Analogously to libertarians, who do not nd inequality to be a normative concern 
if vindicated by the three principles of justice in acquisition, exchange, and rectication, 
many environmental economists do not nd inequality or environmental degradation 
morally concerning if previously accounted for and properly internalized in cost-benet 
calculations.  However,  whereas Nozick developed a theory of justice in response to 
other accounts - most notably Rawls’ -, and presented his theory as fundamentally other 
than these accounts, hoping to initiate a fruitful debate among theories with different 
normative foundations, welfare economists have largely abandoned, since the 1960‘s, 
their commitment to being one voice among many.
This  is  the  fundamental  blind  spot  created  by  the  welfare  economics 
presuppositions of the narrative of ecological modernization: in inspiring development 
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and  environmental  policies,  scholars  working  within  the  ecological  modernization 
framework  sometimes  create  negative  social  and  environmental  impacts,  while 
implicitly justifying these outcomes as being already “accounted for”; furthermore, this 
deprives the public space of confrontations among positions normatively independent 
from each other.  On the other side, however, this normative blind spot also contributes 4
to  the  undeniable  strength  of  the  narrative  of  ecological  modernization:  as  every 
possible  normative  concern  is  placed  on  the  same  scale,  policy-makers  and  their 
advisors have an easy instrument to weigh competing and previously incommensurable 
values and to deliberate among different environmental policies.
Civic environmentalism
It is one thing to say that some inequality and environmental degradation might not be 
morally  concerning  because  social  and  environmental  costs  have  been  internalized, 
quite another to experience those policy outcomes rst-hand and be told that - as social 
and environmental costs have already been properly internalized - such experiences are 
only the ineliminable background noise of an otherwise perfect recording. That would 
not even be too bad if the dynamics of markets always guaranteed a fair alternation 
between  winners  and  losers,  such  that  inequalities  in  wealth  and  access  to 
environmental amenities were in the not-so-long-run equally distributed across a wide 
spectrum  of  people.  However,  the  track  record  of  markets  and  market-based 
mechanisms in delivering equitable environmental protection is tainted by the fact that 
specic features of welfare economics systemically tilt the provision of environmental 
goods in favor of the already better off. A common response to this state of affairs has 
been  to  open  decision-making  institutions  to  the  participation  of  previously 
marginalized  people  with  the  hope  that  the  new participants  are  able  to  affect  the 
distribution  of  resources  created  by  market  mechanisms.  Since  the  late  ‘80s,  this 
movement toward greater participation has been extended to the institutions in charge of 
environmental policies.
A basic idea of procedural justice stands behind the promise that participation - 
especially  when understood in  its  stronger  sense  of  participation as  presence at  the 
decision-making table -  is  capable of  producing convergence between the particular 
perceived interests of different people and the real interests of that community of people 
which might seek a more equitable distribution of resources. That is, the assumption 
that a properly devised procedure could lead to a just outcome. In A Theory of Justice 
(1971),  Rawls  introduced  three  different  notions  of  procedural  justice:  perfect, 
imperfect,  and pure.  Perfect  procedural  justice occurs when there is  an independent 
criterion to establish what is right and just, and there is a procedure which guarantees 
 An excellent reconstruction of the value conicts involved in the decision-making process which leads 4
to building a dam and of how institutionalized procedures which evaluate the environmental impacts of 
large projects (such as the Environmental Impact Assessment) constrain and undermine the playing out of 
open deliberations informed by conicting values is provided by Costa et al. (2016). 
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that just results will be achieved. Rawls’ famous example is that of distributive fairness 
in  cutting a  cake:  provided that  the goal  is  to  allocate  an equal  amount  of  cake to 
everyone, the procedure which guarantees this outcome is that the person in charge of 
cutting the cake will be the last one to pick a slice of it. Assuming that everyone wants 
as  much cake  as  possible,  including  the  cake-cutter  herself,  the  cake-cutter  will  be 
compelled to divide the cake into equal parts. Imperfect procedural justice occurs when 
there  is  an  independent  criterion  to  establish  what  is  right  and just  but  there  is  no 
procedure which guarantees that the just outcome will be achieved. Rawls’ example is 
that of a criminal trial: “even though the law is carefully followed, and the proceeding 
fairly and properly conducted, it may reach the wrong outcome. An innocent man may 
be found guilty, a guilty man may be set free” (Rawls 1971: 86). When an independent 
criterion to establish what is right and fair does not exist, then, in certain instances, a 
procedure  could  be  invoked  to  establish  what  is  right;  and  this  outcome  will  be 
achieved, provided that the procedure has been properly followed. This is an instance of 
pure procedural justice; Rawls’ example is that of gambling. Provided that every player 
has  entered  the  game  uncoerced,  committed  her  own  money  and  not  stolen  from 
anyone,  and  possibly  many  other  requirements,  then,  whatever  the  outcome  of  the 
gambling, it will be just.
The recognition of one’s needs and some redistribution of resources to meet those 
needs are felt by many participants to be the conditio sine qua non for their involvement 
in political decision-making; i.e. what they are there for. For example, major groups of 
the  UN -  the  institution  of  which has  issued a  rst  strong signal  in  the  movement 
towards more participation in the ‘90s -  ask for  more resources to be channeled to 
youths, farmers, etc.; they ask for policies more favorable to their constituencies. Using 
Rawls’s  terminology,  redistribution  is  the  independent  criterion  which  the  various 
participatory  procedure  are  designed  to  achieve.  However,  what  I  have  called  the 
“general  loss  of  authority  of  the  established  sciences”  (section  on  Clashes  -  civic 
environmentalism, above), together with the end-of-history arguments about enhanced 
participation,  not  only  had  been  the  rationale  for  the  uptake  of  a  narrative  of 
participation  in  environmental  politics,  but  it  also  de  facto  progressively  eroded 
whatever  external  and  independent  criterion  existed  in  order  to  evaluate  what  the 
ultimate goal of this movement of participation should be. The more the importance of 
participation has been stressed, the more its role expanded. In other words, the buzz 
around public participation and the concomitant creation of a narrative contributed to 
redening the very role of participation: initially, public participation took the form of 
legitimacy-enhancing consultations on specic agenda items aimed at more resource or 
wealth redistribution. Once the narrative moved to center stage, the limited set of issues 
about which the public could be consulted increasingly felt as an unprincipled limitation 
of the scope of participatory politics. The result is that, in environmental politics, it is 
increasingly the third understanding of procedural justice -  pure procedural justice - 
which  seems  to  subtend  a  number  of  practices  which  receive  the  label  of 
“participatory.” It is participation itself, operationalized as the satisfaction of a number 
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of disparate requirements - the following of a procedure -, which guarantees the moral 
acceptability of resulting policies, whatever they might end up being.
A digression on a specic case of a participatory procedure: FPIC
This  movement  from  procedures  with  a  built-in  guiding  criterion  -  in  Rawls’ 
terminology, both perfect and imperfect procedural justice - towards pure procedural 
justice is for example quite evident in forestry politics, and more specically in those 
forestry policies and projects in which the requirement of public participation has been 
satised through the Free Prior Informed Consent procedure.
While the uptake of government-backed REDD projects has been slow,  REDD 5
projects among private entities have been numerous in the last decade. Before UNFCCC 
ofcially arrived at a blueprint to operationalize the mandate that the management of 
forest resources be participatory - which happened with the agreement on the REDD+ 
Safeguards at UNFCCC’s COP 16 in Cancún - REDD projects among private actors 
which involved areas inhabited by indigenous people were nonetheless being regulated 
by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN General Assembly, 
2007).  In  this  document,  the  most  important  instrument  aimed at  guaranteeing  that 
decision-making  in  the  management  of  natural  resources  is  participatory  is  the 
requirement  of  Free  and  Prior  Informed  Consent  (FPIC).  In  any  case,  REDD+ 
Safeguards remain for the time being quite vague, and individual countries are given a 
signicant margin of appreciation in interpreting the different Safeguards. For example, 
concerning the issue of participation, REDD+ Safeguards specify that it has to be “full 
and effective,” without further detailing what makes participation full and effective. It is 
likely  that  individual  countries  will  interpret  the  requirement  of  “full  and  effective 
participation” in a path-dependent way by continuing to resort to the FPIC principle 
enshrined in the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.  According to the 
United  Nations  Permanent  Forum  on  Indigenous  Peoples  (UNFPII,  2011),  FPIC 
represents  the  absence  of  coercion,  intimidation  or  manipulation  (free)  in  situations 
where  indigenous  peoples  might  be  affected  by  a  development  and  resource 
intervention. It also entails early consent with adequate time for local decision-making 
(prior) and access to sufcient, appropriate information for a considered choice and its 
likely impacts (informed). Finally, indigenous peoples also have the right to consent or 
withhold consent.
Looking  at  the  last  decade  of  forestry  politics,  the  FPIC  procedure  can  be 
considered a veritable battleground for competing ideas of public participation, which in 
turn subtend competing ideas of procedural justice. According to the reconstruction of 
Mahanty and McDermott (2013), FPIC was designed to tilt the balance of power in the 
management of natural resources towards local and indigenous populations. Power and 
 Since it was rst put forward in 2006 it had stalled multiple times due to the legitimate concerns over 5
the double counting of carbon savings (so-called additionality and leakage issues) and over the impacts 
on the local population.
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Looking  at  the  last  decade  of  forestry  politics,  the  FPIC  procedure  can  be 
considered a veritable battleground for competing ideas of public participation, which in 
turn subtend competing ideas of procedural justice. According to the reconstruction of 
Mahanty and McDermott (2013), FPIC was designed to tilt the balance of power in the 
management of natural resources towards local and indigenous populations. Power and 
 Since it was rst put forward in 2006 it had stalled multiple times due to the legitimate concerns over 5
the double counting of carbon savings (so-called additionality and leakage issues) and over the impacts 
on the local population.
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wealth  redistribution had been the  guiding criterion in  the  design of  the  procedure. 
Indeed,  the  practice  of  obtaining  FPIC  was  promoted  by  a  coalition  of  non-
governmental actors led by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), which was increasingly 
frustrated with the impact of the extractive timber industry on local populations and 
with the slow response of inter-governmental negotiations to address the problem. This 
environmental NGOs coalition thus launched the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). 
The  FSC is  an  international  certication  organization  and  a  form of  market-driven 
governance:  it  sets  environmental  standards  and  ensures  that  the  forestry  industry 
employs socially responsible practices.  These standards,  through a system of green-
labeling, then incentivize socially and environmentally sustainable forest practices. A 
number  of  organizations  which comprise  the  coalition led by the  WWF were more 
interested in issues of indigenous recognition - their livelihood and access to resources - 
than in forest loss, and, as a consequence, they fought so that FSC would also place 
signicant emphasis on the participation of indigenous and local people. This internal 
trend was also welcomed due to the perceived convergence between indigenous and 
conservation interests (Elliot 2000: 91). Even before the formal launch of FSC in 1993, 
indigenous organizations were consulted on the content of the FSC standards, and they 
became full members of the certication system. The standards that emerged from these 
early consultations are known as the Ten Principles and Criteria (FSC, 2015). Principle 
3 deals specically with indigenous rights and required “free and informed consent” on 
all matters involving indigenous legal and customary rights.
FPIC  is  grounded  of  the  Western  notion  of  property  rights  (Mahanty  and 
McDermott, 2013). Property rights specify that people who have a legal title to a certain 
property  cannot  be  dispossessed of  it  without  their  consent.  The fact  that  the  main 
mechanism for indigenous people’s participation is grounded on the notion of property 
rights is not a fortuitous accident, but rather a well-thought out political move. It  is 
informed by the desire of indigenous groups to afrm rights to their lands, while at the 
same time strengthening them vis-à-vis public opinion and international organizations. 
As we have seen in Chapter 4, property rights are the door to commodication; once 
introduced, they bring with them the logic that properties can be exchanged and sold. 
On the other hand, if and when this door remains well-guarded - i.e. local populations 
manage to keep holding their property rights even despite nancial pressure -, this can 
work as a strategy to keep withstand commodication and the degradation it entails for 
the environment - for those who subscribe to the theory which links commodication to 
environmental  degradation.  It  is  clear  that  FPIC was intended to  tilt  the balance of 
power  in  the  management  of  the  natural  resources  towards  indigenous  and  local 
populations, and requiring the indigenous and local populations’ consent had been seen 
as  instrumental  to  this.  Furthermore,  the  FPIC  requirement  was  intended  to  work 
together with the many FSC equity principles, ranging from compliance with existing 
laws to enhancing community relations and well-being. However, as the narrative of 
participation  took  center  stage  in  environmental  politics,  FPIC,  too,  become  more 
popular and came to be seen as the most important element in the equity assessment of a 
project.
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While  participation grew in  importance,  other  equity  requirements  shrank and 
became increasingly ancillary.  This understanding of the FPIC as the “queen equity 
procedure” is endorsed by the forestry project promoters and implicit in their behavior. I 
contend that the very possibility of this behavior is a good indication of a change in the 
perception of mechanisms for public participation in the forestry domain.
By  having  the  right  to  withhold  consent,  a  local  population  can  in  principle 
guarantee  that  the  distribution  of  resources  originated  by  the  environmental  or 
development project will in some measure favor them, or in any case not worsen their 
position.  It  is  usually  acknowledged  that  FPIC  might  involve  deliberation  between 
project proponents and the local population, which can be lengthy and costly, and that a 
certain amount of capacity-building for local populations is required.
Yet this is not what the FPIC procedure immediately evokes in the mind of project 
promoters. It is the “consent” part of FPIC which concerns project proponents the most. 
(FPI)Consent  is  often  the  crucial  element  which  separates  project  proponents  from 
donor  money;  obtaining  it  becomes  of  paramount  importance  and  leads  project 
proponents to less than commendable behavior in their dealings with local populations. 
There is ample literature on REDD projects which testies to the tendency of project 
promoters to provide wrong, incomplete, or cursory information to local populations to 
obtain their consent.  In other words, the xation by project proponents on consent - 6
whether  actually  free,  prior,  and  informed,  or  obtained  through  deceit  -  shows  the 
centrality  of  FPIC as  a  procedural  requirement  in  order  to  successfully  address  the 
possible equity concerns which might be raised about the environmental project. Once 
consent  -  free,  prior,  and informed or  not,  and simply presented as  FPI  -  has  been 
obtained, the project,  from the equity point of view, has secured authorization. It  is 
participation, if and when participation can be operationalized through a veriable and 
clear  procedure,  which makes  the  project  equitable,  whatever  the  outcome;  and the 
procedure  in  turn  formally  guarantees  that  all  equity-relevant  issues  dear  to  the 
participants have been previously addressed.  It  is  in this  sense that  participation,  as 
operationalized  in  the  forestry  sector  through  the  requirement  of  FPIC,  can  be 
considered an instance of pure procedural justice.
 For example, the Purus REDD project in Acre (Brasil) had come under attack as the project promoters 6
from the rm Moura & Rosa presented the forest communities with a document to sign as “an insurance 
that the communities were going to benet from the project” (Centro de Memòria 2013: 7). Instead, the 
document was to secure legal rights to the land for the promotors, which document could be used as 
evidence in court in case the forest communities were to later seek legal recognition of their ownership 
over the land. A lack of effective participation in the policy deliberations carried out during the process of 
REDD  readiness  in  Nepal  has  been  proven  by  the  work  of  Bastakoti  and  Davidsen  (2015):  forest 
communities  are  sometimes  summoned  to  meetings  simply  to  legitimize  the  work  already  done  by 
external consultants, without there being an honest debate on the merits and faults of the projects.
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Pure proceduralism is not so pure
The section above highlighted the importance placed on consent as a litmus test for 
equitability and presented it  as a testimony of an ongoing process within a forestry 
politicy  of  erosion  of  alternative  equity  requirements.  The  section  provided  only  a 
concrete  example  of  a  more  general  trend  which  sees  the  invocation  of  public 
participation as a cover-all blanket to every equity concern. These remarks enable us to 
see the narrative of public participation from a different angle and open up the space for 
an  analysis  of  the  implications  of  viewing  public  participation  as  an  instance  of 
procedural justice. This section will make clear how this criticism can also be directed 
against pure procedures.
William Nelson (1980), in an article aimed at better cashing out Rawls’ treble 
distinction, casts doubts on the true novelty of the concept of pure procedural justice. 
More specically, he does not deny that there are actual cases in which the procedure 
determines the moral acceptability of the outcome - as in the case of FPIC in forestry 
projects - and that Rawls’ distinction might be a useful heuristic device. Yet he denies 
that these cases need a new normative apparatus to be explained. In Rawls’ example of 
gambling,  the outcome of the gamble will  necessarily be just  because the gamblers 
entered the gamble voluntarily,  committed their own money, they were not coerced, 
etc.; in other words, they freely exercised their rights to exchange the certainty of their 
money for a chance at some, perhaps bigger, return. These italicized words immediately 
bring us to a very specic set of normative positions: the liberal tradition of justice as 
entitlements.
If Nelson’s reading of Rawls is correct, by assuming and acting in line with the 
belief  that  participation  and  deliberation  guarantee  that  the  resulting  policies  and 
projects will be equitable, participant individuals and communities are transformed into 
bearers of entitlements which they can exercise freely. The normative bite of the policy 
outcomes then falls back on the very existence and the appropriate use - i.e. according 
to a procedure - of these entitlements. That participating people have entitlements is not 
bad; of course, the very notion of “entitlements” is associated with Nozick’s libertarian 
theory of justice which, it is fair to say, has more than a few detractors. However, one 
could espouse a thicker notion of entitlements which can cover primary social goods or 
Sen’s capabilities.
But the problem in constructing participation as a pure procedure lies elsewhere. 
Participants, by means of their entitlements, are the very sources of normativity. It then 
becomes of  paramount importance to understand who has those entitlements,  i.e.  to 
draw the border of participation around those people, and around those only who are 
affected by a political decision or a project. Here, we encounter the same problems as 
before: unborn and geographically distant people are systematically underrepresented. 
And  here  is  also  where  project  promoters  in  the  case  of  REDD  can  exploit  the 
widespread belief that participation makes policies or projects equitable: equitable tout 
court, not just more equitable than they would otherwise be. And they might do this by 
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making those who are not entitled to speak on a certain issue participate in lieu of those 
who would have been entitled to do so.7
The more general  point  to make is  that  procedures always smuggle in values, 
participatory ones included: they obviously do it when there is an independent criterion 
to evaluate what participation should achieve (perfect and imperfect procedural justice); 
but they also do it when such an independent criterion does not exist and the procedure 
itself guarantees that the procedural outcome is right. In the latter case, however, those 
smuggled-in  values  remain  buried  under  a  deep rhetoric  of  “directly  consulting  the 
people.” These values are those linked with an idea of justice as entitlements and they 
are a bedrock which remain non-negotiable and which the various participatory pure 
procedures simply carry forward unchanged. What remains non-negotiable is the value 
of  agreement  in  politics  and,  more  fundamental  still,  that  of  autonomy  and  self-
determination  of  the  single  individuals  involved,  who  are  the  ultimate  source  of 
normative authority. While all of this seems great, mostly because we, in the Western 
world, recognize ourselves in these liberal democratic values, one cannot but notice that 
this value-set also creates specic blind spots. Normative concerns to have a voice must 
speak through one or more participating individuals. In principle nothing precludes that 
a  whole  array  of  usually  marginal  concerns  be  taken  into  consideration  during  a 
participatory decision-making process - concerns for the quality of the environment or 
the distribution of environmental goods (environmental concern), for how policies will 
affect  unborn  or  geographically  distant  people  (concern  for  excluded  people),  and 
regarding whether policy decisions reect the best available research on a certain issue 
(scientic  concern).  But  there  is  no  prior  guarantee  that  they  will  be  taken  into 
consideration either.
What remains non-negotiable is not only autonomy and the attached individual 
entitlements as the ultimate source of normative authority, but crucially also the liberal 
ontology of  the self.  Even the assembly,  the paradigmatic  public  space of  the civic 
environmentalism narrative, is a place in which political preferences and reasons for 
actions may concern the well-being of society as a whole, but they are still defended in 
a moderately competitive way through arguments and rhetoric. This understanding of 
who individuals are and how they behave necessarily prioritizes certain freedoms over 
others. The fact that human beings are understood as isolated, with their own interests, 
ideals, ambition, and desires necessarily has an impact on the procedures that are called 
to make a society out of this individualistic political “primordial soup.” The procedures 
will thus be devised such that likely competing interests can be channeled, mediated, 
 A paradigmatic case of this type of intended mismatches happened with the REDD project in Bribri 7
territory (Costa Rica).  It  is  often presented as a project involving the participation of the indigenous 
population;  however,  it  has  been  implemented  without  proper  FPIC (Aguilar  and  Cabrera  2012:  7). 
Indigenous ofcers employed by state institutions have been involved in the REDD national strategy of 
Costa Rica since 2008; however, they sometimes have no relation with the forest communities directly 
impacted by the specic REDD projects.  Project promoters can, and often do, claim that their project 
involves indigenous people, which is technically true, albeit not in line with the spirit of participation 
(Kill 2015: 19).
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and  balanced.  The  freedoms  which  will  be  prioritized  are  those  attached  to  the 
individuals; they are expressed in terms of rights, and their protection is entrenched in 
the very structure of the state. On the other hand, everything which does not directly 
foster this construction of the liberal individual is not a matter of rights and can be 
bargained  away  in  the  process  of  decision-making.  The  environment,  then,  can  be 
bargained away, unless, of course, it can be shown that interventions upon it have a 
direct impact on the well-being of the people; in this case the harm principle can be 
invoked and environmental concerns are “internalized” into the individuals.
In  other  words,  the  criticism  to  the  liberal  ontology  behind  the  normative 
presuppositions  of  the  narrative  of  civic  environmentalism goes  to  the  heart  of  the 
liberal idea of state neutrality. Liberal procedures reinforce and reward certain liberties 
(contract, property, etc.), but at the same time exclude other possible ontologies of the 
self, and the alternative political arrangements which go with them.
What I am offering here is an update of the criticism to liberal institutions made 
rst by the communitarians. All these non-negotiable points in terms of who individuals 
are and how they behave,  cast  some shadows behind them. In the ‘80s it  was well 
understood  by  the  critics  of  Rawls  that  what  remained  the  blind  spot  of  liberal 
institutions was the value of community bonds which provided a sphere of meanings 
without which it would be impossible - or in any case not desirable - to freely exercise 
one’s individual power of choice in the society and ourish within it. For a while the 
communitarian  criticisms  did  not  really  preoccupy  liberal  scholars  because  the 
examples of alternative societies the communitarians put forward seemed to strengthen 
the  liberal  positions  instead  of  weakening  them:  MacIntyre  (1981)  remained  rather 
vague in his positive contribution and Walzer, famously, used the Indian caste system as 
a counterexample to liberal societies (Walzer, 1983: 313). However, a “second wave of 
communitarians” -  as  Bell  (2016) calls  it  -  did a much better  job in refocusing the 
debate by pointing to the social consequences of societies bent on following the liberal 
premises;  according  to  Etzioni,  loneliness,  crime,  high  divorce  rate  are  all  likely 
consequences of increasingly atomistic societies; a trend encouraged by both left and 
right political positions, albeit in different ways (Etzioni, 2001).
Now the critique can be taken further and employed to say that there are many 
other aspects which communitarians did not see and are equally excluded by the liberal 
self.  Its  blind  spot  includes  not  only  the  role  of  social  communities  but  also  of 
ecological communities. In particular, one could argue that atomistic societies which are 
now moved primarily by competition among the individuals constructed and fostered by 
liberal theories have a built-in tendency to overexploit natural resources. In other words, 
the normative presuppositions of civic environmentalism make it impossible to see the 
criticisms coming from radical environmentalism - it remains in the blind spot -, which 
stresses the role of economic growth, competition, and individualism as some of the true 
culprits of environmental problems.
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The blind spots of radical environmentalism
The  blind  spots  of  ecological  modernization  come  from  converting  equity  and 
ecological concerns into preferences which can then be addressed through the methods 
of  welfare  economics.  The  blind  spots  of  civic  environmentalism  come  from  not 
realizing  that  the  liberal  self  and  liberal  procedures  upon  which  its  normative 
presuppositions are built exclude important ecological dimensions which - similarly to 
communitarian ones - are of paramount importance if we want to make sense of our 
place in the larger ecological community and to act accordingly.
When  it  comes  to  uncovering  the  normative  blind  spots  of  radical 
environmentalism, the task is somewhat more complicated, compared to the other two 
previous  narratives.  In  Chapter  4,  I  reconstructed  radical  environmentalism  as  a 
negative narrative centered on the criticism of commodication and economic growth 
implicit in more mainstream narratives. This also means, however, that while remaining 
true  to  this  core  message  of  anti-commodication  and  anti-economic  growth,  quite 
different ideas of proper social arrangements - i.e. how a society in its basic structures is 
supposed  to  look  like  -  can  be  put  forward:  ecological  feminism,  eco-socialism, 
bioregionalism, deep ecology,  just  to  list  a  few, all  have different  visions of  how a 
society should be structured. Albeit in these many different guises, what brings radical 
environmentalists  together  is  the  attempt  to  reverse  the  logic  of  ecological 
modernization  and  civic  environmentalism.  Despite  their  differences,  ecological 
modernization  and  civic  environmentalism  share  a  common  understanding  of  the 
relation between society and nature in their conceptualization of justice and efciency. 
We have seen this clearly above in the continuities between ecological modernization 
and  civic  environmentalism -  how both  assume scarcity  and  go  in  the  direction  of 
employing economic growth to settle distributive issues - and in Chapter 5 where the 
two radical focuses - anti-commodication and degrowth - can be cashed out both in 
terms  of  a  criticism  against  welfare  economics  and  the  normative  presuppositions 
informing ecological modernization and against liberal theories of distributive justice 
and the normative presuppositions governing civic environmentalism. For the radical 
environmentalists,  the  concern  with  economic  growth  and  an  increase  in  and 
distribution of well-being should be subsumed under, and internalized into, the ecology, 
not the other way around. As put by Andrew Dobson, the guiding idea of these radical 
positions is that “the natural world should determine the political, economic, and social 
life of communities” (Dobson 2012: 100). By using Marxian categories, one could say 
that nature’s workings are the base of our societies, whereas political, economic and 
social arrangements are its superstructure.
In  this  section,  I  have  singled  out  two  possible  methods  which  radical 
environmentalist scholars might wish to employ to ensure the primacy of environmental 
concerns  over  economic  and social  ones.  The  rst  is  to  employ environment-based 
“currencies”  to  evaluate  policies  and  projects,  instead  of  employing  the  logic  of 
preference-satisfaction,  i.e.  a  human-based  currency.  Various  forms  of  energy 
accounting methods do precisely that. Energy accounting turns on the idea of “counting 
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The blind spots of radical environmentalism
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previous  narratives.  In  Chapter  4,  I  reconstructed  radical  environmentalism  as  a 
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concerns  over  economic  and social  ones.  The  rst  is  to  employ environment-based 
“currencies”  to  evaluate  policies  and  projects,  instead  of  employing  the  logic  of 
preference-satisfaction,  i.e.  a  human-based  currency.  Various  forms  of  energy 
accounting methods do precisely that. Energy accounting turns on the idea of “counting 
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in nature”: production and consumption patterns are then studied in terms, for example, 
of  their  ecological  footprint,  i.e.  the  appropriation  of  land  area  in  relation  to  the 
provision of consumer goods as a measure of environmental impact (Wackernagel and 
Rees, 1996). Another counting method is the material ow accounting (MFA), which is 
used  to  quantify  and  study  the  ows  of  materials  and  substances  across  different 
industrial sectors and ecosystems (Fischer-Kowalski et al., 2011). Whereas these energy 
accounting  methods  have  been  around  for  a  while,  they  do  not  seem  to  have 
dramatically advanced the radical cause towards less commodication and less growth. 
This is  because the energy accounting methods are mostly used either as additional 
checks, once the decisions are already taken, or for advocacy purposes. In the rst case, 
additional  energy  accounting  safeguards  are  used  to  identify  any  outstanding 
environmental  concern  to  be  internalized  and  move  on  with  the  project:  these 
accounting methods which count in nature are then instrumental to count nature into 
something  else,  and  hence  to  be  subsumed  under  the  logic  proper  of  ecological 
modernization. In the second case, energy accounting methods are used to advance in 
the public sphere, during debates and negotiations, the specic cause of those negatively 
impacted by environmental  problems.  Studies  on the  ecological  footprint  of  a  wide 
array of consumer products show how unequal the environmental impacts of different 
populations are the extent to which global consumption exceeds the bio-capacity of the 
planet - according to the WWF, we are consuming 1.6 planets (WWF, 2016). Whereas 
radical environmentalists would demand that a decision rst be taken on the basis that a 
policy or project respects the environment - low or zero environmental impact -, and 
only  subsequently  on  the  basis  that  it  meets  the  demands  of  the  consumers  or  the 
electorate, decision-makers usually do precisely the opposite: they justify their choices 
by invoking cost-efciency rationales or the demands of the electorate - both rmly 
grounded  on  the  sanctity  of  individual  autonomy  -,  and  if  there  are  outstanding 
environmental concerns they work a way out to meet them, too.
The second method advocated by some radical scholars is that of scaling back the 
impact of human beings on the environment by redrawing completely the boundaries of 
our  current  societies.  This  vision  is  shared  by  a  number  of  different  proposals: 
Schumacher’s  “small  is  beautiful”  communities  (Schumacher,  1974),  Latouche’s 
degrown societies (Latouche,  2009),  transition town movements,  and bioregionalism 
(Sale, 1985). All these proposals put forward a geographical solution to the problem of 
environmental  degradation:  human  beings,  by  living  beyond  the  boundaries  -  both 
conceptual and physical - dictated by nature, are wreaking havoc on earth and its fragile 
systems and equilibria. The solution is to put human beings back into their place, and 
hence  within  nature.  Among these  proposals,  the  most  radical  is  bioregionalism.  A 
bioregion is, according to the denition provided by Sale, “a part of the earth’s surface 
whose  rough  boundaries  are  determined  by  natural  rather  than  human  dictates, 
distinguishable from other areas by attributes of ora, fauna, water, climate, soils and 
land-forms,  and the human settlements  and cultures  those attributes  have given rise 
to”  (Sale,  1985:  168).  Living  in  a  bioregion  and  in  conformity  with  bioregionalist 
principles  would  entail  making  use  of  the  resources  which  are  found  within  the 
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bioregion - global trading would not be permitted - and living within a relatively small 
community of people. The small community is also the locus of decision-making, which 
would probably be constructed along liberal democratic lines. Yet this would not prove 
to  be  a  disruptive  element,  as  the  individuals  are  already  well  aware  of  what 
bioregionalism dictates to them, hence politics, too, would be limited within ecological 
boundaries.  Such a social  arrangement is  clearly too distant  from our current  social 
arrangements structured around the ideas originated during the French Revolution and 
its immediate aftermath; nothing short of a revolution would be necessary to get these 
ideas out of the papers and books and into politics. Yet this bioregional vision offers a 
powerful regulative idea of what radicals should aspire to: living within the bounds of 
nature, not outside of them.
Both  the  methods  surveyed  above  -  counting  in  nature  and  living  within 
ecological boundaries - implicitly presuppose some very specic ideas about nature. In 
the rst case, when energy accounting is used in a prescriptive way - for example to halt 
projects  in  which  the  dispersion  of  energy  does  not  justify  its  employment  -,  it 
presupposes that the movement from low entropy to high entropy should be minimized, 
that  low entropy  is  good  and  that  such  a  state  should  be  safeguarded  as  much  as 
possible.  In  the  second case,  the  geographical  solution  assumes  that  there  are  such 
things as bioregions and that an optimal size for organizing a society can be established. 
Radical environmentalists criticize environmental economics for establishing and using 
theoretical constructs such as “tons of CO2” and for dividing nature into clearly dened 
ecosystem  services  which  can  be  bought  and  sold.  They  caution  environmental 
economists about the perils of considering nature as an entity with dened boundaries, 
yet  ecologists  and  radical  scholars  do  not  seem to  be  engaged  in  a  very  different 
endeavor when they divide the world into bioregions, distinguish high and low entropy 
by introducing threshold levels, and prescribe the size of a society, such that human 
beings could live in harmony with nature. Surely, they might claim that their division is 
based on rmer ground as they are dictated by science and scientic ecology, instead of 
on the convenience of having tradable entities. But what they are essentially doing is to 
claim that there actually are some authorities who can correctly establish certain natural 
boundaries. These authorities are ecology and the natural sciences but they, too, use 
categorizations and pre-dene problems in a way which is  potentially controversial. 
Words, metaphors, and concept call for appropriate responses; and the categories and 
principles of ecology which make use of such words, metaphors, and concepts end up 
concealing implicit prescriptions. These are then received uncritically by those radical 
scholars who wish to put forward normative positions - such as those implicit in energy 
accounting or bioregionalism -, which follow the categories and principles of ecology 
and the natural  sciences.  The idea that  something is  in equilibrium, or would be in 
equilibrium  if  external  forces  were  not  present,  implicitly  demands  an  appropriate 
response, i.e. not perturbing the equilibrium state or removing the external forces that 
are  currently  perturbing  it.  The  idea  that  imaginary  lines  along  which  natural 
phenomena can be divided exist, and that these lines are called “boundaries,” implicitly 
demands that we treat these lines in the same way as we do geographical boundaries.
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The most enduring and comprehensive categorization across all the narratives and 
their  respective  normative  presuppositions  surveyed  so  far  -  hence  radical 
environmentalism included - is the dichotomy between society on the one hand and 
nature  on  the  other.  The  narratives  of  ecological  modernization  and  civic 
environmentalism perpetuate this categorization by depicting human interventions upon 
the  environment  as  external  forces  able  to  either  technically  reestablish  some  lost 
environmental  equilibrium  worth  preserving  or,  more  often,  by  dening  away 
environmental problems. Radical environmentalism tries to subvert the dichotomy by 
claiming that man and nature should be part of a harmonious unicum. The two radical 
methods surveyed above - counting in nature and living within ecological boundaries - 
can be understood precisely as instruments in order to realize this ideal. However, by 
leaving intact the categories of man/society, on the one hand, and environment/nature, 
on  the  other,  radical  environmentalism,  too,  perpetuates  the  dichotomy,  albeit  by 
different means. This is most evident when ecological explanations are employed to 
bear  on  human  matters.  If  social  arrangements  are  a  superstructure  on  top  of  the 
ecological base, then it  follows that the main ecological categories should sufce to 
explain social phenomena.
However, ecology is less successful in explaining the movement of the human 
population than those of sh or birds populations (Martínez-Alier, 1990). Sometimes, 
the  category  of  “adaptation”  is  employed to  explain  the  behavior  of  certain  human 
populations,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Peruvian  shepherds  in  the  Andes,  who  sustain 
themselves  with very low energy consumption.  Martínez-Alier  notes,  however,  how 
“Peruvian peasants have attempted time and again, at least from the Spanish conquest 
onwards, not to adapt to the destiny that the colonial power, the authorities from Lima, 
the  local  landowners,  and  the  world  economic  and  political  system,  reserved  for 
them” (Martínez-Alier,  1990:  11).  In  other  words,  there  are  occasions  in  which  an 
ecological explanation of some quintessentially human phenomenon risks giving up a 
more ne-grained analysis of what is going on in favor of some ideologically-driven 
account of biological evolution, i.e. motivated by the belief that human matters should 
be explained ecologically.
From the point of view of those who remain skeptical about the possibility of 
grounding a normative theory upon the descriptive statements of ecology, it might thus 
seem as a bad deal to give up what seem to be more normatively neutral approaches to 
environmental  politics -  such as those put  forward by ecological  modernization and 
civic environmentalism - in favor of a substantive and ecologically-inspired one.
As we have seen throughout this book, and on closer inspection, this is not how 
the deal should be presented at all: both the ecological modernization narrative and civic 
environmentalism narratives are far from being normatively neutral. These narratives 
smuggle in values which resonate with the majority of the people, which have been 
around at least since the French Revolution and hence which most persons were born 
into; they are neutral not because they are not substantive but because it is the kind of 
substance which we are used to. On the other hand, radical environmentalism tries to 
bring in prescriptions which are felt by many as an impediment to those same liberties 
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we currently take for granted. There is a specic set of well-known examples used by 
those  who  push  this  kind  of  argument  against  the  radical  positions:  radical 
environmentalism is - according to those critics - deeply misanthropic as, if followed 
through to its theoretical consequences, it would entail population control, curtailing of 
dietary  choices,  restrictions  on the  ability  to  freely  move by car  and plane,  trading 
limitations,  etc.  (Westra  and Lawson,  2001).  At  bottom,  this  can  be  portrayed as  a 
classic  old  vs.  new  values  debate:  the  ideas  of  the  Enlightenment  and  of  French 
Revolution before they imposed themselves faced an uphill battle that lasted more than 
a century; the conservatives of the time contended that while the promise of the new 
values  -  liberty  and  equality  -  might  seem  alluring,  the  price  to  pay  in  terms  of 
insecurity and instability due to the loss of the moral compass of the Ancien Régime 
would have been too high. And yet those new disrupting values are by and large the 
same which are now considered so commonplace - at least in the Western world, it must 
be remarked - that Rawls built his political liberalism upon them, i.e. a neutral meeting 
place where those who hold competing substantive theories of the good can negotiate 
among  themselves.  Of  course,  it  can  be  contended  that  Rawls  has  not  really  been 
successful  in  building  such  a  neutral  space,  that  his  theory  can  be  accused  of 
ethnocentrism and it is all but neutral. But the fact that a towering gure such as Rawls 
considered  them  as  suitable  candidates  to  build  a  mildly  multicultural  theory  of 
legitimate  power  and  distributive  justice  upon  them,  is  a  testimony  of  how 
commonplace these ideas have become since terror was rst needed to defend them.
The major blind spot of the normative positions which can be grouped under the 
label  of  radical  environmentalism does  not  come  from wanting  to  put  forward  the 
theoretical building blocks of a substantive environmental theory of justice and, in so 
doing, from translating and subsuming under an environmental core other normative 
concerns,  but  in  doing so  without  having previously  rinsed of  its  implicit  bias  and 
normative  presuppositions  the  conceptual  apparatus  necessary  to  subtend  such  a 
theoretical endeavor. In other words, radical propositions are constrained in either of 
two different ways. Either their propositions employ an anthropological model which 
keeps the liberal traits, in which case they are then ill-tted to the demands a substantive 
theory makes on human beings as characterized in a quintessentially liberal way. Or 
radical  positions  dump the  liberal  anthropological  model  (as  in  the  case  of  Andean 
peasants who supposedly should have adapted to the external energy conditions), yet 
they risk alienating all those people who are not yet willing to leave behind the typically 
modern construction of what counts as a human being.
It  makes  sense  to  speak  about  blind  spots  when  referencing  radical 
environmentalism scholarship because it remains locked up in this dynamics in which it 
is thus far incapable of re-conceptualizing the relation between society and nature in a 
way that can defuse this conundrum. This entails that radical environmentalism wants to 
have  its  cake  and  eat  it,  too:  either  critique  ecological  modernization  and  civic 
environmentalism, while holding on to the concept of social justice predicated of those 
positions, or introduce a model of environmental justice that cannot be reconciled with 
the key tenets of what counts as justice for moderns. In this sense, a blind spot which 
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covers what I have previously referred to as the liberal self is created because there is an 
understanding  that  the  underlying  anthropological  model  of  the  more  mainstream 
approaches is something worth keeping, and its traits are still felt as worth catering to; 
however  it  is  put  under  strain  and  overshadowed  by  the  substantive  theory  of 
environmental justice as envisioned by radical environmentalism scholars. Or there is a 
blind  spot  to  the  values  intrinsic  to  liberal  politics  which  makes  radical 
environmentalism  unpalatable  to  many  -  if  not  most  -  addressees  of  the  radical 
environmentalist narrative.
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CONCLUSION
“There is no consistent solution to the problems we are discussing that does not involve 
biting at least one bullet,” wrote Singer (2015) in the afterword to The Ethics of Killing 
Animals (Visak and Garner, 2015). He is referring to the moral dilemmas involved in 
killing animals for our consumption, but the quote can be perfectly applied to a wider 
array of environmental issues, including the debate presented in this book on competing 
environmental  narratives  and  their  normative  presuppositions  over  the  merits  and 
demerits of market-based mechanisms for environmental protection. In other words, no 
individual narrative - and its related normative presuppositions - is able to capture the 
complexity  of  environmental  politics  with  its  competing  demands  and  different 
concerns in such a way as not to create at least some discontent. The fact that each 
narrative has its blind spots - areas in which the concerns of competing narratives are 
willingly  or  unwillingly  overlooked  -  makes  it  unlikely  that  the  debate  about  the 
appropriate  normative  principles  informing  environmental  policy  will  disappear 
anytime soon. The policy implications of this irreducible complexity can be revealed in 
the actual elements which characterize a number of different environmental policies in 
the recent past, as well as in the debates surrounding these policies, which contributed 
to their approval and implementation or, alternatively, to their eventual demise. In other 
words, these competing narratives live side-by-side and, when environmental policies 
are rst put forward and then debated, each tries to pull in its separate direction. This 
plurality is reected both in the debates about these policies, as well as in the policies 
themselves.
I kicked off this book with the policy initiative of Ecuador. A decade ago, Ecuador 
submitted  a  conditional  policy  proposal  to  the  international  community:  monetary 
compensation  in  exchange  for  forfeiting  the  opportunity  costs  of  alternative,  more 
resource-intensive,  development  policies;  in  turn,  this  would  have  guaranteed 
environmental  protection and the  continual  provision of  various  valuable  ecosystem 
services. In this sense, the structure of this exchange is quite similar to what have come 
to be known as REDD(+) mechanisms, and to another Guyana proposal, which was 
much less successful. I started this book with these cases because they provided me with 
a  precise  entry  point  into  a  debate  -  on the  merits  and demerits  of  a  market-based 
mechanism for environmental protection - which is polarized and, most importantly, 
complex. In particular, the accusations of blackmail which at various points in the past 
decade  have  been  directed  to  these  conditional  policies  allowed  me  to  focus  on  a 
specic aspect  of  these policies:  their  normativity.  Of course,  normativity is  said in 
many ways and a way had to be devised to limit, and at the same time structure, the 
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much less successful. I started this book with these cases because they provided me with 
a  precise  entry  point  into  a  debate  -  on the  merits  and demerits  of  a  market-based 
mechanism for environmental protection - which is polarized and, most importantly, 
complex. In particular, the accusations of blackmail which at various points in the past 
decade  have  been  directed  to  these  conditional  policies  allowed  me  to  focus  on  a 
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eld of inquiry: looking at environmental narratives did precisely that. I have called this 
approach meso-level because it ideally inhabits a space which is found below macro-
global approaches to environmental policy analysis, yet does not rely on a case-by-case 
analysis of policies. By a macro approach I meant the tendency to employ a macro lens 
- a single overarching normative framework - when considering a given problem, and 
then nding out whether the case at hand can be justied in light of this normative 
framework.  By  global  I  meant  the  tendency  to  analyze  environmental  policies  by 
resorting to global justice approaches which evaluate a certain policy on the basis of 
rights and duties which distant states and people owe to each other. The quote with 
which I have opened Chapter 3 represents a good example of both. 
Narratives are stories already out there in the words of politicians,  journalists, 
negotiators, academics, about what is appropriate, acceptable, practicable or not, in the 
domain of environmental politics. As such, they are also vehicles of normative ideas 
which shape our perception of environmental politics.
By  looking  at  the  normative  presuppositions  governing  the  environmental 
narratives in terms of the popular dichotomy efciency vs. justice, and by analyzing the 
relationship  among  the  narratives  and  their  respective  normative  presuppositions  in 
terms of clashes, continuities, and blind spots, we get a better sense of where, precisely, 
the complexities lie,  and why the debate over the merits and faults of market-based 
environmental policies is not likely to see a reduction in its polarization any time soon.
Concerning  the  rst  matrix  -  efciency  vs.  justice  -,  ecological  modernization 
justies the adoption of market-based policies to address environmental problems on 
two  independents  grounds:  welfare  economics  and  libertarian  justice.  The  former 
justies market-based policies on the premise that they produce the greatest amount of 
well-being for  a  given population;  the latter,  on the premise that  they allow human 
beings  to  freely  go about  with  their  lives  with  minimum interference from state  or 
supranational  authorities.  Most  of  the  time  these  two  independent  grounds  of 
justication  reinforce  each  other:  market-based  mechanisms  efciently  satisfy 
preferences (the currency of welfare economics) and  safeguard individual freedoms. 
More rarely, however, libertarianism could work as an internal limit to policies built 
solely  on  welfare  economics  grounds.  This  happens  when  environmental  problems 
might infringe or impact negatively on the rights of individual people. We have also 
seen, however, that while libertarian justice might work as an internal constraint, this 
almost never happens because of several reasons: rst, it is not easy to specify which 
rights have been infringed, and complex policies often impact people on both sides of 
an issue - people whose rights are negatively impacted if a policy is implemented and 
those whose rights are negatively impacted if a policy is not implemented. Second, there 
are many brands of libertarianism, and these are invoked strategically by those who 
stand to gain from the status quo. Finally, as we have seen in Chapter 5, issues of justice 
are embedded in the welfare economics framework through the internalization of a wide 
array of normative concerns into economic preferences. In light of these considerations, 
it is possible to summarize the narrative of ecological modernization as the attempt to 
assimilate justice to efciency in environmental policy.
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Civic  environmentalism scholars  maintain  that  market  mechanisms might  well 
provide environmental  protection,  but  it  is  unlikely that  they also provide equitable 
environmental  protection.  The tendency of markets to produce inequitable outcomes 
needs to be corrected by resorting to mechanisms of public participation. We have seen 
that the narrative of participation is built on rejecting the assumption that the normative 
presuppositions  of  ecological  modernization  are  relevant  to  equitably  decide  on 
environmental  issues  (distributional  concern)  and  the  claim  that  the  inputs  of 
economists in policy making, and technical personnel in general, are truly value-free 
(legitimacy concern).  There are two different models of democracy, each relying on 
different normative grounds, upon which the narrative of civic environmentalism can be 
justied. The rst one sees the inputs of participating people in environmental politics 
as  valuable because the information that  they provide to policy makers through the 
voting process is helpful in designing more equitable policies. This model of democratic 
aggregation is anchored in a Rational Choice Theory model of individual behavior and 
remains prey of the specic epistemic communities which have privileged access to 
policy makers and which can weigh in on how political preferences are aggregated. This 
model of democracy, furthermore, hopes to solve the distributional concern without also 
tackling  the  legitimacy  concern.  The  aggregative  model  of  democracy  thus  only 
provides limited access to participating people. A more ambitious approach to public 
participation  is  represented  by  the  participatory  model  of  democracy,  which  is 
integrative in its aspirations. This model is grounded on Rawlsian political liberalism 
and aims to tackle the distributional concern by rst tackling the legitimacy concern 
through procedural  justice.  In  other  words,  a  fair  procedure,  centered on creating a 
space for the exercise of public reason, is needed to collectively clarify what counts as 
an  “equitable”  environmental  policy,  given  that  it  is  not  possible  to  rely  on  the 
substantive value commitments of particular epistemic communities. In light of these 
considerations, it is possible to summarize the narrative of civic environmentalism as 
the attempt to subsume efciency under a broader conception of political justice.
Radical  environmentalism  scholars  doubt  that  market-based  environmental 
protection can provide a lasting solution to environmental problems. Quite the opposite, 
they  are  -  according to  them -  their  true  culprit.  They arrive  at  this  conclusion  by 
offering a criticism of both the process of commodication of natural resources and the 
role of economic growth within our contemporary societies. In particular, they criticize 
welfare  economics  and  liberal  theories  of  distributive  justice  by  showing  how  the 
process of commodication of nature, which is instrumental to both, is both technically 
difcult and increases the inequality in the access to, and collective enjoyment of, those 
resources.  Furthermore,  they  criticize  welfare  economics  and  liberal  theories  of 
distributive justice by arguing that the need for continuous economic growth, which is 
necessary to both, is responsible for the degradation of the environment. They argue for 
this by resorting to a barrage of literature in ecological economics (Georgescu-Roegen, 
1971; Jackson, 2009, Meadows et al., 1972) and by criticizing the traits of competition 
and egoism within economics’ idealizing assumptions. In light of these considerations, 
it is possible to summarize the narrative of radical environmentalism as the attempt to 
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reject both the paradigms of efciency and political justice in favor of a largely non-
anthropocentric conception of justice. 
Table 6.1 - The rst matrix: efciency vs. justice.
The second matrix - clashes, continuities, and blind spots -, builds upon the work 
done  in  Chapters  2  to  4  and  represents  an  in-depth  analysis  of  the  normative 
presuppositions  unveiled  in  the  rst  matrix.  Starting  from  clashes,  the  different 
environmental  narratives  are  compared  by  means  of  four  different  categories:  (i) 
relevant  information,  (ii)  individual  agency,  (iii)  locus  of  decision-making,  and  (iv) 
governance  model.  Ecological  modernization  represents  a  technocratic  approach  to 
environmental  problem-solving which stresses  the role  of  consumers,  and economic 
actors  in  general,  in  providing  environmental  protection.  It  is  believed  that 
technocratically and externally determined policies and incentives can work towards 
aligning the economic preferences of economic actors with important societal goals. 
Civic environmentalism represents a participatory approach to environmental problem-
solving which stresses  the  role  of  the  citizens  in  providing equitable  environmental 
protection. Participating people collectively decide under fair and open conditions of 
deliberation the principles by which environmental policy should be informed. Radical 
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who contest that efciency and social justice are normative concerns to be taken into 
consideration when dealing with environmental issues.
These different narratives are, however, linked to one another by a deep set of 
continuities: the different proposals are built upon each other’s perceived shortcomings 
and depart from similar concerns. The three narratives depart from scarcity as a central 
theme  to  be  addressed  by  their  proposals.  Scarcity  is  framed  by  environmental 
economists  working  within  the  ecological  modernization  framework  both  as  a 
theoretical assumption from which economics draws its raison d'être and as a challenge 
to be met by ever more rened allocations. Scarcity is framed by civic environmentalist 
scholars  as  a  prerequisite  of  justice  -  half  way  between  abundance  and  extreme 
indigence -; as a theoretical assumption which impedes liberal distributive theories of 
justice from turning into perfectionist theories of the good; and as justication for a 
redistributive  system which,  within  the  limits  of  a  politically  agreed fair  system of 
distribution, pursues economic growth. Scarcity is framed by radical environmentalist 
scholars  as  a  fact  as  well  as  the  all-too-real  consequence  of  the  policy  solutions 
proposed thus  far  by the environmental  scholars  working within the  frameworks of 
competing narratives. Furthermore, by assuming scarcity and by employing a liberal 
normative framework, both ecological modernization and civic environmentalism resort 
to  economic  growth  in  order  to  settle  problems  of  efcient  allocation  and  fair 
redistribution of available resources. 
The  three  narratives,  as  a  consequence  of  the  fact  that,  while  departing  from 
common positions, pursue different theoretical paths, each have a peculiar blind spot. 
Ecological  modernization  translates  every  normative  concern  into  preferences  to  be 
maximized in the most cost-efcient way, premised on the assumption that this is the 
most “natural” way to analyze and solve social problems. Civic environmentalism does 
not  realize  that  the  liberal  self  and  liberal  procedures  upon  which  its  normative 
presuppositions are built implicitly stress the role of economic growth, competition, and 
individualism,  and  excludes  important  ecological  dimensions.  Radical 
environmentalism  implicitly  denies  the  modern  conception  of  human  agency  and 
freedom, yet it is not able to convincingly substitute it.
But what about those cases with which I have opened the book? They provided an 
example  of  the  debates  surrounding  market-based  mechanisms  for  environmental 
protection,  but  now  that  we  have  a  better  understanding  of  the  various  normative 
positions informing these types of debates, can we say something more about those too? 
I believe so, and not without a certain degree of hindsight, we can extrapolate some 
general traits which summarize the policy implications of the clashes, continuities, and 
blind spots  which each narrative and its  correlative normative presuppositions carry 
with them. I opened the book with the case of Ecuador, and I will end it with it. Not just 
because it gives the sense of a reassuring “coming full circle,” but also because the 
debate  which  accompanied  the  Yasuní-ITT  Initiative  as  a  market-based  policy,  its 
merits, and its shortcomings, has been, from the very beginning, more complex, more 
cacophonous,  and  more  publicly  available  in  the  general  media.  Of  course,  the 
vicissitudes  of  the  Yasuní-ITT Initiative  will  tell  a  story  which  is  very  specic  to 
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I believe so, and not without a certain degree of hindsight, we can extrapolate some 
general traits which summarize the policy implications of the clashes, continuities, and 
blind spots  which each narrative and its  correlative normative presuppositions carry 
with them. I opened the book with the case of Ecuador, and I will end it with it. Not just 
because it gives the sense of a reassuring “coming full circle,” but also because the 
debate  which  accompanied  the  Yasuní-ITT  Initiative  as  a  market-based  policy,  its 
merits, and its shortcomings, has been, from the very beginning, more complex, more 
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Ecuador and a handful of other Latin American countries; yet, when seen through the 
lenses of the environmental narratives and their normative presuppositions explored in 
the previous chapters, a few general lessons about the policy implications of competing 
environmental narratives can nonetheless be extrapolated.
Each environmental narrative analyzed in the previous chapters would frame and 
respond  to  Correa’s  Yasuní-ITT  Initiative  differently.  Ecological  modernization  is 
perfectly in line with Ecuador’s conditional proposal: by leaving the oil in the soil and 
receiving compensation for it,  both environmental protection and provision of social 
services are guaranteed. Correa’s proposal wanted to link compensation to the carbon 
market  in  a  way  that  the  amount  of  money  spent  on  leaving  oil  under  the  Yasuní 
National Park could earn a credit to emit CO2 somewhere else in the world. This is 
consistent  with  the  ecological  modernization  logic  that  CO2  reductions  need  to  be 
pursued where it is most efcient to do so. After the Initiative failed, the second option 
of Correa’s conditional proposal - drilling for oil - can still be understood within a larger 
ecological modernization framework: valuable resources are extracted in a way which, 
however,  allegedly  minimizes  its  social  costs.  Social  and  environmental  impact 
assessments  are  conducted,  and only  those  courses  of  action  which  minimize  these 
impacts are pursued, providing compensation for any outstanding social costs.
The Yasuní-ITT Initiative had been the result of civic society engagement around 
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Table 6.2 - The second matrix: clashes, continuities, and blind spots.
CONCLUSION
particular, participation around the Yasuní Initiative beneted from a general climate of 
public  engagement  which  culminated  with  the  drafting  of  the  new  Constitution  of 
Ecuador in 2008. Notably, the 2008 Constitution is the rst of its kind to grant rights to 
ecosystems and nature in general. The Yasuní could have convincingly been branded as 
the rst actual government-sponsored plan emerging from this collective redenition of 
what  counts  as  an  equitable  and  sustainable  policy.  However,  while  the  Initiative 
initially represented and reected the engagement of large part of the population on the 
issue  of  environmental  protection  and  fair  redistribution  of  the  resources,  once  the 
government was forced to follow through on its promise that, lacking sufcient foreign 
contributions, oil needed to be extracted, public support for the alternative course of 
action dwindled. This now reected more traditional forms of resource extraction: oil is 
drilled following so-called best  practices  which minimize impacts  -  e.g.  the  inland-
offshore model  -,  compensation and work opportunities  are provided for  the people 
directly affected by the policy, public oversight and monitoring is limited. While the 
proposal  of  the Initiative was in line with a model of  development which could be 
consistent with civic environmentalism, this cannot be said of the way in which the 
government has handled the dismissal of the Initiative. The civil society asked again to 
be involved and demanded a referendum over the approval of the new course of action, 
but this has not been granted.
From the point of view of radical environmentalism, the Yasuní-ITT Initiative has 
been a deeply problematic policy proposal. While admirable in its intention to keep the 
oil  underground,  the  Initiative  had  been  pursued  with  the  wrong  set  of  policy 
instruments.  Even  before  Correa’s  government  ofcially  axed  the  plan  to  save  the 
Yasuní Nation Park over the ITT oil blocks, in order to pursue a more fairly traditional 
extractive development path, the Yasuní-ITT Initiative had several features which would 
put  it  in  direct  tensions  with  radical  environmentalism positions:  rst,  the  intrinsic 
commodication of nature which comes when a price is attached to it; second, the fact 
that the Initiative had been designed in order to function as an offset scheme which 
would enable pollution somewhere else in the world, such that it remained anchored to a 
broader  neoliberal  scheme  of  environmental  protection;  third,  it  remained  rmly 
anchored to a pro-growth ideology, in particular Correa’s development agenda.
With a certain degree of simplication - which is unavoidable when dealing with 
complex issues at  an abstract  level  of  analysis  -,  it  is  possible to say that,  from an 
ecological modernization point of view, both the conditional proposal and how it has 
been followed through, once contributions did not reach the necessary amount to pursue 
the  Initiative,  are  justied.  From the  point  of  view  of  civic  environmentalism,  the 
conditional proposal, which was put forward by the civil society and then taken up by 
the government, was justied; but this cannot be said of the drilling of oil afterward, 
which  had  been  carried  out  notwithstanding  the  protests  of  a  large  section  of  the 
population  and  in  a  non-inclusive  manner.  From  the  point  of  view  of  radical 
environmentalism,  both  the  conditional  proposal  and  the  ensuing  drilling  are  not 
justied.
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directly affected by the policy, public oversight and monitoring is limited. While the 
proposal  of  the Initiative was in line with a model of  development which could be 
consistent with civic environmentalism, this cannot be said of the way in which the 
government has handled the dismissal of the Initiative. The civil society asked again to 
be involved and demanded a referendum over the approval of the new course of action, 
but this has not been granted.
From the point of view of radical environmentalism, the Yasuní-ITT Initiative has 
been a deeply problematic policy proposal. While admirable in its intention to keep the 
oil  underground,  the  Initiative  had  been  pursued  with  the  wrong  set  of  policy 
instruments.  Even  before  Correa’s  government  ofcially  axed  the  plan  to  save  the 
Yasuní Nation Park over the ITT oil blocks, in order to pursue a more fairly traditional 
extractive development path, the Yasuní-ITT Initiative had several features which would 
put  it  in  direct  tensions  with  radical  environmentalism positions:  rst,  the  intrinsic 
commodication of nature which comes when a price is attached to it; second, the fact 
that the Initiative had been designed in order to function as an offset scheme which 
would enable pollution somewhere else in the world, such that it remained anchored to a 
broader  neoliberal  scheme  of  environmental  protection;  third,  it  remained  rmly 
anchored to a pro-growth ideology, in particular Correa’s development agenda.
With a certain degree of simplication - which is unavoidable when dealing with 
complex issues at  an abstract  level  of  analysis  -,  it  is  possible to say that,  from an 
ecological modernization point of view, both the conditional proposal and how it has 
been followed through, once contributions did not reach the necessary amount to pursue 
the  Initiative,  are  justied.  From the  point  of  view  of  civic  environmentalism,  the 
conditional proposal, which was put forward by the civil society and then taken up by 
the government, was justied; but this cannot be said of the drilling of oil afterward, 
which  had  been  carried  out  notwithstanding  the  protests  of  a  large  section  of  the 
population  and  in  a  non-inclusive  manner.  From  the  point  of  view  of  radical 
environmentalism,  both  the  conditional  proposal  and  the  ensuing  drilling  are  not 
justied.
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The analysis carried out in the previous chapters show that the three narratives 
represent  three  possible  coherent  stances  in  terms  of  environmental  protection 
approaches. As shown here, however, these stances are also incompatible among each 
other, and, similarly to a Condorcet paradox, there is no set of arguments on which all 
three can nd common ground to justify the policy. 
The macro approaches - which these narratives well represent when considered in 
isolation - are ultimately reductive and fail to make sense of what is at stake in specic 
environmental conicts. This is the rst thesis I sought to defend throughout this book. 
The  framework  of  ecological  modernization  justies  developmental  policies  on  the 
basis  that  signicant  benets  for  the  society  -  calculated  in  terms  of  economic 
preferences  and well-being -  can be  expected and that  appropriate  compensation to 
those  negatively  impacted  would  be  provided.  This  overlooks  the  simple  fact  that 
monetary or  even in kind compensations are,  to  many people,  not  as  valuable as  a 
publicly debated and collectively agreed course of action reecting the values of society 
as a whole. Sometimes compensation is even perceived as an affront. This sentiment is 
well-captured by the village leader of Puerto Miranda - a small village on the Rio Napo 
in the Yasuní National Park - who said “What am I gonna do if they give me a million 
dollars  and  then  erase  the  whole  forest?  What’s  that  worth?  I  prefer  to  keep  the 
forest”  (France  24  English:  2017).  In  the  context  of  ecological  modernization,  this 
incapacity  to  grapple  with a  plurality  of  values,  translating instead every normative 
concern into the currency of economic preferences, is, for example, also documented in 
another case study, geographically closer to us.  Frey and Felix Oberholzer-Gee (1997) 
observed that the citizens of a small town in Switzerland were less likely to accept that 
their  community  house  a  facility  to  store  nuclear  waste  if  the  proposal  by  the 
government involved monetary compensation; on the other hand, they were willing to 
accept the waste in case no monetary compensation was involved. This is because - 
argued Michael Sandel - “willingness to accept the nuclear waste site reected public 
spirit - a recognition that the country as a whole depended on nuclear energy and that 
the nuclear waste had to be stored somewhere” (Sandel, 2012: 115). 
Civic environmentalism scholars, while more attentive to the importance of these 
social aspects of policy making, are blind to the fact that open and fair procedures are 
not value-free: they are built around the liberal ontology of the self which implicitly 
constructs the environment as something which is up for negotiation.  This narrative 
remains linked to the protection of environmental human rights, as opposed to the rights 
of  nature,  as  an approach to  address  environmental  problems.  The logic  behind the 
Initiative, and of countless other compensatory schemes, still reects an anthropocentric 
understanding of nature as a resource: the policy is justied inasmuch as the potential 
loss  of  revenues  is  compensated  somehow  and  the  benet  fairly  redistributed. 
Environmental protection is but one component of human well-being which needs to be 
taken into consideration when accessing possible developmental policies, i.e. it does not 
have an independent normative force. Albeit couched in a language - that of “rights of 
nature” - which might confuse many into think that nature does have this independent 
normative  force,  this  framework  has  been  upheld  by  Correa  himself  to  justify  the 
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exploitation of oil underneath the Yasuní National Park. He said: “The biggest mistake 
is to subordinate human rights to ostensible natural rights” (President Correa quoted in 
Becker, 2013, emphasis is mine).
A radical environmentalist perspective is incapable of explaining how the kind of 
rigorous environmental protection they envisage can be reconciled with the imperative 
of delivering human services and social welfare for the population - this is especially 
the case if we consider states that have no other stream of income than their natural 
resources. While they might point to the indigenous notion of Kawsay sumak included 
in the 2008 Ecuadorean Constitution (it  means “good living,” close to the notion of 
living  “a  good  life,”  rather  than  “the  good  life”)  as  a  possible  way  to  concretely 
operationalize how human beings and nature can live alongside each other in a way that 
ultimately promotes the dissolution of  the human/nature dichotomy, it  is  difcult  to 
imagine  that  the  allegedly  naturally  sustainable  indigenous  model  might  become  a 
lifestyle that everybody living in modern liberal states could, much less would want to, 
freely accept.
There is no silver bullet solution to this kind of environmental conicts, and the 
analytical  approach  employed  here  has  shown  us  why.  In  particular,  understanding 
conicts  in  terms  of  popular  environmental  narratives  and  their  normative 
presuppositions enables us to create a map of the complexity of a certain issue. By 
knowing where tensions are and where they come from, it is possible to have a synoptic 
view of the positions in a debate. Through the lens of the meso-level approach, the 
various positions can thus implicitly “talk” to each other. This is the second thesis I 
sought to defend throughout this book.
Finally, there is a built-in adaptability within the meso-level approach. While the 
three narratives employed throughout the book have been chosen on the basis that they 
reect  the  most  common  positions  found  in  environmental  debates  concerning  the 
appropriate approach to environmental protection, environmental narratives come and 
go. In the future, other positions in environmental debates might become popular which 
cannot be traced back to any of the three narratives analyzed here. Different narratives 
can be easily accommodated within the meso-level approach and analyzed by means of 
the two matrices model. Similarly, while efciency and justice are the two normative 
concerns which have shaped and dened environmental policy debates in the last half 
century, and although their inuence does not seem to be waning any time soon, they 
are not the only possible normative coordinates against which environmental policies 
can  be  judged.  Need  and  security  -  in  a  world  increasingly  dened  by  broader 
environmental challenges such as military conicts over natural resources or climate 
change-induced migration - might become more relevant normative coordinates for the 
evaluation of environmental policies. The meso-level approach can accommodate this 
eventuality, too.
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